People v. Spann CA3

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Filed 3/3/25 P. v. Spann CA3
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

THE PEOPLE, C092586

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 17FE012187)

v.
OPINION ON TRANSFER
NICORY MARQUIS SPANN,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Nicory Marquis Spann shot a Sacramento County Sheriff’s Deputy in
the face at a light rail station in Sacramento. On appeal, Spann sought reversal of his
convictions for attempted murder and assault on a peace officer with a semiautomatic
weapon or, alternatively, remand for resentencing due to a retroactive change to the
procedures for selecting upper term sentences. We affirmed both the convictions and the
sentence, but our Supreme Court granted review and transferred the case back to this
court with directions to vacate our decision and consider whether People v. Lynch (2024)
16 Cal.5th 730 (Lynch) requires resentencing Spann.

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The parties have filed supplemental briefs and agree the case should be remanded
for resentencing. Accordingly, we will affirm Spann’s convictions and remand for
resentencing.
BACKGROUND
A. Evidence at Trial
Spann spent the night in a park after being kicked out of his father’s house. The
next day, he rode the light rail to the Watt Avenue and Interstate 80 station at the end of
the line. He spoke with transit agent Angelah Cannon, who told him he would have to
leave the lower platform where the trains arrived if he did not have a ticket. Spann
responded: “I don’t trust you. You’re the fucking police.” Cannon led Spann to the
upper platform. Two hours later, she saw him seated on the lower platform again.
Around the time Cannon saw Spann back on the lower platform, Deputy Alex
Ladwig arrived at the station. Deputy Ladwig worked for the Sacramento County
Sheriff’s Department in the Sacramento Regional Transit Division. His duties included
checking fares at light rail stations, responding to calls from the public or transit agents,
and investigating crimes connected to the light rail system.
While patrolling the light rail station, Deputy Ladwig asked a woman smoking a
cigarette on the lower platform to move to the designated smoking area. Spann, who was
standing nearby, began moving erratically and yelling profanities at Deputy Ladwig and
calling him a “racist pig” and “cracker cop,” among other things. Deputy Ladwig asked
Spann if he was okay, and Spann began to walk away. Spann calmed down once he was
farther away, so Deputy Ladwig returned to his patrol car.
At this point, a woman whom Spann had been following and touching walked over
to the deputy’s car and told the officer that Spann had been touching her. Spann then
turned around and approached the patrol car. Deputy Ladwig got out of his car and
walked toward Spann to check his fare. At the deputy’s approach, Spann continued
angrily yelling profanities, while clenching his teeth and balling up his fists.

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Deputy Ladwig asked to see Spann’s ticket, which Spann eventually produced.
Finding the ticket expired, the deputy asked Spann to purchase another ticket or leave the
station. Spann began walking away, but toward the path to the next station rather than
toward a ticket machine or out of the station. Spann continued acting erratically and
turned back to continue yelling at the deputy. Deputy Ladwig then told Spann to stop so
that he could give him a citation. The deputy asked for Spann’s identification, but Spann
said he did not have identification. Deputy Ladwig then asked Spann for his name. At
first, Spann did not respond, but after repeated requests, he began saying his name very
loudly and quickly so that the deputy could not understand. In between shouting his
name multiple times, Spann continued behaving erratically and using profanities.
After several repetitions, Spann again walked away, but Deputy Ladwig followed
him and asked him to take a seat on a bench in the station. Spann sat down, but refused
to say his name slowly enough for the deputy to understand. A train pulled into the
station, and a transit agent who had just gotten off saw the situation and called for backup
over the radio.
Deputy Ladwig wanted to keep Spann detained until backup arrived, which he
expected to take at least 10 minutes. At some point, Spann stood up but sat back down
when the deputy told him to. When Spann stood up again, Deputy Ladwig unholstered
his Taser, held it by his side, and said he would tase Spann unless he sat down. Spann
acted like he was going to sit back down, but as soon as the deputy’s Taser clicked back
into the holster, Spann lunged at him.
Spann wound up to punch Deputy Ladwig. The deputy took a defensive stance,
and Spann backed off. The deputy then tried to grab Spann and control his arms. After
several seconds of struggling, Deputy Ladwig felt Spann tugging at his gun. The two
men tripped and fell. As he was falling, the deputy felt the mechanism securing his gun
in its holster release. Deputy Ladwig landed on his back. Spann landed on his knees

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above the deputy with the deputy’s gun in his hand. Spann then shot the deputy in the
face from only a few inches away.
Deputy Ladwig pushed Spann off him, and Spann’s second shot narrowly missed
the deputy’s face. The deputy ran to his car to try to grab another gun, but could not find
one. Deputy Ladwig then ran to seek cover behind some bike lockers, with Spann
following and waving the gun above his head in a celebratory manner. A bystander who
had been recording the fight with a cell phone told Spann he had better get out of there
before the police came to get him, at which point Spann stopped and looked around.
Spann then walked over to a storm drain, dropped the gun in, and walked off.
The gunshot shattered the left side of Deputy Ladwig’s jaw and fractured the right
side. A 13-centimeter laceration ran from the deputy’s tongue back to his tonsil and over
to his cheek, and part of his fractured jawbone was protruding into his mouth. He spent
11 days in the trauma intensive care unit and spent six weeks with his jaw wired shut and
titanium plates holding his right jawbone together. After approximately 20 surgeries,
including reconstruction of his left jawbone using a bone from his lower leg, Deputy
Ladwig still has no feeling or function in 90 percent of his tongue and requires a hearing
aid. He spent almost a year learning to speak again and required significant rehabilitation
for the leg from which the bone was removed.
Police officers later arrested Spann at a nearby hotel. When an officer searched
Spann’s suitcase, they found his identification inside.
Spann testified at trial and admitted shooting Deputy Ladwig. Spann did not like
police officers and thought that the deputy was harassing him. Deputy Ladwig ordered
him to get on the ground, but Spann refused because police officers had previously
slapped him in the face after making him get on the ground. When shown a video of him
lunging at the deputy, Spann explained that he had thought about assaulting the deputy
but decided not to and stepped back. When Deputy Ladwig then approached Spann to
arrest him, Spann decided that he needed to use the deputy’s gun before the deputy did.

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Spann denied intending to kill the deputy when he pulled the trigger, claiming both
gunshots were just reactions and the second shot was “just like normal.”
While watching the video of his confrontation with Deputy Ladwig during cross-
examination, Spann stated, “He said get on the ground right there. I’m not getting on the
ground.” The prosecutor responded, “Okay. Wait until I have a question. We already
heard what you believe.” Spann then stated, “I don’t really give a fuck. I don’t really
give a fuck. He can do whatever, doesn’t matter. He got shot in his face, and I’m
fucking happy about that shit. He got popped, POP, POP, all in his mother fucking face.
I did that shit.”
B. Verdict and Sentencing
The jury found Spann guilty of attempted murder of a peace officer (Pen. Code,
§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)),1 and assault with a semiautomatic firearm on a peace officer
(§ 245, subd. (d)(2)), and found true all three firearm use allegations for each offense
(§ 12022.5, subds. (b)-(d)).
The probation officer prepared a presentence report recommending the trial court
impose an upper term sentence for assault with a semiautomatic firearm based on seven
aggravating circumstances: “[T]he crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, and
acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, and callousness” (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)); “defendant used a firearm at the time of commission of the
crime” (Id., rule 4.421(a)(2)); “defendant has engaged in violent conduct which indicates
a serious danger to society” (Id., rule 4.421(b)(1)); “defendant’s prior convictions as an
adult and sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings are numerous” (Id.,
rule 4.421(b)(2)); “defendant has served a prior prison term” (Id., rule 4.421(b)(3));
“defendant was on probation when the crime was committed” (Id., rule 4.421(b)(4)); and

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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“defendant’s prior performance on probation or parole was unsatisfactory” (Id.,
rule 4.421(b)(5)). The probation report listed four juvenile adjudications—three
misdemeanors and one felony—as well as seven prior convictions—four misdemeanors
and three felonies. Most of these offenses had been committed more than 10 years before
the time of the report, including felony convictions for the transport or sale of a
controlled substance and for being an accessory to buying or receiving stolen property.
The most recent felony conviction was for assault on a custodial officer.
At sentencing, defense counsel acknowledged that he had reviewed the probation
report and discussed it with Spann. Spann did not object to or dispute any of the
evidence presented by the probation officer. The court found the seven aggravating
circumstances true. The trial court found no mitigating circumstances because Spann had
demonstrated that his actions and lack of remorse were not the result of mental illness,
but instead were a result of “a deep hatred.” Considering these circumstances, the trial
court refused to strike the firearm enhancements or impose a lesser firearm enhancement.
Accordingly, the court sentenced Spann to life in prison with the possibility of parole for
attempted murder of a peace officer (§ 664, subd. (e)), plus 25 years to life for the firearm
enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (d)), and the upper term of nine years in prison for assault
with a semiautomatic firearm on a peace officer (§ 245, subd. (d)(2)), plus 25 years to life
for the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (d)). The court then stayed the sentence
for assault with a firearm and the associated enhancement pursuant to section 654.
C. Appeal and Transfer
Spann timely appealed arguing we should reverse his convictions for attempted
murder and assault on a peace officer with a semiautomatic weapon because of
prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. The People contended that Spann
forfeited this issue by failing to object and that Spann failed to demonstrate his counsel
performed ineffectively by not objecting. Spann also argued he should be resentenced
because of a retroactive change to the procedures for selecting upper term sentences. We

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affirmed both the convictions and the sentence, but our Supreme Court granted review
and transferred the case back to this court with directions to vacate our decision and
reconsider whether the trial court should resentence Spann in light of Lynch, supra, 16
Cal.5th 730. Accordingly, we vacated our decision.
The parties submitted supplemental briefs, agreeing we must remand the case for
resentencing.
DISCUSSION
I
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Spann contends we must reverse his convictions because of prosecutorial
misconduct during closing argument. We disagree.
A. Closing Arguments
In the first portion of her closing argument, the prosecutor focused extensively on
how Spann’s actions and his testimony at trial belied his claim that he acted in self-
defense. The prosecutor then told the jury:
“And this case has had similar effects on me since I watched the video. That
video was chilling to watch. Slow it down. Watch him pull back and shoot that officer in
the face and have no regard for what he did. Watch him celebrate afterward. I thought
about, you know, I’m raising two girls. I thought about is this the world that I want my
children to be raised in. And it affected me just like yesterday affected me, and it should
affect all of you.
“I watched [the bystander recording the video of the fight] in disgust. I’ve
watched that video over and over again with the same sinking feeling, what is this world
we have come to live in? And I thought I just want to keep my kids in that bubble
forever. We should really all feel that way about people we love, children, significant
others, whoever they may be and protect them.

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“And it wasn’t til I saw what Mr. Hollaway did that my faith was restored.
Because he got off that train. He was already on the train. He could have turned his head
like everyone else did that day. He got off the train when he saw that the Deputy, a
human being, had been shot in the face and was bleeding profusely, as he described. And
he ran over, and he took the shirt off his back to help save that officer. And who knows,
maybe he did. But for Mr. Hollaway and the pressure put on his face, it was five minutes
before help arrived. That restored my faith in humanity. Because not everybody is good,
and not everyone will look out for our loved ones. But he didn’t care what color skin the
officer had. He didn’t care who the officer was. He didn’t help him because he was an
officer and put on a uniform. He went to help him because he was a human being who
had been shot in the face and could die.
“Deputy Ladwig, yes, he’s a police officer. Yes, he swore to protect the public
imperfect or perfect as that system may be. But he’s a human being. He’s somebody’s
grandson. He’s somebody’s child. He’s somebody’s husband. Hopefully one day
despite the Defendant’s best efforts, he will be somebody’s father. He is a human being.
And this case is not about like or dislike of police officers or injustices that have
happened in the past. It’s about this case, this officer, this human being, and what the
Defendant did.
“Despite his very best efforts Alex Ladwig will live another day. Whether he ever
goes back out on the streets or not, I don’t know. It’s chilling to live through something
like this. And every time he would meet with me and ask me, you know, how’s it going
to go? The family would ask me, What’s going to happen? And I always told them, I
can’t predict what 12 people of the community will do. I can have faith in it, but I can’t
predict it.
“But I always told him and the family that the truth you know it here. The truth
always comes out whether it’s in the court or later. The truth is something that rings true,
you know it. And we saw it from the witnesses in this courtroom in this case with this

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officer, with this human being. And the Defendant spoke his truth loud and clear for us
to hear yesterday. And his truth, as he screamed it, was not, I shot this officer in self-
defense. His truth loud and clear and he can never take it back, there is just no coming
back from that. Mr. Spangler is a fantastic attorney, and you can’t take that back. You
can’t fix that. His truth was that he pulled that gun out, shot the officer in the face, and
he was happy he did it.
“So when you go back and you deliberate and you think about this case and this
case, not out there, this courtroom, this evidence, this police officer, this human being,
you let justice be served by your verdicts. I can’t tell you what that justice is. That’s
why there are 12 of you. But you let that reflect the truth.
“And when you sign those verdict forms, you know that justice will be served.
That’s all I ask three years later for this officer, this family, let it be served by your
verdicts.”
Spann did not object to any of this argument. Instead, defense counsel addressed
the prosecutor’s argument at the end of his closing argument:
“Ms. Anderson is a very accomplished prosecutor. In her closing argument, she
was appealing to your sympathy, to your passions. This isn’t about your sympathy or
your passions. This is about what you, as jurors, can arrive at logically and reasonably in
drawing inferences from the evidence that you were presented.
“Again, it was a terrible thing that Deputy Ladwig was shot, and he has suffered
greatly. There’s no question. This isn’t a question about how badly he suffered. This is
a question of how did Mr. Spann act in this particular situation and is it justified. I do
agree with Ms. Anderson that the truth go [sic] out.
“Deputy Ladwig used unreasonable force while acting outside the scope of his
duties. Mr. Spann was put in unreasonable fear for his—or reasonable fear for his life
and safety, and he reacted in the only manner that seemed appropriate to him at that

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moment to preserve his life. He’s not guilty of the crimes that are charged, and we look
forward to you returning a not guilty verdict.”
B. Forfeiture
As an initial matter, the People contend Spann forfeited this claim of prosecutorial
misconduct by failing to object. We agree.
“In order to preserve a claim of misconduct, a defendant must make a timely
objection and request an admonition; only if an admonition would not have cured the
harm is the claim of misconduct preserved for review.” (People v. Alfaro (2007) 41
Cal.4th 1277, 1328.) Spann did not object at all during the prosecutor’s closing
argument.
Spann argues an exception to the forfeiture rule should apply because objection
and admonition would not have cured the harm from the prosecutor’s improper argument.
Spann quotes People v. Kirkes (1952) 39 Cal.2d 719, 726, suggesting that an objection
“might well have served to impress upon the jury the damaging force of the challenged
assertions.” Our Supreme Court has limited this language in Kirkes, noting: “This
exception, of course, would swallow the rule requiring a timely objection and request for
admonition, for one always runs the risk of drawing the jury’s attention to an improper
line of argument by registering an objection. The mere concern of highlighting alleged
misconduct by objecting, without more, cannot serve as an exception to the general rule
requiring an objection and request for an admonition.” (People v. Boyette (2002) 29
Cal.4th 381, 432.) The prosecutor’s argument in this case is not comparable to the
misconduct in Kirkes, wherein the prosecutor asserted personal knowledge from an
unidentified source not in evidence of the defendant’s guilt, implied he would not have
prosecuted had he not believed in the defendant’s guilt, and suggested the defendant
would kill again to cover his crime and prevent witnesses from testifying, with “no
evidence whatever upon which to base that statement.” (Kirkes, at pp. 723-725; see
People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 80.) The Kirkes court also noted that the improper

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remarks “were interspersed throughout the closing argument in such manner that their
cumulative effect was devastating.” (Kirkes, at p. 726.) Here, by contrast, the remarks to
which Spann failed to object occurred all at once and take up a small fraction of the
entirety of the prosecutor’s closing argument.
We conclude Spann has failed to demonstrate either that an objection would not
have stopped this line of argument or that an admonition would not have cured any harm.
Accordingly, Spann has forfeited this issue on appeal.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Anticipating this conclusion, Spann also argues his counsel performed
ineffectively by failing to object to the prosecutor’s argument. We are not persuaded.
While we agree with the parties that the prosecutor committed misconduct by
invoking the safety of her own children, suggesting the jurors should protect their own
loved ones from Spann, and referring to conversations she had with the deputy and his
family, a defendant may not “automatically transform a forfeited claim into a cognizable
one merely by asserting ineffective assistance of counsel.” (People v. Thompson (2010)
49 Cal.4th 79, 121, fn. 14; see People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1202-1203.)
Rather, “[t]o establish constitutionally inadequate representation, a defendant must
demonstrate that (1) counsel’s representation was deficient, i.e., it fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and (2) counsel’s
representation subjected the defendant to prejudice, i.e., there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s failings, the result would have been more favorable to the
defendant.” (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 845; see Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-696.)
“[R]arely will an appellate record establish ineffective assistance of counsel.”
(People v. Thompson, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 122.) “ ‘When a defendant on appeal makes
a claim that his counsel was ineffective, the appellate court must consider whether the
record contains any explanation for the challenged aspects of representation provided by

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counsel. “If the record sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner
challenged, ‘unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or
unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation,’ [citation], the contention must
be rejected.” ’ ” (People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 845-846.) “ ‘Reviewing
courts defer to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions in examining a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel [citation], and there is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” ’ ” (People v. Weaver
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 925.)
Here, rather than objecting, defense counsel addressed the prosecutor’s remarks in
his own argument, pointing out to the jury that the prosecutor was improperly appealing
to their “sympathy” and “passions.” Defense counsel urged the jurors instead to rely on
logic and reason to determine whether Deputy Ladwig used unreasonable force and
whether Spann reasonably feared for his life and safety. This indicates defense counsel
made a tactical decision, which we may not second-guess. Defense counsel may also
have been happy to let the prosecutor talk about personal matters because it meant she
stopped discussing Spann’s disastrous testimony on cross-examination: “I don’t really
give a fuck. He can do whatever, doesn’t matter. He got shot in his face, and I’m
fucking happy about that shit. He got popped, POP, POP, all in his mother fucking face.
I did that shit.” Defense counsel could reasonably have considered that testimony, the
last piece of evidence the jury heard in the case, so damaging that any other argument
was a welcome distraction.
We conclude Spann has failed to overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”
II
Upper Term Sentence
Spann contends we must remand for resentencing because amendments made to
section 1170 while his appeal was pending apply retroactively and the trial court relied on

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aggravating circumstances that were not proven according to the new procedures. The
People agree that, in light of Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th 730, the record does not establish
that the trial court’s reliance on improperly proven aggravating circumstances was
harmless. We agree with the parties and will remand for resentencing.
Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature amended section 1170, subdivision (b)
so that, among other things, a sentencing court “may impose a sentence exceeding the
middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify
the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the facts
underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been
found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.”
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(2), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) The amended version
of section 1170, subdivision (b) applies retroactively in this case as an ameliorative
change in the law applicable to all nonfinal convictions on appeal. (Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 749.)
Applying section 1170, subdivision (b) retroactively, “a Sixth Amendment
violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an
upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly
established. The violation is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied
upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were
otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory requirements.” (Lynch,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 768.) If the facts underlying any one aggravating circumstance
fail to meet this standard, “the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.” (Ibid.)
Here, none of the underlying facts for the seven aggravating circumstances the
trial court relied upon were found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury and Spann did
not stipulate to the truth of any. Because we must conclude beyond a reasonable doubt

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that the jury would have found true the facts underlying all seven aggravating
circumstances, we look first at the most uncertain of those circumstances.
We cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true
the facts underlying the aggravating circumstance that “defendant’s prior convictions as
an adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings are numerous.” (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2).) This aggravating circumstance rests on a somewhat
vague and subjective standard, which makes it difficult “to conclude with confidence
that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in
the same manner as did the trial court.” (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 840.)
For example, we cannot confidently say where the jury would have drawn the line for
“numerous,” how the jury would have weighed felonies, misdemeanors, or juvenile
adjudications, or how the jury might have considered the passage of time and discounted
older convictions. We are also mindful that we “cannot necessarily assume that the
record reflects all of the evidence that would have been presented had aggravating
circumstances been submitted to the jury.” (Id. at p. 839.) For example, had the defense
told the jury more details about the offenses, the jury could have been more likely to
count convictions as minor and thus less likely to add up to the “numerous” standard.
Having determined that the facts underlying one aggravating circumstance do not
meet the standard for harmless error, we must vacate Spann’s sentence and remand for
resentencing. “Further proceedings on remand are to be conducted in accordance with
the current statutory requirements and the defendant given the opportunity for the jury
trial, of which he was deprived. [Citations.] On remand, the parties remain free to
introduce at trial all relevant evidence to support or contest the factual support for the
aggravating circumstances set out in the California Rules of Court. The court may rely
on any properly proven aggravating facts, including prior convictions or facts necessarily
found by the jury to support a verdict on underlying counts and enhancements. The court
retains its discretion to impose an upper term sentence if it concludes that one or more

14
properly proved circumstances justify such a sentence. (§ 1170[, subd.] (b)(2).) If it
cannot so conclude, it may impose no more than a middle term for each of the counts on
which [the defendant] stands convicted. (Id., subd. (b)(1).)” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
pp. 777-778.)
DISPOSITION
Spann’s convictions are affirmed, his sentence is vacated, and the matter is
remanded for further litigation of the aggravating circumstances and for the court to
exercise its discretion under current section 1170, subdivision (b), as indicated here.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

We concur:

/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.

/s/
MAURO, J.

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