People v. Daniel CA2/2

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Filed 3/4/25 P. v. Daniel CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B332203

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA263581)
v.

KENNETH MARTIN DANIEL,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stephen A. Marcus, Judge. Affirmed.

Adrian K. Panton, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, William H. Shin and Lindsay Boyd, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
In 2006, defendant and appellant Kenneth Martin Daniel
was convicted of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187,
subd. (a))1 and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)).
In 2023, while defendant was serving a 40-year-to-life sentence,
the trial court resentenced him to 31 years to life pursuant to
section 1172.75.2
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to rule on his request to dismiss prior
“strike” convictions under California’s “Three Strikes” law (§ 667,
subds. (b)-(i)). Finding no merit in this contention, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Facts
“Shelida H. (Shelida) met defendant in February 2004 and
became his girlfriend. Shelida learned she was pregnant in
April 2004 and expressed to defendant her uncertainty about
whether to keep the baby. At approximately 9:00 p.m. on
April 12, 2004, defendant arrived at Shelida’s home carrying a
suitcase. Shelida was not happy that defendant appeared to have
decided to move in with her. She allowed him to enter, but she
displayed ‘a little attitude’ and went back to bed. When Shelida
lay down on her bed, defendant hugged her and asked her how
she was. Shelida brushed him off. Defendant asked her what
was wrong, and Shelida replied, ‘nothing,’ and went to sleep.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1171.1 was renumbered
section 1172.75, with no substantive changes. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 12; People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 378,
fn. 2.) For simplicity, we refer to the section by its new
numbering.

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Defendant left the bedroom and later returned and tried to talk
to her again. He sat on the bed and asked her what was wrong.
Shelida said only that she was sleepy and did not want to talk.
Shelida was later awakened by defendant straddling her on the
bed. He was upset and angry and demanded to know why she
would not talk to him. He stabbed her on the right side of her
head and told her she was evil like his sister. He said Shelida
would not get away with it and he was going to kill her. Shelida
was groggy and at first thought defendant had hit her with his
fist. She realized then that he was stabbing her, and defendant
continued to stab her on the shoulder, collarbone, face, neck,
chest and arm while saying he should kill her. He also said he
should kill her anyway because he knew she was going to kill the
baby.
“Shelida begged defendant not to kill her, and she promised
to keep the baby. She gripped him tightly with her left hand, and
eventually defendant stopped stabbing her. He said, ‘Look what
you made me do to you.’
“Shelida called 911 and was taken to a hospital and
treated. Police found the knife defendant used in the kitchen
sink. Police arrested defendant the following day at his friend’s
house. Defendant had told his friend that he believed he had
‘“hurt [Shelida] pretty bad.”’ He later told a detective that he did
not kill Shelida but he should have.” (People v. Daniel (Nov. 28,
2007, B194003) [nonpub. opn.] (Daniel).)
II. Procedural History
A. Conviction
In 2006, a jury found defendant guilty of attempted murder
(§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 1) and assault with a deadly weapon
by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1);

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count 2). As to count 1, the jury found true the allegation that
defendant used a deadly and dangerous weapon, a knife, to
commit the offense. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) As to both counts, the
jury found true the allegation that defendant inflicted great
bodily injury upon the victim in a circumstance involving
domestic violence. (§ 12022.7, subd. (e).)
The trial court found that defendant had suffered five prior
serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), five prior strike
convictions within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667,
subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12), and five prior prison terms (former
§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced defendant to serve
75 years to life in state prison.
B. Direct appeal
On direct appeal, we modified defendant’s sentence on
count 1 to 59 years to life and stayed the sentence on count 2 to
53 years to life. (Daniel, supra, B194003) We otherwise affirmed
the judgment. (Ibid.)
C. 2018 resentencing
In September 2018, the trial court resentenced defendant
to serve 40 years to life.3
D. Section 1172.6 petition; other motions for resentencing
In July 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6.4 The trial court appointed counsel to

3 Why defendant was resentenced in 2018 is not clear from
the record before us. According to the September 24, 2018,
minute order, it was prompted after the trial court “read and
considered the Department of Corrections letter dated
[August 30, 2018].”

4 Section 1172.6 provides a procedural mechanism for
defendants who could no longer be convicted of attempted murder

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represent defendant in connection with his section 1172.6
petition.
Between November 2022 and January 2023, defendant
filed several motions, in propria persona, seeking the benefit of
other ameliorative sentencing laws, including resentencing under
Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)5 and
section 1172.75.6
On June 20, 2023, defendant’s counsel filed a sentencing
brief “invit[ing]” the trial court to “invalidate the five one-year
prison prior enhancements, . . . exercise its discretion to strike
and/or dismiss the 5 five-year serious felony conviction
enhancements,” and “conduct a full resentencing hearing[.]”

because of changes made to sections 188 and 189 in 2019 to
petition for retroactive relief. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 959.)
5 Senate Bill No. 1393, effective January 1, 2019, amended
section 667, subdivision (a), and section 1385, subdivision (b), to
give trial courts discretion to strike five-year serious felony
enhancements. (People v. Garcia (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 961,
971.)
6 Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.) added section 1172.75, which renders “legally invalid”
any former section 667.5, subdivision (b) sentence enhancement
imposed prior to January 1, 2020, “except for any enhancement
imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense . . . .”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)

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E. Hearing and resentencing
At a hearing on June 21, 2023, the trial court denied
defendant’s section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage on the
ground that he was not entitled to relief as a matter of law.7
The trial court proceeded to conduct a full resentencing
under section 1172.75. The court indicated that it “was
tentatively considering giving . . . defendant a mid term on the
charge” and that the “issue [became] what to do about the other
matters.” The court noted that defendant was “a three-striker as
well” and continued: “I used one of the unusual formulas to reach
the sentence here. I didn’t just go 25 to life. I did the sentence,
and I added various numbers in, and it’s one of the triads of the
Three Strikes law that you’re permitted to do, and that’s what I
did. [¶] And the reason I bring up the Three Strikes law . . . it’s
not clear that [section] 1385 or any of the new changes in the law
penetrates the Three Strike sentencing regimen. In other words,
that’s an independent sentencing structure.” Defendant’s counsel
asked the court, “given the circumstances, [to] strike one of the
priors . . . and not consider it a Three Strike case.”
The trial court then entertained a lengthy oral argument.
The court commented that it thought that defendant “represents
an endangerment to public safety.” The court stated: “I think his
history is just terrible. Anytime he’s been out, he’s committed
violent crimes against people. I do not believe I’m supposed to
ignore that fact. [¶] And when considering whether to strike
strikes or not, you do not give credit when you consider

7 Defendant’s counsel conceded that section 1172.6 “wouldn’t
apply” to defendant because his attempted murder conviction was
not based on the natural and probable consequences theory or the
felony murder rule.

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remoteness to the time that someone’s in custody because you
can’t pick up any new strikes, you can’t pick up any new crimes
while you’re in custody. And I don’t think that’s a real test of
whether someone can act normal in society because they have
armed people there. They have people watching you.”
The trial court struck five one-year prior prison term
enhancements (former § 667.5, subd. (b)) and four five-year
serious felony enhancements (§ 667, subd. (a)).8 Explaining that
this was a “Three Strike sentence[,]” the court resentenced
defendant to an aggregate term of 31 years to life. The sentence
was comprised of 25 years to life on count 1, plus a five-year great
bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)) and a one-year
personal use of a deadly or dangerous weapon enhancement
(§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The court imposed and stayed, pursuant
to section 654, a 25-year-to-life sentence on count 2.
F. Appeal
This timely appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court
failed to rule on his request to dismiss a prior strike conviction,
which would have eliminated the Three Strikes status of the
case.9

8 The reporter’s transcript of the hearing reflects some
confusion whether defendant was subject to four or five
section 667, subdivision (a) enhancements. The trial court
concluded that defendant was only subject to four such
enhancements and struck all of them.

9 Defendant raises no challenge to the denial of his
section 1172.6 petition, thus forfeiting any claim of error as to
that ruling. (See Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th

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I. Relevant Law
Section 1172.75 renders “legally invalid” any former
section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison term enhancement
imposed prior to January 1, 2020, except for a prior conviction for
a sexually violent offense. (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) A defendant
who qualifies for the recall of his sentence under section 1172.75
is entitled to “a full resentencing” at which the trial court may
reconsider all of its prior sentencing decisions. (People v. Monroe
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402 (Monroe).)
When conducting a full resentencing under section 1172.75,
a trial court has the authority under section 1385, subdivision (a),
and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497
(Romero) to strike prior convictions that qualify as strikes under
the Three Strikes law. (People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th
340, 345 (Rogers).) In determining whether to take such action,
the court “must consider whether, in light of the nature and
circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or
violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background,
character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside
the [Three Strikes] scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence
should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted
of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (People v.
Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)
“[T]he [T]hree [S]trikes law not only establishes a
sentencing norm, it carefully circumscribes the trial court’s power
to depart from this norm and requires the court to explicitly
justify its decision to do so. In doing so, the law creates a strong

92, 99 [“Issues do not have a life of their own: if they are not
raised or supported by argument or citation to authority, we
consider the issues waived”].)

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presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing
norms is both rational and proper. [¶] In light of this
presumption, a trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing
to strike a prior felony conviction allegation in limited
circumstances. For example, an abuse of discretion occurs where
the trial court was not ‘aware of its discretion’ to dismiss
[citation], or where the court considered impermissible factors in
declining to dismiss [citation].” (People v. Carmony (2004)
33 Cal.4th 367, 378 (Carmony).)
II. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s decision to dismiss or strike a
strike prior for abuse of discretion. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th
at p. 374; see also People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848,
856–857 [same, as to a resentencing court’s decision not to reduce
a defendant’s sentence under section 1172.75].)
III. Analysis
As required by section 1172.75, the trial court struck all
five of defendant’s former section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior
prison term enhancements. And, as required, the court
conducted a full resentencing (Rogers, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at
p. 361; Monroe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 402), during which it
exercised its discretion to strike all of defendant’s five-year
serious felony enhancements (§ 667, subd. (a)). Although the
“court had the authority to exercise its discretion under
section 1385[, subdivision] (a) and Romero to strike any or all of
[defendant]’s strike priors” (Rogers, at p. 364), it declined to do so
and resentenced defendant pursuant to the Three Strikes law.
Defendant contends that “[t]he [trial] court never
specifically ruled on [defendant]’s request to dismiss the prior
strike convictions” and that a “failure to exercise . . . properly

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authorized discretion is itself an abuse of discretion.” The
premise of this argument is fundamentally flawed because the
court did rule on defendant’s request to dismiss the strike priors.
After entertaining extensive oral argument from the parties, the
court expressly ruled that it would exercise its discretion to strike
all of the serious felony enhancements (§ 667, subd. (a)), “[b]ut
the sentence w[ould] remain 31 years to life” because “[i]t’s a
Three Strike sentence.”
The rationale for the trial court’s decision not to strike the
strike priors was clearly articulated during the hearing. The
court considered defendant to be “an endangerment to public
safety” with a “terrible” criminal history; “[a]nytime” defendant
was out of prison, he “committed violent crimes against people.”
The court was unmoved by any suggestion that the strikes were
remote in time because defendant had been in custody for those
years, where he was “watch[ed]” by “armed people.”
The trial court’s statements indicate that it reasonably
viewed defendant as “‘an exemplar of the “revolving door” career
criminal to whom the Three Strikes law is addressed.’ [Citation.]
As such, the court’s decision not to strike [defendant]’s priors is
neither irrational nor arbitrary and does not constitute an abuse
of its discretion.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 379.) Where,
as here, “the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced
the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in
conformity with the spirit of the law” (People v. Myers (1999)
69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310), we must affirm its ruling.

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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s June 21, 2023, order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_____________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________________, P. J.
LUI

________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

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