People v. Vargas CA4/3

CourtListener 10354239Calctapp11 mars 2025

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Filed 3/11/25 P. v. Vargas CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G063553

v. (Super. Ct. No. 97NF0952)

RAY ANTHONY VARGAS, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Jonathan S. Fish, Judge. Reversed and remanded with
directions.
Steven S. Lubliner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel
Rogers, and Alana Cohen Butler, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Ray Anthony Vargas appeals from the denial of his petition for
recall and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code sections 1172.7 and 1172.75.1
Vargas contends the plain language of the statute proves that the
resentencing procedure is available to defendants whose former section 667.5,
subdivision (b) (section 667.5(b)) enhancements were stayed. Accordingly, the
trial court erred in denying him relief. We agree with Vargas and reverse and
remand for resentencing.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In February 2000, a jury convicted Vargas of willful, deliberate,
and premeditated attempted murder. (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 1.) The
jury found true that Vargas personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5(a)), and
personally inflicted great bodily harm (§12022.7). Thereafter, the trial court
found all prior allegations true. Vargas was sentenced to a total of life in
prison plus 18 years. As pertinent here, the court imposed one year for the
former section 667.5(b) prior and stayed that sentence.
In November 2023, Vargas filed a petition for recall and
resentencing under sections 1172.7 and 1172.75. The following month, the
trial court concluded Vargas was not eligible for relief under section 1172.75.
The court found Vargas was ineligible for resentencing because Vargas’s
prison prior was “either stayed or stricken at [the] time of sentencing” and
thus never imposed and executed, citing People v. Rhodius (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 38 [prison priors that were imposed but stayed are not entitled
to relief under the statute], review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283169 (Rhodius).
The court’s order denying relief in this case also stated, “If Defendant appeals
this decision, the briefing, oral and written arguments, transcripts, decision,

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless

otherwise indicated.

2
and minutes in [People v. Banuelos, Orange County Superior Court case No.
16CF3259, and People v. Eckstein, Orange County Superior Court case
No.17CF0713, are] to be part of the trial court record for any action [on]
appeal.” This necessitated the record in this appeal to be augmented with the
portions of the records of the two unrelated cases referenced by the trial
court.
DISCUSSION
Effective January 1, 2022, section 1172.75 provides that certain
one-year sentence enhancements for prior prison terms imposed under former
section 667.5(b) are legally invalid and provides a mechanism for
resentencing individuals serving judgments that include one or more of those
enhancements. (§ 1172.75, subds. (a)–(c).) The question before us in this
appeal is whether section 1172.75 entitles a defendant to a resentencing
hearing if the defendant’s prior prison term enhancement was stayed for the
purposes of sentencing.
There is a split of authority on the issue, and we await resolution
by our Supreme Court. In our own district, the divisions have disagreed on
the issue. (Compare Rhodius, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 40–41, 45, 48–49
[§ 1172.75 does not authorize resentencing for stayed prior prison term
enhancements], rev.gr., with People v. Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th
300, 305 [§ 1172.75 requires resentencing for stayed prior prison term
enhancement], review granted, Feb. 21, 2024, S283189 (Christianson).)2
Vargas argues the plain language of section 1172.75 does not
limit its application to cases in which the enhancement was ordered to be

2 We are aware there are a multitude of opinions issued by other

appellate courts on this issue. Indeed, the number seems to grow daily. We
limit our discussion to Rhodius and Christianson because we believe these
cases adequately explain the reasoning supporting the different results.

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executed. This position is consistent with the court’s holding in Christianson.
The Attorney General relies on Rhodius, just as the trial court did. He
contends because the court struck the punishment for Vargas’s prior prison
term enhancement, Vargas is not entitled to relief under section 1172.75.
Both parties rely on the statutory language and interpretation for their
conclusions. We agree the question is resolved by statutory interpretation.
The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we
review de novo, under well-settled standards. (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 961.) In interpreting a statute, “‘[o]ur fundamental task . . . is
to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We
first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense
meaning. . . . If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain
meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences
the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits more than
one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the
statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’” (Sierra Club v.
Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 157, 165–166.) “We must look to the
statute’s words and give them their usual and ordinary meaning.” (People v.
Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1126 (Gonzalez).)
Under section 1172.75, subdivision (a), “[a]ny sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to [former
section 667.5(b)], except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction
for a sexually violent offense as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of
the Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.” The Attorney General
argues the term “‘imposed,’” for purposes of section 1172.75, means imposed
and executed, not imposed and stayed for purposes of punishment. He notes

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section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), states that resentencing “shall result in a
lesser sentence than the one originally imposed.”
The issue of a lesser sentence was addressed in Christianson. The
court reasoned that a stayed enhancement “result[s] in a lesser sentence”
under section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), because “[w]hen a punishment is
stayed, as opposed to stricken, the trial court retains the ability to lift the
stay and impose the term under certain circumstance, such as if an
alternately imposed term is invalidated. [Citation.]” (Christianson, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at p. 312, rev.gr.)
Here, the trial court stayed the enhancement for the purpose of
sentencing. The enhancement remained part of the judgment. As part of the
judgment, the stayed enhancement could be revived upon resentencing
consideration.
Returning to the statutory language, section 1172.75,
subdivision (b) directs “[t]he Secretary of the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation and the county correctional administrator of each county [to]
identify those persons in their custody currently serving a term for a
judgment that includes an [invalid] enhancement [and] provide [their
information] to the sentencing court that imposed the enhancement.” This
provision does not limit the obligation to identify only those defendants who
are actually serving a sentence for the enhancement. The absence of such a
limitation indicates the Legislature did not intend to restrict relief to those
defendants whose sentences had been both imposed and executed as the
Attorney General argues. As the court in Christianson stated, if the
Legislature had intended to limit section 1172.75 to only those individuals
who were currently serving an additional term based on the enhancement, it

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had the ability to do so. (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 313,
rev.gr.)
The Attorney General contends Gonzalez, supports his position.
We agree with the Christianson court that Gonzalez is not controlling. There,
our Supreme Court recognized the term “imposed” could encompass
enhancements that were imposed and executed and enhancements that were
imposed and stayed, but stated, “‘[A]s a practical matter, the word “impose” is
often employed as shorthand to refer to the first situation . . . .’ [Citation.]”
(Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1125.) Construing the term in the context
of the statutory scheme before it, the court held that “imposed” in section
12022.53, subdivision (f) meant imposed and executed. (Gonzalez, at p. 1126.)
This construction accorded with the statute’s purpose of ensuring longer
sentences for felons who use firearms. (Id. at p. 1129.) Unlike the statute at
issue in Gonzalez, section 1172.75 is “expressly aimed at reducing sentences
by retroactively eliminating a sentencing enhancement.” (Christianson,
supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 314, rev.gr.) Gonzalez is therefore unhelpful to
the Attorney General’s position.
We acknowledge the well-reasoned dissent in People v. Espino
(2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 188, review granted October 23, 2024, S286987,
which concludes that where the punishment for an enhancement was
stricken, the enhancement has not been imposed within the meaning of
section 1172.75. We also have considered the reasoning in Rhodius and the
Attorney General’s argument concluding both are plausible. But we find the
reasoning in Christianson regarding a stayed enhancement compelling and
see no reason to conclude differently when the enhancement is stricken.
When an enhancement is found to be true by the trial court, by a
jury, or admitted by the defendant, it becomes part of the judgment and must

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be addressed of as part of the sentencing process. A sentence on the
enhancement may be imposed and executed so that the defendant serves an
additional term of imprisonment. Or the court may stay or strike the
enhancement so that the enhancement does not increase the defendant’s
sentence. Whether or not the sentence is increased because of the
enhancement, the enhancement is accounted for in the judgment and
abstract. We do not draw a distinction in terms of the application of section
1172.75 between an executed sentence and a stayed or stricken sentence.
Whether executed, stayed, or stricken, the judgment contains a
now-invalid enhancement for a prison prior regardless of how the court
addressed the enhancement. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order.

DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order denying Vargas’s petition for recall and
resentencing is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for
resentencing. Upon conclusion of the new sentencing hearing, the trial court
is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a
certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

O’LEARY, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOETHALS, J.

MOTOIKE, J.

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