People v. Jimenez CA2/6

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Filed 2/19/25 P. v. Jimenez CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B332964
(Super. Ct. No. PA099312)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)

v.

JOCELYN JIMENEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

Jocelyn Jimenez appeals from the judgment after pleading
no contest to possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code1,
§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 1), unlawful possession of
ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 2), and carrying a
loaded, unregistered handgun (§ 25850, subds. (a), (c)(6); count
3). The trial court granted appellant two years of probation with
terms, including credit for time served.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Appellant contends the court erred by failing to find she
was subjected to an unlawful detention and pat-down search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. We will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 2, 2022, Los Angeles Police Department
Officer Felix Rodriguez, who was with his partner, saw appellant
standing directly behind a car in a parking lot. During Officer
Rodriguez’s investigation, appellant stated the car belonged to
her uncle. Alejandro Cazares was in the car’s front passenger
seat. Officer Rodriguez had arrested Cazares twice in the past.
Cazares was on postrelease community supervision (PRCS) with
search conditions. He was also a member of the Violent Boys
gang.
At the May 2023 preliminary hearing, Officer Rodriguez
testified he had been assigned to monitor Violent Boys gang
members for the past three and a half years. He had been a
sworn peace officer for approximately seven and a half years.
According to Officer Rodriguez, Violent Boys gang members are
known to carry firearms. One year prior to the incident with
appellant, Officer Rodriguez had arrested Violent Boys gang
members at that specific location, including an arrest for firearm
possession on that property. Officer Rodriguez also testified that
“[g]ang members utilize tactics where they either hand [a
firearm] to a female associate of theirs or also a member to avoid
police confiscation.”
After seeing appellant standing behind the car, Officer
Rodriguez asked her to wait against a fence. He told appellant
not to reach into her pocket and asked if she had been arrested
before. Appellant said she had been arrested for drugs. Officer

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Rodriguez told appellant she was being detained. Appellant
indicated she had no weapons.
Officer Rodriguez conducted a pat-down search of appellant
for officer safety reasons. Appellant was wearing oversized,
baggy clothing. At one point, Officer Rodriguez slightly lifted
appellant’s shirt to check her waistband. He observed a dark
object concealed in appellant’s front waistband. Appellant
advised it was a gun. Officer Rodriguez handcuffed appellant
and recovered a nine-millimeter compact firearm from her front
waistband. The gun had an inserted magazine with six live
rounds of ammunition, but there was no round in the chamber.
At the end of the preliminary hearing, the magistrate
denied appellant’s section 1538.5 motion to suppress. The
magistrate cited several factors, including appellant being
directly behind the car containing Cazares, appellant’s indication
the car belonged to her uncle, body-worn video that was played,
and Officer Rodriguez’s “particular knowledge of the practices of
members of this particular street gang with regard to secreting of
firearms on female companions or associates . . . .” Appellant
subsequently moved for a special hearing under section 1538.5,
subdivision (i). The court denied that motion, as well as a
renewed motion under that subdivision.
DISCUSSION
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. (Terry v. Ohio
(1968) 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 [20 L.Ed.2d 889] (Terry).) But the Fourth
Amendment “permits an officer to initiate a brief investigative
. . . stop when [the officer] has ‘a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal
activity.’ [Citations.] ‘Although a mere “hunch” does not create

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reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires
is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance
of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable
cause.’” (Kansas v. Glover (2020) 589 U.S. 376, 380 [206 L.Ed.2d
412]; People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1041 (Flores).)
Furthermore, an officer may conduct a reasonable search
for weapons when the officer has reason to believe a suspect is
armed and dangerous, regardless of whether probable cause to
arrest exists. (People v. Avila (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1074.)
“The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is
armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent [person] in the
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that [their] safety
or that of others was in danger.” (Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 27.)
An inchoate, unparticularized suspicion or hunch is insufficient.
(In re Jeremiah S. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 299, 305.) Instead, a
Terry search is justified only if “the officer can point to specific
and articulable facts which, considered in conjunction with
rational inferences to be drawn therefrom, give rise to a
reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous.”
(People v. Medina (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 171, 176.)
“‘In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress
evidence, we defer to that court’s factual findings, express or
implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.]
We exercise our independent judgment in determining whether,
on the facts presented, the search or seizure was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.’” (People v. Silveria and Travis
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 232.) “In doing so we do not consider each
fact in isolation. Instead, ‘we must consider “the totality of the
circumstances — the whole picture.”’” (Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at p. 1043.)

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Reasonable suspicion supported the Terry detention and
search of appellant. Alejandro Cazares, a Violent Boys gang
member, was sitting in the front passenger seat of the car behind
which appellant stood. Officer Rodriguez had twice arrested
Cazares, who was on PRCS with search conditions. Moreover,
Officer Rodriguez had been assigned to monitor Violent Boys
gang members for years. Violent Boys gang members are known
to carry firearms. One year prior, Officer Rodriguez had even
arrested a Violent Boys gang member for firearm possession in
the same location. These circumstances created reasonable
suspicion Cazares illegally possessed a firearm. (See Flores,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1046 [a trained police officer could draw
inferences “‘that might well elude an untrained person’”].)
Specific, articulable facts connected Cazares and appellant.
Appellant’s proximity to a car containing Cazares implied
association. Given that the driver’s seat was empty, it was
reasonable to infer appellant may have been driving the car.
Critically, Officer Rodriguez testified that gang members will
hand a firearm to a female associate to avoid police confiscation.
Thus, reasonable suspicion supported detention of appellant to
ascertain whether Cazares, in conformity with this tactic, had
passed her a firearm. These same facts gave rise to reasonable
suspicion appellant was armed and dangerous. Appellant was
also wearing baggy, oversized clothes capable of concealing a
firearm, further necessitating a Terry search to ensure officer
safety. (In re Jeremiah S., supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 305 [baggy
clothing that suggests a hidden weapon is a relevant
consideration].) No Fourth Amendment violation occurred.
Flores does not suggest otherwise. Flores repeatedly
ducked behind a car, apparently pretended to tie his shoe, and

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failed to acknowledge officers who approached him—all
ostensibly to avoid police interaction. (Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at pp. 1045, 1047.) Flores was in an area known for narcotics and
gang activity, and the testifying officer “had arrested someone in
the vicinity the night before for narcotics crimes.” (Id. at
p. 1038.) The totality of the circumstances, including Flores’s
“noteworthy” behavior, did not provide reasonable suspicion he
was engaged in illegal activity. (Id. at p. 1047.)
Here, the proper focus is not appellant’s physical behavior
but the surrounding circumstances. Those circumstances
supported an inference that appellant was associating with
Cazares, a known Violent Boys gang member. Officer
Rodriguez’s specific knowledge of that gang’s practices, and of
Cazares in particular, helped furnish reasonable suspicion. The
officers in Flores lacked this degree of particularized knowledge.
Relying on People v. Pantoja (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 483,
appellant argues the year-old information regarding Officer
Rodriguez’s arrest of Violent Boys members at the same location
“simply does not satisfy the specific, articulable facts required for
reasonable suspicion to detain and search a defendant for
weapons under the current state of the law.” We do not read
Pantoja to forbid consideration of information that is one year
old. Although information’s value diminishes over time, one year
is not an inordinately long period. (Cf. People v. Bush (2001) 88
Cal.App.4th 1048, 1053 [relying on six-year-old information about
a defendant to uphold denial of a suppression motion].)
Moreover, we do not evaluate that piece of information in
isolation. (Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1032.) We instead
assess the totality of the circumstances. The year-old arrests,
including for firearm possession, would likely be insufficient

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alone. But, when considered alongside the other circumstances,
we conclude reasonable suspicion existed. “To say otherwise
would be tantamount to undermining all the specialized
knowledge about gang operations gathered by investigators who
are deeply immersed in tracking such activity and would
impermissibly shrink Terry . . . analysis to an artificially confined
scope.” (People v. Esparza (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1092; see
also United States v. Cortez (1981) 449 U.S. 411, 418 [66 L.Ed.2d
621] [analysis properly encompasses “consideration of the modes
or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

BALTODANO, J.

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Michael Terrell, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________

Adrian K. Panton, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Lauren Sanchez, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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