CourtListener 10334713•People v. Grunow CA2/6
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Filed 2/18/25 P. v. Grunow CA2/6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B327660
(Super. Ct. No. 21F-05749)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Luis Obispo County)
v.
CRAIG ANTHONY GRUNOW,
Defendant and Appellant.
Craig Anthony Grunow appeals from the judgment entered
after a jury convicted him of one count of sexual intercourse with
a child (Kaitlyn) who was 10 years old or younger (Pen. Code,
§ 288.7, subd. (a)),1 and 10 counts of lewd act upon a child under
the age of 14 years: four counts as to Kaitlyn, two counts as to
Kylee, and four counts as to Thea. (§ 288, subd. (a).) For each of
these 10 counts, the jury found true an allegation that appellant
was convicted in the present case of committing the same offense
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
against more than one victim. (§ 667.61, subds. (c)(8), (e)(4),
(j)(2).)
The trial court sentenced appellant to prison for an
aggregate term of 250 years to life, calculated as follows: 25 years
to life for sexual intercourse with Kaitlyn; 25 years to life, stayed
pursuant to section 654, for a lewd act (the sexual intercourse)
committed upon Kaitlyn; plus a consecutive sentence of 25 years
to life for each of the remaining nine counts of lewd acts. For all
counts except the sexual intercourse count, 25-year-to-life terms
were required pursuant to section 667.61, subdivisions (c)(8),
(e)(4), and (j)(2).2
Appellant contends: (1) as to his conviction of sexual
intercourse with Kaitlyn, the evidence is insufficient to show that
she was 10 years old or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (a)); (2) the
evidence is insufficient to support the convictions for lewd acts
committed upon Kaitlyn and Thea (§ 288, subd. (a)); (3) section
654’s prohibition against multiple punishment was violated by
the imposition of consecutive sentences for each of the lewd acts
committed upon Thea; (4) the matter must be remanded for
resentencing because the trial court was not aware of its
discretion to order that the sentences be served concurrently
instead of consecutively; and (5) the trial court’s reasons for
imposing consecutive sentences were inadequate. We affirm.
2 Section 667.61, subdivision (j)(2) provides, “A person who
is convicted of an offense specified in subdivision (c) [here, a
violation of section 288, subdivision (a)] under one of the
circumstances specified in subdivision (e) [here, committing the
offense against more than one victim], upon a victim who is a
child under 14 years of age, shall be punished by imprisonment
in the state prison for 25 years to life.”
2
Factual Background
Appellant was the boyfriend of Kaitlyn’s and Kylee’s
mother (Mother). He was not the father of Kaitlyn or Kylee.
When Kaitlyn was about four years old, Mother and her
daughters moved into appellant’s house. Appellant was a
“[f]ather figure” to Kaitlyn. She called him “dad.” Kylee also
called him “dad” because “[h]e was the only father figure that
[she] had.”
After several years of living together, Mother and appellant
ended their relationship. Mother moved to Arizona without her
daughters “because she started doing drugs.” Kaitlyn and Kylee
moved into their aunt and uncle’s house, but they frequently
visited appellant at his house and stayed the night there. During
the visits, appellant committed multiple acts of a sexual nature
upon Kaitlyn and Kylee as well as Kaitlyn’s friend, Thea. We
describe below the sexual acts relevant to the issues in the
present appeal.
Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support Conviction of
Sexual Intercourse with Child 10 Years Old or Younger
In count 1 appellant was charged with having engaged in
sexual intercourse with Kaitlyn when she was 10 years old or
younger. (§ 288.7, subd. (a)). Appellant contends the evidence is
insufficient to satisfy the age requirement. He asserts,
“Throughout her trial testimony, . . . Kaitlyn expressed
uncertainty and spoke in contradictory terms about being either
10 or 11 years old at the time that crime occurred, which is
insufficient to establish the requisite age element for conviction.”
“‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,
we do not determine the facts ourselves. Rather, we “examine
the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
3
determine whether it discloses substantial evidence – evidence
that is reasonable, credible and of solid value – such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” [Citations.] We presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably
deduce from the evidence. [Citation.] [¶] . . . “[I]f the
circumstances reasonably justify the jury's findings, the
judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances
might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.”
[Citation.] We do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness’s
credibility. . . .’” (People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174,
200.)
Facts
Kaitlyn’s testimony was internally inconsistent. On direct
examination, she testified that appellant had committed the act
“[p]robably when I was like nine or ten” after Mother had moved
out of appellant’s house. She moved out about three or four
months after Kaitlyn’s tenth birthday. Thus, Kaitlyn would have
turned eleven about eight to nine months after Mother had left.
On cross-examination Kaitlyn testified that the offense
“had to have [occurred in] summer, but I don’t remember how old
I was.” Defense counsel asked, “Is it possible that this
incident . . . happened more than a year after your mother left?”
Kaitlyn answered, “Yes.” If it had happened more than one year
after Mother had left, Kaitlyn would have been 11 years old at
the time of the offense. Defense counsel continued, “[Do] you
have any way of knowing whether it happened in that first year
after she had left or it happened in the second year after she had
left?” Kaitlyn responded, “I do not remember.” Counsel said,
“[T]he question I'm asking is you can’t be sure if this happened in
4
that first year or second year?” Kaitlyn replied: “I don't
remember. I would probably say the first year, but I’m not, like,
100 percent sure.” Counsel subsequently asked, “[Y]ou’ve limited
this time frame that it could have happened when you were ten,
maybe it happened when you were 11. Is that fair?” Kaitlyn
answered, “Yes.” On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked,
“And you believe that you were ten at the time the defendant was
on top of you with his private in your private?” Kaitlyn
responded, “Correct.”
Discussion
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
judgment, we conclude substantial evidence supports the jury’s
finding that Kaitlyn was under the age of 11 years when
appellant had sexual intercourse with her. A reasonable trier of
fact could have believed Kaitlyn’s testimony on direct and
redirect examination that the offense had occurred when she was
ten years old. “‘[I]t is for the trier of fact to consider internal
inconsistencies in testimony’ [citation], and it is for us when
reviewing for substantial evidence to resolve the inconsistencies
in favor of the verdict. . . . As a general matter, juries may accept
some parts of a witness's testimony and reject other parts
[citations] . . . .” (People v. Collins (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 333,
345.) “In our limited role on appeal, ‘[c]onflicts and even
testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify
the reversal of a judgment . . . . We resolve neither credibility
issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial
evidence.’” (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 161-
162; see People v. Smith (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 415, 427 [“While
Doe’s testimony was internally inconsistent, it constituted
5
substantial evidence that defendant's molestation of Doe when
she was eight years old involved substantial sexual conduct”].)
People v. Haywood (1955) 131 Cal.App.2d 259, is on point.
Haywood was convicted of statutory rape of a 16-year-old girl.
The girl “testified on direct examination that . . . she had
committed . . . an act [of sexual intercourse] with Haywood. . . .
[O]n cross and redirect examination the girl gave contradictory
testimony on this point. Relying on this testimony, [Haywood]
assert[ed] that ‘It would therefore appear to be conclusive that an
act of sexual intercourse was not accomplished . . . .’” (Id. at
p. 261.) The appellate court held, “[T]he trial judge was entitled
to accept as true the testimony of the complaining witness on
direct examination rather than the conflicting testimony which
she later gave.” (Ibid; accord, People v. Koontz (1959) 171
Cal.App.2d 633, 634 [13-year-old victim’s testimony sufficient to
show sexual penetration; on direct examination she testified that
penetration had occurred, but “[o]n cross-examination in answer
to leading questions as to whether she was sure that there had
been penetration . . . she answered ‘No’”].)
Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support Convictions on
Three Counts of Lewd Act Committed upon Kaitlyn
Each of counts 3, 4, and 5 charged appellant with
committing a lewd act upon Kaitlyn in violation of section 288,
subdivision (a). During closing argument, the prosecutor told the
jury that these counts were based on three separate occasions
when appellant directed Kaitlyn to take a shower. Appellant
contends the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions on
all three counts.
6
Facts
Kaitlyn testified as follows: When she was “[p]robably 11”
years old, on three occasions appellant “[d]irected [her] to take a
shower” in a bathtub equipped with a showerhead. On each
occasion the same scenario occurred. Appellant said, “‘Hey, go
get in the shower.’” She “needed to shower” because she had
been playing in a nearby creek and “there’s gross stuff in the
water.” When Kaitlyn was naked in the shower, appellant “came
in, and he plugged the . . . drain. And then he got in . . . the
shower with me, but he still had his underwear on. . . . [A]s the
bath . . . filled up, he told me to sit down. And so I sat down, and
he just . . . took a bath with me.” “He just sat there” and did not
“say anything.” Appellant “[j]ust stare[d] at” Kaitlyn and did not
touch her. They remained in the bathtub together “[p]robably
like five to ten minutes.” Kaitlyn could not “really remember”
how she felt when this was happening, but she “probably” felt
“scared.”
The first time appellant took a bath with Kaitlyn, he “told
[her] not to tell anyone.” He did not repeat this command the
second or third time.
Discussion
The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
To prove that the defendant is guilty of [violating section
288, subdivision (a)], the People must prove that:
1A. The defendant willfully touched any part of a child's
body either on the bare skin or through the clothing;
OR
1B. The defendant willfully caused a child to touch his/her
own body, . . . either on the bare skin or through the
clothing [italics added];
7
2. The defendant committed the act with the intent of
arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or
sexual desires of himself or the child;
AND
3. The child was under the age of 14 years at the time of
the act.
It is undisputed that appellant did not actually touch
Kaitlyn during the bathing incidents. The prosecutor argued
that appellant had committed a “constructive touching” by
directing Kaitlyn to take a shower, which required her to undress
and touch her naked body. (See People v. Meacham (1984) 152
Cal.App.3d 142, 154, abrogated on another ground in People v.
Brown (1994) 8 Cal.4th 746, 756-757, 763 [“We hold the children's
touching of their own genitalia at the instigation of appellant was
a “constructive touching” by appellant himself”].)
Based on Kaitlyn’s testimony, a reasonable trier of fact
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that, by directing her to
take a shower, appellant constructively touched Kaitelyn, i.e., he
willfully caused her to remove her clothing and touch her bare
skin. (See People v. Lopez (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1230
(Lopez) [“The evidence established that the touching occurred
when, at defendant’s direction, the girls removed their clothing
and dressed in clothing defendant told them to wear”]; People v.
Austin (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 110, 114 [although defendant did
not actually touch child, “a touching occurred in the performance
of [child’s] act of removing [her] pants” because defendant coerced
her to perform the act]; id. at p. 115 [defendant “was responsible
for the touching and removal of the child’s pants as surely as if he
had done it himself”].)
Appellant did not commit a violation of section 288,
subdivision (a) unless his constructive touching of Kaitlyn was
8
accompanied by a sexual intent: “The trier of fact must find a
union of act and sexual intent (see § 20), and such intent must be
inferred from all the circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 452 (Martinez); see
People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 606, 889 [“the touching
necessary for a section 288 violation may be done by the child
victim on his or her own person provided it is done at the
instigation of a person who had the required specific intent”].)
A reasonable trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable
doubt that, when appellant directed Kaitlyn to take a shower, he
acted with the requisite intent, i.e., the intent of arousing or
gratifying his own sexual desires. Appellant’s act “was sexually
motivated by [his] lascivious desire to observe” Kaitlyn naked in
the bath. (Lopez, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 1230; see People v.
Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 176 [“Where committed for a
sexually exploitative purpose,” “the actual or constructive
disrobing of a child by the accused . . . is presumptively harmful
and prohibited by section 288(a)”].)
We reject appellant’s assertion that “there is no evidence
th[at] his thoughts and conduct consisted of anything more than
taking a bath with this prepubescent child for a nonlewd reason,
i.e., to keep her company while she played with the soap suds,
such as might occur with family members as an expression of
nonsexual affection for a child.” Appellant did not display any
affection for Kaitlyn. She did not intend to take a bath. She was
taking a shower when appellant forced her to take a bath by
plugging the drain and telling her to sit down. Appellant did not
engage in play or conversation with Kaitlyn. She testified that
for “five to ten minutes” he “just sat” mute in the bath, “star[ing]
at” her naked body.
9
Appellant exhibited consciousness of guilt when he told
Kaitlyn not to tell anyone about what had happened. (See
Martinez, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 445 [In determining whether act
was performed with the required lewd or lascivious intent,
“relevant factors can include . . . any coercion . . . used to obtain
the victim’s cooperation or to avoid detection”].) Kaitlyn testified,
“I . . . respected what he said [about not telling anyone] because I
felt like that’s always how I was taught is to respect what adults
tell me to [do].”
Moreover, as evidence of appellant’s sexual intent, the jury
could consider his act of sexual intercourse with Kaitlyn as well
as the other lewd acts committed upon Kylee and Thea. (People
v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1160 [“In determining
whether defendant acted with lewd intent, the jury was entitled
to consider the other charged counts and his pattern of
conduct”].) Accordingly, ample evidence supports the conviction
of appellant on counts 3, 4, and 5.
Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support
Convictions for Committing Lewd Acts upon Thea
Counts 8-11 charged appellant with committing lewd acts
upon Thea in violation of section 288, subdivision (a). Appellant
committed the acts while he was massaging Thea. Counts 8 and
9 were based on separate acts of touching Thea’s breast. Counts
10 and 11 were based on separate acts of touching her vagina.
Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his
convictions because “there was no evidence that appellant
behaved in a predatory fashion” or “that he was actually aroused
during the massages, . . . or that he had no purpose other than
sexual gratification.”
10
Facts
Thea and Kaitlyn were close friends. They would often stay
overnight together at appellant’s house. Thea referred to
appellant as her “uncle,” but they were not related.
Starting when Thea was nine years old, appellant gave her
massages at his house. During the massages, he touched her
breast, nipples, and “private parts” under her clothing. He
touched “the top” of her vagina, but “not inside” it. Thea testified
that the touching happened “[a]lmost every time I had a
sleepover there, which I did frequently.” The touching ended
when she was 11 years old and was informed that appellant was
a “predator.”
Discussion
Based on Thea’s testimony as well as the testimony of
Kaitlyn and Kaylee about other sexual acts committed by
appellant, a reasonable trier of fact could find beyond a
reasonable doubt that appellant touched Thea’s naked skin with
the intent of arousing or gratifying his own sexual desires. He
could have given her a massage without touching her breast,
nipples, and vagina under her clothing.
The Imposition of Consecutive Sentences
on Counts 8-11 Did Not Violate Section 654
Appellant argues that the imposition of consecutive
sentences on counts 8-11 violated section 654’s prohibition
against multiple punishment. Appellant contends that on counts
8 and 10 he was punished for the “hand to breast touching” and
hand to vagina touching during a single course of conduct – his
“first massage” of Thea. Count 8 was based on the “first time” he
touched Thea’s breast. Count 10 was based on the “first time” he
touched Thea’s vagina.
11
Appellant further contends that on Counts 9 and 11 he was
also punished for acts committed during a single course of
conduct – the hand to breast touching and “hand to vagina
touching during [Thea’s] last massage.” Count 9 was based on
the “last time” appellant touched her breast. Count 11 was
based on the “last time” he touched her vagina.
Appellant asserts, “Because each massage constituted a
single episode or course of conduct as to which he had a single
intent and objective, the separate convictions and sentences
imposed for two ‘lewd’ acts during each massage were a violation
of the proscription against double punishment under section
654.”
Section 654, subdivision (a) provides, “An act or omission
that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law
may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case
shall the act or omission be punished under more than one
provision.” “Even though section 654 refers to an ‘act or
omission,’ . . . the relevant question is typically whether a
defendant’s ‘“course of conduct . . . comprised a divisible
transaction which could be punished under more than one statute
within the meaning of section 654.”’ [Citation.] . . . ‘Whether a
course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to
more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on
the intent and objective of the actor. If all of the offenses were
incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any
one of such offenses but not for more than one.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 335-336.)
“[S]ection 654 does not bar multiple punishment simply
because numerous sex offenses are rapidly committed against a
victim with the ‘sole’ aim of achieving sexual gratification.”
12
(People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 325.) “Such offenses are
generally ‘divisible’ from one another under section 654, and
separate punishment is usually allowed.” (People v. Scott (1994)
9 Cal.4th 331, 344, fn. 6 (Scott).) If multiple punishment were
barred for separate lewd acts committed on the same occasion,
“the clever molester could violate his victim in numerous lewd
ways, safe in the knowledge that he could not be convicted and
punished for every act.” (Id. at p. 347.)
“[S]ection 654 does not preclude separate punishment for
multiple sex offenses which, although closely connected in time
and part of the same criminal venture, are separate and distinct,
and which are not committed as a means of committing any other
sex offense, do not facilitate commission of another sex offense,
and are not incidental to the commission of another sex offense.”
(People v. Castro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 578, 584-585 (Castro).)
Thus, “[w]here a defendant fondles a portion of the victim’s
body with the requisite intent, a violation of section 288 has
occurred. The offense ends when the defendant ceases to fondle
that area. Where a defendant fondles one area of the victim’s
body and then moves on to fondle a different area, one offense has
ceased and another has begun. There is no requirement that the
two be separated by a hiatus, or period of reflection. [¶] . . . It
cannot reasonably be doubted that, when fondling of an underage
victim moves from one area of the body to another, a separate
outrage has occurred.” (People v. Jimenez (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th
450, 456.)
“Whether [section 654] ‘applies in a given case is a question
of fact for the trial court, which is vested with broad latitude in
making its determination. [Citations.] Its findings will not be
13
reversed on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support
them. . . .’” (People v. Vang (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 912, 915-916.)
Substantial evidence supports appellant’s commission of
two separately punishable lewd acts – touching Thea’s vagina
and touching her breast – during both the first and last
massages. Neither act was “committed as a means of committing
any other sex offense, . . . [nor] facilitate[d] commission of another
sex offense, . . . [nor was] incidental to the commission of another
sex offense.” (Castro, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pp. 584-585; see
People v. Alvarez (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 999, 1007 [trial court
could have reasonably concluded that kissing child was
separately punishable under section 654 and not “merely
designed to facilitate the subsequent acts of penetration and
fondling”].) Accordingly, the trial court properly imposed
consecutive sentences on each of counts 8-11.
Claim that Trial Court Was Not Aware of Its Discretion
To Impose Concurrent Instead of Consecutive Sentences
This claim concerns the nine consecutive sentences of 25
years to life for lewd act upon a child in violation of section 288,
subdivision (a). Appellant argues: “[E]rror occurred because the
trial court did not realize it had discretion to impose concurrent
sentences. ‘ . . . [R]emand is necessary so that the trial court may
have the opportunity to exercise its sentencing discretion at a
new sentencing hearing. . . .’”
At the time of sentencing, the trial court initially stated:
“[E]ach of the counts for which he's found guilty . . . will be
entered as consecutive terms, pursuant to Penal Code Section
667.6(d) [which requires consecutive sentencing]. I’ll go into
more detail as I pronounce the judgment for the defendant’s
conviction on . . . these counts.”
14
The trial court’s pronouncement of judgment shows that,
despite its prior referral to section 667.6, subdivision (d), it knew
it had discretion to impose concurrent sentences on seven of the
nine counts: counts 3-5, 7, and 9-11. For each of these seven
counts, the court said consecutive sentences were justified
pursuant to subdivision (a)(1) or (a)(3) of rule 4.425 of the
California Rules of Court.3 Rule 4.425 applies only when the trial
court has discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive
sentences. Rule 4.425(a)(1) provides that factors affecting the
decision to impose consecutive rather than concurrent sentences
include whether “[t]he crimes and their objectives were
predominantly independent of each other.” Rule 4.425(a)(3)
provides that such factors also include whether “[t]he crimes
were committed at different times or separate places, rather than
being committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a
single period of aberrant behavior.”
For the consecutive sentences imposed on counts 6 and 8,
the trial court did not invoke rule 4.425. Instead, it said the
consecutive sentences were pursuant to rule 4.426(a)(1) and
section 667.6, subdivision (d). Rule 4.426(a)(1) provides: “When a
defendant has been convicted of multiple violent sex offenses as
defined in section 667.6, the sentencing judge must determine
whether the crimes involved separate victims or the same victim
on separate occasions. [¶] (1) . . . If the crimes were committed
against different victims, a full, separate, and consecutive term
must be imposed for a violent sex crime as to each victim, under
section 667.6(d).” (Italics added.)
3 All references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
15
Section 667.6, subdivision (d)(1) provides, “A full, separate,
and consecutive term shall be imposed for each violation of an
offense specified in subdivision (e) if the crimes involve separate
victims or involve the same victim on separate occasions.”
Section 667.6, subdivision (e)(5) specifies the crime of “[l]ewd or
lascivious act, in violation of subdivision (b) of Section 288.”
Section 288, subdivision (b)(1) states that it applies to lewd or
lascivious acts “described in subdivision (a)” that are committed
“by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate
and unlawful bodily injury.” Subdivision (e) does not mention
the charged offense in counts 6 and 8 – a nonviolent violation of
section 288, subdivision (a).
Because counts 6 and 8 do not charge violent sex offenses,
the trial court erroneously relied on rule 4.426(a)(1) and section
667.6, subdivision (d) in imposing consecutive sentences on these
counts. The People concede that “section 667.6, subdivision
(d) . . . was not applicable in this case.”
The People argue that appellant forfeited the claim of error
“by failing to object to the imposition of consecutive sentences at
the sentencing hearing.” “Although the court is required to
impose sentence in a lawful manner, counsel is charged with
understanding, advocating, and clarifying permissible sentencing
choices at the hearing.” (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 353.)
“‘[C]laims involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or
articulate its discretionary sentencing choices’ are subject to
forfeiture, including ‘cases in which the stated reasons allegedly
do not apply to the particular case . . . .’” (People v. Boyce (2014)
59 Cal.4th 672, 730-731.) Thus, “complaints about the manner in
which the trial court exercises its sentencing discretion and
16
articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal.” (Scott, supra, at p. 356.)
Appellant is not merely complaining about “the manner in
which the trial court exercise[d] its sentencing discretion and
articulate[d] its supporting reasons.” (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at
p. 356.) The record shows that the trial court erroneously
believed that, as to counts 6 and 8, it could not exercise any
sentencing discretion because it was required to impose 25-year-
to-life consecutive terms. The trial court followed the probation
report’s recommendations without modification. The probation
report stated that, as to counts 6 and 8, “the crimes were
committed against different victims, therefore, a full, separate,
and consecutive term must be imposed for a violent sex crime as
to each victim, under Penal Code section 667.6(d).” (Italics
added.) Thus, appellant may raise the claim of error for the first
time on appeal. (See In re Sean W. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1177,
1181 [juvenile offender allowed to argue for the first time on
appeal that “the court completely failed to exercise its
discretion . . . in setting appellant's maximum term of
confinement”].)
“‘Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in
the exercise of the “informed discretion” of the sentencing court.
[Citations.] A court which is unaware of the scope of its
discretionary powers can no more exercise that “informed
discretion” than one whose sentence is or may have been based
on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s
record.’ [Citation.] In such circumstances, [our Supreme Court
has] held that the appropriate remedy is to remand for
resentencing unless the record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial
court would have reached the same conclusion ‘even if it had been
17
aware that it had such discretion.’” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58
Cal.4th 1354, 1391.)
Here, the record clearly indicates that the trial court would
have imposed consecutive sentences on counts 6 and 8 even if it
had been aware of its discretion to impose concurrent sentences
on these counts. Relying on either rule 4.425(a)(1) or rule
4.425(a)(3), the court imposed consecutive 25-year-to-life
sentences on all seven of the other section 288, subdivision (a)
convictions. “In other words, the court was . . . uniformly
imposing the maximum possible punishment . . . .” (People v.
Dearborne (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 250, 266.) We can think of no
reason why the court would not have exercised leniency as to
these seven counts but would have exercised leniency as to counts
6 and 8. The imposition of concurrent sentences on counts 6 and
8 would have been contrary to its intent to impose the maximum
possible punishment.
Furthermore, the court found aggravating factors in that
“each and every one of these victims was particularly vulnerable”
(rule 4.421(a)(3)) and that appellant “took advantage of a position
of trust or confidence to commit these offenses.” (Rule
4.421(a)(11).) The court continued, “The only factor in mitigation
that the Court has to find -- and will do so because I have no
choice -- is pursuant to Rule 4.423(b)(1), the defendant has no
prior record.”
Finally, the probation report was particularly damning of
appellant. It concluded: “The defendant’s repeated acts of sexual
assault on multiple victims over the course of one year, during
which time he could have reflected upon the wrongfulness of his
actions and ceased his behavior, demonstrates a significant level
of callousness and cruelty. The defendant took advantage of his
18
position as a trusted family and father figure to create
opportunities and gain access to the victims. He has subjected
them to a lifetime of psychological pain and suffering. The three
young victims were robbed of their innocence and their daily lives
have been impacted in irrevocable measures.”
Appellant Forfeited Claim that Trial Court Gave
Inadequate Reasons for Imposing Consecutive Sentences
Appellant claims, “The trial court’s statement of reasons for
imposing full, separate, and consecutive sentences was
inadequate.” (Bold and capitalization omitted.) The claim is
forfeited because appellant did not object to the statement of
reasons in the trial court. (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 356.)
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
CODY, J.
19
Timothy S. Covello, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
______________________________
Maxine Weksler, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, Ana R. Duarte, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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