People v. Perez CA2/7

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Filed 3/12/25 P. v. Perez CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B334801

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA083301)
v.

ANIBAL ANTONIO PEREZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lisa M. Strassner, Judge. Affirmed.
Liberty Bell Law Group, Alan Tavelman and Michele H.
Kendall for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________
Anibal Antonio Perez appeals from the judgment of
conviction after the jury found him guilty of multiple sexual
offenses against his stepdaughter, N.G., and his biological
daughter, L.P., beginning when the girls were around 10 and
11 years old, respectively. Perez was convicted of one count of
forcible rape of a child, two counts of sexual penetration of a
child, two counts of oral copulation of a child, and three counts of
lewd acts upon a child. The jury also found true Perez committed
lewd acts against multiple victims.
On appeal Perez contends the prosecutor engaged in
prejudicial misconduct during her closing argument by
highlighting that Perez failed to introduce evidence of
inconsistencies between L.P.’s trial testimony and her earlier out-
of-court police and forensic interviews. Perez contends this was
improper vouching for L.P.’s credibility and shifting of the burden
of proof to Perez. Perez also contends the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct by playing an audio recording that N.G. made of a
confrontation with Perez and his parents, which she recorded
without their consent in violation of Penal Code section 632.1
Finally, Perez argues the trial court committed prejudicial
misconduct in its questioning of L.P. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Prosecution Case
1. Sexual abuse of N.G.
N.G., who was 19 years old at the time of the trial, testified
that Perez began to sexually abuse her when she was 10 years

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

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old and continued the abuse until she was about 15. Throughout
this period N.G. lived in Lancaster with her mother, Ana; her
half-sister, L.P. (who is four years younger than N.G.); an older
half-sister, Melissa; and Perez. Perez had lived with the family
since N.G. was about four years old, and N.G. regarded Perez as
her father. However, even before the abuse started, N.G. had a
strained relationship with Perez, Ana, and Melissa.
One night, when N.G. was 10 years old, Perez came into
her bedroom and lay down next to her, telling her that he had a
nightmare. While she was lying on her side, Perez put his hands
down her pajama pants and inside her underwear, and he rubbed
her vagina. Perez also put his hands up her pajama top and
touched her breasts. He pressed his erect penis against her
bottom. Perez then said goodnight and left the bedroom. N.G.
did not tell anyone because she did not understand that what had
occurred was wrong.
When N.G. was 11 or 12 years old, Perez came into N.G.’s
bedroom one day when the two were home alone, and he began to
scold her for failing to take out the trash. He put his hands on
her shoulders, pushed her down on to the bed, and removed her
pants and underwear. Perez removed his pants, wrapped a
plastic grocery bag around his erect penis, and penetrated her
vagina repeatedly. After Perez “finished,” he pulled up his pants
and left N.G. in her room. She was in pain and bleeding from her
vagina, but Perez told her this was because she was having her
period.
On multiple subsequent occasions from when N.G. was 12
to 13 or 14 years old, Perez came into her bedroom at night while
the rest of the family was sleeping. He woke her up by tickling
her feet and then carried or pulled her by her arm into the
kitchen. He would place N.G. on the kitchen table, pull down her

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pants and underwear, and perform oral sex on her, penetrating
her vagina with his tongue. Sometimes Perez would lift N.G. off
the table and have her get on her knees, then push her head
down on his penis to perform oral sex on him. Perez would
ejaculate onto N.G.’s face or clothes and leave her in the kitchen.
Perez, who worked as a building contractor, would also
bring N.G. to his work sites in his truck, and on multiple
occasions he parked his truck near a public park or job site and
put his hands down her pants and rubbed her clitoris. Other
times he would have N.G. lie down on the front seat and perform
oral sex on him while he was driving. On one occasion when N.G.
was about 11 years old, Perez brought her inside a home where
he was doing renovations and performed oral sex on her while
she was lying on the living room carpet.
On another occasion when N.G. was 13, she stayed home
sick from school. While Ana was out of the house, Perez came
into N.G.’s bedroom and laid her down on her bed. He placed a
condom on his penis, put it inside N.G.’s vagina, and had
intercourse until he ejaculated. He removed the condom and
flushed it down the toilet. N.G. did not tell anyone about any of
these incidents at the time because she feared she would be
blamed for breaking up the family.
In 2020 or 2021, when N.G. was about 16 or 17 years old,
she finally told Ana that Perez had touched her sexually
(although she did not tell Ana he had sexually penetrated her),
and Ana kicked Perez out of the house. Perez and his parents
subsequently came over to the house to ask for N.G.’s forgiveness,
and N.G. surreptitiously recorded their conversation on her cell
phone. The recording was played for the jury, and a transcript of
the Spanish-language recording with an English-language
translation was admitted into evidence without objection.

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Although the recorded conversation has unintelligible
portions, Perez told N.G. he “admitted everything” to his parents
and to Ana, and he wished to ask for N.G.’s forgiveness. Perez
explained he “was not doing well,” and he had been abusing
crystal methamphetamine. N.G. countered that she was only
10 years old when it began and that Perez was “disgusting,” to
which he responded, “Okay, but nothing happened,” and “thank
God there was no sex.” Perez asserted that N.G. told him, “Okay,
Tony, let’s go fuck” when she was mad at her mother. N.G.
countered, “That is disgusting!” and “even if that was the thing, I
was 12 years old.” N.G. added, “You started touching me at
night, 10 years old!” Perez responded, “I accept it,” but added,
“There was no sex. Thank God. That didn’t happen.” Perez
continued, “You know what I mean? Like on Raysack, when you
also told me about that, that . . . I didn’t have condoms or
anything. So I put a trash bag on. . . .” N.G. responded, “No!
You . . . forced it on me!” After Perez’s mother interjected that
Perez was placing the blame on himself, he responded, “Just
because I’m an adult I have to accept it okay? Because she was a
little girl . . . since she doesn’t want to accept it, I do accept it.”
Perez stated that he wanted “to break this chain” and accept
what happened “in order for me to free myself and be at peace.”
Later in the recording, Perez’s mother asked him, “And what
happened with [L.P.] is also true?” To which Perez responded,
“What happened with [L.P.] too.” N.G. shouted, “That’s
disgusting” and “that’s your own daughter,” and she walked out
of the room crying.

2. Sexual abuse of L.P.
L.P. was 15 years old at the time of the trial. She testified
that on one occasion when she was 11 or 12 years old, she was

5
lying on her father’s lap on the living room sofa playing on her
tablet computer when he put his hand up her shirt and touched
her breast. Perez then lifted her shirt and began to suck on her
nipple. L.P. laughed and kicked her leg because it was
uncomfortable, and her leg hit Perez’s head. Ana then came out
of her room into the hallway, and Perez lowered L.P.’s shirt.
When L.P. was 13 years old, she told a school friend about
the incident after the friend confided that she had suffered sexual
abuse. The friend then told her mother about L.P.’s abuse. A
short time later a uniformed police officer came to L.P.’s school
and interviewed her with a social worker, without a parent
present. Later that day police officers came to the family home
and interviewed L.P. and N.G. separately. Defense counsel asked
L.P. if there was another occasion when L.P. was interviewed at a
facility “by a woman asking open-ended questions,” but L.P. did
not recall being interviewed.2 She was not present for N.G.’s
preliminary hearing testimony or trial testimony.

3. Additional prosecution evidence
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Detective Nichelle Carlson,
who was assigned to the special victims unit, testified it was
departmental policy not to conduct a sexual assault response
team (SART) physical examination if a victim has disclosed a
sexual assault more than 30 days after it occurred. Detective
Carlson explained that the likelihood of finding DNA evidence
decreases dramatically with the passage of time.

2 N.G. testified that she and L.P. both participated in a
forensic interview after the police interviews at home. N.G. and
L.P. traveled to the facility together, but they were interviewed
separately.

6
Jayme Jones, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist, testified as a
prosecution expert on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome (CSAAS). Dr. Jones explained that CSAAS is a model
developed over several decades to address how children react to
sexual abuse by people they know. Dr. Jones explained that it is
a common myth that children will fight back when they are
abused and that they will disclose the abuse immediately. To the
contrary, children, especially preadolescent children, often do not
disclose abuse because they do not want to get their abuser into
trouble or lose the positive aspects of a familial relationship; they
also fear they will not be believed.
The prosecution introduced a certified minute order
reflecting that Perez was convicted in 2002 of felony sexual
battery (§ 243.4, subd. (a)).

B. The Defense Case
Bradley McAuliff, Ph.D., a psychology professor at
California State University at Northridge, was the only defense
witness. He testified as an expert on children’s suggestibility in
forensic interviewing. Dr. McAuliff explained that
“suggestibility” broadly refers to the factors that influence the
accuracy of a witness’s report. Although a witness may not
intentionally lie, several factors may cause the witness to lie or
provide an inaccurate account without realizing it. Dr. McAuliff
gave as examples that the age of the witness, the passage of time
from the abuse, the involvement of authority figures, family
relationships, and cross-contamination by other interviews could
all lead to inaccurate reports. Children are generally more
suggestible than adults, and studies have shown that when
interviewing children, adults often ask questions that influence a
child’s responses. Repeated questioning can also make children

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think they have not answered correctly or that they need to
produce more information.
In light of the dangers of suggestibility and contamination,
the best practices for a forensic interview of a child include
asking open-ended questions, instructing the child it is fine if the
child does not know the answer to a question, avoiding questions
whether the child was touched in a particular place, and trying to
put a child at ease by interviewing in a child-friendly
environment with the questioner in plain clothes rather than a
uniform. An initial interview by a police officer who does not
adhere to best practices may also contaminate a later forensic
interview even if the later interview is conducted under better
conditions, because the child will be reluctant to contradict the
earlier statements.

C. The Verdict and Sentencing
The jury found Perez guilty with respect to abuse of N.G. of
two counts of sexual penetration of a child under the age of 14
(§ 289, subd. (j); counts 1 & 2); two counts of a lewd act upon a
child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 3 & 8); two
counts of oral copulation of a minor under the age of 14 (§ 288a,
subd. (c)(1); counts 5 & 6); and forcible rape of a child under the
age of 14 (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); count 9). The jury found Perez
guilty with respect to L.G. of a lewd act upon a child under the
age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a); count 7). The jury also found true as to
counts 3, 4, and 7 that Perez committed lewd acts against
multiple victims within the meaning of the one strike law
(§ 667.61, subdivision (e)(4)).
In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true five
circumstances in aggravation under California Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(11), (b)(1), and (b)(2). The court

8
sentenced Perez to an aggregate sentence of 21 years, plus 45
years to life in state prison. On each of counts 3, 7, and 8 for
lewd acts the court imposed a term of 15 years to life based on the
jury’s multiple-victim finding. On count 9 for forcible rape the
court imposed the upper term of 13 years based on the factors in
aggravation. On each of counts 1 and 2 for sexual penetration
and counts 5 and 6 for oral copulation, the court imposed a
consecutive term of two years (one-third of the middle term of six
years).
Perez timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Perez’s Claims of Prosecutorial Misconduct Lack Merit
1. Governing law
“‘“A prosecutor commits misconduct when his or her
conduct either infects the trial with such unfairness as to render
the subsequent conviction a denial of due process, or involves
deceptive or reprehensible methods employed to persuade the
trier of fact.”’” (People v. Parker (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1, 72 (Parker);
accord, People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 657.) It is
misconduct for a prosecutor “to misstate the evidence or go
beyond the record.” (People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 204;
accord, People v. Young (2019) 7 Cal.5th 905, 933.) “Referring to
facts not in evidence is ‘clearly’ misconduct ‘because such
statements “tend[] to make the prosecutor his own witness—
offering unsworn testimony not subject to cross-examination. It
has been recognized that such testimony . . . ‘can be “dynamite” to
the jury because of the special regard the jury has for the
prosecutor.’”’” (People v. Rodriguez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 474, 480; see
People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 828 [“‘Statements of

9
supposed facts not in evidence . . . are a highly prejudicial form of
misconduct, and a frequent basis for reversal.’”].) Improper
vouching for a witness “‘occurs when the prosecutor either
(1) suggests that evidence not available to the jury supports the
argument, or (2) invokes his or her personal prestige or depth of
experience, or the prestige or reputation of the office, in support
of the argument.’” (Rodriguez, at p. 480; accord, People v.
Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 415.)
“In evaluating [a claim of prosecutorial misconduct], we are
cognizant that ‘“[a] prosecutor is given wide latitude to vigorously
argue his or her case and to make fair comment upon the
evidence, including reasonable inferences or deductions that may
be drawn from the evidence.”’” (People v. Dworak (2021)
11 Cal.5th 881, 910; see Parker, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 72
[“During opening and closing arguments, the prosecution is given
wide latitude to make ‘“fair comment on the evidence, including
reasonable inferences or deductions to be drawn from it.”’”].) “To
preserve a claim of misconduct for appeal, a defendant must
make a timely objection and ask the court to admonish the jury,
unless an objection would have been futile and a request for
admonition ineffective.”3 (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371,
403; accord, Parker, at p. 72.)
Further, even if there was prosecutorial misconduct, “‘“[a]
defendant’s conviction will not be reversed for prosecutorial
misconduct . . . unless it is reasonably probable that a result more

3 Although defense counsel did not object at trial to the
prosecutor’s conduct, we exercise our discretion to consider
Perez’s contentions. We therefore do not reach Perez’s contention
that his counsel’s failure to object constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel.

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favorable to the defendant would have been reached without the
misconduct.”’” (Parker, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 71-72; Flores, at
p. 403.) “We review claims of prosecutorial misconduct under an
abuse of discretion standard [citations], asking whether there is a
reasonable likelihood the jury construed the remarks in an
objectionable fashion.” (People v. Dworak, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 910; accord, People v. Steskal (2021) 11 Cal.5th 332, 350.)

2. The prosecutor did not improperly vouch for L.P. in
her closing argument
Perez contends the prosecutor improperly vouched for
L.P.’s credibility during her closing argument by insinuating that
evidence outside the record—L.P.’s two police interviews, her
forensic interview, and her preliminary hearing testimony—could
have been admitted at trial if there were any inconsistencies with
L.P.’s trial testimony. This contention lacks merit.
In defense counsel’s closing argument, he argued there was
no contemporaneous evidence of L.P.’s and N.G.’s abuse, and the
prosecution relied entirely on the girls’ reports years later.
Further, he argued, children are suggestible, and experts in
forensic child examinations recommend against “multiple
interviews before the forensic interview.” Defense counsel stated:
“We don’t know what was suggested, we don’t know what came
before, and we don’t know . . . what was said to them in other
interviews by other detectives, district attorney’s office, initial
law enforcement officers, the [social] workers. None of that is
before you except for what [N.G.] and [L.P.] tell you. And what
[L.P.] tells you is that the officer that came to the school gave her
leading questions, filled in the blanks for her.”
The prosecutor responded in her rebuttal as follows:
“[Defense counsel] also tried to say we don’t know what was said

11
in the other interviews . . . . Now, as you could tell from some of
the things that were introduced, again [defense counsel] has
access to those interviews. And the rules of evidence are such
that you can’t just put in any old previous statement because of
hearsay. But if there are inconsistent statements, either side can
put in those inconsistent statements. And although you heard
there were at least three times . . . to deputies, the forensic
interview, and in court at a previous hearing that [L.P.] was
asked about what happened to her, [but defense counsel] did not
bring in a single inconsistency, a single thing that [L.P.] said
different.”
The prosecutor’s rebuttal was a reasonable comment on
L.P.’s credibility based on evidence in the record and the
arguments advanced by Perez. Defense counsel, not the
prosecutor, introduced evidence through cross-examination that
L.P. had four interviews about the alleged abuse, including the
police interview at school, the police interview at her home, the
forensic interview, and her testimony at the preliminary hearing.
Defense counsel also elicited L.P.’s testimony that during the
initial interview at her middle school, the police officer asked her
close-ended questions, after refreshing L.P.’s recollection with the
interview transcript. Dr. McAuliff testified how a police officer
who asks a child close-ended questions may induce a false report
and contaminate a subsequent forensic interview.
Moreover, a central theme of defense counsel’s closing
argument was that L.P.’s initial “confession” to her friend was
likely fabricated in response to her friend’s disclosure of abuse,
and L.P.’s claims about what had happened snowballed from
there. Defense counsel argued, “[L.P] is then all of a sudden
approached by law enforcement at school. They don’t call mom
and dad or anybody to come down there, but bring her into

12
somewhere inside the school with a uniformed officer and a
[social] worker and start questioning her about what she had told
her friend. As our expert said, that is something very hard for a
child, especially a middle schooler to say, Oh, you know what? I
lied to my friend. The school’s going to find out that I lied. My
friend is going to find out that I lied. I’m going to stick with it.
That is not uncommon with these types of allegations.”
The defense case was thus centered on L.P.’s out-of-court
interviews and how the circumstances of those interviews
(despite their contents not being admitted) caused L.P. at trial to
make false statements about what had happened. The
prosecutor, in pointing out that Perez failed to introduce any
conflicting prior statements despite an available hearsay
exception, invited the jury to draw a contrary inference about
L.P.’s credibility. The prosecutor did not make any “[s]tatements
of supposed facts not in evidence” to vouch for L.P. (People v.
Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 828.) Instead, she operated within
her “‘“wide latitude”’” to make “‘“‘assurances regarding the
apparent honesty or reliability of’ a witness ‘based on the “facts of
[the] record and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.”’”’”
(People v. Rodriguez, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 480.) The jury was
also instructed with CALCRIM No. 200 that it should decide
what happened “based only on the evidence that has been
presented to you in this trial,” and the trial court admonished the
jury more than once that closing arguments were arguments and
not evidence.4

4 Perez also argues the prosecutor improperly vouched for
L.P. when the prosecutor argued to the jury that “[L.P.] would
and did say those things about her own father . . . because she
was telling the truth, not because it’s somehow the easiest thing

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3. The prosecutor did not shift the burden of proof to
Perez
Perez also argues, based on the same portion of the
prosecutor’s closing argument, that the prosecutor “insinuated” to
the jury that Perez bore the burden to prove his innocence when
she suggested Perez could have introduced prior inconsistencies
to advance his case. However, the prosecutor was well within her
wide latitude in commenting on the absence of any impeaching
evidence at the trial, and doing so did not, without more, amount
to shifting the burden of proof.
People v. Woods (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 106 (Woods), the
only case Perez cites in support of this argument, illustrates why
there was no misconduct here. In Woods, the defense attorney
argued the jury should not believe a police officer’s testimony
that he observed the defendant selling drugs because the events
in the officer’s report were contradicted by computer logs and
several aspects of his testimony were implausible and lacked
reasonable detail. (Id. at p. 111.) In her rebuttal argument, the
prosecutor argued the defense attorney “‘didn’t bring one witness
into this courtroom to say that [the officer] doesn’t do it properly.
That he does it in a poor manner, that he does it wrong. That he
tramples on anybody’s rights. . . . No, she is obligated to put the
evidence on from that witness stand.’” (Id. at p. 112) The trial

to do.” The assertion that L.P. was credible because accusing her
own father of a crime would be difficult was a “‘“fair comment on
the evidence, including reasonable inferences or deductions to be
drawn from it.”’” (Parker, supra, 13 Cal.5 at p. 72.) L.P. testified
how her report of abuse caused a schism in her family, and she no
longer saw her father and paternal relatives. And Dr. Jones
explained that the fear of losing an important relationship is a
significant reason why children conceal or deny familial abuse.

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court overruled the defense attorney’s objection that she was “‘not
obligated to do anything.’” The prosecutor then continued, “‘If
there was anything to show that he was a bad cop, that he did
something that was misconduct or inappropriate or wrong in this
day and age, you’d have heard about it. You’d have heard about
it right there from the witness stand.’” (Ibid.) The trial court
again overruled an objection by the defense attorney.
The Court of Appeal reversed the defendant’s conviction,
concluding the prosecutor engaged in prejudicial misconduct by
vouching for the police officer, and the prosecutor violated the
defendant’s due process rights by arguing the defendant was
“‘obligated’” to prove police misconduct. (Woods, supra,
146 Cal.App.4th at p. 113.) Further, “a prosecutor may not
suggest that ‘a defendant has a duty or burden to produce
evidence, or a duty or burden to prove his or her innocence.’” (Id.
at p. 112.) The court reasoned the prosecutor’s statement “went
far beyond a mere comment on the failure of the defense to
present evidence proving misconduct by [the officer]. The
assertion that the defense had an ‘obligation’ to present evidence
expressly and erroneously advised the jury that appellant bore
some burden of proof or persuasion. The court not only failed to
correct this misstatement, but overruled appellant’s objection,
thereby implying that the ‘obligation’ to which [the prosecutor]
referred actually existed. It is inconceivable that the jury would
understand this uncorrected, implicitly approved statement to
mean anything other than appellant carried a burden of proof or
production.” (Id. at pp. 113-114.)
Here, the prosecutor stated correctly that “if there are
inconsistent statements, either side can put in those inconsistent
statements.” She then stated that, although defense counsel had
elicited evidence and argued in her closing that L.P. participated

15
in several interviews that tainted L.P.’s trial testimony, defense
counsel “did not bring in a single inconsistency, a single thing
that [L.P.] said.” The prosecutor did not argue that Perez had an
“obligation” to produce evidence that impeached L.P., let alone
suggest his failure to do so showed Perez’s guilt. (See People v.
Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1340 [“A distinction clearly
exists between the permissible comment that a defendant has not
produced any evidence, and on the other hand an improper
statement that a defendant has a duty or burden to produce
evidence, or a duty or burden to prove his or her innocence.”].)
Moreover, unlike in Woods, the trial court did not create juror
confusion about the burden of proof by overruling a defense
objection (because there was none). The court also instructed the
jury with CALCRIM No. 103 that the prosecution bore the
burden of proof, admonished the jury that closing arguments are
not evidence, and instructed with CALCRIM No. 200 on the
difference between argument and evidence. Under the
circumstances, there is no reasonable likelihood the prosecutor’s
statement was construed as a misstatement about the burden of
proof.

4. The prosecutor did not commit misconduct by
introducing N.G.’s secret recording of Perez
Perez contends the prosecutor engaged in deceptive and
reprehensible methods at trial by introducing N.G.’s “illegal”
audio recording of Perez when he came to N.G.’s house to
apologize. (See Parker, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 72 [“‘“A prosecutor
commits misconduct when his or her conduct . . . involves
deceptive or reprehensible methods employed to persuade the
trier of fact.”’”].) Perez bases his contention on section 632,
subdivision (a), which makes it illegal for a person to record a

16
confidential communication without the consent of all
participants.5
As an initial matter, Perez’s contention is more properly
characterized as evidentiary error rather than prosecutorial
misconduct. There was nothing deceptive or reprehensible about
the prosecutor’s use of the recording. The prosecutor filed a
motion in limine to introduce the recording, arguing the recorded
statements were admissible under Evidence Code section 1220 as
a party admission. At the pretrial hearing, the trial court
indicated the statements were admissible, and defense counsel
agreed. Defense counsel noted there was “one glitch with this,
. . . which is that it is in Spanish.” The court and lawyers then
worked out a plan to introduce the audio recording and provide
the jury with transcription and certified side-by-side translation.
At trial, defense counsel elicited N.G.’s testimony she made the
recording secretly and argued Perez’s statements did not include
any admission of sexual assault. Defense counsel never objected
or argued that the recording was inadmissible, let alone that it
was illegal.
In any event, it was not error or misconduct to introduce
the recording. People v. Guzman (2019) 8 Cal.5th 673 (Guzman)
is directly on point. In that case, a jury convicted Alejandro
Guzman of two counts of committing a lewd act on a child after
the jury heard a recorded phone conversation between the mother
of one of the victims and Guzman’s niece, Lorena, which the

5 Section 632, subdivision (a), states in relevant part, “A
person who, intentionally and without the consent of all parties
to a confidential communication, uses an electronic amplifying or
recording device to eavesdrop upon or record the confidential
communication” is liable for criminal fines and imprisonment.

17
mother recorded without Lorena’s consent in violation of
section 632. (Guzman, at pp. 676-677.) In the recording Lorena
told the victim’s mother that Guzman never touched her sexually,
but she knew “‘he’s capable of doing that.’” (Id. at p. 678.)
Guzman argued the recording was inadmissible under
subdivision (d) of section 632, which provides, “Except as proof in
an action or prosecution for violation of this section, evidence
obtained as a result of eavesdropping upon or recording a
confidential communication in violation of this section is not
admissible in any judicial, administrative, legislative, or other
proceeding.”
The Supreme Court affirmed Guzman’s conviction, holding
section 632, subdivision (d), was abrogated by the subsequent
enactment in 1982 of the “Right to Truth in Evidence” provision
of the California Constitution as part of Proposition 8. (Guzman,
supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 679.) The amendment, now codified at
article 1, section 28, subdivision (f), paragraph (2) of the
Constitution, provides, in relevant part, “Except as provided by
statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership
in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be
excluded in any criminal proceeding . . . . Nothing in this section
shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to
privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code Sections 352, 782 or 1103.”
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (f), par. (2); see Guzman, at
pp. 679-680.) The court held the language of the amendment not
only “unambiguously abrogate[d]” section 632, subdivision (d),
but the Proposition 8 ballot materials “specifically singled out
‘evidence obtained through unlawful eavesdropping,’ which was
then ‘not permitted to be presented in a criminal trial or hearing,’
and advised voters that Proposition 8 would change the law so as
to ‘allow most relevant evidence to be presented in criminal

18
cases.’” (Guzman, at pp. 680-681.) The court concluded “the
natural inference is that Proposition 8 would permit ‘evidence
obtained through unlawful eavesdropping’ to be admitted in
criminal cases.” (Guzman, at p. 681.)
The Supreme Court also rejected Guzman’s argument that
“‘the right to privacy outranks the right to truth in evidence’”
such that section 632, subdivision (d), must be given effect.
(Guzman, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 683-684.) The court reasoned
that “[a]lthough there is a conflict between the demands of
Proposition 8 and section 632(d), this conflict does not lead
inexorably to friction between Proposition 8 and the
constitutional right to privacy. [Guzman’s] argument rests on the
faulty premise that the exclusionary rule of section 632(d) is one
and the same as the right to privacy itself.” (Id. at p. 684.)
Perez in his opening brief omits any reference to
section 632, subdivision (d), arguing simply that the prosecutor
committed misconduct by introducing an “illegal” recording. This
is a distinction without a difference—Guzman made clear that a
defendant may be convicted based on a recording obtained
without a participant’s consent in violation of section 632. It
follows that introduction of the recording, if it is otherwise
admissible, is not error, and the prosecutor’s argument based on
the recording was not misconduct.
In his reply brief, Perez argues that Guzman is
distinguishable because the recording here revealed statements
of Perez’s parents, “people who were not victims of any crime, nor
were they witnesses that were called by either side.” He argues
Proposition 8 “shouldn’t be allowed to trample on the privacy
rights of innocent people not being tried for a crime or involved in
one.” We are not persuaded. First, the recording in Guzman
similarly did not involve either the victim or the perpetrator and,

19
while it is true Lorena was a trial witness, her privacy was
invaded far more seriously than the incidental inclusion of
Perez’s parents, who barely spoke in the recording and made no
personal revelations. The Supreme Court in Guzman, supra,
8 Cal.5th at page 684 rejected the premise that the “exclusionary
rule of section 632(d) is one and the same as the right of privacy
itself.” The court observed, “[E]ven after the passage of
Proposition 8, surreptitious recording of telephone conversations
is still prohibited. Presently, such recording is punishable by . . .
‘both that fine and imprisonment.’ (§ 632, subd. (a).) . . .
Furthermore, individuals who are injured by secret recordings
made in violation of section 632 can bring civil actions against
the perpetrators to recover statutory or actual damages. (§ 637.2,
subd. (a).) Given such protective measures, we cannot say that
people like Lorena have been shorn of their right to private phone
conversations simply because Proposition 8 repealed the
exclusionary remedy of section 632 as it applied to criminal
proceedings.” (Guzman, at pp. 684-685.) Perez’s parents
similarly have not been shorn of their right to privacy by the use
of N.G.’s recording to prosecute Perez.6

6 The only case cited by Perez in connection with the use of
the recording, People v. Lyon (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 237, is
inapposite. In Lyon, the defendant was prosecuted for violating
section 632, subdivision (a), after he videotaped prostitutes in his
home. (Lyon, at p. 242.) The case turned on whether the
prostitutes had a reasonable expectation of privacy, so as to bring
the recording within the scope of section 632.

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B. The Trial Court Did Not Commit Prejudicial Misconduct in
Questioning L.P.
1. Trial court proceedings
Perez contends the trial court committed prejudicial
misconduct by asking L.P. a series of questions during defense
counsel’s cross-examination about L.P.’s initial interview with a
police officer. Perez points to the following questions and
testimony:

Defense counsel: “[I]s it fair to say that the officer was trying to
get you to be more descriptive as to what happened to you?”
Prosecutor: “Objection, speculation.”
Court: “Sustained.”
Defense counsel: “Was the officer giving you answers to questions
that the social worker would ask?”
L.P.: “I don’t remember.”
Defense counsel: “Okay. Would [the officer] ask, like, if you said
that he touched you, did -- would she ask you things like was he
touch[ing] your nips and gave you the word that she was looking
for?”
Prosecutor: “Objection, vague and hearsay.”
Court: “Do you understand the question?”
L.P.: “No.”
Defense counsel: “Okay. What I’m trying to find out from you [is]
was the officer asking you open-ended questions like what
happened next? Can you describe that for me? Or were . . . [the]
questions like when he reached under your shirt did he lick your
nips?”
L.P.: “I don’t remember.”
Defense counsel: “Were they giving you the words to the body
parts that they were asking you about?”

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Prosecutor: “Objection. Vague.”
Defense counsel: “I think she understood the question.”
Court: “Do you understand the question?”
L.P.: “Kind of.”
Defense counsel: “Were they giving you the words to use?”
Prosecutor: “And, your Honor, it’s compound as well.”

The court then asked the following questions:

Court: “[L.P.], you’ve reviewed in terms of refreshing your
recollection some [of the] transcript. When the officers were
interviewing you did they ask you what happened and you told
them what happened or did they put words—did they tell you
what happened and then say is that what happened?”
L.P.: “Like, did they rephrase it for me? Is that what you’re
trying to say?”
Court: “What I’m asking is did they ask you open questions like
tell me what happened with your dad? Or did they say did your
dad do this and then did he do this and then did he do this?
Which way did it occur?”
L.P.: “The second part.”
Court: “Next question.”
Defense counsel: “Thank you. Also, when they were talking to
you they asked about him touching your nipples, do you
remember that?
L.P.: “Yes.”

2. Governing law
A trial court has the “‘“‘power, discretion and affirmative
duty . . . [to] participate in the examination of witnesses
whenever [the court] believes that [it] may fairly aid in eliciting

22
the truth, in preventing misunderstanding, in clarifying the
testimony or covering omissions, in allowing a witness his right of
explanation, and in eliciting facts material to a just
determination of the cause.’”’” (People v. Holmes, McClain and
Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 818; accord, People v. Harris
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 350; see Evid. Code, § 775 [trial court “may
call witnesses and interrogate them the same as if they had been
produced by a party to the action, and the parties may object to
the questions asked and the evidence adduced the same as if such
witnesses were called and examined by an adverse party”].) “‘The
constraints on the trial judge’s questioning of witnesses in the
presence of a jury are akin to the limitations on the court’s role as
commentator. The trial judge’s interrogation “must be . . .
temperate, nonargumentative, and scrupulously fair.”’” (Harris,
at p. 350; accord, Holmes, at p. 818.) “‘A court commits
misconduct if it persistently makes discourteous and disparaging
remarks so as to discredit the defense or create the impression it
is allying itself with the prosecution.’” (People v. Raviart (2001)
93 Cal.App.4th 258, 269; accord, Harris, at p. 347 [court may not
“‘“officiously and unnecessarily usurp[] the duties of the
prosecutor . . . and in so doing create[] the impression”’” the court
is allied with the prosecution].)
“It is settled that a judge’s examination of a witness may
not be assigned as error on appeal where no objection was made
when the questioning occurred.”7 (People v. Corrigan (1957)
48 Cal.2d 551, 556; accord, People v. Raviart, supra,
93 Cal.App.4th at p. 269.) We review claims of judicial

7 Defense counsel did not object to the trial court’s
questioning of L.P. However, we exercise our discretion to
consider Perez’s contention on the merits.

23
misconduct “on a case-by-case basis, examining the context of the
court’s [conduct] and the circumstances under which they
occurred.” (People v. Abel (2012) 53 Cal.4th 891, 914; accord,
People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 730.) “‘“[O]ur role . . . is not
to determine whether the trial judge’s conduct left something to
be desired, or even whether some comments would have been
better left unsaid. Rather, we must determine whether the
judge’s behavior was so prejudicial that it denied [the defendant]
a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.”’” (Abel, at p. 914; accord,
People v. Nadey (2024) 16 Cal.5th 102, 155.)

3. The trial court’s questions were clarifying and did not
impede the cross-examination of L.P.
Perez contends the trial court engaged in prejudicial
misconduct when it “independently interrogated [L.P.] with the
intent to elicit specific testimony helpful to the prosecution and
blocked defense counsel ability to get specific information on
cross-examination.” Perez argues, “Before the judge’s question
began [Perez’s] attorney was not asking the witness about open
ended questions, she was trying to determine whether law
enforcement told her words to use for body parts, and because of
the questioning by the judge, [Perez] never got the answer to
question.”
There was no interrogation or improper questioning. It is
clear in context of the cross-examination as a whole that defense
counsel was trying to elicit testimony that the police had asked
L.P. close-ended questions—which Dr. McAuliff would later
testify created a risk of a false report. It is also evident that
defense counsel’s inquiry about the identification of body parts
was an attempt to help L.P. respond to the questions (directed to
whether the questions were open- or close-ended). Defense

24
counsel began by asking “Was the officer giving you answers . . .
like, if you said that he touched you, did—would she ask you
things like was he touch[ing] your nips and gave you the word
that she was looking?” (Italics added.) When L.P. said she did
not understand the question, defense counsel stated, “What I’m
trying to find out from you [is] was the officer asking you open-
ended questions like what happened next? Can you describe that
for me? Or were they saying when he—or questions like when he
reached under your shirt did he lick your nips.”
Defense counsel’s attempts to frame the question drew
multiple objections, and L.P. only “kind of” understood what she
was being asked. At this point the trial court asked, “[D]id [the
officers] ask you what happened and you told them what
happened or did they put words—did they tell you what
happened and then say is that what happened?” and “[D]id they
ask you open questions like tell me what happened with your
dad? Or did they say did your dad do this and then did he do this
and then did he do this?” After L.P. answered that it was the
latter, the court instructed defense counsel to proceed with her
next question. Defense counsel did not object, she thanked the
court, and she continued her cross-examination.
The only reasonable interpretation of this exchange is that
the trial court helped defense counsel clarify her question after
she repeatedly stumbled, and with the court’s help, counsel was
able to introduce evidence critical to Perez’s defense that L.P. was
questioned in a manner that could have resulted in a false report.
The court did not elicit testimony favorable to the prosecution or
criticize defense counsel’s questions. And although the court
stated, “Next question,” after L.P. finally answered, the court did
not “impede” defense counsel from asking questions narrowly
tailored to body parts; in fact, the very next question was

25
whether L.P. recalled the police asking her if Perez touched her
nipples.8

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

FEUER, J.
We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

PULOS, J.*

8 Perez also argues the trial court improperly aided the
prosecution during the preliminary hearing by asking, after the
prosecutor elicited L.P.’s testimony that Perez touched her
breast, whether the contact was above or under L.P.’s clothing.
The question was a proper clarifying question, and that portion of
the preliminary hearing transcript was not used at trial.
* Judge of the San Diego County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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