People v. Williams CA1/5

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Filed 3/10/25 P. v. Williams CA1/5
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A157031
v.
(Contra Costa County
OMAR LAMONT WILLIAMS, Super. Ct. No. 5-142200-5)
Defendant and Appellant.

Omar Lamont Williams was convicted of forcible oral
copulation in concert (Pen. Code, § 287, subd. (d))1, forcible rape
in concert (§ 264.1), kidnapping for extortion (§ 209, subd. (a)),
and other offenses committed in 2014 when he was 23 years old.
After a successful appeal resulting in a remand for resentencing,
Williams appealed again, contending his new sentence is
unauthorized. In a 2020 unpublished opinion, we agreed and
remanded his case for resentencing. (See People v. Williams
(April 7, 2020, A157031) [nonpub. opn.] (Williams II).) In
addition, we held that his categorical exclusion, as a sex offender
sentenced under the One Strike Law (§ 667.61), from eligibility

1 Williams was tried and convicted of oral copulation in

concert in violation of Penal Code section 288a, subdivision (d),
but the Legislature subsequently renumbered that provision to
section 287, subdivision (d). (See Sen. Bill No. 1494 (2017-2018
Reg. Sess.), Stats. 2018, ch. 423, § 49, eff. Jan. 1, 2019.)
All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
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for a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051 violates
equal protection. (See ibid.) As a result, in our 2020 opinion we
ordered that on remand, the trial court should determine
whether Williams was afforded an adequate opportunity to make
a record of information relevant to a youth offender parole
hearing. (See ibid.) Recently, however, our Supreme Court
reached the opposite conclusion, holding that the exclusion of One
Strike offenders from the youth offender parole scheme does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause because it is rationally
related to the state’s legitimate interests in addressing recidivism
and setting punishments for “serious and dangerous sex
offenders.” (People v. Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99, 136 (J.
Williams)2.) Having granted Williams’s petition for review
pending its resolution of J. Williams, our Supreme Court issued
an order directing us to vacate our 2020 decision and reconsider
the case in light of J. Williams.

Accordingly, we vacate our 2020 decision. Given our
Supreme Court’s guidance, we now reject Williams’s equal
protection challenge to the One Strike exclusion. We otherwise
adhere to the portions of our previous opinion concluding that
Williams is entitled to resentencing based on an unauthorized
sentence.

BACKGROUND

A.

The underlying facts and procedural history are primarily
taken from this Court’s unpublished opinion in Williams’s first

2 Our Supreme Court’s recent decision involved a different

defendant, Jeremiah Ira Williams, who bears the same last name
as the appellant here. To avoid confusion in this opinion, we
refer to the Supreme Court decision as J. Williams.
2
appeal. (People v. Williams (April 27, 2018, A147160) [nonpub.
opn.] (Williams I).)3

In May 2014, Williams’s cousin, Audrey Sims, had an
altercation with Jane Doe, accusing Doe of owing her money.
Williams, who was 23 at the time, got involved and took Doe’s
phone. He choked her, called her a “bitch,” and told her she owed
his cousin money. Although Doe denied the debt, Williams and
Sims told Doe she needed to figure out a way to make the money
back that night. They told her she was going to “ ‘get on
Redbook,’ ” a prostitution website, and they would get clients for
her. Doe refused but Williams and Sims told her they didn’t care
what she wanted. Williams pulled a gun out from the back of his
pants and said, “ ‘I’m not stupid. You have a pussy, right?’ ”
Williams pointed the gun in Doe’s face and said “ ‘he was about
that life and that he wasn’t afraid to use it.’ ”

Williams and another individual who was present, Michael
Keith Madison, Jr., told Doe they needed pictures of her to put on
her Redbook page. Williams and Madison had Doe get in the
back seat of her car with Williams driving. Williams said Doe
would have to prostitute herself one to three times each day to
pay back the money she owed.

Williams drove to a gas station and sent Madison inside the
store to buy condoms. Williams later drove back to the complex
where Sims lived and stopped at a grassy area by the community
pool. He and Madison were smoking and drinking. Williams
took Doe into the bushes and photographed her with her pants
pulled down, saying he would post the pictures on Redbook.

3
We deny as unnecessary Williams’s request for judicial
notice of the appellate record. (See In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th
428, 484 [“Petitioners need not separately or specifically request
judicial notice of all documents connected with their past
appeals”].).
3
Williams, who had a gun, forced Doe to give both him and
Madison oral sex. While Doe performed oral sex on Williams,
Madison tried to have anal sex with her before raping her
vaginally. Doe was crying and the men were laughing. Williams
also raped her vaginally. The incident ended when Doe said she
needed to go pick up her son. Doe drove to a friend’s house,
hysterical, and said she had been raped. The friend called the
police.

B.

Section 667.61, known as the “One Strike” law (Stats. 1994,
1st Ex. Sess. 1993-1994, ch. 14X, § 1, p. 8570), is an alternative,
harsher sentencing scheme that applies to specified felony sex
offenses. (J. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 117.) For covered
offenses, the One Strike law mandates a sentence of either 15
years to life or 25 years to life depending on whether certain
factual circumstances are found true. (§ 667.61, subds. (a)-(b).)
For some of the covered sex offenses, if the crimes involve
separate victims or the same victim on separate occasions, the
trial court must impose consecutive sentences. (§ 667.61, subd.
(i).) As relevant here, “[t]he sentence will be 25 years to life if the
jury finds (or the defendant admits) . . . one of the more
aggravated ‘circumstances’ listed in section 667.61, subdivision
(d).” (People v. Perez (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1223, italics
omitted.) The circumstances enumerated in section 667.61,
subdivision (d) include: “The defendant kidnapped the victim of
the present offense and the movement of the victim substantially
increased the risk of harm to the victim over and above that level
of risk necessarily inherent in the underlying offense.” (§ 667.61,
subd. (d)(2).) Forcible rape in concert (§ 264.1) and forcible oral
copulation in concert (§ 287, subds. (c)-(d)) are among the offenses
that qualify for treatment under the One Strike law. (§ 667,
subds. (c)(3), (c)(7).)

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C.

A third amended information was filed charging Williams
as follows: count one: conspiracy to commit kidnapping for
extortion, human trafficking and pandering (§§ 182, subd. (a)(1),
209, subd. (a); 236.1, subd. (b); 266i); count two: kidnapping for
extortion (§ 209, subd. (a)); count three: human trafficking
(§ 236.1, subd. (b)); count four: forcible rape in concert (§ 264.1);
count five: forcible oral copulation in concert (§ 288a, subd. (d)).
The third amended information also alleged that Williams had
personally used a firearm within the meaning of section
12022.53, subdivision (b), in the commission of the kidnapping
charged in count two; had personally used a firearm within the
meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a), in the commission of
the human trafficking charged in count three; and had been
armed with a firearm within the meaning of section 12022,
subdivision (a)(1), during the commission of the rape in concert
and oral copulation in concert charged in counts four and five.
Finally, as to the oral copulation charged in count five, it was
alleged under the One Strike law that Williams (along with
Madison) had kidnapped the victim within the meaning of section
667.61, subdivision (d)(2), and that the movement substantially
increased the risk of harm to her above that level of risk inherent
in the underlying offense.

Williams was jointly tried along with his codefendants,
Sims and Madison. The three defendants were convicted as
charged. Williams received the following sentence: (1) a One
Strike term of 25 years to life for the rape in concert conviction
under count four, plus one year for the firearm enhancement
pursuant to section 12022, subdivision (a)(1); (2) 25 years to life
for the oral copulation in concert conviction under count five, plus
one year for the firearm enhancement pursuant to section 12022,
subdivision (a)(1), concurrent to the sentence in count four; (3)
life with the possibility of parole for the kidnapping conviction

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under count two, plus a 10-year firearm enhancement pursuant
to section 12022.53, subdivision (b), concurrent to the sentence in
count four; (4) life with the possibility of parole for the conspiracy
conviction under count one, that sentence to be stayed pursuant
to section 654; and (5) the lower term of eight years for the
human trafficking conviction under count three, plus the lower
term of three years for the firearm enhancement under section
12022.5, subdivision (a), with “ ‘the 11 years that is imposed’ ”
being “ ‘concurrently stayed under . . . section 654.’ ” The trial
court also ordered that Williams pay a restitution fine under
section 1202.4 in the amount of $300 per count, or a total of
$1,500, and stayed a parole revocation fine in the same amount
under section 1202.45.

D.

In Williams’s first appeal, this Court affirmed his
conviction but remanded the case for resentencing. (Williams I,
supra, A147160.) That opinion held that the One Strike sentence
for Williams’s rape in concert conviction under count four was
unauthorized because the accusatory pleading did not include a
specific One Strike allegation as to that count. (Ibid.) In
addition, this Court held that because the case was being
remanded for resentencing on count four, the trial court could
consider whether to strike or impose the firearm enhancements
on counts two and three pursuant to then newly enacted
discretionary authority in sections 12022.5, subdivision (c), and
12022.53, subdivision (h). (Williams I, supra, A147160.) This
Court also identified errors relating to Williams’s restitution and
parole revocation fines. (Ibid.) The disposition read as follows:
“The true finding on the One Strike allegation attached to
[Williams’s] rape in concert conviction[] under count 4 is vacated
and the case is remanded for resentencing on that count. At the
time of resentencing, the court may exercise its discretion under
sections 12022.5, subdivision (c), and 12022.53, subdivision (h),

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as to any counts to which that discretion applies. The court shall
reduce . . . Williams’s restitution fine and parole revocation fine
under sections 1202.4 and 1202.45 from $1,500 to $900, and shall
modify the abstract of judgment in Williams’s case to reflect this
modification and to indicate that the sentence for human
trafficking under count 3 was stayed under section 654. As so
modified, the judgment is affirmed.” (Ibid.)

DISCUSSION

A.

In our 2020 opinion, we concluded that the Legislature’s
decision to exclude One Strike offenders from the youth offender
parole scheme lacked a rational basis and was therefore
unconstitutional. (See Williams II, supra, A157031.) Specifically,
we agreed with Williams that One Strike offenders are similarly
situated to those convicted of murder, and that there is no
rational basis to exclude One Strike offenders from the youth
offender parole scheme while including individuals with murder
convictions. (Ibid.)

In J. Williams, however, our Supreme Court rejected an
equal protection challenge to the youth offender parole statute,
section 3051, brought by a defendant who, similar to Williams,
was ineligible based on One Strike offenses committed when he
was 24 years old. (J. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 110.) The
appellant in J. Williams raised an argument identical to
Williams’s, asserting that the Legislature lacked a rational basis
to exclude One Strike offenders while affording early parole
hearings to young adults with murder convictions. (Id. at p. 125.)
In rejecting this argument, our Supreme Court reasoned that
“[t]he Legislature could rationally conclude, based on its view
that a One Strike sex offender's risk of recidivism is high, that
rehabilitation is unlikely, and therefore these offenders would not
likely be eligible for parole, much less early parole under section
3051.” (Id. at p. 130.) The court further noted that there was no
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evidence before it that the Legislature had similar recidivism
concerns about offenders who commit murder, or that murder
offenses are necessarily accompanied by the same types of
aggravating factors tied to One Strike offenses under section
667.61. (Ibid.)

Although the parties had an opportunity to submit
supplemental briefing addressing the impact of J. Williams,
Williams declined to file such a brief. He thus appears not to
contest that his equal protection claim is no longer viable in light
of J. Williams. We therefore reject his challenge to section 3051.

B.

In its supplemental brief, the People assert, and Williams
does not dispute, that apart from the outcome as to Williams’s
equal protection claim, the remedy we ordered in our 2020
opinion should remain unchanged. We agree.

In their original briefing in the 2020 appeal, both parties
contend that, following remand, the trial court’s resentencing
authority was limited to carrying out the instructions in this
court’s disposition. Although we disagree as to the scope of the
trial court’s authority, we agree that a remand for resentencing is
nonetheless required here.

1.

The parties cite the principle that after the appellate court
issues “a remittitur, ‘the trial court is revested with jurisdiction
of the case, but only to carry out the judgment as ordered by the
appellate court.’ ” (People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330,
337, quoting People v. Dutra (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1366.)
While the trial court must no doubt act in accordance with the
appellate court’s instructions, in the resentencing context a
special rule applies: “when part of a sentence is stricken on
review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all
counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its
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sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances. ’ ”
(People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893; see also, e.g., People
v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425 (“the full
resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing
decisions when resentencing a defendant”].) However, on
resentencing, the court may not increase the defendant’s
aggregate prison term after a partially successful appeal. (People
v. Burbine (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1253, 1256.)

2.

With respect to counts one (conspiracy to commit
kidnapping, human trafficking, and pandering) and two
(kidnapping for extortion), the parties agree that the trial court
issued unauthorized sentences.

At the original sentencing, on count one, the court
sentenced Williams to life with the possibility of parole, staying
the sentence pursuant to section 654. On count two, the court
sentenced Williams to life with the possibility of parole with a 10
year firearm enhancement pursuant to section 12022.53,
subdivision (b) (to run concurrently with the original sentence for
count four).

This Court’s 2018 opinion affirmed the judgment as to
these sentences but authorized the trial court to consider whether
to strike the firearm enhancement as to count two. (Williams I,
supra, A147160; § 12022.5, subd. (c).)

On remand, the trial court declined to strike the
enhancement as to count two but modified both sentences. On
count one, the court imposed an “indeterminate life term [with]
seven year[s] mandatory minimum parole” and stayed it
pursuant to section 654. On count two, the court imposed “an
indeterminate life sentence which in effect means a[n] initial
seven-year minimum parole term” plus a 10 year firearm
enhancement.

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It is undisputed, however, that the correct sentence is life
with the possibility of parole for both counts, with the firearm
enhancement applicable to count two. (See §§ 182, subd. (a)
[penalty for conspiracy to commit multiple felonies is the penalty
for the felony with the greater maximum term]; 209, subd. (a)
[penalty for kidnapping unaccompanied by death or bodily harm
is life with the possibility of parole].)4 Accordingly, on remand,
the trial court should impose sentences of life with the possibility
of parole for counts one and two, with the firearm enhancement
applicable to count two.

3.

With respect to count three (human trafficking), the parties
assert that the trial court erred in increasing Williams’s sentence
on remand and declining to stay it pursuant to section 654. (See
§ 654 [where an act is “punishable in different ways by different
provisions of law[,] . . . in no case shall the act . . . be punished
under more than one provision”].) The court originally sentenced
him to eight years in prison for the human trafficking conviction
plus three years for the firearm enhancement, staying the
sentence pursuant to section 654. This Court’s 2018 opinion
affirmed the judgment as to this count but authorized the trial
court to exercise its discretion to determine whether to strike the
firearm enhancement pursuant to section 12022.5, subdivision
(c). (Williams I, supra, A147160.) On remand, the trial court
declined to strike the enhancement. However, under the
mistaken belief that it had originally selected a four-year
enhancement, the court imposed an enhancement of four years on

4 The penalty for kidnapping is greater than the penalties

for the other crimes Williams was convicted of conspiring to
commit. (See § 236.1, subd. (b) [penalty for human trafficking is
eight, 14, or 20 years and a fine not to exceed $500,000]; 266i
[penalty for pandering not involving a minor is three, four, or six
years].)
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remand, resulting in a 12 year total sentence on count three. The
court also failed to stay the sentence pursuant to section 654, as
it had done originally. Under the full resentencing rule, the court
had authority to select a four year enhancement rather than the
original three year enhancement. However, because Williams is
entitled to a remand for resentencing on counts one and two, as
discussed above, on remand the trial court may consider whether
it wishes to increase the enhancement term or impose the
original three year enhancement. On remand, the court shall
stay the sentence pursuant to section 654.

4.

Finally, the abstract of judgment does not accurately reflect
the trial court’s imposition of $900 in restitution fines under
section 1202.4. On remand, the abstract of judgment and clerk’s
minutes must accurately reflect the sentence orally pronounced
by the trial court. (See People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th
380, 385.)

DISPOSITION

Our opinion in Williams II, supra, A157031, is vacated.
The case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing on counts
one, two, and three. With respect to count one, the court shall
impose a sentence of life with the possibility of parole, staying the
sentence pursuant to section 654. With respect to count two, the
court shall impose a sentence of life with the possibility of parole,
with a firearm enhancement of 10 years. With respect to count
three, the court may select the firearm enhancement term it
deems appropriate, staying the sentence pursuant to section 654.
On remand, the court shall also modify the abstract of judgment
to reflect the corrected sentences, and to reflect the court’s
imposition of $900 in restitutions fines under section 1202.4. In
all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

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BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:

JACKSON, P.J.
SIMONS, J.
People v. Williams (A157031)

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