People v. Albatat CA4/1

CourtListener 10335659Calctapp19 févr. 2025

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Filed 2/19/25 P. v. Albatat CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D083394

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE417140)

MOHAMMED MUHSIN ALBATAT,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Herbert Exarhos, Judge. Affirmed.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney
General, Christopher P. Beesley and Michael J. Patty, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

A jury convicted Mohammed Muhsin Albatat of mayhem (Pen. Code,1
§ 203), among other crimes, on the prosecution’s theory he “unlawfully and
maliciously slit the lip” of the victim. On appeal, he asserts the mayhem
conviction must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence that he
“maliciously disfigured” the victim. Because that is not an element of
mayhem as charged here, we reject Albatat’s sole claim of error and affirm
the judgment.
BACKGROUND
S. Zamora, a gardener of 16 years, was working at an El Cajon
apartment complex on the morning of April 5, 2023. While Zamora was using
a handheld “weed eater” to trim the grass, Albatat came out of one of the
apartments in an “aggressive” stance and yelled at Zamora that he did not
want to hear any noise. Zamora turned off his tool and explained he needed
to do his work. Albatat said he did not care and suddenly, without
provocation, punched Zamora in the face with a clenched fist. Zamora’s body
“went limp,” his knees “went weak” and he lost his balance, although he did
not fall completely to the ground.
Zamora called 911. He was in pain and bleeding a lot from the right
side of his lip. The responding officer found Zamora with a bloody mouth
from an injury the officer described as “a laceration on his upper lip on the
right-hand side, approximately one half to three quarters inch” that was
“completely separated . . . completely split open.” The jury received in
evidence photographs taken of Zamora’s injury on the day of the assault.

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
Zamora went to a hospital where he underwent “exploration and
reconstruction” surgery by Alexander Kim, M.D., a specialist in facial
reconstructive surgery. Dr. Kim explained the lip is comprised of three
layers: the vermilion, vermilion border, and oral mucosa. The vermilion is
the skin layer on the outside, “the pink part of your lip” where “one might
apply lipstick.” The vermilion “extends to the inner portion” called the “oral
or buccal mucosa,” or what might be referred to as “the gums on the back of
the lip and . . . [extend[ing] to the inner part of the cheek.” The vermilion

border is the transition between the vermilion and facial skin.2
Dr. Kim testified Zamora had injuries to all three layers of the lip.
According to his medical records, which were admitted into evidence, Zamora
suffered a “significant open wound of the face with complex lacerations.” The
wound appeared at “the mid face and lower cheek with devitalized crushed
skin and muscle” and with a “full-thickness lip laceration involving [the]
vermilion border 2.5 cm,” which was noted as “greater than half the vertical
height of the lip.” Dr. Kim testified Zamora’s laceration was through the
vermilion border and “through the lip, and . . . extend[ing] to the inside of the

2 Although Dr. Kim did not specifically define “vermilion border,”
according to the Merriam-Webster Medical Dictionary, it is “the exposed pink
or reddish margin of a lip” (Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2025)
<https://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/vermilion%20border> [as of Feb.
19, 2025], archived at <https://perma.cc/HJ2E-AHXG>.) We take judicial
notice of the definition. (Evid. Code, § 451, subd. (e); see California Public
Records Research, Inc. v. County of Stanislaus (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1432,
1445 [“Moreover, mandatory language in Evidence Code section 451,
subdivision (e) requires judicial notice be taken of ‘[t]he true signification of
all English words and phrases.’ ”]; Golden Security Thrift & Loan Assn. v.
First American Title Ins. Co. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 250, 256 [“ ‘true
signification’ ” of a word is best derived from dictionary definitions].)

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mouth up towards the . . . mid face or the lower cheek as it connects to the
lip.”
After undergoing exploratory and reconstructive surgery, Zamora
received approximately 25 absorbable, internal and external sutures. He was
in pain approximately seven days out from the surgery and had difficulty
eating and drinking for about a month after. At the time of trial, he had a
“barely” visible scar on the outside of his lip. Inside his lip, he had
permanent scarring which he described as “the skin is a little lifted, . . . it’s
altered.”
The jury convicted Albatat of mayhem (§ 203; count 1), assault by
means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 2), and
battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d); count 3). It also found
true the allegations Albatat personally inflicted great bodily injury on
Zamora within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a), as to count 2,
and section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8), as to count 3.
Albatat later admitted he committed all three offenses while on parole
from state prison (§ 1203.085, subd. (b)); that he suffered three prior felony
convictions that qualified as serious felony priors (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 668,
and 1192.7, subd. (c) and strike priors (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, and
668); and that one of the six alleged aggravating factors was present to justify
an upper term sentence (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(3) [he has served a
prior prison term]).

At sentencing, the trial court granted Albatat’s Romero3 motion and
dismissed two of the strike priors and one of the serious felony priors. The
court sentenced Albatat to 26 years in prison, consisting of the upper term of

3 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.

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8 years on the mayhem count, doubled for one strike, plus 10 years for two of
the serious felony priors. The court stayed the sentence on counts 2 and 3
pursuant to section 654.
DISCUSSION
In his sole claim of error on appeal, Albatat asserts substantial
evidence does not support the mayhem conviction. Specifically, he argues the
conviction must be reversed because the prosecution did not prove he
“maliciously disfigured Zamora with a single punch.”
In reviewing and rejecting this claim, “we must ‘examine the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible,
and of solid value that would support a rational trier of fact in finding [the
defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. San Nicolas (2004)
34 Cal.4th 614, 657–658; see also Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307,
319.) We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the
jury could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v. Young (2005) 34
Cal.4th 1149, 1175.) We do not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in the
evidence, or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. (People v. Jacobo (2019)
37 Cal.App.5th 32, 42.) We do not reverse on an insufficient evidence claim
“unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’ ” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18
Cal.4th 297, 331.)
Section 203 provides, “Every person who unlawfully and maliciously
deprives a human being of a member of his body, or disables, disfigures, or
renders it useless, or cuts or disables the tongue, or puts out an eye, or slits
the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of mayhem.” (See People v. Santana (2013) 56
Cal.4th 999, 1003 (Santana).) As our Supreme Court explained, “Section 203

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generally prohibits six injurious acts against a person, three that specify a
particular body part and three that do not: (1) dismembering or depriving a
part of someone’s body; (2) disabling or rendering useless a part of someone’s
body; (3) disfiguring someone; (4) cutting or disabling the tongue; (5) putting
out an eye; and (6) slitting the nose, ear or lip. (See CALCRIM No. 801
[delineating six types of injuries].)” (Santana, at p. 1003.) Because the

statute specifies these six injurious acts in the disjunctive,4 any one of these
will support a conviction of mayhem. (See People v. Caldwell (1984) 153
Cal.App.3d 947, 952 (Caldwell).)
As alleged in the operative charging document, the People tried Albatat
for mayhem on the theory he “slit the lip” of Zamora. The People did not
proceed on any theory that Albatat committed mayhem by disfiguring or
disabling Zamora. Thus, the trial court properly instructed the jury with a

modified CALCRIM No. 801,5 as follows:
“The defendant is charged in Count 1 with Mayhem in violation
of Penal Code section 203.

“To prove that the defendant is guilty of mayhem, the People
must prove that the defendant unlawfully and maliciously: [¶]
Slit someone’s lip.

“Someone acts maliciously when he or she intentionally does a
wrongful act or when he or she acts with the unlawful intent to
annoy or injure someone else.” (Italics and boldface omitted.)

4 Section 203 contains the word “or” seven times. CALCRIM No. 801
contains six different descriptions of conduct, each of which qualifies as an
act of mayhem, with each description separated by “[OR]” indicating a choice
or selection to be made based on the evidence in the case under consideration.

5 Albatat does not raise an issue of instructional error on appeal.

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Ignoring the slit lip theory on which he was prosecuted, Albatat
contends the evidence was insufficient to establish that he “maliciously
disfigured” Zamora with “a single punch.” (Italics added.) Doing so, he
focuses on the circumstances that Zamora did not fall to the ground or
become unconscious, had “absorbable stitches” that fell out seven days later,
was “no longer in pain,” had a “scar that is barely noticeable,” and did not
require further medical treatment. We reject Albatat’s contention because it
lacks merit.
Mayhem based on a slit lip does not require disfigurement, permanent

injury, or permanent scarring.6 “By defining ‘slitting the nose, ear or lip’ as
an injurious act sufficient to constitute mayhem, ‘the Legislature itself
established [the injuries’] requisite level of seriousness in section 203’ . . . ,
finding those injuries sufficiently egregious to be considered a cruel and
savage crime.” (People v. Turner (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 882, 890–891,
quoting Santana, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1010.) The Court of Appeal in
Turner, a case cited by Albatat, “found no California case . . . finding section
203 requires slitting the nose, ear or lip to be a permanent injury or to leave a
permanent scar . . . for purposes of mayhem” under that theory. (Turner, at
p. 891, italics added.) “The cases referencing the permanent injury graft on

6 Accordingly, Albatat’s reliance on cases involving a disfigurement
theory, or other theory not involving a slit lip, is misplaced. (See, e.g., People
v. Keenan (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 26, 32–33 [defendant who burned victim’s
breasts with lit cigarette during a home invasion robbery and sexual assault,
leaving victim with permanent scars, prosecuted for mayhem on a
disfigurement theory]; People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1547, 1559–1560
[defendant who brutally slashed victim’s chest with box cutter, nearly
severing her left breast, charged with mayhem on a disfigurement theory];
Goodman v. Superior Court (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 621, 622 [defendant who
stabbed victim in the face prosecuted for mayhem on disfigurement theory].)

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to section 203 have done so in the context of a disfiguring injury only.” (Ibid.;
see also Santana, at p. 1010.) The Turner court thus rejected the defendant’s
argument that a slit lip theory, as opposed to a disfigurement theory,
requires permanent injury or serious scarring. (Turner, at p. 891.)
Caldwell, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d 947, another case cited by Albatat, is
instructive. There the defendant bit the victim’s lower lip, resulting in
lacerations which were in the process of healing. (Id. at p. 952.) The court
rejected the defendant’s argument “that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain his conviction of mayhem because the wound to the victim’s lip was
not disfiguring enough to constitute mayhem within the meaning of the
statute and applicable case law.” (Ibid.) Emphasizing the disjunctive
language of the statute, the court held that section 203 does not require
evidence of disfigurement in addition to evidence of the slit lip; i.e., slitting a
victim’s lip, in and of itself, is an act of mayhem under section 203.
(Caldwell, at p. 952.)
Although Albatat does not develop the argument, to the extent he
argues “a single punch” cannot be the basis of mayhem, we reject that
argument too. The method used to inflict the relevant injury, including a slit
lip, is not dispositive. (See People v. Johnson (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 267, 281
[rejecting defendant’s argument that he “punctured” the victim’s lip, not “slit
it” and construing “slitting to include such other mechanisms as puncturing
and biting as long as the injury inflicted is not slight or temporary”];
Caldwell, supra, 153 Cal.App.3d at p. 952 [defendant caused victim’s slit lip
by biting it].) In People v. Hayes (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 796, the Court of

Appeal held a Flannel7 or imperfect self-defense does not apply to mayhem.

7 People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668.

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In so holding, the court observed: “[T]he essential distinction between
mayhem and assault is not the actor’s mental state but the result achieved:
‘If a person unlawfully strikes another, not with the specific intent to commit
the crime of mayhem, and the blow so delivered results in the loss or
disfigurement of a member of the body of the assaulted party or in putting out
his eye, the crime is nevertheless mayhem.’ ” (Id. at p. 805, second italics
added.) “So long as general criminal intent is present, the requisite malice
may be inferred from the fact of the injury.” (Ibid.) And Albatat does not
contend the evidence is insufficient as to his malice or general criminal intent
in striking Zamora.
Albatat fails to grapple with the evidence regarding the severity of the
injury he inflicted on Zamora, at times minimizing it to a mere “cut lip.” On
this record, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s
finding that Albatat committed mayhem by slitting Zamora’s lip. The noun
“slit” is defined in the Merriam-Webster dictionary as “a long narrow cut or

opening.”8 The verb “slit” means “to make a slit in,” “to cut off or away:

SEVER” or “to form into a slit.”9 We have reviewed the photographs taken of
Zamora’s injury on the day of the assault and disagree with Albatat’s
characterization it is a mere cut lip. Consistent with the responding officer’s
observations, the photographs show Zamora’s upper lip on the right-hand
side was “completely separated . . . completely split open.” (Italics added.)

8 Definition of slit, noun, Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online (2025)
<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/slit> [as of Feb. 19, 2025],
archived at <https://perma.cc/5RNV-L3CV>.

9 Definition of slit, verb, Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online (2025)
<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/slit> [as of Feb. 19, 2025],
archived at <https://perma.cc/3JBP-FMXW>.

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Dr. Kim explained Zamora suffered a significant wound “with complex
lacerations” that cut across all three tissue layers of the lip, including the
vermilion, vermilion border, and oral mucosa, and there was “devitalized
crushed skin and muscle,” and which required reconstructive surgery to
normalize his appearance. Applying the common meaning of “slit,” we
conclude there is substantial evidence to support the mayhem conviction.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.

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