Mulberg v. Amster CA1/1

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Filed 3/3/25 Mulberg v. Amster CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

FRANK MULBERG,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A169032
v.
PATRICIA AMSTER, (Marin County
Super. Ct. No. CIV 1703628)
Defendant and Respondent.

Plaintiff Frank Mulberg, a licensed attorney appearing in propria
persona, appeals from a judgment entered in favor of defendant Patricia
Amster after the court rejected his cause of action for breach of contract and
his common counts for “account stated” and “open book account.” We affirm.
I.
BACKGROUND
The parties have spent years litigating their disputes, and we restate at
length some of the relevant background, which we described in an earlier
appeal:1 “Amster hired Mulberg from 2008 to 2012 to help her with matters
related to an anticipated inheritance. During this time, Amster paid Mulberg
for some, but not all, of the attorney fees incurred.

1 We grant Mulberg’s December 26, 2024 request for judicial notice of

various filings from his previous appeals.

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“When her mother died in 2011, Amster inherited property titled in a
trust and, with the apparent authority to do so, she appointed Mulberg as
trustee. It is uncontested that . . . Mulberg used trust funds to pay himself
the attorney fees that Amster incurred in her individual capacity.
Specifically, Mulberg used trust assets to pay himself $35,000 in October
2011 and $27,819.75 in January 2012. The total amount was $62,819.75,
which we, as do the parties, round to $62,820. After Mulberg made these
payments to himself, he sent Amster a statement in April 2012 notifying her
that her individual attorney fees had been paid in full.
“In 2013, the parties’ relationship deteriorated, and in 2014 probate
proceedings were initiated, with Amster petitioning to remove Mulberg as
trustee, and Mulberg cross-petitioning to challenge Amster’s right to remove
him and to seek approval of the estate’s accounts. A probate trial was held in
2015, and one of the main issues was whether Mulberg had paid himself
excessive trustee fees, which the evidence showed amounted to around
$500,000. In its ruling, the probate court removed Mulberg as trustee,
approved a trustee fee for him of $227,897.59, representing ‘1% of the total
trust corpus per annum,’ and ordered him to return—in what the parties
refer to as a ‘surcharge’—more than $200,000 to the estate.
“Mulberg appealed, and we affirmed the probate court’s decision.
(Amster v. Mulberg (Nov. 18, 2016, A146374) [nonpub. opn.].) Mulberg
thereafter reimbursed the estate the amount ordered, with interest. He then
sent Amster a new bill for the $62,820, plus interest. After Amster refused to
pay, Mulberg filed this suit. In his complaint, he asserted six causes of
action: promissory fraud, breach of contract, account stated, open book
account, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment. Amster answered with a
general denial, and she also asserted 33 affirmative defenses.

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“After a bench trial, the trial court ruled against Mulberg on all his
causes of action, and it therefore did not consider Amster’s affirmative
defenses.” (Mulberg v. Amster (July 14, 2021, A158954 [nonpub opn.]),
fn. omitted.) (Mulberg II).) Mulberg appealed the trial court’s ruling, and we
affirmed in part and reversed in part. We affirmed the judgment as to the
claims for fraud, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment. But we reversed
the judgment as to the breach-of-contract claim and the common counts of
“account stated” and “open book account,” remanding for further proceedings,
including a consideration of Amster’s affirmative defenses.
On remand, the parties agreed to have the claims tried on the record,
and the trial court issued a 21-page statement of decision rejecting Mulberg’s
common counts and finding that, although Mulberg presented a prima facie
case of breach of contract, his claims failed because of the affirmative
defenses of the statute of limitations and the doctrine of unclean hands.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. The Standards of Review.
In conducting our appellate review, we presume that a judgment or
order of a lower court is correct. The general rule is that “ ‘[a]ll intendments
and presumptions are indulged to support [the judgment] on matters as to
which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.’ ”
(Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; In re Marriage of
Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133.) Accordingly, “ ‘in reviewing a
judgment based upon a statement of decision following a bench trial, “any
conflict in the evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts
will be resolved in support of the determination of the trial court decision.” ’ ”
(Cuiellette v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 757, 765.)

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We review factual determinations for substantial evidence. In doing so,
“[o]ur authority begins and ends with a determination as to whether, on the
entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, in support of the judgment.” (Howard v. Owens Corning
(1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 630–631.) “Even in cases where the evidence is
undisputed or uncontradicted, if two or more different inferences can
reasonably be drawn from the evidence this court is without power to
substitute its own inferences or deductions for those of the trier of fact, which
must resolve such conflicting inferences in the absence of a rule of law
specifying the inference to be drawn. We must accept as true all evidence
and all reasonable inferences from the evidence tending to establish the
correctness of the trial court’s findings and decision, resolving every conflict
in favor of the judgment.” (Id. at p. 631.)
“[A]n appellate court does not evaluate the credibility of the witnesses
or otherwise reweigh the evidence. [Citation.] Rather, ‘we defer to the trier
of fact on issues of credibility.’ [Citation.] ‘If the trial court’s resolution of the
factual issue is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed.’ ”
(Greisman v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1310, 1322.) “Our job is
only to see if substantial evidence exists to support the [decision] in favor of
the prevailing party, not to determine whether substantial evidence might
support the losing party’s version of events.” (Schmidt v. Superior Court
(2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 582.)
To the extent the trial court’s determinations rest on purely legal
issues, our review is de novo. (Snow v. Woodford (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 383,
393.)

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B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Applying the Doctrine of Unclean
Hands to Bar Mulberg’s Claims.

On remand, the trial court rejected the common counts, but it found
that Mulberg established a prima facia case for a breach of contract because
Amster had orally agreed to pay Mulberg his attorney fees and the fees
remained unpaid. It nonetheless denied Mulberg relief, concluding that his
claims were barred because of both the applicable statute of limitations and
the doctrine of unclean hands. Because we conclude that the court properly
rejected Mulberg’s claims based on the doctrine of unclean hands, we need
not address Mulberg’s appellate contentions that the court otherwise erred in
rejecting the breach of contract claim and common counts.
The doctrine of unclean hands “rests on the maxim that ‘ “ ‘he who
comes into equity must come with clean hands.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘The doctrine
demands that a plaintiff act fairly in the matter for which he seeks a remedy.
[The plaintiff] must come into court with clean hands, and keep them clean,
or [the plaintiff] will be denied relief, regardless of the merits of [the] claim.’ ”
(Aguayo v. Amaro (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1110.) The doctrine “applies
when it would be unfair for the plaintiff to profit from his or her wrongdoing,
even assuming the defendant might otherwise be liable, at least in part, for
the losses sustained by the plaintiff.” (Stine v. Dell’Osso (2014)
230 Cal.App.4th 834, 845.) And it applies to legal as well as equitable claims
and to both tort and contract remedies. (Camp v. Jeffer, Mangles, Butler &
Marmaro (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 620, 638; see also Unilogic, Inc. v. Burroughs
Corp. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 612, 620.)
The unclean hands doctrine protects not only parties’ interests, but also
the courts’ interests. The doctrine “protects judicial integrity and promotes
justice. It protects judicial integrity because allowing a plaintiff with unclean

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hands to recover in an action creates doubts as to the justice provided by the
judicial system. . . . The doctrine promotes justice by making a plaintiff
answer for his [or her] own misconduct in the action. It prevents ‘a
wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits of his [or her] transgression.’ ” (Kendall-
Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 970, 978
(Kendall-Jackson).)
Employing what is sometimes referred to as the “Blain test,” courts use
a “three-pronged test to determine the effect to be given to the plaintiff's
unclean hands conduct. Whether the particular misconduct [at issue] is a bar
to the alleged claim for relief depends on (1) analogous case law, (2) the
nature of the misconduct, and (3) the relationship of the misconduct to the
claimed injuries.” (Kendall-Jackson, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 979, citing
Blain v. Doctor’s Co. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1048, 1060 (Blain).) Our
standard for reviewing the application of the Blain test comports with the
general standard of review we have already described. We independently
review the first prong of the test—analogous case law—as it presents a legal
question. (Padideh v. Moradi (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 418, 436–439.) But we
review the second and third prongs—the nature of the misconduct and its
relationship to the claimed injuries—for substantial evidence when they turn
on the trier of fact’s factual determinations. (Ibid.)
Starting with the first prong, the parties have identified no analogous
case law supporting either of their positions. Amster’s brief is especially
unhelpful as it fails to discuss the trial court’s rationale for its application of
the unclean hands doctrine, much less the Blain test in particular.2 And
while Mulberg points out that the trial court failed to cite analogous case law

2
Amster’s appellate brief mostly argues that Mulberg’s claims fail
because the attorney fees were paid. We specifically addressed and rejected
this argument in our last decision in this case, Mulberg II.

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in applying the doctrine, he provides no analogous case law to support his
contention that the doctrine’s application was improper.
Our independent research has found no authority directly on point, but
one Ninth Circuit case stands for the general proposition that applying the
doctrine of unclean hands is permissible to prevent an attorney who has
engaged in wrongdoing from profiting in a financial dispute with their client,
even though the client also engaged in wrongdoing. (Northbay Wellness
Group, Inc. v. Beyries (9th Cir. 2015) 789 F.3d 956, 961.) In that case, the
court applied the doctrine to prevent an attorney who had misappropriated a
client’s funds from discharging in bankruptcy a debt owed to that client.
Mulberg’s wrongdoing here may not have been as egregious as the attorney’s
wrongdoing in Beyries, but, as we discuss below, it was still significant, and
in California “[a]ny conduct that violates conscience, or good faith, or other
equitable standards of conduct is sufficient cause to invoke the doctrine.”
(Kendall-Jackson, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 979.)
This leads us to the second prong of the Blain test: the nature of the
misconduct. Although Mulberg in his appellate briefs addresses the Blain
test generally, he largely ignores the trial court’s factual determinations
about the nature of his misconduct, which were thoughtful and withering.
According to the trial court, “All the difficulties in this case arise from
Mulberg’s inequitable conduct. Mulberg breached multiple fiduciary duties,
used trust funds to pay money owed him personally, charged the trust for
multiple services in violation of law, and failed to properly account for funds
and services. After retaining trust funds for years and unsuccessfully
litigating the probate action through appeal, Mulberg now seeks to turn back
the clock years to recover funds he improperly received in the first place.
From the Court’s perspective, Mulberg is attempting to have the client

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indemnify him for his own mistakes.” These findings are supported by
substantial (and largely undisputed) evidence.
In discussing the nature of Mulberg’s wrongdoing, the court began by
noting that while the parties “may have believed that the debt had been
satisfied by payments from the trust, there is no basis in equity to blame
Amster for any misunderstanding. As between the parties, Mulberg was the
party with superior knowledge of the legal requirements of the relationship;
he was both an experienced attorney and a fiduciary charged with properly
(and legally) administering the trust. [He] should have known that the
estate assets were being ‘improperly used in a failed attempt to pay off the
obligation,’ particularly when only a minimal amount of research would have
illuminated the infirmities with the arrangement.”
The trial court went on to find that “[e]ven if [Mulberg] had a
legitimate excuse for not being aware of the rules before [Amster’s petition in
the probate proceeding was filed] (a doubtful proposition), once it was filed,
he should have recognized that the payments to himself for past attorney fees
were improper. He could have returned the disputed fees to the trust and
initiated any action to collect [them].” As Mulberg admits, Amster testified
at the trial in the probate proceedings “that she never consented” to using
trust assets to pay the attorney fees obligation.
Mulberg attempts to minimize his wrongdoing by focusing only on his
use of trust funds to pay himself the attorney fees that Amster incurred in
her individual capacity, and by arguing that it was done with Amster’s
acquiescence. But we need not decide if that conduct alone would have been
sufficient for the application of the doctrine, because the trial court did not
rely exclusively on it when it ruled that Mulberg’s hands were unclean. The
court also found that Mulberg billed the trust excessive amounts, provided

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Amster with confusing invoices that a reasonable client would not be able to
understand, and litigated (instead of promptly remedying) the billing
problems and overcharges. We agree with the trial court that the nature of
Mulberg’s misconduct in its entirety was significant and warranted the
application of the doctrine.
Finally, under the third prong of the Blain test, there is a direct
relationship between the misconduct to the claimed injuries. In his appellate
briefing, Mulberg argues that Amster has shown no prejudice. But he
ignores the trial court’s findings to the contrary. To begin with, it found that
“Mulberg was unable to explain with any specificity the benefits he conferred
on Amster for his work as her personal counsel.” While there was “a plethora
of invoices, Mulberg did not deliver a bill in the regular course of business
that expressly indicated a balance ‘due and owing,’ ” “no complete statement
of account as to fees earned as [Amster’s] personal counsel was ever
provided,” and the invoices that were provided were “incomplete and
confusing,” providing “only vague descriptions of the services provided” and
failing to distinguish between charges for Amster’s personal legal services
and charges for trust services. As we have mentioned, the court found that
“[a] client receiving these invoices, with their terse descriptions of multiple
activities, would not reasonably be able to determine what amounts were
owed for personal legal services.” The court succinctly found that in light of
these circumstances “the passage of time has prejudiced Amster’s ability to
contest the amounts that Mulberg contends he was owed.”
In short, the court found that Mulberg’s misconduct directly related to,
and made more difficult, Amster’s ability to challenge the amounts owed for
attorney fees. We discern no error in the court’s findings or analysis.

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III.
DISPOSITION

Mulberg’s December 26, 2024 request for judicial notice is granted.
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. Amster is awarded her
appellate costs.

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_________________________
Humes, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Banke, J.

_________________________
Smiley, J.

Mulberg v. Amster A169032

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