CourtListener 10334710•Sarad v. Lorenz CA2/6
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Filed 2/18/25 Sarad v. Lorenz CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
JOHN SARAD, 2d Civil No. B322452
(Super. Ct. No. 16CV05193)
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
VALERIE STAFFORD
ECKLES LORENZ, as
Trustee, etc., et al.,
Defendants and
Respondents.
Appellant John Sarad appeals from the order apportioning
fees and costs of partition. He contends the trial court abused its
discretion in apportioning respondents’ attorney fees and tax
penalties to him. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2005, Sarad acquired a 34.29% ownership interest in
property (Property) located in Orcutt. The rest of the interest was
owned by respondents as follows: Sean Gabbert owned 15.2%
interest, Nora Minnies owned 15.2% interest, Thomas Gabbert
owned a 15.2% interest, Stephen Gabbert owned a 15.2% interest,
and Valerie Lorenz owned a 4.8% interest.
From 2008 to 2013, the owners did not pay property taxes on
the Property. In December 2013, the tax assessor’s office sent the
owners a notice of delinquency, stating that if the past due property
taxes were not paid in full, the Property would be subject to a tax
sale. Sean Gabbert (Sean1) paid both his and Sarad’s share of the
delinquent property taxes to prevent foreclosure. From then until
2015, Sean continued to pay his share and Sarad’s share of the
property taxes without reimbursement from Sarad. After 2015,
Sean could no longer afford to pay his and Sarad’s share. From
2016 to 2022, the owners stopped paying property taxes and
incurred penalties and fees.
In November 2016, Sarad sued the other owners for partition
of the Property. He moved to appoint a referee to sell the Property,
which the trial court denied. Subsequently, the parties agreed to
sell the Property. The trial court ordered the Property to be sold
pursuant to the terms of the parties’ agreement, with outstanding
taxes to be paid through escrow and the remainder of the funds to
be held in trust pending resolution of the division of funds.
Sarad selected a realtor, Duke Parmelly. Respondents
proposed another realtor, Richard Watkins. The Property
appraised for $750,000. The trial court selected Parmelly as the
realtor and ordered the Property to be sold at the appraised value
with the proceeds to be placed in escrow. The parties later
stipulated to increasing the listing price to $950,000.
1 We use Sean’s first name for clarity. No disrespect is
intended.
2
The parties signed a listing agreement with Parmelly.
However, Sarad modified the agreement to prohibit the property
from being listed on the multiple listing service (“MLS”). Parmelly
sent a cancellation of the listing, stating he would no longer act as
the listing agent. The parties agreed to appointing Watkins as the
new realtor.
In April 2022, respondents filed an ex parte application
seeking an order to have funds from the property sale placed in a
third-party escrow account pending resolution of the allocation of
funds. The court granted the order. The Property sold for
$1,172,136.33.
Respondents filed a motion for apportionment. Sarad did not
file a written opposition, any evidentiary objections, or present any
evidence. Sarad also did not file a separate motion for
apportionment. Respondents requested Sarad pay them
$187,034.92 from his portion of the sale proceeds, which included
$59,553.22 for reimbursement to Sean for past tax payments,
$1,508.76 for his share of appraisal costs, $40,065.28 for tax penalty
obligations, and $85,907.66 for attorney fees and costs.
Respondents submitted declarations and evidence, including
correspondence and tax bills to show that Sarad had refused to pay
his share of taxes since 2008 and refused to reimburse Sean. The
evidence also showed that Sarad attempted to force a tax sale and
acquire the Property for himself.
At the evidentiary hearing on the motion, Sarad did not
submit any documentary evidence, but testified on his own behalf.
His testimony only pertained to the amount of reimbursement he
owed to Sean for tax payments. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the trial court ordered Sarad’s share of the sales proceeds to be
reduced in the amount of $187,034.92.
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DISCUSSION
Sarad contends the trial court erred in awarding respondents
attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure2 section 874.010, that
substantial evidence did not support the amount of tax penalties
and attorney fees apportioned to Sarad, and that the appraisal costs
were incorrect. Respondents argue Sarad forfeited his contentions
because he did not raise them in the court below. We agree with
respondents.
Generally, issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal. (Premier Medical Management
Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163
Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) “Failure to raise specific challenges in the
trial court forfeits the claim on appeal.” (Ibid.) Thus, “ ‘ “ ‘we
ignore arguments, authority, and facts not presented and litigated
in the trial court.’ ” ’ ” “ ‘ “Appellate courts are loath to reverse a
judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not have an
opportunity to argue and the trial court did not have an opportunity
to consider. [Citation.] In our adversarial system, each party has
the obligation to raise any issue or infirmity that might subject the
ensuing judgment to attack. . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
Here, Sarad claims for the first time on appeal that attorney
fees awarded to respondents’ counsel from his share of the sale
proceeds were “not incurred for the common benefit.” He also
argues the court abused its discretion in awarding fees that were
not yet incurred and only “anticipated,” and that the fee total
included “unsubstantiated fees.” But Sarad never filed an
opposition to respondents’ motion for apportionment or objected.
Nor did he raise these arguments at the hearing on respondents’
2 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Code of
Civil Procedure.
4
motion for apportionment. Because these arguments and the
authorities Sarad now cites in his appellate briefs were not
presented in the trial court, he has forfeited them on appeal. To the
extent Sarad challenges the evidence supporting the attorney fees,
he also forfeited any claim of error because he did not object to the
evidence in the trial court. We will not consider a challenge to a
ruling if an objection could have been made but was not made in the
trial court. (Boyle v. CertainTeed Corp. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 645,
649 (Boyle).)
Sarad claims for the first time on appeal that the trial court
erred in apportioning “100% of tax penalties” to him rather than in
proportion to his ownership interest. Because he did not raise this
argument or the related authorities below, he forfeited them. Sarad
also did not object to the trial court’s final order regarding the
allocation of appraisal costs for $1,508.76. Had he objected, the
trial court could have addressed and corrected any alleged errors.
(Boyle, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 649.) Thus, any claim of error
regarding the appraisal costs is also forfeited.
Notwithstanding forfeiture, Sarad does not demonstrate the
trial court erred in apportioning respondents’ attorney fees and tax
penalties to Sarad. Section 874.040 provides that “the court shall
apportion the costs of partition among the parties in proportion to
their interests or make such other apportionment as may be
equitable.” Costs include “[r]easonable attorney’s fees incurred or
paid by a party for the common benefit” and other “disbursements
or expenses determined by the court to have been incurred or paid
for the common benefit.” (§ 874.010, subds. (a) & (e).) The statute
“broadly allows the trial court to ‘make such other apportionment as
may be equitable.’ ” (Lin v. Jeng (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1024
(Lin).) “When a trial court makes a ruling based upon equitable
5
considerations, the abuse of discretion standard applies on review of
that ruling. [Citation.] In other words, the ruling must stand
unless plaintiffs establish that the trial court exceeded the bounds
of reason, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. [Citation.]” (Id. at
p. 1025.)
In our view, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
apportioning $85,907.66 in attorney fees to Sarad’s share of sales
proceeds. Section 874.040’s broad language permits the trial court
to apportion attorney fees based on equitable considerations. (Lin,
supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1025.) Respondents provided
uncontroverted evidence in support of their fees. Respondents’
counsel declared that the attorney fees were associated with
facilitating the sale of the property and filing the motion for
apportionment and that 100% of the fees should be apportioned to
Sarad because he engaged in bad faith conduct that increased the
cost of litigation. This conduct included refusing to list the property
on the MLS and refusing to reimburse Sean for taxes that he paid
on Sarad’s behalf. Respondents presented exhibits, including email
correspondence, documents demonstrating counsel’s work related to
selling the property, and counsel’s time sheets detailing the services
she provided, and the fees incurred for each service. The trial
court’s determination of the value of an attorney’s professional
services will not be disturbed unless there is a manifest abuse of
discretion. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084,
1095.) The trial court here found that the amount of attorney fees
requested was reasonable, and Sarad does not demonstrate
otherwise. We will not disturb that judgment.
We also conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in
apportioning tax penalties and reimbursements for taxes to Sarad.
Respondents presented Sean’s declarations supporting the
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$59,553.22 reimbursement owed to him. The declaration included
details regarding how much he paid for Sarad’s share of taxes and
calculated interest for the period between 2013-2022. Respondents
also presented tax bills and documentation showing amounts that
Sean paid on behalf of Sarad. And they presented evidence to
support their request that Sarad be ordered to pay all tax penalties
from 2008 to the date of sale in the amount of $40,065.28 because
Sarad refused to pay his share of taxes, thus forcing the other
owners to carry his share to avoid a forced tax sale. For example,
respondents supported their motion with Sean and Stephen
Gabbert’s declarations stating that Sarad refused to pay his share,
email correspondence demonstrating Sarad’s refusal to pay, and the
tax bills for that time period. Respondents’ evidence was
uncontested. There was no abuse of discretion in apportioning tax
penalties to Sarad.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover costs on
appeal. Respondents are also entitled to attorney fees incurred on
appeal in an amount to be determined by the trial court. (§§
874.010, 874.040; see Morcos v. Board of Retirement (1990) 51
Cal.3d 924, 927.)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J. CODY, J.
7
James F. Rigali, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Barnick Hodges Law Corp., Whitney Northington Barnick;
Reed & Nash and Matthew Nash for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Ross Legal Corp and Polina L. Ross for Defendants and
Respondents Stephen Gabbert, Valerie Lorenz and Sean Gabbert.
Hutkin Law Firm and Donald L. Mabry for Defendants and
Respondents Thomas Gabbert and Nora Minnies.
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