CourtListener 10346970•People v. Harris CA2/7
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Filed 2/27/25 P. v. Harris CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B327052
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA023031)
v.
CALEB JAMES HARRIS et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Laura C. Ellison, Judge. Affirmed as to Dwayne Arthur
Moore. Reversed and remanded with instructions as to
Caleb James Harris.
Juvenile Innocence & Fair Sentencing Clinic, Loyola Law
School, Sean Kennedy, Christopher Hawthorne and Jason
Mayland for Defendant and Appellant Caleb James Harris.
John Steinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Dwayne Arthur Moore.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Michael C. Keller, John Yang, and
Stefanie Yee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Dwayne Moore and Caleb James Harris appeal from the
denial of their separate petitions for resentencing under Penal
Code section 1172.6.1
After appointing counsel and reviewing the parties’
briefing, the superior court denied Moore’s petition at the prima
facie stage without issuing an order to show cause because it
concluded the record of conviction established Moore was the
actual killer. Moore contends the record of conviction does not
establish he was ineligible for relief as a matter of law, and the
superior court engaged in improper judicial factfinding. We
affirm the denial of Moore’s section 1172.6 petition.
A different panel of this court previously reversed the
superior court’s denial of Harris’s section 1172.6 petition at the
prima facie stage and remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
After holding the evidentiary hearing, the superior court denied
Harris’s petition for resentencing. The court found the People
met their burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Harris was
guilty of murder under current law. Harris contends the superior
court prejudicially erred when it excluded newly available
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise specified.
2
eyewitness testimony, relied on inadmissible hearsay testimony,
and failed to consider Harris’s youth in its decision. We conclude
the superior court abused its discretion when it excluded the new
eyewitness testimony proffered by Harris, and that Harris has
demonstrated he was prejudiced. We reverse the denial of
Harris’s petition and remand for a new evidentiary hearing. We
decline Harris’s request to transfer the matter to a different
judge on remand.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
A. Valerie Rivers’s Apartment Is Firebombed
On January 26, 1995, Valerie Rivers was in labor and
waiting for her mother to take her to the hospital when Moore,
someone she had known for many years, arrived at her home. A
neighbor, who was there to watch Rivers’s two-year old son, let
Moore into the apartment. Without asking for permission, Moore
used Rivers’s landline telephone. Moore was told he could not
use the phone at that time, but he continued with the call. When
he was done, Moore mocked Rivers and left. Rivers gave birth at
the hospital later that day.
On January 28, 1995, when Rivers returned to her
apartment after her hospital stay, her then-boyfriend was asleep
2 In this opinion, we provide an abbreviated factual
background. Detailed descriptions of the evidence are provided
in our previous opinions from the direct appeals. (People v. Moore
(July 17, 2000, B112631) [nonpub. opn.]; People v. Harris
(Dec. 17, 1998, B118894) [nonpub. opn.].) We additionally grant
Harris’s request for judicial notice of the reporter’s transcripts
from the second and third trials as well as the hearings from the
petitions for resentencing.
3
in her bedroom. She stepped outside to confront Moore about
“disrespecting” her on January 26 when she was in labor. As
they argued, Rivers’s boyfriend came outside and pointed a gun
at Moore. Moore began to cry and asked Rivers, “You gonna let
him do this to me?” Rivers’s boyfriend eventually went back into
the apartment with Rivers. Moore’s friends, Charles Lewis and
Bobby Freeman, witnessed the incident.
Later the same day, Eric Bowden saw Moore at an
apartment building located on Eucalyptus Avenue. Harris’s
sister lived in that apartment building with her boyfriend,
Cleveland Mouton. Bowden and Harris often stayed at Mouton’s
apartment. Harris was also at the Eucalyptus Avenue
apartments that day. Freeman lived in the building next door,
and a dozen or so people frequently congregated in the carport in
between the two buildings. Bowden testified that “everybody”
was teasing Moore about the incident with Rivers’s boyfriend.
Bowden told detectives he saw Moore and Harris fill beer bottles
with gasoline and put cut-up bedsheets into the bottles.3 Moore
and Harris left the apartment complex around 8:00 p.m.
At approximately 8:30 p.m. that evening, Rivers heard
people talking outside her apartment. She was in the bedroom
with her children. A man whose voice she could not identify said,
“If the home girl is cool and she got kids, then I wouldn’t fuck
with her. But if she—if she’s not, then fuck it. Whatever.”
3 At the first trial, Bowden recanted his prior statements to
the police. Bowden explained he had simply repeated what the
police told him and had lied out of fear because the investigating
officer said he was a suspect. The prosecutor subsequently
impeached Bowden with his preliminary hearing testimony and
his prior statements to the police.
4
Rivers then heard a voice she recognized as Moore’s respond, “I’m
not going out like that. Meet me back here in 30 minutes.” Less
than 30 minutes later, Rivers heard Moore call her by name,
“Valerie.” A “ball of fire” was then thrown through her bedroom
window. It hit Rivers in the face and she ran to the bathroom to
put it out. Rivers attempted to reach her children, but the
bedroom was quickly engulfed in flames. Rivers suffered severe
burns, requiring multiple skin grafts, and was hospitalized for
two months. Both her children died as a result of the fire.
Robert Alcaraz, Jr., testified he was waiting in his car for a
friend when he saw two young Black men in dark, loose clothing
outside Rivers’s apartment light a rag and throw an object
through the window. Alcaraz saw a flame and heard the sound of
breaking glass. The two men ran off. Neither Alcaraz nor his
friend identified Harris as one of the two men outside Rivers’s
apartment building that night. Alcaraz’s friend had previously
lived in the area and knew Moore. The friend testified she saw
Moore standing outside Rivers’s apartment building with one or
two others when she arrived with Alcaraz. Bowden testified
Harris later told Bowden he went over to Rivers’s apartment but
had not thrown the Molotov cocktail.
Moore and Harris were charged by information on June 1,
1995 with two counts of first degree murder of Rivers’s children
(counts 1 and 2; § 187, subd. (a)), one count of attempted murder
of Rivers (count 3; §§ 664/187, subd. (a)), and one count of arson
causing great bodily injury (count 4; § 451, subd. (a)). The
information further alleged as special circumstances that the
murders were committed by means of a destructive device
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(6)), were committed during the commission of
arson (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), and constituted multiple murders
5
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). It was also alleged the attempted murder
was willful, deliberate, and premeditated (§ 664, subd. (a)) and
committed with the intent to personally inflict great bodily injury
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
Moore and Harris were tried together. The jury was unable
to reach a verdict as to either defendant, and the court declared a
mistrial. Moore was subsequently convicted in a second trial, but
the jury failed to reach a verdict as to Harris. Harris was
convicted in a third trial. We discuss Moore’s second and Harris’s
third trial in greater detail below.
B. The Jury Finds Moore Guilty on All Counts at the Second
Trial
At the second trial, Moore and Harris were again tried
together. But this time, Bowden was unavailable to testify, and
the People read his testimony from the first trial into the record,
including the testimony from the preliminary hearing and his
statements to the police that were used to impeach him.
As relevant here, for counts 1 and 2 involving the children,
the court instructed the jury on first degree malice murder and
felony murder, and aiding and abetting liability. The court did
not instruct the jury on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. The court further instructed the jury on three special
circumstance allegations, i.e., murder during the commission of
arson, murder by means of destructive device, and multiple
murders. The introductory instruction on the special
circumstance allegations advised the jury that if they found the
defendant to be the actual killer, they did not have to find an
intent to kill but if they found he was not the actual killer, they
could not find true the special circumstances unless they also
6
found the defendant harbored an intent to kill as an aider or
abettor or that he was a major participant in the underlying
felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
The jury was instructed on attempted willful, deliberate,
and premeditated murder of Rivers for count 3, which required a
finding that the defendant acted with malice. The jury was also
instructed on the intentional infliction of great bodily injury
enhancement attendant to the attempted murder count, which
required the jury to determine whether the defendant, with the
specific intent to inflict injury, did personally inflict great bodily
injury on Rivers.
On November 14, 1996, the jury found Moore guilty as
charged on all four counts. The People sought the death penalty
for Moore but after a penalty phase trial, the jury announced it
was hopelessly deadlocked on the penalty verdict. The
prosecution announced it would not retry the penalty phase.
Moore’s motions for new trial and to reduce the judgment
were denied. The trial court sentenced Moore to consecutive
terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole for the first
degree murders in counts 1 and 2 and a consecutive term of life in
prison with the possibility of parole for the premeditated
attempted murder plus three years for the great bodily injury
enhancement in count 3. The prison term in count 4 was stayed
pursuant to section 654. Moore appealed, and we affirmed.
(People v. Moore (July 17, 2000, B112631) [nonpub. opn.].)
C. Harris Is Convicted of Murder and Arson at a Third Trial
A second mistrial was declared as to Harris when the jury
was unable to reach a verdict. The People retried Harris. At
Harris’s third trial, the People once again read Bowden’s
7
testimony into the record because Bowden was unavailable as a
witness. The jury heard him repudiate his statements to the
police identifying Harris as one of the individuals who made the
Molotov cocktails and carried them to a van with Moore. The
prosecution also presented testimony from Detective Patrick
Lane. In a police interview, Bowden told Detective Lane he
heard Moore say he was “going to get the dude back.” Detective
Lane also testified that Bowden said Harris was “pumping up”
Moore to get revenge against Rivers’s boyfriend.
Ernest Bowman testified two individuals made Molotov
cocktails in the laundry room behind the apartment complex and
said he saw Moore and Harris carry the Molotov cocktails to a
parked van and drive away together. On direct examination,
Bowman identified Harris as one of the men actually making the
Molotov cocktails, but conceded on cross-examination that Harris
had just been standing in the doorway to the laundry room while
two other men made the Molotov cocktails.
The jury found Harris guilty on both counts of first degree
murder and of arson causing great bodily injury, but not guilty of
attempted murder. The jury also found true all the charged
special circumstances that the murders were committed by
means of a destructive device, were committed during the
commission of arson, and constituted multiple murders.
The trial court denied Harris’s motion for new trial. The
court concluded the verdict was valid on a felony murder theory:
“from what the jury came up with, [Harris] basically was an aider
and abettor, as far as the arson is concerned.”
The People recommended a sentence of life without the
possibility of parole. The trial court sentenced Harris to a term of
25 years to life for each murder count, reasoning, “I know the
8
People tried to show that the defendant may have thrown [a
Molotov cocktail]. But there’s just no evidence of that at all.”
The court also observed, “both the jury and I personally feel that
[Harris] did not intend the happening that did occur,” and that
the court “would have had a problem with the case if the jury
based their decision on any kind of finding by innuendo that this
defendant intended these babies [or Rivers] be killed or injured.”
The trial court further sentenced Harris to a consecutive
determinate term of seven years for the arson. On appeal, we
affirmed the judgment. (People v. Harris (Dec. 17, 1998,
B118894) [nonpub. opn.].)
D. Moore Files a Section 1172.6 Petition, Which Is Denied at
the Prima Facie Stage
On January 24, 2022, Moore filed a petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. The petition alleged, in
relevant part: (1) that Moore was prosecuted under the theory of
felony murder, the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
or other theory under which malice was imputed based solely
upon his participation in a crime; (2) that he was convicted of
murder or attempted murder under the felony-murder rule, the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory
under which malice is imputed . . . based solely on [his]
participation in a crime . . .”; (3) that he could not presently be
convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes
made to sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019; and
(4) having presented a facially sufficient petition, he requested
appointment of counsel. The superior court appointed counsel
and the People opposed the petition.
9
The court issued a tentative decision denying the petition
because the record of conviction showed Moore was the actual
killer. Moore’s counsel filed an “SB 1437 Merit Brief” arguing the
superior court improperly engaged in fact finding at the prima
facie stage and that the evidence did not establish Moore was a
major participant who acted with reckless indifference to life.
The superior court denied Moore’s petition, concluding
Moore was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 because he
was the actual killer. The court determined the record of
conviction established the jury found Moore personally threw the
firebomb through the window when it found true the
section 12022.7, subdivision (a), special allegation that Moore
personally inflicted great bodily injury in the attempted murder
of Rivers. The court explained, “the jury may well have
concluded that Petitioner only intended to kill Ms. Rivers and not
her two young children. The jury may have relied on an arson
felony murder theory as to the two children. However, the
evidence established that it was the firebomb that ignited the
fire . . . killing the children. Therefore, by throwing the firebomb,
Petitioner was the actual killer.”
Moore timely appealed.
E. Harris’s Section 1172.6 Petition Is Denied After an
Evidentiary Hearing
On February 13, 2019, Harris petitioned for resentencing
pursuant to former section 1170.95 (current section 1172.6). The
superior court denied Harris’s petition at the prima facie stage.
Harris appealed and this court reversed with directions to the
superior court to issue an order to show cause and to conduct an
10
evidentiary hearing. (See People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th
939, 961 (Harris I).)
The superior court conducted the evidentiary hearing on
January 23 and February 15, 2023. The parties submitted
briefing before the hearings. The People argued in their brief
that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt Harris was
guilty of murder under current law as an aider and abettor who
acted with malice aforethought and as a major participant who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Harris argued he could not currently be convicted of
murder under felony murder principles or any alternate theory of
liability in which malice was imputed. He further argued the
People’s evidence against him was based on testimony that was
recanted, biased, and contradicted. Harris sought to introduce
new testimony from Cleveland “Bam” Mouton.4
In a sworn declaration, Mouton stated he had known Moore
since the ninth grade and had personal knowledge of the crimes
against Rivers and her children. Mouton explained that, in the
course of their investigation, the police accused him and his
“associates,” including Bowman and Bowden, of firebombing
Rivers’s apartment. As a result, “[a]t Caleb Harris’ trial I
pleaded the 5th and chose not to testify and exculpate Caleb
because I was personally present at this offense.” Mouton stated
in his declaration that he had knowledge that “Bowden lied to
police about Caleb’s involvement because I was present during
4 Harris also submitted a declaration by Lolita Jennings,
Bowman’s then-girlfriend. Jennings repeated her trial testimony
that she did not see Harris at the Eucalyptus apartments on the
day of the murders. Jennings did not appear at the resentencing
hearings.
11
this crime and Caleb was not there.” Mouton also stated, that
Bowman told him that Bowman lied to the police about Harris’s
involvement “following [Bowman’s] unrelated arrest in order to
get the benefit of serving less time.”
At the hearing, the People orally moved to exclude
Mouton’s testimony because the “sole purpose [to admitting
Mouton’s testimony] is to argue to the court that [Harris] didn’t
commit a crime” and “the statute itself does not contemplate re-
litigating issues such as identification.” Harris’s counsel denied
any intention to invoke an identity defense at the evidentiary
hearing; he asserted the issue of identity was raised in Harris’s
separate habeas petition. Counsel argued Mouton’s testimony
was relevant to Harris’s state of mind, his level of participation in
the crime, and whether Harris had sufficient influence over
Moore. The superior court granted the People’s motion to exclude
Mouton’s testimony, concluding, “[i]t appears that this testimony
would lend itself solely to an identity, ‘I wasn’t there,’ type of
defense, which is not a relevant factor under the 1170.6 rubric.”
After the parties presented their arguments, the superior
court denied Harris’s petition, stating as follows:
“If you look at the role that the defendant had in the
planning, the facts indicate that the petitioner helped
fill beer bottles with gasoline, and put cut up bed
sheets into it. The petitioner encouraged Moore to
get revenge for an earlier act by Del[l]ano. He was
involved in the planning and preparation of the
arson. If you look at the role the defendant had or
petitioner had in supplying or using the lethal
weapons, the facts are he took part in the creation of
12
the murder weapons. . . . The defendant was aware
of the dangers posed by this, even though he was the
youthful age of 17, I find that he had awareness of
the danger of the particular dangers posed by the
nature of this weapon. After the lethal force in this
case was used, it’s clear that the defendant fled with
knowledge of what had occurred. Based on all of
these factors, again, I find that after reviewing the
Banks factors, after looking at the laws that
currently exist now, under 1172[.6] I find the People
have met their burden beyond a reasonable doubt to
prove that he could still be convicted of these two
murders.”
Harris timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. The Superior Court Properly Denied Moore’s Petition for
Resentencing Under Section 1172.6 at the Prima Facie
Stage
1. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015) eliminated the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder and
significantly limited the scope of the felony murder rule by
amending sections 188 and 189. (See People v. Reyes (2023)
14 Cal.5th 981, 984 (Reyes); People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 707-708 (Strong); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957
(Lewis).) Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing
13
malice based solely on an individual’s participation in a crime
and requires proof of malice to convict a principal of murder,
except under the revised felony murder rule in section 189,
subdivision (e). Section 189 now requires the People to prove the
defendant was the actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); an aider and
abettor to murder who had the intent to kill (§ 189, subd. (e)(2));
or a major participant in an underlying felony listed in
section 189, subdivision (a), who acted with reckless indifference
to human life as described in subdivision (d) of section 190.2
(§ 189, subd. (e)(3)). (See People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433,
448 (Curiel); People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 868-869.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 also provided a procedure in
section 1172.6 for an individual convicted of felony murder or
murder under the natural and probable consequences theory to
petition the sentencing court to vacate the conviction and be
resentenced on any remaining counts if the individual could not
have been convicted of murder under the changes to sections 188
and 189. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959.)
Section 1172.6 sets out the following sequence: “a
complying petition is filed; the court appoints counsel, if
requested; the issue is briefed; and then the court makes one . . .
prima facie determination.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 966;
see § 1172.6, subds. (b)-(c).) “In reviewing any part of the record
of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not
engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion.’” (Lewis, at p. 972.) Rather, at the prima
facie review stage, the court’s review is limited to “‘readily
ascertainable facts’” in the record, such as the jury instructions,
the record of the crimes committed, and jury findings on the
enhancements. (People v. Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798,
14
815; see Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 453-454 [relevant jury
finding is generally preclusive in section 1172.6 proceedings];
accord, Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 710; People v. Beaudreaux
(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1241 (Beaudreaux).) “[T]he ‘prima
facie bar was intentionally and correctly set very low.’” (Lewis, at
p. 972; accord, People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972, 979-
980; see People v. Lopez (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 566, 576 [“It is
only where the record of conviction establishes the petition lacks
merit as a matter of law that the court may deny the petition
without a hearing.”].)
We independently review the superior court’s prima facie
determination under section 1172.6. (See People v. Williams
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251; People v. Harden (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52 (Harden).)
2. The Record of Conviction Establishes Moore Is
Ineligible for Relief as a Matter of Law Because He
Was the Actual Killer
The jury found true “the allegation that in the commission
and attempted commission of the above [attempted murder]
offense the said defendant, Dwayne Arthur Moore, with the
intent to inflict such injury, personally inflicted great bodily
injury upon Valerie Ann Rivers within the meaning of Penal
Code section 12022.7(a).”5
“‘[T]he meaning of the statutory requirement that the
defendant personally inflict the injury does not differ from its
nonlegal meaning.’” (People v. Martinez (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th
5 The current version of section 12022.7, subdivision (a), no
longer requires an intent to inflict great bodily injury. This
change in the statute does not alter our analysis.
15
1169, 1184.) “[I]n enacting section 12022.7, the Legislature
intended the designation ‘personally’ to limit the category of
persons subject to the enhancement to those who directly perform
the act that causes the physical injury to the victim.” (People v.
Cole (1982) 31 Cal.3d 568, 579.) “‘Commonly understood, the
phrase “personally inflicts” means that someone “in person”
[citation], that is, directly and not through an intermediary,
“cause[s] something (damaging or painful) to be endured.”’”
(Martinez, at p. 1184, quoting People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th
58, 68; accord, People v. Slough (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 419, 423
(Slough).) “Accordingly, ‘one who merely aids, abets, or directs
another to inflict the physical injury is not subject to the
enhanced penalty of section 12022.7.’” (Slough, at p. 423.)
Further, “a relevant jury finding is generally preclusive in
section 1172.6 proceedings, i.e., it ‘ordinarily establish[es] a
defendant’s ineligibility for resentencing under Senate Bill 1437
and thus preclude[s] the defendant from making a prima facie
case for relief.’” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 453-454, quoting
Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 710.)
The jury’s verdict demonstrates the jury found that Moore
committed the crime of attempted murder against Rivers by
throwing the Molotov cocktail into her apartment. Although this
true finding was attendant to the attempted murder charge in
count 3 and not to the murder charges in counts 1 and 2, at trial
the evidence was uncontroverted that the children died as a
result of the firebombing. The prosecution argued in closing that
Moore threw a Molotov cocktail through Rivers’s window and
that Moore was the actual killer of the children. Moore’s trial
counsel conceded that “these two children died as the result of the
arson fire” and “[y]ou will never hear Mr. Moore or the defense in
16
this case try and tell you that the deaths were caused by
something other than that.” The jury additionally found true the
special allegation that Moore committed murder “by means of a
destructive device that said defendant delivered, attempted to
deliver, and caused to be delivered.” This true finding further
indicates the jury directly linked Moore to the firebomb that
caused the children’s deaths.
Given the jury instructions and verdicts, and the personal-
infliction-of-great-bodily-injury enhancement, the record of
conviction establishes Moore was convicted as the actual killer
without the need to engage in factfinding, weigh conflicting
evidence, or make credibility determinations. “As a matter of
law, resentencing relief under section 1172.6 is not available to
an ‘actual killer.’” (People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956,
973; accord, People v. Bodely (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1201.)
Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at page 47, is instructive.
There, the superior court summarily denied relief under former
section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6) because “the jury
instructions and verdicts conclusively establish—with no
factfinding, weighing of evidence, or credibility determinations—
that in 2001 [the petitioner] was convicted as the actual killer.”
(Harden, at p. 47.) The Harden jury was instructed on murder,
felony murder, special circumstances, and personal infliction of
great bodily injury, but not on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or aiding and abetting. The jury convicted
the defendant of murder with special circumstances—that she
committed murder while engaged in the commission of robbery
and burglary and that in the commission of these crimes, she
personally inflicted great bodily injury pursuant to
section 12022.7. (See Harden, at p. 55.)
17
Harden concluded, “The instructions and verdicts show the
only path to convicting [the defendant] of first degree felony
murder with special circumstances and a personal-infliction-of-
great-bodily-injury enhancement was based on a finding she
actually killed [the victim].” (Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at
p. 56; see Beaudreaux, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1247 [despite
felony murder instruction, “reading all the charges, the
instructions, the verdicts, and the findings as a whole, we see no
legal route [the defendant’s] jury could have taken to convict him
without finding he was [the victim’s] actual killer”].)
Moore’s attempt to distinguish Harden because the Harden
jury was not instructed on aiding and abetting principles is
unavailing. In Harden, the prosecutor decided not to request an
aiding and abetting instruction because there was no evidence of
a second perpetrator. (Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 53.)
Harden noted it was “certainly not dispositive” that aiding and
abetting instructions would have left open the possibility that at
least one juror convicted the defendant of felony murder on a
theory other than that of being the actual killer. (Ibid.) Harden’s
holding that jury instructions and verdicts, and a finding of a
personal-infliction-of-great-bodily-injury enhancement means the
record of conviction can establish ineligibility for section 1172.6
relief as a matter of law remains instructive. (See Harden, at
p. 56.)
Relatedly, Moore contends the superior court engaged in
impermissible judicial factfinding at the prima facie stage by
applying the jury’s true finding for the attempted murder count
to the two murder counts. He recites the superior court’s
statement that “[t]he evidence at trial established that Petitioner
threw a firebomb through an apartment window, horribly
18
injuring Valerie Rivers and burning to death her [two children].”
According to Moore, the superior court was not entitled to make a
factual finding that the same act (throwing the firebomb) that
was the basis for the jury’s verdict as to the personal infliction of
great bodily injury in count 3 also caused the death of the murder
victims in counts 1 and 2.
“In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this
preliminary juncture, a [superior] court should not engage in
‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion.’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) But here, the
superior court did not consider conflicting evidence or make
credibility determinations to reach the conclusion that the same
act caused both Rivers’s great bodily injury and her children’s
deaths.6 (See People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 233
6 We reject Moore’s argument that a dispute of fact was
noted by this court in its previous opinion from Moore’s direct
appeal. Moore cites our conclusion that Harris’s extrajudicial
statement that he was present at the scene of the crime “‘did not
even necessarily indirectly implicate appellant [Moore] when
considered with the rest of the evidence . . ., it is not at all
apparent from Harris’s statement appellant, rather than a third
party, was the one who threw the Molotov cocktails.’ (People v.
Moore, B112631, slip opinion page 27, italics added.)” This
observation was made in response to Moore’s argument that
Harris’s extrajudicial statement somehow implicated Moore and
was inadmissible under Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S.
123 and People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518. We merely
observed Harris’s statement did not identify Moore or otherwise
implicate him. Our observation was not a conclusion that the
evidence was disputed as to whether Moore threw the firebomb or
whether Rivers’s great bodily injury and the children’s deaths
were caused by the same firebomb.
19
[affirming summary denial at prima facie stage where
uncontradicted facts were that petitioner was driving on wrong
side of road while intoxicated, causing death].) Here, it is
undisputed the firebombing killed the children, and the jury
found Moore threw the Molotov cocktail that started the fire. The
court did not engage in any factfinding under these
circumstances.
Moore also argues the jury’s true finding of personal
infliction of great bodily injury does not render him ineligible for
resentencing under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. In support,
he cites People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 598 (Offley),
People v. Davenport (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 476, 485-486
(Davenport), and People v. Elder (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 411, 424
(Elder), but these cases are distinguishable and do not stand for
the proposition advanced by Moore.
Offley addressed personal use of a firearm pursuant to
section 12022.53, subdivision (d).7 Offley determined the jury’s
finding the defendant had personally used a gun did not render
him ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law.
It held the jury might have concluded the petitioner intended
only to commit an assault with the aim of injuring or frightening
the victim and if so, may have convicted the defendant of murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (See
7 Section 12022.53, subdivision (d), provides:
“Notwithstanding any other law, a person who, in the commission
of a [specified] felony . . . personally and intentionally discharges
a firearm and proximately causes great bodily injury, as defined
in Section 12022.7, or death, to a person other than an
accomplice, shall be punished by an additional and consecutive
term of imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years to life.”
20
Offley, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 599.) But here, the jury was
not instructed under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.
In Davenport, the defendant pleaded no contest to the
personal use of a firearm enhancement under section 12022.5,
subdivision (a). Davenport concluded the personal use of a
firearm admission did not preclude the possibility of prosecution
under a now invalid felony murder theory.8 (See Davenport,
supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 485-486.) “‘“Personally uses a
firearm”’” in the context of section 12022.5 includes the
intentional display of the weapon in a menacing manner, to
intentionally fire it, or to intentionally strike or hit a human
being with it. (People v. Johnson (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1315,
1319.) Unlike the jury’s finding here, Davenport’s plea of no
contest to personal use of a firearm did not establish as a matter
of law that he was the actual killer, had the intent to kill and
aided or abetted the actual killer, or was a major participant in
the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to
human life.
And Elder did not involve section 1172.6 resentencing, but
was a direct appeal that addressed whether a defendant could be
convicted of the personal infliction of great bodily injury
enhancement if the victim dislocated his own finger trying to
prevent the defendant’s escape. (See Elder, supra,
8 Section 12022.5, subdivision (a), provides: “Except as
provided in subdivision (b), any person who personally uses a
firearm in the commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be
punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment
in the state prison for 3, 4, or 10 years, unless use of a firearm is
an element of that offense.”
21
227 Cal.App.4th at p. 424.) Elder set out the parameters of when
the enhancement could be imposed and did not discuss whether a
jury’s true finding of the enhancement could establish as a
matter of law that the defendant was the actual killer.
Moore next contends the instructions relating to the
murder counts allowed the jury to convict him as an aider and
abettor who did not harbor an intent to kill, rendering him
eligible for relief under section 1172.6.
But here, the aiding and abetting instructions did not open
up the possibility a juror might have convicted Moore on a theory
other than being the actual killer. That is because the aiding and
abetting instructions should be viewed in the context of the jury
instructions as a whole and the entire trial. (See Cupp v.
Naughten (1973) 414 U.S. 141, 146-147 [“In determining the
effect of this instruction on the validity of respondent’s conviction,
we accept at the outset the well established proposition that a
single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial
isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.
[Citation]. . . . [A] judgment of conviction is commonly the
culmination of a trial which includes testimony of witnesses,
argument of counsel, receipt of exhibits in evidence, and
instruction of the jury by the judge. Thus not only is the
challenged instruction but one of many such instructions, but the
process of instruction itself is but one of several components of
the trial which may result in the judgment of conviction.”];
People v. Haskett (1990) 52 Cal.3d 210, 235 [“‘we follow the
familiar rule stated in Cupp’”].) At closing, the prosecutor
advised the jury he was proceeding on a theory Moore was the
actual killer who threw the Molotov cocktail, and Harris aided
and abetted the murder. The court instructed the jury that if it
22
found Moore was the actual killer, it did not have to find an
intent to kill. The verdict form also required the jury to
determine whether the defendant did personally inflict great
bodily injury on Rivers. As discussed, the jury’s finding that
Moore personally inflicted great bodily injury on Rivers in
connection with the attempted murder count meant that the jury
found Moore was the actual killer who threw the Molotov cocktail
that killed the children; this finding is consistent with the
prosecution’s theory of liability and the court’s instructions.
In sum, the superior court did not err by summarily
denying Moore’s section 1172.6 petition.
B. Harris Is Entitled to a New Evidentiary Hearing Under
Section 1172.6
1. Governing Law and Standard of Review
If the petitioner makes the requisite prima facie showing
he is entitled to relief under section 1172.6, the superior court
must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction
and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts. (See
§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d)(1).) Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3),
provides that at the evidentiary hearing, “the burden of proof
shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under
California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189
made effective January 1, 2019. The admission of evidence in the
hearing shall be governed by the Evidence Code, except that the
court may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior
hearing or trial that is admissible under current law, including
witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially
23
noticed. . . . The prosecutor and the petitioner may also offer new
or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
As stated, section 189, subdivision (e), now requires the
People to prove the defendant was the actual killer, an aider and
abettor to murder, or a major participant in an underlying felony
who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (See Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 448.) People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th
788 (Banks) “substantially clarified the law surrounding major
participant findings,” and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522
(Clark) “substantially clarified the relevant considerations for
determining whether a defendant has acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 721.)
Banks specified that courts should consider: “What role did
the defendant have in planning the criminal enterprise that led
to one or more deaths? What role did the defendant have in
supplying or using lethal weapons? What awareness did the
defendant have of particular dangers posed by the nature of the
crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other
participants? Was the defendant present at the scene of the
killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder,
and did his or her own actions or inaction play a particular role in
the death? What did the defendant do after lethal force was
used?” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803, fn. omitted.)
In Clark, the high court analyzed the subjective and
objective elements to determine whether a defendant acts with
reckless indifference to human life, including: was the defendant
aware that weapons would be used; did the defendant himself or
herself use the weapon; did the defendant have an opportunity to
reduce the overall risk of violence during the felony or to aid the
24
victim; did the defendant know his cohorts were likely to use
lethal force? (See Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618-622.) The
high court observed these elements largely overlap with the
“major participant” analysis. (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th
667, 676-677.) “‘Although we state these two requirements
separately, they often overlap,’” “‘for the greater the defendant’s
participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted
with reckless indifference to human life.’” (Clark, at p. 615.)
“We review a trial court’s rulings on the admission and
exclusion of evidence under the abuse of discretion standard.”
(People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 128.) “Of course, in a
section [1172.6] petition, the trial judge isn’t charged with
holding a whole new trial on all the elements of murder. Instead,
the parties will focus on evidence made relevant by the
amendments to the substantive definition of murder.” (People v.
Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298 (Clements); accord,
People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 952 (Vargas); see
People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, 678 [rejecting
argument that section 1172.6 “authorizes a defendant to present
new evidence to undermine a jury’s finding of guilt under a
particular theory of murder, effectively retrying the case”].)9
9 Harris asserts the resentencing hearings in Clements and
Vargas took place in 2021, when the statute did not allow for the
introduction of new or additional evidence at the evidentiary
hearing. In 2021, section 1172.6 was numbered section 1170.95.
Subdivision (d)(3) of that section expressly provided that at the
evidentiary hearing, “[t]he prosecutor and the petitioner may rely
on the record of conviction or offer new or additional evidence to
meet their respective burdens.”
25
We review the superior court’s decision to deny the petition
after an evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence, provided
the court understood the elements of the offense and applied the
proper standard and burden of proof. (See Reyes, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 988; Vargas, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 951.)
2. The Superior Court Prejudicially Erred When It
Excluded Mouton from Testifying
Harris contends the superior court abused its discretion
when it excluded Mouton’s proffered testimony. According to
Harris, Mouton’s personal knowledge of the events at the
Eucalyptus apartments and Rivers’s apartment was sufficient to
render Mouton’s testimony relevant and admissible. Specifically,
Harris argues that Mouton’s testimony was relevant to determine
the level of Harris’s participation in the arson, Harris’s state of
mind, and the reliability of Bowden’s and Bowman’s testimony,
all of which are relevant to the Banks and Clark factors. Harris’s
contention has merit, in particular because on appeal, the People
do not contend Harris was the actual killer or that he aided and
abetted with the intent to kill. They instead contend the
evidence was overwhelming that he acted as a major participant
with reckless disregard for human life.
Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), provides that the
admission of evidence at an evidentiary hearing is governed by
the Evidence Code, which specifies that only relevant evidence is
admissible at trial. (See Evid. Code, § 350.) “‘Relevant evidence’
means evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a
witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to
prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.) The test of
26
relevance is whether the evidence tends to logically, naturally
and by reasonable inference establish material facts such as
identity, intent, or motive. (See People v. Williams (2008)
43 Cal.4th 584, 633-634.)
Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), also places the burden on
the People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Harris was
guilty of murder under current law. The People acknowledge
their burden: “at the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution need
only prove either that a petitioner acted with actual malice under
the amended section 188, subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2), or that
his conduct satisfied the amended elements of felony murder
under section 189, subdivision (e).” In other words, the People
were required to prove malice, or that Harris was a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
As we explained in our opinion in Harris I, an evidentiary
hearing was necessary because some of the factors under Banks
and Clark to determine whether Harris was a major participant
who acted with reckless indifference to human life were disputed
at trial and not clearly resolved by the jury’s findings.
Under Banks and Clark, evidence of Harris’s presence at
the scene of the crime was plainly relevant to whether he was a
major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life. The United States Supreme
Court has “stressed the importance of presence to culpability.”
(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619, citing Tison v. Arizona (1987)
481 U.S. 137, 158.) Where “the murder is a culmination or a
foreseeable result of several intermediate steps . . . , ‘the
defendant’s presence allows him to observe his cohorts so that it
is fair to conclude that he shared in their actions and mental
state. . . . [Moreover,] the defendant’s presence gives him an
27
opportunity to act as a restraining influence on murderous
cohorts. If the defendant fails to act as a restraining influence,
then the defendant is arguably more at fault for the resulting
murders.’” (Clark, at p. 619.) Harris’s potential absence from
Rivers’s apartment (to which Mouton would have testified) would
have demonstrated a different level of participation in the crime
than if Harris had been present. Further, it was established at
trial that Mouton was present at the Eucalyptus apartments and
he could also have testified as to Harris’s conduct there.
In short, Harris’s state of mind, the level of his
participation in the crime, and Bowden and Bowman’s reliability
were disputed facts of consequence at the evidentiary hearing.
Mouton’s testimony was relevant and admissible as to these
issues. As a result, we are not persuaded by the People’s
argument that Mouton’s proffered testimony was limited to the
issue of identity and therefore irrelevant to the issues at the
evidentiary hearing.
The People contend that even if the court erred when it
excluded Mouton’s testimony, any error was harmless because
the record “overwhelmingly” demonstrates Harris was a major
participant in the underlying arson and that he acted with
reckless indifference to human life. In support, the People cite to
the “mutually corroborating evidence” found in Bowman’s and
Bowden’s testimony that Harris was involved in preparing and
transporting the Molotov cocktails as well as his presence at the
scene of the crime.
We apply the “‘reasonable probability’” test of Watson,
supra, 46 Cal.2d at page 836 to determine whether the exclusion
of Mouton’s testimony was harmless. (People v. Robinson (2005)
37 Cal.4th 592, 627.) We conclude it is reasonably probable
28
Harris would have obtained a more favorable decision had
Mouton’s testimony been admitted. As stated, the degree of
Harris’s culpability was disputed at trial and was not clearly
resolved by the jury’s findings. Mouton’s proffered testimony
that Harris was absent from the scene of the crime was relevant
and material to whether Harris was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human
life under Banks and Clark. Mouton also indicated he would
testify to Bowman’s and Bowden’s lack of credibility. We
conclude the exclusion of Mouton’s testimony was prejudicial and
reverse and remand for a new evidentiary hearing.10
3. Harris Does Not Establish Grounds for Judicial
Disqualification Under Code of Civil Procedure
Section 170.1
Harris requests that we direct any further proceedings to a
different judge pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1,
subdivision (c). That provision states that, “At the request of a
party or on its own motion an appellate court shall consider
whether in the interests of justice it should direct that further
10 In light of our reversal and remand, we do not reach
Harris’s additional contentions that the superior court:
considered inadmissible hearsay testimony by Detective Lane;
found that Harris harbored an intent to kill even though such
finding was not supported by the record; and, failed to consider
his youth at the time of the offense.
29
proceedings be heard before a trial judge other than the judge
whose judgment or order was reviewed by the appellate court.”11
Appellate courts must exercise the power to disqualify
sentencing judges “sparingly and only where the interests of
justice require it.” (People v. Gulbrandsen (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d
1547, 1562 (Gulbrandsen); accord, Peracchi v. Superior Court
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 1245, 1256-1257.) “Disqualification may be
necessary where the sentence of the original judge indicates an
animus inconsistent with judicial objectivity. It may also be
called for where the judge’s failure to follow the sentencing rules
suggests a whimsical disregard of the sentencing scheme that is
incompatible with a judicious effort to comply with its complex
terms. But mere sentencing error, given the complexity of the
determinate sentencing scheme, does not justify removing the
trial judge; a mere failure to comply with its requirements cannot
be said to reflect a lack of objectivity implicating the interests of
justice. Nor would sentence reversal in such a case be likely to
cause the sentencing court to lose its objectivity.” (Gulbrandsen,
supra, at p. 1562, fn. omitted; see Peracchi, at pp. 1256-1257
[remand to different judge may be necessary where the ruling or
sentence of the original judge indicates an animus inconsistent
with judicial objectivity or whimsical disregard of the law].)
Harris questions the superior court judge’s impartiality and
ability to comply with this Court’s direction to “proceed
consistently” with section 1172.6 on remand. In particular,
Harris faults the superior court judge’s decision to exclude his
only new witness and for contradicting its own determination at
11 Certain sections of the Code of Civil Procedure, including
section 170.1, apply to both civil and criminal proceedings. (See
People v. Superior Court (Laff) (2001) 25 Cal.4th 703, 729, fn. 12.)
30
the prima facie stage that Harris did not display an intent to kill.
Neither of these decisions indicates judicial animus or a
“whimsical disregard” for the requirements of section 1172.6.
“‘[A] judge’s “rulings against a party—even when erroneous—do
not establish a charge of judicial bias, especially when they are
subject to review.”’” (People v. Silveria (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195,
320, fn. omitted.) Accordingly, we decline Harris’s Code of Civil
Procedure Section 170.1 request.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Moore’s petition for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6 is affirmed.
The order denying Harris’s petition for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6 is reversed and the matter is
remanded for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6,
subdivision (d). We further direct the court to vacate its order
granting the People’s motion to exclude Mouton from testifying
and to enter a new order denying the motion so Mouton may be
allowed to testify at Harris’s evidentiary hearing.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
SEGAL, J. PULOS, J.*
* Judge of the San Diego County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
31
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