CourtListener 10347752•People v. Huerta CA4/1
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Filed 2/28/25 P. v. Huerta CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D083628
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN434544)
VICENTE HUERTA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Daniel F. Link, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with instructions.
Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel
Rogers, Adrian R. Contreras and Amanda Lloyd, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Following a confrontation with a rival gang member, Vicente Huerta
shot at the rival’s departing vehicle, fatally wounding a passenger. A jury
convicted him of shooting at an occupied vehicle (Pen. Code, § 246; count 2)
and found true an allegation that he personally discharged a firearm causing
great bodily injury or death in committing the offense (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).
In a bifurcated proceeding, the court found the allegation Huerta committed
the offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang proven true beyond a
reasonable doubt (§ 186.22(b)(4)). Huerta admitted to having a strike prior
and a serious felony prior. The trial court sentenced him under
section 186.22(b)(4)(A) to a total term of 74 years to life in prison for count 2.
The court reached that sum by imposing the upper term of 7 years for the
base count plus 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement and 5 years for
the serious felony prior, which resulted in a minimum indeterminate term of
37 years that was then doubled under the Three Strikes law.
Huerta contends the trial court erred in its calculation “by including
both the 25 years to life firearm enhancement and the 5-year serious prior
felony enhancement within the minimum indeterminate term.” We disagree.
People v. Sok (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 88 and California Supreme Court case
law interpreting substantively indistinguishable provisions in the Penal Code
support the trial court’s calculation of Huerta’s sentence. We therefore affirm
and remand with instructions.
I.
A.
In 1988, the Legislature enacted the Street Terrorism Enforcement and
Prevention Act “‘to seek the eradication of criminal activity by street gangs.’”
(People v. Montes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 350, 354, quoting § 186.21.) Originally,
the STEP Act prescribed sentencing enhancements for certain offenses
committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang, but it also provided: “Any
person who violates this subdivision in the commission of a felony punishable
by imprisonment in the state prison for life, shall not be paroled until a
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minimum of 15 calendar years have been served.” (Stats. 1988, ch. 1242, § 1,
eff. Sept. 26, 1988; former § 186.22(b)(1)-(3).)
In March 2000, California voters amended the STEP Act by passing
Proposition 21. (Montes, 31 Cal.4th at p. 354.) Proponents of the measure
believed “the law must be strengthened to require serious consequences,
protecting [Californians] from the most violent . . . gang offenders.” (Ballot
Pamp., Primary Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) argument in favor of Prop. 21, p. 48.)
They argued the measure “ends the ‘slap on the wrist’ of current law by
imposing real consequences for GANG MEMBERS.” (Ibid.)
In addition to increasing the sentencing enhancements, “Proposition 21
created an alternate penalty provision prescribing indeterminate terms of life
imprisonment for those who committed certain enumerated felonies.” (People
v. Lopez (2022) 12 Cal.5th 957, 970.) As relevant here, the provision states:
A person who is convicted of a felony enumerated in this
paragraph committed for the benefit of, at the direction of,
or in association with a criminal street gang, with the
specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal
conduct by gang members, shall, upon conviction of that
felony, be sentenced to an indeterminate term of life
imprisonment with a minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence calculated as the greater of:
(A) The term determined by the court pursuant to
Section 1170 for the underlying conviction, including
any enhancement applicable under Chapter 4.5
(commencing with Section 1170) of Title 7 of Part 2,
or any period prescribed by Section 3046, if the felony
is any of the offenses enumerated in subparagraph
(B) or (C) of this paragraph.
(B) Imprisonment in the state prison for 15 years, if
the felony is . . . a felony violation of Section 246 . . . .
(§ 186.22(b)(4).)
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B.
The correct construction of a statute is a question of law we review de
novo. (People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1032.) We aim to discern the
Legislature’s intent so as to effect the statute’s purpose. (Ibid.) We first give
“the statute’s words . . . a plain and commonsense meaning.” (People v.
Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142.) “If the language is unambiguous, the
plain meaning controls.” (Voices of the Wetlands v. State Water Resources
Control Bd. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 499, 519.) Yet the words must be construed in
context, so we must look to the entire section as well as “the statutory
framework as a whole” to harmonize terms. (Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp.
Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230.) We consult extrinsic aids, like the
legislative history, only if the language is ambiguous. (Walker, at p. 1032.)
C.
Huerta raises several reasons why the trial court’s interpretation of
section 186.22(b)(4) is allegedly erroneous. None persuade us.
Huerta contends the plain language of section 186.22(b)(4)(A) bars
including the section 12022.53(d) firearm enhancement or the five-year
serious felony prior enhancement as part of his minimum term. Huerta
points out the minimum term includes “any enhancement applicable under
Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 1170) of Title 7 of Part 2, or any
period prescribed by Section 3046,” but “Chapter 4.5 . . . does not include
either” of the enhancements at issue here. (§ 186.22(b)(4)(A).)
We conclude this language is ambiguous. It is unclear precisely what
“the term determined by the court pursuant to Section 1170 for the
underlying conviction, including any enhancement applicable under
Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 1170) of Title 7 of Part 2, or any
period prescribed by Section 3046” (§ 186.22(b)(4)(A)) encompasses—
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although, if the Legislature intended the interpretation Huerta advances, it
could have used “contained within” or similar language rather than
“applicable under.” We thus find it appropriate to reference extrinsic aids in
analyzing the merits of Huerta’s claims.
Doing so, we are persuaded by the People’s argument that the
interpretation of virtually identical language in the Three Strikes law
mandates a different interpretation. In relevant part, the Three Strikes law
provides that, “if a defendant has two or more prior serious or violent felony
convictions . . . that have been pled and proved, the term for the current
felony conviction shall be an indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence calculated as the greatest of:
[¶] . . . [¶] The term determined by the court pursuant to Section 1170 for the
underlying conviction, including any enhancement applicable under
Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 1170) of Title 7 of Part 2, or any
period prescribed by Section 190 or 3046.” (§ 667(e)(2)(A)(iii).)
In People v. Acosta (2002) 29 Cal.4th 105, 115, the Supreme Court
construed this language to “include[ ] any applicable enhancement that would
be used to lengthen the term the defendant would receive absent the Three
Strikes law.” (Acosta, at p. 115, italics added.) In doing so, Acosta relied on
its interpretation of similar language in People v. Jenkins (1995)
10 Cal.4th 234, which concerned section 667.7. (Ibid.) And in Sok, the
Second District, also relying in part on Jenkins, concluded the language of
section 186.22(b)(4)(A) must also be construed in this way. (Sok,
181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 96-97.)
Huerta responds Sok was wrongly decided. Huerta first faults Sok for
“assum[ing] the sentence for the Penal Code section 12022.53 enhancement is
added to the minimum indeterminate term calculation for purposes of
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section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4)(A)” without “address[ing] the precise
language” in section 186.22(b)(4)(A) regarding Chapter 4.5. The People
acknowledge Sok does not address that language directly but contend it did
not need to. We agree Supreme Court precedent fills in any holes Sok left
unaddressed in this regard.
Next, Huerta argues Sok failed to address a Supreme Court case that
allegedly endorsed a sentence inconsistent with that in Sok and here. (Citing
People v. Jones (2009) 47 Cal.4th 566.) But Jones assumed
section 186.22(b)(4)(B) applied, and thus it did not consider the appropriate
minimum term under section 186.22(b)(4)(A). Jones therefore is not
precedential on the issue before us (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139,
154-155), and Sok’s failure to address it is of no moment.
Huerta also points to language in Sok acknowledging its interpretation
“is not free from doubt and could, in at least certain circumstances, produce a
somewhat anomalous result.” (Sok, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 99.) Yet the People
contend, and we agree, that Huerta takes this statement out of context. The
statement applies to Sok’s conclusion “the section 12022.53 gun enhancement
should not be used both to establish the minimum term of the indeterminate
life term under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(4)(A), and as a separate
enhancement of that life term,” as that interpretation can sometimes result
in subdivision (b)(4)(B) imposing a longer sentence. (Sok, at pp. 98-99.)
Thus, the language did not suggest, as Huerta claims, that Sok’s conclusion
that enhancements are included in the minimum term was infirm.
That brings us to Huerta’s last argument against Sok’s interpretation
of section 186.22(b)(4): that it can lead to anomalous results where more
serious crimes are sometimes punished less harshly than less serious ones.
But the fact Huerta can conjure several such examples does not make the
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interpretation advanced by Sok and our high court absurd. Ultimately, “it
matters not whether the drafters, voters or legislators consciously considered
all the effects and interrelationships of the provisions they wrote and
enacted.” (People v. Garcia (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1, 14.) “We must take the
language of section [186.22] . . . as it was passed into law, and must, if
possible without doing violence to the language and spirit of the law,
interpret it so as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions.” (Ibid.)
That we have done.
Finally, Huerta claims it is well settled that under the Three Strikes
law the court doubles the term for the underlying felony but not any
applicable enhancements. We agree this is an accurate statement of the law
so far as it goes. (See People v. Dominguez (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 410, 424.)
Here, however, the court doubled the minimum term for an indeterminate
sentence under an alternate penalty provision that includes the terms of any
enhancements as an element; accordingly, no enhancement was imposed and
impermissibly doubled. The court’s action complied with the express terms of
the Three Strikes law, which provides: “If a defendant has one prior serious
or violent felony conviction as defined in subdivision (d) that has been pled
and proved”—like Huerta—“the determinate term or minimum term for an
indeterminate term shall be twice the term otherwise provided as punishment
for the current felony conviction.” (§ 667(e)1), italics added.) The cases
Huerta cites to support his contrary position are unpersuasive because they
concern enhancements imposed and sentenced as enhancements rather than
as part of the minimum term under section 186.22(b)(4).
We are bound by our Supreme Court’s express pronouncement that
section 186.22(b)(4) “combines an underlying felony with an enhancement in
order to establish a minimum term.” (Montes, 31 Cal.4th at p. 360.)
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Accordingly, we conclude the trial court properly interpreted and applied
section 186.22(b)(4)(A) in calculating Huerta’s sentence for count 2.
II.
We affirm. Because the superior court was unable to locate the
abstract of judgment in this matter, we remand for the trial court to prepare,
to the extent it is necessary, an abstract of judgment consistent with this
opinion and forward a copy to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
IRION, J.
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