In re Adrian M. CA2/7

CourtListener 10333664Calctapp14 févr. 2025

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Filed 2/14/25 In re Adrian M. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re ADRIAN M., III et al., B338331
Persons Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP00038BC)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ADRIAN M., JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Affirmed.
Jesse Frederic Rodriguez, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Adrian M., Jr.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Brian Mahler, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________________

INTRODUCTION

Adrian M., Jr. (Adrian) appeals from orders under Welfare
and Institutions Code section 366.26 terminating his parental
rights to his children, Adrian M., III (Adrian III) and Alana M.1
Adrian argues the juvenile court erred in ruling the
parental-benefit exception under section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), did not apply. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Juvenile Court Declares Adrian III and Alana
Dependent Children of the Court, and the Department
Reports on the Children’s Placement and Visits with
Adrian
In January 2021 the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services filed a petition under section 300
on behalf of three-year-old Adrian III, 18-month-old Alana, and
their half sibling (who is not Adrian’s child or at issue in this
appeal). The Department alleged emergency medical services
found Adrian III on the floor of the backseat of Adrian’s car
following an accident where Adrian drove his car into a pole. The
Department alleged (1) Adrian endangered Adrian III and placed

1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.

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him at risk of serious physical harm by failing to use an
appropriate child restraint seat in his car; (2) Adrian’s history of
substance abuse and current use of controlled substances
endangered the children’s physical health and safety and placed
them at risk of serious physical harm, and the children’s mother,
Valarie G., failed to protect the children when she knew Adrian
was abusing substances and allowed Adrian to reside with, and
have unlimited access to, them; and (3) Valarie’s history of
substance abuse and current use of marijuana and
methamphetamine endangered the children’s physical health and
safety and placed them at risk of serious physical harm, and
Adrian failed to protect the children when he knew Valarie was
abusing substances and allowed Valarie to reside with, and have
unlimited access to, the children. The court detained the children
and placed them with their maternal grandmother, Cynthia H.
The court ordered triweekly, three-hour minimum, monitored
visitation for Adrian and Valarie. The children remained placed
with Cynthia and subject to the same visitation order throughout
the dependency proceedings.
In March 2021 the juvenile court sustained the petition as
alleged, declared Adrian III and Alana dependent children of the
court, and ordered reunification services. For the two months
after the Department filed the petition, the Department reported
Adrian visited the children to the extent permitted by the court.
During the six-month review period Adrian maintained
“quality monitored visitation with the children” and helped
Cynthia “clothe, bathe, feed, and play with the children.” The
court found Adrian made substantial progress with his case plan.
In early October 2021, however, Cynthia told the Department
that Adrian and Valarie were “no longer welcomed in her home”

3
after Cynthia discovered money missing following a visit from
Adrian and Valarie. The children’s paternal grandfather agreed
to monitor future visits, but Adrian never contacted him to take
advantage of the opportunity. Cynthia said Adrian did not call or
visit the children for two months until December 2021, when
Adrian asked to visit the children before he had to surrender to
begin serving a prison term.
Adrian was incarcerated from December 2021 until
January 2023. At the 12-month review hearing in April 2022 the
court found Adrian had not made substantial progress with his
case plan. Cynthia reported Adrian had no contact with the
children in January or February 2022. At the time of the
permanency review hearing in December 2022 Adrian remained
incarcerated, and the Department reported “[t]he children have
not had contact with their father during this period of
supervision.” The court found Adrian’s progress with his case
plan was not substantial, terminated reunification services, and
set a hearing under section 366.26
In April 2023 Adrian filed petitions under section 388 (later
denied) asking the court to reinstate reunification services. In
support of his petitions Adrian asserted he had maintained
“weekly visitation” with the children since his release from prison
in January 2023. Cynthia’s statement to the Department
confirmed Adrian visited the children every Saturday for six to
eight hours and used a video chat application to visit with them
at other times. As of April 27, 2023, however, Adrian was again
in custody for violating the terms of his probation. He remained
in custody until November 2023.
In a June 2023 status review report the Department stated
the children had developed a “strong bond” with each other and

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Cynthia and that they turned to Cynthia for affection, support,
and assistance when needed. The Department also said Cynthia
continued to provide the children a “safe and stable
environment,” as well as the basic necessities of life. During
visits with Adrian before his incarceration in April 2023, Cynthia
reported that Adrian engaged with the children, that the children
benefited from his visits, and that the children were “sad” when
the visits ended. Cynthia also said she had to “redirect” the
children to their parents for assistance during visits.
In August 2023 the Department reported that the children
were “extremely bonded” to Cynthia, that she was “protective of
the children and their well-being,” and that she wanted “to
support them as they grow.” Cynthia told a case social worker
that she “could not imagine her life without the children” and
that she was willing to adopt them (and their half sibling).
Cynthia reported Adrian called from prison “on a regular basis.”
Adrian was released from custody in November 2023.
In March 2024 Adrian again filed petitions under
section 388 (later denied) asking the court to reinstate
reunification services, and he again stated he had maintained
weekly visitation with the children since his release from his
most recent incarceration. In the Department’s May 2024 report
the Department stated both Adrian III and Alana told a case
social worker they wanted to live with Cynthia. Adrian III said
that he “loves visiting with his dad,” but that he wanted to live
with his grandmother. At the time, Adrian was visiting the
children Friday, Saturday, and Sunday for three to four hours
each visit. The case social worker found the children were
“closely bonded” with Cynthia, who was willing and able to
provide a permanent home for them and committed to adoption.

5
The report stated that Adrian’s time in prison had affected his
children’s ability to trust Adrian “to be there for them
emotionally [and] physically” and that Adrian’s incarceration and
drug use caused him to be “absent more than present in their
lives.” Cynthia expressed concerns Adrian made “poor decisions
that might put the children at danger in the future.”
Also in May 2024 the Department reported Cynthia
continued to provide “excellent care of the children,” who
“demonstrate[d] a healthy, loving bond” with her. The
Department also reported the children had “stabilized” in
Cynthia’s home and had “predictable routines that support their
wellbeing.”

B. The Juvenile Court Terminates Adrian’s Parental
Rights
At the June 2024 selection and implementation hearing
under section 366.26 Adrian testified he was visiting the children
every weekend for nine or 10 hours. Adrian said that the
children call him “Daddy” and that they “light up” when they see
him and get “extremely happy.” Adrian said that during visits he
took the children to the park, read to them, and did puzzles.
Adrian said he also cooked breakfast, helped the children with
homework if they had any, and helped them bathe and go to bed.
At the end of visits, Adrian said, the children cried. Adrian
stated that, during both his periods of incarceration, he called the
children every other day. He said he could not have visits with
the children while incarcerated because the prison was “too far.”
Counsel for Adrian argued the parental-benefit exception to
adoption applied because Adrian visited the children as
consistently as possible, he had a substantial bond with them,

6
and terminating his parental rights would be detrimental to the
children in that “he would not have any legally enforceable way
to maintain his presence in their lives.” Regarding visitation,
counsel for Adrian argued that “visitations were not under
[Adrian’s] control” when he was incarcerated and that no one
was able to take the children “hundreds of miles” to visit Adrian.
Counsel for Adrian stressed Adrian “immediately” visited the
children upon his release. “It was his incarceration,” counsel for
Adrian argued, “that prevented [Adrian] from doing it to the
fullest extent that he wanted.”
Counsel for the children argued the parental-benefit
exception did not apply because Adrian’s “inconsistent” visitation
throughout the case prevented the children from developing a
positive emotional attachment to their father. Counsel also
stated that the children had been with Cynthia for over three
years, that they looked to Cynthia for assistance during visits
with their parents, and that Cynthia provided them “a stable
environment, in which they are thriving emotionally and
physically.”
Counsel for the Department acknowledged that Adrian was
not able to visit the children while he was in prison, but argued
that Adrian was incarcerated “due to his own actions” and that
“the children can’t be impacted by that at this point in the case.”
Counsel for the Department also argued that the children were
adoptable, that they had a caring and stable relationship with
Cynthia, and that Cynthia was open to allowing contact with
Adrian even after adoption. For these reasons, counsel for the
Department argued, the parental-benefit exception did not apply.
The juvenile court found that the children were adoptable,
that no exception to adoption applied, and that returning the

7
children to their parents would be detrimental. The court did not
make specific findings regarding the parental-benefit exception at
the hearing, but the minute order issued following the hearing
stated: (1) Adrian had not maintained regular visitation and had
not established a bond with the children; (2) any benefit to the
children from their relationship with Adrian was outweighed by
the physical and emotional benefit the children would receive
through the permanency and stability of adoption; and
(3) adoption was in the best interest of the children. The court
terminated Adrian’s (and Valarie’s) parental rights and
transferred care, custody, and control of the children to the
Department for adoptive planning and placement. The court
designated Cynthia the prospective adoptive parent and found
the permanent plan of adoption was preferable to legal
guardianship because the children were “still available” to their
parents “since they are with their maternal grandmother.”
Adrian timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Adrian argues the juvenile court erred in ruling the
parental-benefit exception under section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), did not apply because, Adrian maintains,
the Department’s reports failed to properly address the children’s
bond with him and the court erred in considering whether the
children would continue to have contact with Adrian after their
adoption. Adrian does not argue substantial evidence did not
support the findings that he did not consistently visit the
children and that the children did not have a substantial,
positive, emotional attachment to him.

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A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
The purpose of a hearing under section 366.26 is “‘to select
and implement a permanent plan for the child’” after the juvenile
court has terminated reunification services. (In re Caden C.
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630 (Caden C.); see In re C.P. (2023)
91 Cal.App.5th 145, 153.) If the court determines “the child is
likely to be adopted,” the court must “terminate parental rights to
allow for adoption.” (Caden C., at p. 630; see § 366.26,
subd. (c)(1).) “But if the parent shows that termination would be
detrimental to the child for at least one specifically enumerated
reason, the court should decline to terminate parental rights and
select another permanent plan.” (Caden C., at pp. 630-631; see
§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B), (4)(A).) One of those reasons, the
parental-benefit exception, requires the parent to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence (1) “that she had ‘regular
visitation and contact with the child,’ (2) ‘that the child has a
substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the
kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship,’ and (3) ‘that terminating that
attachment would be detrimental to the child even when
balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive
home.’” (In re P.S. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 541, 554; see § 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); Caden C., at p. 636; see also In re V.S. (2024)
104 Cal.App.5th 1154, 1168 [“‘The party claiming that
termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child
has the burden of proving the detriment.’”].)
“The first element—regular visitation and contact—is
straightforward. The question is just whether ‘parents visit
consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by court

9
orders.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632; accord, In re A.L.
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1151; see In re I.R. (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 201, 212 [“Regular visitation exists where the
parents visit consistently and to the extent permitted by court
orders.”].) “Visits and contact ‘continue[ ] or develop[ ] a
significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent.’
[Citation.] Courts should consider in that light whether parents
‘maintained regular visitation and contact with the child’
[citation] but certainly not to punish parents or reward them for
good behavior in visiting or maintaining contact—here, as
throughout, the focus is on the best interests of the child.”
(Caden C., at p. 632; accord, In re Eli B. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th
1061, 1069-1070.) Thus, “the visitation element is to be
understood in light of the overall purpose of the beneficial
relationship exception.” (Eli B., at p. 1070.)
As stated, to establish the second element, “the parent
must show that the child has a substantial, positive, emotional
attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that
the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636; see In re J.D. (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 833, 852.) The “focus is the child,” and “the
relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age
of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s
custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between
parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’” (Caden C., at
p. 632; see J.D., at p. 854.) In assessing the attachment, “courts
often consider how children feel about, interact with, look to, or
talk about their parents.” (Caden C., at p. 632; see J.D., at
p. 854.)

10
“Concerning the third element—whether ‘termination
would be detrimental to the child due to’ the relationship—the
court must decide whether it would be harmful to the child to
sever the relationship and choose adoption. [Citations.] Because
terminating parental rights eliminates any legal basis for the
parent or child to maintain the relationship, courts must assume
that terminating parental rights terminates the
relationship. [Citations.] What courts need to determine,
therefore, is how the child would be affected by losing the
parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the
child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633; see In re I.E. (2023)
91 Cal.App.5th 683, 692; In re A.L., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1151.) “A ‘“showing [that] the child would derive some benefit
from continuing a relationship maintained during periods of
visitation”’ is not a sufficient ground to depart from the statutory
preference for adoption.” (In re Andrew M. (2024)
102 Cal.App.5th 803, 818; see Caden C., at pp. 633-634.)
The juvenile court’s ruling a parent has not satisfied his or
her burden to establish the parental-benefit exception applies
“‘may be based on any or all of the [three] component
determinations,’” including “‘whether the parent has maintained
regular visitation.’” (In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 973, 996.)
Indeed, “a parent must prove all three components of the
beneficial relationship exception,” and a “failure of proof on any
one of them is fatal.” (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
303, 322, fn. 10; see In re Eli B., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1068
[where the father did not meet his burden to prove he maintained
regular visitation, the reviewing court need not consider the
other elements of the parental-benefit exception].)

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“We review the juvenile court’s ruling on the first two
elements for substantial evidence.”2 (In re Eli B., supra,
73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1068; see Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 639; In re Andrew M., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 815.) “We
review its ruling on the third element under a hybrid standard,
reviewing its factual determinations concerning the detriment
analysis for substantial evidence but its ultimate weighing of the
relative harms and benefits of terminating parental rights for an
abuse of discretion.” (Eli B., at p. 1068; see Caden C., at p. 640.)
In reviewing factual determinations for substantial evidence, we
do not “‘reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of
witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.’” (Caden C., at p. 640.)

B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Ruling the
Parental-benefit Exception Did Not Apply

1. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile
Court’s Implied Finding Adrian Failed
To Regularly Visit Adrian III and Alana
Adrian’s only argument regarding the juvenile court’s
finding on visitation is that the juvenile court’s minute orders

2 Citing In re S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 654, the
Department argues that, because the juvenile court found Adrian
did not meet his burden of proof to demonstrate the parental-
benefit exception applied, we should consider whether the
evidence compels a finding in his favor as a matter of law. (See
id. at p. 671.) The Department’s argument has some analytical
merit, but the Supreme Court has held the substantial evidence
standard of review applies. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 639.) In any event, Adrian cannot prevail under either
standard.

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stating he did not maintain regular visits with his children
“sounded like boilerplate language.” He does not, however, argue
the court erred in failing to make different or more detailed
findings at the hearing under section 366.26. The juvenile court’s
minute orders do include findings the court did not actually make
and suggest the findings were added by the clerk from a
template, a practice that undermines the integrity of the
proceedings and is a disservice to the parties and to this court.3
Yet, section 366.26 does not require a juvenile court to make
specific findings to support a determination the parental-benefit
exception does not apply. (In re A.L., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1156; see In re Jayden M. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1261, 1270,
fn. 6 [“specific findings are not required absent a statute so
requiring”].)
In any event, the record confirms Adrian did not
consistently visit the children to the extent permitted by the
court’s orders (nine hours per week), even taking into account his
periods of incarceration. The record shows Adrian’s visitation
was essentially nonexistent (1) before his first period of
incarceration, when Cynthia refused to allow him in her house for
two months and the Department made alternative arrangements
with the paternal grandfather that Adrian did not pursue;
(2) during his first period of incarceration for approximately
seven months; and (3) during his second period of incarceration
for approximately 13 months. Although Adrian testified he called

3 We have previously criticized this practice, which is not
confined to this judicial officer or courtroom at the Edelman
Children’s Courthouse. (See e.g., In re T.G. (2020)
58 Cal.App.5th 275, 298, fn. 20.) That it persists, and that no one
appears to be listening, continues to be deeply troubling.

13
the children regularly from prison, the Department reported
Adrian had no contact with the children during certain periods of
his incarceration. Thus, even if Adrian had argued substantial
evidence did not support the juvenile court’s (implied) finding he
did not consistently visit the children, substantial evidence
supported that finding.
We appreciate Adrian’s incarceration made it difficult for
him to visit the children in person for almost 20 months. Adrian,
however, does not argue the Department did not provide
reasonable reunification services by failing to arrange
appropriate visits during his incarceration. (See § 361.5,
subd. (e)(1)(C) [reunification services for incarcerated parents
may include “[v]isitation services, where appropriate”]; Mark N.
v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1014 [child
protective agency must offer or provide reasonable reunification
services to an incarcerated parent].) Indeed, the record shows
Adrian did not respond to the Department’s efforts to maintain
monthly communication with him, at least during much of his
first period of incarceration. Moreover, the juvenile court must
consider whether the parent maintained regular visitation
precisely because developing a significant, positive, emotional
attachment from child to parent requires consistent visitation.
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) Adrian III and Alana
were very young when they were removed from Adrian. Adrian’s
absence from their lives for more than half the time the family
received reunification services undoubtedly affected the
children’s ability to establish an emotional attachment with him.

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2. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile
Court’s Implied Finding Adrian Failed To
Establish a Bond with Adrian III and Alana
Even if Adrian’s visitation when he was not incarcerated
satisfied the first element of the Caden C. analysis, substantial
evidence supported the juvenile court’s implied finding Adrian
did not have a substantial, positive, emotional bond with
Adrian III and Alana.4 According to the Department’s reports,
the children turned to Cynthia for affection, support, and
assistance, despite Cynthia’s efforts to direct the children to their
parents. The Department stated in one report Adrian’s long
absences affected the children’s ability to trust Adrian “to be
there for them emotionally [and] physically.” By the time of the
selection and implementation hearing, Adrian III had spent
almost half of his six and one-half years, and Alana had spent
well over half of her life, with Cynthia. And although Adrian
testified his children called him “Daddy” and cried when his
visits with them ended, there was no evidence that the children
experienced distress when visits ended (see In re I.E., supra,
91 Cal.App.5th at p. 692 [evidence the child “experienced no
distress at the end of visits” supported the juvenile court’s finding
“the relationship was not so substantial that its severance would
be detrimental to the child”]) or that their relationship with
Adrian was any different than that of an uncle or family friend
(see In re Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 318

4 As he argued regarding visitation, Adrian argues the
juvenile court made only the “boilerplate” finding he did not
establish a bond with his children. As discussed, that is not a
basis for reversing the juvenile court’s orders terminating
Adrian’s parental rights.

15
[“the beneficial relationship exception demands something more
than the incidental benefit a child gains from any amount of
positive contact with [his or] her natural parent”]).
Adrian argues he presented evidence the children had a
substantial, positive, emotional attachment to him. He cites his
testimony that the children would “light up” and were “extremely
happy” to see him when he visited; that he took them to the park
and read, played, and did puzzles with them; and that he helped
them with homework, completing school projects, eating
breakfast, bathing, and getting ready for bed. Adrian also points
to Cynthia’s statements to the Department that the children
benefited from Adrian’s visits and were sad when he left. We do
not review, however, whether Adrian presented sufficient
evidence Adrian III and Alana had a strong, positive emotional
attachment to him, but whether substantial evidence supported
the juvenile court’s implied finding they did not. (See In re
Matthew M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1186, 1195 [“[w]e do not
inquire whether substantial evidence would have supported a
different order”; we “ask only whether the juvenile court abused
its discretion with respect to the order it made”]; In re Eli B.,
supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1072 [“We must uphold the juvenile
court’s factual determination as long as it is supported by
substantial evidence ‘“even though substantial evidence to the
contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a
different result had it believed other evidence.”’”].) As discussed,
substantial evidence supported that finding.
Adrian also faults the Department’s reports for failing to
adequately address Adrian III’s and Alana’s interactions and
relationship with Adrian. Adrian, however, forfeited this
argument by not making it in the juvenile court. (See In re S.B.

16
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“a reviewing court ordinarily will
not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have
been but was not made in the trial court”]; In re G.C. (2013)
216 Cal.App.4th 1391, 1399 [“father forfeited the right to
complain that his parental rights had been terminated without
an adequate selection and implementation report” because he did
not object in the juvenile court].)
Adrian argues the Department’s reports contained “very
little information” about the quality of his relationship with the
children. But Adrian, who had the burden at the selection and
implementation hearing to prove Adrian III and Alana had a
significant emotional attachment to him (see Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 636; In re Andrew M., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at
p. 815), provided only general information about his activities
with Adrian III and Alana. He did not address the quality of his
relationship with them, their emotional dependence (if any) on
him, or the benefit (again, if any) to the children in continuing
their relationship with him. (See Caden C., at pp. 632, 636; see
also In re Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 321 [father
failed to show he had the requisite bond where he “adduced no
expert testimony or current opinions (for example from social
workers or therapists) who might have supported the strength of
his relationship” with his child].) Substantial evidence supported
the court’s implied finding Adrian failed to meet his burden on
the second element of the parental-benefit exception.

17
3. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its
Discretion in Concluding Adoption Outweighed
Any Benefit from Continuing the Parental
Relationship
Finally, even if Adrian satisfied the first two elements of
the Caden C. analysis, he does not argue and cannot show the
juvenile court abused its discretion in concluding any benefit to
the children from their relationship with him was outweighed by
the physical and emotional benefit the children would receive
through the permanency and stability of adoption. As discussed,
although Adrian testified the children cried when his visits with
them ended, there was no evidence that ending Adrian’s
relationship with the children would harm them. (See In re
Andrew M., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 819 [evidence a child
“shared an affectionate connection” with his parents during visits
and was sometimes reluctant to end the visits did not show a
detrimental effect from terminating parental rights, where there
was “no evidence that [the child] ever showed distress or was
upset when separating from them”]; In re I.E., supra,
91 Cal.App.5th at p. 692 [evidence a child “experienced no
distress at the end of visits” supported the juvenile court’s finding
“the relationship was not so substantial that its severance would
be detrimental to the child”].) To justify withholding the
“security,” “stability,” and “‘sense of belonging a new family
would confer’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633), a parent
“must prove more than ‘“some benefit.”’” (Andrew M., at p. 820;
see In re G.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 15, 25.) At a minimum,
Adrian had to show some type of harm beyond the fact that
enjoyable visits ended, and he failed to make such a showing.
(Andrew M., at p. 820.)

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Moreover, there was ample evidence the children were
emotionally bonded with Cynthia, wanted to continue living with
her, and relied on her for emotional support and stability, which
supported the court’s implied finding adoption would not be
detrimental to the children. (See In re I.E., supra,
91 Cal.App.5th at p. 693 [evidence the child was well adjusted in
her placement, had a mutual attachment to her foster mother,
and wanted to live with her prospective adoptive mother
supported the finding terminating parental rights would not
harm the child]; see also In re Andrew M., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th
at p. 818 [“It is only ‘[w]hen the relationship with a parent is so
important to the child that the security and stability of a new
home wouldn’t outweigh its loss, [that] termination would be
“detrimental to the child due to” the child’s beneficial relationship
with a parent.’”].)
Adrian asserts the juvenile court, in determining under the
third step of the Caden C. analysis whether adoption outweighed
any benefit from the children’s continued relationship with their
father, erred in considering whether the children would continue
to have contact with him after their adoption. (See In re J.D.,
supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 866 [“the juvenile court must assume
that if it decides to sever parental rights, then parent and child
will be left as not just legal strangers to one another but also
literal strangers”].) The record does not support Adrian’s
assertion. It was only after finding that the children were
adoptable and that no exception to adoption applied that the
juvenile court stated: “The court finds the permanent plan of
adoption is the permanent plan, versus the permanent plan of
legal guardianship, is appropriate, since they are with their
maternal grandmother, and the parents still have a connection to

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their children, and the children are still available to them,
[adoption] is ordered to continue as the permanent plan.” The
juvenile court did not consider whether Adrian would continue to
see the children as part of its Caden C. analysis.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s orders terminating Adrian’s parental
rights to Adrian III and Alana are affirmed.

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

FEUER, J.

STONE, J.

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