People v. Pham CA4/3

CourtListener 10352171Calctapp7 mars 2025

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Filed 3/7/25 P. v. Pham CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G063261, G064073

v. (Super. Ct. No. 04WF0034)

HUNG VAN PHAM, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeals from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Jonathan S. Fish, Judge. Andre Manssourian, Judge. Appeals dismissed.
David R. Greifinger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette
C. Cavalier and Christoper P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
In this consolidated appeal, defendant Hung Van Pham
challenges the summary denial of two separate pro. per. resentencing
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petitions he filed under Penal Code section 1172.1. We dismiss the appeal
involving the first petition because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
consider that petition. And we dismiss the appeal involving the second
petition because that petition did not result in an appealable order. However,
that does not mean Pham is without recourse to pursue his claim for
resentencing. In light of recent amendments to section 1172.1, we conclude
Pham may invite the trial court to recall his sentence and resentence him
pursuant to that statute.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In October 2010, Pham pleaded guilty to attempted murder, a
crime he committed when he was 24 years old. Pham also admitted
personally discharging a firearm and causing great bodily injury to the
victim. Per the terms of his plea agreement, the trial court sentenced him to
32 years in prison.
A. The First Petition and Appeal, G063261
In September 2023, Pham filed a pro. per. petition for
resentencing under section 1172.1. As an attachment to the petition, Pham
included a Comprehensive Risk Assessment for the Board of Parole Hearings.
The assessment was prepared by a psychologist who interviewed Pham in
April 2023.
During the interview, Pham reported that he was neglected and
abused while he was growing up in Vietnam and the United States. He said

1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. Former
section 1170.03 was recodified without substantive change as section 1172.1
in 2021. (People v. Salgado (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 376, 378, fn. 2.)

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he also witnessed domestic violence in his family and suffered from food
insecurity and bullying during much of his childhood. To obtain a sense of
belonging, he eventually joined a gang, which led him down a path of drugs
and crime that culminated with his current incarceration.
Despite Pham’s childhood circumstances, the trial court
summarily denied his petition for resentencing by minute order. The court
rejected the petition on procedural grounds because section 1172.1 does not
provide a mechanism for a defendant to petition for resentencing on their
own behalf. Pham appealed that ruling on October 30, 2023.
B. The Second Petition and Appeal, G064073
On January 25, 2024, while his first appeal was still pending,
Pham filed a second petition for resentencing that included additional
documentation. Again, the trial court ruled by minute order alone. The court
believed the petition was improper for three reasons. First, the court lacked
jurisdiction due to the pendency of Pham’s first appeal. Second, since Pham
was represented by appointed counsel, he had no right to file the petition on
his own. And third, Pham lacked standing to file a pro. per. petition under
section 1172.1. However, rather than denying the petition, the trial court
took no action on it. Pham filed a notice of appeal on April 24, 2024.
By order dated August 23, 2024, we granted Pham’s request to
consolidate his appeals and invited the parties to file supplemental briefing
on his entitlement to resentencing. Having received that briefing, we now
take up Pham’s arguments.
DISCUSSION
Pham urges us to reverse the trial court’s orders and remand the
matter with directions for the court to consider his petitions on the merits.
For the reasons explained below, we find neither order is appealable.

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However, that finding does not preclude Pham from inviting the trial court to
recall his sentence under section 1172.1 and to resentence him pursuant to
the terms of that statute.
I.
RULES GOVERNING APPEALABILITY
“The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not appeal
a trial court’s judgment, order or ruling unless such is expressly made
appealable by statute.” (People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1159; see
People v. Vaesau (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 132, 143.) In this case, Pham relies on
section 1237, subdivision (b) as the basis for his appeal. That provision allows
an appeal to be taken from “any order made after judgment, affecting the
substantial rights of the party.” (§ 1237, subd. (b).)
However, it is well established that a “trial court order denying
relief that the court has no jurisdiction to grant does not affect a defendant’s
substantial rights and is therefore not appealable under section 1237,
subdivision (b).” (People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 639; see also
People v. Turrin (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1208; People v. Chlad (1992) 6
Cal.App.4th 1719, 1725.) Therefore, if the trial court did not have the
authority to take up Pham’s petitions for resentencing, its denial orders are
not appealable. (Ibid.)
II.
THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER PHAM’S ORIGINAL
RESENTENCING PETITION IN APPEAL NO. G063261
Section 1172.1 sets forth the procedures for recall and
resentencing after the defendant has been committed to custody for a felony

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offense. At the time Pham filed his first petition, the statute provided in
pertinent part:
“When a defendant . . . has been committed to the custody of the
Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation . . ., the court
may, within 120 days of the date of commitment on its own motion, at any
time upon the recommendation of the secretary or the Board of Parole
Hearings in the case of a defendant incarcerated in state prison, . . . [or] the
district attorney of the county in which the defendant was sentenced, . . .
recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the
defendant . . . as if they had not previously been sentenced[.]” (Former §
1172.1, subd. (a)(1); Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 9.)
Under this version of the statute, the trial court lost jurisdiction
to recall Pham’s sentence on its own motion 120 days after he was committed
to prison. And there was no mechanism for Pham to personally petition for
recall. Rather, recall had to be initiated by one of the authorities identified in
the statute. (People v. Pritchett (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 190, 193 (Prichett).)
Therefore, the trial court’s order denying Pham’s initial request
for recall was “not appealable as an order affecting [his] substantial rights . . .
. This is because [Pham] ha[d] no right to request such an order in the first
instance; consequently, his ‘substantial rights’ [were not] affected by an order
denying that which he had no right to request.” (Pritchett, supra, 20
Cal.App.4th at p. 194; accord, People v. E.M. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1075,
1085; People v. Magana (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 1120, 1127–1128; People v.
Fuimaono (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 132, 135.) Accordingly, we will dismiss
Pham’s challenge to that order in appeal No. G063261.

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III.
THE RECENT AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 1172.1
Effective January 1, 2024, section 1172.1 made it explicitly clear
that “[a] defendant is not entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the
court under this section. If a defendant requests consideration for relief under
this section, the court is not required to respond.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (c).) This
amendment confirms Pham’s first petition was insufficient to invoke the
jurisdiction of the trial court. Although the Legislature intended for section
1172.1 to provide meaningful resentencing relief in appropriate cases (Assem.
Bill No. 600 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) § 1, subd. (d)) [uncodified legislative
findings], pro. per. petitions are simply not permitted under the statute.
Nevertheless, Pham claims the order denying his second petition
should be deemed to be appealable because, in amending section 1172.1, the
Legislature made an additional change to the statute. Namely, the
Legislature amended the statute to allow the trial court to recall a sentence
on its own motion “at any time” if the governing sentencing laws were
changed in the defendant’s favor following the imposition of his original
sentence. (§ 1172.1, subd. (a).)2

2
The amended statute states that, after a defendant has been
committed to prison, “the court may, on its own motion, within 120 days of
the date of commitment or at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at
the time of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory
authority or case law, [or] at any time upon the recommendation of [an
enumerated authority] recall the sentence and commitment previously
ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not
previously been sentenced, whether or not the defendant is still in custody,
and provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial sentence.
. . .” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a).)

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In this case, the legal development that prompted Pham’s
resentencing petitions is the enactment of section 1016.7, which became law
a decade after he pleaded guilty. (Stats. 2021, ch. 695, § 4.) That provision
requires prosecutors engaged in plea bargaining to consider whether the
defendant’s youth or childhood trauma may have contributed to the
commission of his offense. (§ 1016.7, subd. (a)(1), (2).)
However, even though this development provided the trial court
with a justification for recalling Pham’s sentence under newly amended
section 1172.1, subdivision (a), the court did not do that. In fact, the court did
not take any action on the petition. The court’s decision not to act on the
petition was entirely proper, given that Pham did not have the right to file
the petition in the first place. Indeed, as our colleagues in the Second District
recently noted in People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985 (Hodge), section
1172.1, subdivision (c) “excuses the trial court from any responsibility to rule
on [an unauthorized resentencing] request, or even to respond.” (Hodge at p.
996.)
This provision also has implications for the issue of appealability.
Hodge reasoned that since trial courts are free to ignore a pro. per. request
for resentencing under section 1172.1, subdivision (c), “[i]t follows that a
defendant who chooses to file [such a] request [] has no right to a ruling. The
defendants may have a liberty interest at stake in any decision as to whether
they should remain incarcerated. But a defendant has no right to demand
that the trial court actually make such a decision. If the defendant has no
right to a decision, the trial court’s choice not to make one does not deprive
the defendant of any right, much less a substantial one.” (Hodge, supra, 107
Cal.App.5th at p. 996.) Therefore, under Hodge, that choice does not

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constitute an appealable order for purposes of section 1237, subdivision (b).
(Hodge, at p. 996Ibid.)
In February 2025, the Hodge decision was examined by the Fifth
District Court of Appeal in People v. Chatman (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 650
(Chatman). Chatman recognized the trial court has no duty to rule on a
petition for resentencing under section 1172.1. (Chatman, at p. 659.)
However, in Chatman, the trial court actually denied the defendant’s
petition, based on lack of jurisdiction. (Id. at pp. 656, 659.) Because the court
chose to act by issuing an order denying relief, Chatman ruled the order was
appealable. (Id. at pp. 659–661.)
In support of that ruling, Chatman relied on People v. Loper,
supra, 60 Cal.4th 1155 and People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367
(Carmony), which deemed the orders at issue in those cases appealable even
though the defendant did not personally have the right to seek the relief
requested. (Chatman, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at pp. 659–660.) Chatman
construed these cases as permitting a pro. per. defendant to appeal an order
affirmatively denying a request for resentencing under section 1172.1.
(Chatman. at pp. 659–664.)
In so doing, Chatman was critical of Hodge for deeming the trial
court’s order nonappealable in that case. That is because the trial court in
Hodge actually made an affirmative decision not to recall the defendant’s
sentence. (See Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 991.) However, Chatman
also made it clear that, “The posture of such a case is distinct from that in
which a court fails to rule on the request as permitted by section 1172.1,
subdivision (c).” (Chatman, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 664.) This suggests
that Chatman, like Hodge, would not permit an appeal when the trial court

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fails to take action on the defendant’s request for resentencing (Hodge, supra,
107 Cal.App.5th at p. 996.)
And that is precisely what the trial court did in the present case
after assessing Pham’s second resentencing petition. As part of the
assessment process, the court did cite various reasons for why it believed the
petition was improper. However, in contrast to Chatman, the court did not
affirmatively deny the petition for those reasons. Instead, it ultimately
decided not to take any action on the petition. For the reasons explained in
Hodge, that decision does not constitute an appealable order, and therefore
Pham’s appeal from that decision must be dismissed.
We note, however, there is nothing in section 1172.1 that
precludes a defendant from inviting the trial court to exercise its authority to
recall his or her sentence. So, if Pham wants to pursue that avenue for relief,
he has every right to do so. (Cf. People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13
Cal.4th 497; People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 375 [“A defendant has
no right to make a motion, and the trial court has no obligation to make a
ruling under section 1385. But he or she does have the right to ‘invite the
court to exercise its power’”].) We express no opinion on how the trial court
should treat any such invitation.

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DISPOSITION
Pham’s appeals in appeal No. G063261 and appeal No. G064073
are dismissed. The dismissals are without prejudice to Pham’s right to invite
the trial court to exercise its authority to recall his sentence and resentence
him pursuant to section 1172.1.

DELANEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

SANCHEZ, J.

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