People v. Garibaldi CA2/4

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Filed 2/19/25 P. v. Garibaldi CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B331863

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA157932
v.

MIGUEL GARIBALDI,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Hector E. Gutierrez, Judge. Affirmed.
William G. Holzer, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Jason Tran and Taylor Nguyen,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Because the issue presented in this appeal is narrow and
straightforward, and because we are not publishing this opinion,
we resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (See Cal. Stds.
Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) We reject defendant and appellant Miguel
Garibaldi’s argument that his sentence violated Penal Code
section 654.1

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A jury convicted Garibaldi of second-degree robbery (§ 211;
count one) and possession of a firearm with a prior violent felony
conviction (§ 29900, subd. (a)(1); count two). On the robbery
count, the jury found true the allegation that Garibaldi
personally used a firearm in the commission of the offense.
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a).) In a bifurcated proceeding, Garibaldi
admitted he sustained the prior conviction alleged related to
count two, and the trial court found various aggravating
sentencing factors true. The court sentenced Garibaldi to nine
years and eight months in state prison, consisting of a five-year
upper term on count one, plus a four-year firearm enhancement
on that count, and an eight-month consecutive term on count
two.2 Garibaldi timely appealed.
The facts underlying Garibaldi’s convictions are as follows.
Mohammad Wali Ullah owned a market in Carson, and worked
there on July 7, 2022. Around 2:00 p.m. that day, Ullah was
standing at the market’s front door when he saw a man, whom he

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2 Although the information alleged Garibaldi sustained a
prior strike conviction, at sentencing, the trial court exercised its
discretion to dismiss that allegation in the interest of justice.

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identified in court as Garibaldi, pacing back and forth outside.
Ullah observed Garibaldi had something protruding from under
his shirt at his lower back. Ullah recognized Garibaldi as
someone who had come to the market in the past, and when he
saw Garibaldi this time, he was concerned Garibaldi “may do
something” bad.
Garibaldi entered the market under the pretense that he
was purchasing beer, then pulled out a gun and pointed it at
Ullah. Garibaldi pulled back the slide on the gun, ordered Ullah
to get on the ground, demanded money, and threatened to kill
Ullah if he did not comply. Ullah gave Garibaldi $700 or $800
then got down on the ground as directed. Garibaldi took some
cigarettes, then left. Ullah called 911, reported the robbery, and
told the dispatcher he knew where Garibaldi lived.
Shortly after the robbery, around 2:40 p.m., officers
detained Garibaldi. At that point, the officers did not suspect
Garibaldi in the robbery of Ullah’s market, as Garibaldi’s clothing
did not match those of the robbery suspect. The officers arrested
Garibaldi on an outstanding probation violation and placed him
in the patrol car. Garibaldi did not have a gun on him when
arrested. Ullah later identified Garibaldi as the person who
robbed him.

DISCUSSION

Garibaldi’s sole contention on appeal is the trial court erred
in violation of section 654 by imposing the firearm enhancement
on count one, without staying the eight-month sentence on count
two (the felon in possession of a firearm count). Specifically, he
argues that under section 654, substantial evidence does not
support the trial court’s imposition of sentence on count two,
because the court could not reasonably conclude the firearm

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possession was divisible from the armed robbery. We are
unpersuaded.

A. Relevant Law

Section 654, subdivision (a) provides, in pertinent part: “An
act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different
provisions of law may be punished under either of such
provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished
under more than one provision.” Put more succinctly, section 654
bars multiple punishments for a single act. (People v. Jones
(2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143 (Jones).) It also bars multiple
punishments for acts that comprise an indivisible course of
conduct. (Ibid.) The question whether a course of criminal
conduct is divisible depends on the intent and objective of the
actor. (Ibid.) “[I]f the defendant harbored ‘multiple . . . objectives,
independent of and not merely incidental to each other, the
defendant may be punished for each violation committed in
pursuit of each objective even though the violations share
common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of
conduct. [Citation.]’” (Ibid.)
“Whether section 654 applies in a given case is a question
of fact for the trial court, which is vested with broad latitude in
making its determination.” (Jones, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p.
1143.) “Its findings will not be reversed on appeal if there is any
substantial evidence to support them.” (Ibid.) “We [therefore]
review the trial court’s determination in the light most favorable
to the [judgment] and presume the existence of every fact the
trial court could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (Ibid.)

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B. Analysis

Applying these principles, we reject Garibaldi’s argument
that the trial court’s imposition of a consecutive sentence on
count two is unsupported by substantial evidence. As Jones
explains: “[W]hen an ex-felon commits a crime using a firearm,
and arrives at the crime scene already in possession of the
firearm, it may reasonably be inferred that the firearm
possession is a separate and antecedent offense, carried out with
an independent, distinct intent from the primary crime.
Therefore, section 654 will not bar punishment for both firearm
possession by a felon [ ] and for the primary crime of which the
defendant is convicted.” (Jones, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p.
1141.) This language from Jones is controlling and dispositive of
the section 654 argument Garibaldi raises in this appeal.3
The factual premise of Garibaldi’s argument is an assertion
that “the record does not support reasonable inferences that [he]
was armed before or after the robbery.” It is true the record
demonstrates Garibaldi was not in possession of the firearm
when he was arrested roughly 30 minutes after the robbery. The
record does show, however, that when Garibaldi arrived at the
market to commit the robbery, he already had the gun with him.
As described above, Ullah testified that before the robbery, he
saw Garibaldi pacing back and forth outside the market, with
something protruding under his shirt at his lower back. Garibaldi

3 Although some cases have concluded section 654 may bar
multiple punishments where the evidence shows the firearm
came into a defendant’s possession fortuitously “at the instant of
the committing another offense” (People v. Ratcliff (1990) 223
Cal.App.3d 1401, 1412 (Ratcliff)), as we explain in the following
paragraph, that is not what happened here.

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then entered the market and pulled the gun on Ullah. On these
facts, the trial court could reasonably conclude Garibaldi was
armed with the gun before he came to the market to commit the
robbery.4 In other words, the court could make reasonable factual
findings dividing Garibaldi’s conduct into two separate acts with
separate intents, and could therefore reasonably impose a
consecutive sentence on count two without violating section 654.
(See Ratcliff, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 1414 [“Commission of a
crime under section [29900] is complete once the intent to possess
is perfected by possession. What the ex-felon does with the
weapon later is another separate and distinct transaction
undertaken with an additional intent which necessarily is
something more than the mere intent to possess the proscribed
weapon”]; Jones, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1145 [“[W]e
conclude that section 654 is inapplicable when the evidence
shows [ ] the defendant arrived at the scene of his or her primary
crime already in possession of the firearm”].)5
For these reasons, we reject Garibaldi’s section 654
argument.

4 Garibaldi’s attorney indeed concedes the following in his
opening brief: “[A]ppellant acknowledges the trial court could
have inferred that appellant brought the handgun to the market
[record cites], used it during the robbery [record cites], and then
carried it home [record cites].” Later in the opening brief, counsel
again concedes “the prosecution established that appellant
brought the gun to the market, used it, and then carried it away
as he escaped from the scene.”
5 Despite the Attorney General’s persuasive reliance on
Jones, Garibaldi’s attorney makes no mention of that case in the
reply brief. This omission suggests counsel has no colorable way
to distinguish that case.

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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

CURREY, P. J.
We concur:

MORI, J.

ZUKIN, J.

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