CourtListener 10332731•People v. Rodriguez CA4/1
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Filed 2/13/25 P. v. Rodriguez CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D083063
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. FVI18002029)
HECTOR RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino,
Joseph B. Widman, Judge. Affirmed as modified, and remanded with
directions.
Cynthia M. Jones, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney
General, Steve Oetting and Heather B. Arambarri, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Hector Rodriguez fired a gun into a car four times, hitting
two passengers inside. A jury convicted Rodriguez of one count of attempted
voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 1921; count 1), two counts of
assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); counts 3 & 4), two counts of
shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246; counts 5 & 6), and found true
enhancement allegations related to each count. Thereafter, the trial court
found true prior serious felony convictions supporting an enhanced sentence
under the Three Strike Law and sentenced Rodriguez to an aggregate prison
term of 75 years to life, consisting of consecutive terms of 25 years to life for
each conviction under section 246, counts 5 and 6, and a consecutive term of
25 years to life for a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53) related to count 5.
The court stated it was striking and staying the remaining enhancements
under section 1385.
On appeal from the judgment, Rodriguez asserts he was wrongfully
convicted of two counts under section 246 because the statute contemplates a
single crime based on a shooting, not separate crimes for each occupant of the
vehicle. In supplemental briefing authorized by this court, Rodriguez further
argues that if the convictions are based on the firing of separate shots, as the
Attorney General asserts, one of the convictions must still be reversed
because the jury was not properly instructed on this theory. Alternatively,
Rodriguez argues that remand for resentencing is required because the trial
court did not consider whether it was required to stay one of the convictions
under section 654.
In addition, Rodriguez argues the trial court erred by stating it was
staying the enhancement punishments. The Attorney General concedes the
error and both parties agree this court may correct the judgment to reflect
1 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
that the enhancements are stricken because the trial court clearly indicated
this was its intention.
We accept the Attorney General’s concession and agree with the parties
that this court should modify the judgment to reflect the enhancements are
stricken. We reject Rodriguez’s arguments concerning the convictions under
section 246 and the application of section 654. Accordingly, the judgment is
affirmed as modified in the disposition of this opinion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At the time of the crimes, one of the occupants of the car that Rodriguez
shot at, M.H., lived in a house in a remote area north of San Bernardino.
M.H. lived with her brother, her friend S.G., and S.G.’s children. The other
occupant of the car, A.P., also periodically stayed at the house. M.H., S.G.,
and A.P. used methamphetamine regularly at the house.
M.H. also used methamphetamine regularly with Rodriguez. M.H.,
however, testified that she never used the substance with A.P. and Rodriguez
at the same time. M.H. had an intimate relationship with both A.P. and
Rodriguez. M.H. also had a boyfriend, R.C., who she testified was abusive.
M.H. would often call Rodriguez to pick her up from R.C.’s house after
episodes of abuse. Rodriguez encouraged M.H. to break up with R.C.
The day before the shooting, Rodriguez and M.H. went to R.C.’s house
to fill up a water tank because the water service had been disconnected at
M.H.’s house. Rodriguez also took a power washer from R.C.’s house. When
R.C. discovered Rodriguez had taken the power washer, he became angry and
told M.H. he would “beat her ass” if the washer was not returned.
Several hours later, around 2:00 a.m. the following day, M.H. was
drinking with S.G. and Rodriguez at their house when A.P. called her. A.P.
said his grandmother had passed away and he needed to talk. Around the
3
same time, Rodriguez left the house to visit a friend and then to return the
power washer to R.C.’s house. At 2:47 a.m., after Rodriguez left, A.P. arrived
at the house and parked his car across the street. M.H. came outside and got
into A.P.’s car to talk.
While M.H. and A.P. were talking in A.P.’s car, Rodriguez returned to
the house in his truck. He pulled up next to A.P.’s parked car, so that his
driver’s side window and A.P.’s driver’s side window faced each other. A.P.
testified that both windows were rolled down, and that Rodriguez pointed a
gun at him. In response, A.P. raised his arms and said, “Hey dawg, it’s me.”
Rodriguez then said, “All right, I just wanted to make sure.” M.H. testified
that Rodriguez used his fingers to simulate a gun, pointed them at A.P., and
told A.P. that A.P. was lucky he did not shoot him. M.H. said A.P. and
Rodriguez then laughed, and Rodriguez pulled into the driveway, got out of
his truck, and shut off the lights of the house.
According to A.P., moments after Rodriguez went to the house, he
returned to his truck and drove toward A.P.’s car. A.P. testified that when he
saw the truck coming towards him, he rolled up his window, and started his
car. Rodriguez then fired a gun four times at the driver’s side of A.P.’s car,
striking A.P. in the shoulder and the forearm. The bullet that hit A.P. in the
forearm also struck M.H. in the stomach. A.P. testified that two bullets
struck the driver side window of his car, one struck the car’s frame between
the driver and passenger side doors, and one struck the car’s rear window.
A.P. drove to a nearby gas station while M.H. called 911. Before
authorities arrived, A.P. hid a bag of ammunition clips that were in his trunk
in a dumpster. A.P. and M.H. testified that A.P. did not have a gun in his car
at the time of the shooting.
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Rodriguez’s testimony from an earlier trial was read to the jury.
Rodriguez stated that when he returned to the house, he pulled up next to
A.P.’s car and “gestured that [he] had a gun.” He said he could not tell who
was in the car because it was dark and the car’s windows were up. Rodriguez
said after he made the gun gesture, he parked his truck in front of M.H.’s
house, waited a minute to see if the car would leave, then went inside and
shut off the house’s exterior lights. Once inside, Rodriguez asked S.G. where
M.H. was, and S.G. responded she did not know. He then checked M.H.’s
room and saw she was not in the house.
Rodriguez testified he thought M.H. was in the car with R.C. and that
she might be in danger. When he got back in his truck and drove toward
A.P.’s car, which was also moving, he saw a flash that he thought was
gunfire, prompting Rodriguez to fire his gun at the car four times. Rodriguez
then drove to the house he shared with his wife, dropped off his truck, and
went back to M.H.’s house.
Rodriguez was arrested later that day at M.H.’s house. The San
Bernardino County District Attorney filed an information charging Rodriguez
with two counts of attempted murder (§§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a);
counts 1 & 2), two counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2);
counts 3 & 4), and two counts of shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246;
counts 5 & 6)). With respect to all six counts, the information alleged
Rodriguez personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). With
respect to counts 1, 2, 5 and 6, the information alleged Rodriguez personally
discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). With
respect to counts 3 and 4, the information alleged Rodriguez personally used
a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). Additionally, the information alleged
Rodriguez had suffered three prior serious felony convictions (§ 667,
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subd. (a)(1)), subjecting him to sentencing under the Three Strikes Law
(§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)).
At the conclusion of trial, the jury acquitted Rodriguez on count 2 and
convicted him on the five remaining counts. The jury, however, did not
convict Rodriguez of attempted murder on count 1, instead finding him guilty
of the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter. The jury
also found true the great bodily injury and firearm allegations alleged in
counts 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6, and the trial court found true the allegations
regarding the prior convictions. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced
Rodriguez to an aggregate term of 75 years to life, consisting of consecutive
terms of 25-years-to-life on counts 5 and 6, and a consecutive term of 25-
years-to-life for the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm enhancement on
count 5. The trial court stayed the remaining counts pursuant to section 654,
and both struck and stayed the other great bodily injury enhancements,
firearm enhancements, and prior conviction enhancements pursuant to
section 1385.
Rodriguez filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment of
conviction.
DISCUSSION
I
Section 246 Convictions
Rodriguez contends he was wrongfully convicted of two counts under
section 246 because the statute contemplates a single crime based on a
shooting, not separate crimes for each occupant of the vehicle. He further
contends, in a supplemental brief authorized by this court, that even if the
convictions can be based on the firing of separate shots, as the Attorney
General argues one of the convictions must still be reversed because the jury
6
was not properly instructed on this theory. The Attorney General responds
that the prosecutor did not rely on an invalid legal theory or, if he did, the
error was harmless.
In addition, Rodriguez argues that, even if the convictions are properly
based on multiple gunshots, remand for resentencing is necessary because
the court failed to consider whether one of the convictions should be stayed
pursuant to section 654. The Attorney General argues the multiple victim
exception to section 654 applies and, therefore, the court properly sentenced
Rodriguez to separate consecutive terms on counts 5 and 6.
A
Additional Background
The evidence presented at trial, including Rodriguez’s own testimony,
showed Rodriguez fired four shots at the car occupied by A.P. and M.H. This
important fact is not disputed by Rodriguez on appeal. The information filed
against Rodriguez charged him with two counts of violating section 246,
setting forth the following identical language in counts 5 and 6: “On or about
July 22, 2018, in the above named judicial district, the crime of shooting at
an [occupied motor vehicle], in violation of Penal Code section 246, a felony,
was committed by Hector Rodriguez, who did willfully, unlawfully, and
maliciously discharge a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle.”
(Capitalization omitted.) The information did not identify a victim as to
either count, but the section 12022.53, subdivision (d), enhancements
following each count identified A.P. as the victim for count 5 and M.H. as the
victim for count 6.
After the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury with
CALCRIM No. 965, advising jurors that Rodriguez was charged in counts 5
and 6 with shooting at an occupied vehicle. The instruction provided that for
7
the jury to convict Rodriguez of this crime, the prosecution had to prove he
willfully and maliciously shot a firearm, he shot the firearm at an occupied
motor vehicle, and he did not act in self-defense. As with the charges in the
information, the instruction did not specify a victim for either count.
The jury was given verdict forms for each count. The verdict forms for
counts 5 and 6 identified victims associated with each count. The forms
stated: “We, the jury ..., as to the crime charged in Count Five [or Count Six],
namely, SHOOTING AT AN OCCUPIED VEHICLE as to [A.P. or M.H.], find
the defendant Hector Rodriguez: [¶] NOT GUILTY [or] GUILTY [circle one].”
The jury circled guilty on both forms, which then prompted the jury to
determine whether the intentional discharge of a firearm and the great
bodily injury enhancements for each count were true. Unlike the
information, the enhancement portions of the forms did not reference A.P. or
M.H.2
In her closing argument, the prosecutor explained that to convict
Rodriguez, he “must have willfully and maliciously shot a firearm ... at an
occupied motor vehicle. And the defendant did not act in self-defense.” The
prosecutor also explained there was “no requirement that the defendant
kn[o]w that the motor vehicle was occupied.” In addition, the prosecutor
walked the jury through the verdict forms. The prosecutor stated, “Count 5 is
shooting at an occupied motor vehicle as it relates to [A.P], and you will find
that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, because I’ve proved
that to you as well …. And then, finally, you’ll make your way to Count 6,
which is on page 13, second to the last page. And this is the same charge as
Count 5, but as it relates to [M.H.], you will find the defendant guilty as it
2 The jury circled true for all four enhancements.
8
relates to [M.H.], because he shot at an occupied motor vehicle which
contained [M.H.]. And I’ve proven that to you beyond a reasonable doubt.”
At sentencing, the parties and the trial court did not address the
applicability of section 654 to counts 5 and 6. Rather, before imposing
consecutive sentences on the counts, the court stated that it was unsure of its
decision on this point and it was looking to the factors set forth in Rule 4.425
of the California Rules of Court. The court indicated that because there were
two victims, its inclination was to impose consecutive sentences on counts 5
and 6. The court then invited argument from the parties.
The prosecutor argued that concurrent sentences would be appropriate
if there were just one bullet fired by Rodriguez. However, because each
round constituted a separate violation of section 246 and a separate intention
by Rodriguez each time he pulled the trigger, and because there were two
victims of the crimes, consecutive sentences were appropriate. Further, the
prosecutor asserted the crimes involved separate acts of violence, which
constituted an aggravating factor under Rule 4.425. In response, defense
counsel pointed to Rodriguez’s testimony that he did not know M.H. was in
the car and he fired his weapon in self-defense, believing he had been fired on
first. Defense counsel also pointed to the facts that Rodriguez expressed
remorse for shooting M.H. and he offered, after the start of jury selection, to
plead guilty in exchange for a certain term of 40 years in prison.
After argument, the court announced its decision to impose consecutive
sentences for counts 5 and 6, pointing to the aggravating factors that
Rodriguez engaged in violent conduct that constituted a danger to society and
that his criminal convictions as an adult were numerous and increasing in
seriousness.
9
B
Legal Standards
“Section 954 generally permits multiple convictions: ‘An accusatory
pleading may charge ... different statements of the same offense’ and ‘the
defendant may be convicted of any number of the offenses charged.’ The
issue must be distinguished from the closely related question of whether a
defendant may receive multiple punishment based upon a single act or course
of conduct. (People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 692, disapproved on
another point in People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1228–1229, 1231.)
Section 654 prohibits multiple punishment for the same act or omission. The
Supreme Court has recognized the tension between section 954 and section
654. The solution adopted, in general, is ‘to permit multiple convictions on
counts that arise from a single act or course of conduct—but to avoid multiple
punishment, by staying execution of sentence on all but one of those
convictions.’ ” (People v. Johnson (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1474, fn.
omitted.)
“The proper unit of prosecution is a question of legislative intent that
arises when interpreting any criminal statute. (See Sanabria v. United
States (1978) 437 U.S. 54, 70 [‘Whether a particular course of conduct
involves one or more distinct “offenses” under the statute depends on ...
congressional choice.’]; see generally Note, Counting Offenses (2009) 58 Duke
L.J. 709.) Answering a unit of prosecution question requires courts to
determine when ‘the actus reus prohibited by the statute—the gravamen of
the offense—has been committed more than once.’ ” (People v. Whitmer
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 733, 744 (Whitmer) (conc. opn. of Liu, J).)
With respect to whether section 654 applies to preclude multiple
punishments, a course of conduct is generally indivisible if the defendant
10
harbored a single criminal objective the entire time. (People v. Gaio (2000) 81
Cal.App.4th 919, 935.) “ ‘ “ ‘Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible
... depends on the intent and objective of the actor.’ [Citations.] ‘[I]f all the
offenses were merely incidental to, or were the means of accomplishing or
facilitating one objective, defendant may be found to have harbored a single
intent and therefore may be punished only once.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’
[Citations.] However, if the defendant harbored ‘multiple or simultaneous
objectives, independent of and not merely incidental to each other, the
defendant may be punished for each violation committed in pursuit of each
objective even though the violations share common acts or were parts of an
otherwise indivisible course of conduct.’ ” (People v. Jones (2002) 103
Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143.) Further, “ ‘the limitations of section 654 do not
apply to crimes of violence against multiple victims.” (People v. Oates (2004)
32 Cal.4th 1048, 1063 (Oates), italics added, superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 696.)
To the extent Rodriguez’s argument requires an interpretation of
section 246, “we employ the de novo standard of review.” (People v. Villegas
(2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 642, 646.) “The issue of whether multiple convictions
are proper is also reviewed de novo, as it turns on the interpretation of
section 954.” (Ibid.)
C
Analysis
1. Rodriguez Was Properly Convicted of Multiple Counts of Section 246
Section 246 states, “Any person who shall maliciously and willfully
discharge a firearm at an ... occupied motor vehicle ... is guilty of a felony,
and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment.” As the parties
agree, the offense does not turn on the number of occupants in the vehicle, or
11
even whether the defendant knew the vehicle was occupied. “The purpose of
section 246, when it was enacted in 1949 ... was to combat ‘the increasing
frequency of shootings into homes by reckless, irresponsible and malicious
persons’ ” and its amendment in 1976 to add “ ‘occupied motor vehicle’ to the
specified targets, was intended to strengthen the law prohibiting discharge of
a firearm at a motor vehicle.” (People v. Manzo (2012) 53 Cal.4th 880, 886
(Manzo).)
“According to an enrolled bill report prepared by the California
Highway Patrol in support of the [1976] amendment, there had been ‘an
alarming number of incidents in the recent past where a person has
discharged a firearm into an occupied vehicle,’ with a ‘tremendous’ potential
for ‘severe or fatal wounds.’ (Cal. Highway Patrol, Enrolled Bill Rep. on
Assem. Bill No. 3303 (1975–1976 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 3, 1976, p. 1.) The bill’s
supporters believed that the act of discharging a firearm at an occupied
vehicle, even in the absence of an intent to cause great bodily harm, was
serious enough to warrant felony punishment.” (Manzo, supra, 53 Cal.4th at
p. 886.)
As discussed, multiple convictions for the same offense are permitted
where the defendant commits multiple completed crimes as determined by
the statutory elements of the crime. (Whitmer, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 744
(conc. opn. of Liu, J.).) The elements of section 246 are (1) acting willfully
and maliciously and (2) shooting at an inhabited vehicle. (People v. Ramirez
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 980, 985.) As Rodriguez points out, the statute “does not
even necessarily require a victim to be present.” (See In re Daniel R. (1993)
20 Cal.App.4th 239, 244 [assault not a lesser included offense of section 246
because “not all violations of section 246 require persons or victims even be
physically present”].) Here, the evidence, which Rodriguez does not dispute,
12
established he willfully and maliciously shot at A.P.’s car four times. Thus,
he completed the elements of the crime four times and could be charged and
convicted accordingly. The jury’s conclusion he was guilty of two violations of
the statute was proper.
Rodriguez asserts that because he could find no published California
opinions where more than one violation of section 246 was charged, he was
wrongly convicted of more than one count. This argument lacks merit. As
the Attorney General points out, the fact that prosecutors in other cases have
charged defendants with only a single count of violating section 246 where
the defendant fired multiple shots does not establish error in this case.
Because the crime was completed each time Rodriguez fired his gun with the
intent to shoot at the occupied vehicle, or with conscious indifference to the
probability that the shots would hit the vehicle, the crime was appropriately
charged more than once.3
3 Rodriguez relies on People v. Wilson (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 193 to
support his assertion that only one count of section 246 could be properly
charged. Wilson, however, does not address the issue in this case. Rather, it
addressed the circumstances under which it is appropriate to convict a
defendant of multiple counts of section 422, prohibiting criminal threats. The
Wilson court held that “section 422 prohibits multiple convictions based on
multiple threats toward a single victim during a single encounter.” (Id. at
p. 201.) The court explained that “[t]he appropriate unit of prosecution is
indicated by section 422’s requirement that the victim ‘be in sustained fear
for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family’s safety,’ ” which
“occurs over ‘a period of time “that extends beyond what is momentary,
fleeting, or transitory.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Thus, “[a] violation of section 422 is not
complete upon the issuance of a threat; it depends on the recipient of the
threat suffering ‘sustained fear’ as a result of the communication. It is not
appropriate to convict a defendant of multiple counts under section 422 based
on multiple threatening communications uttered to a single victim during a
brief, uninterrupted encounter.” (Ibid.) Notably, Wilson explained that the
defendant in the case conceded multiple convictions of 422 could be obtained
13
2. Rodriguez Was Not Convicted Based on an Illegal Theory
Rodriguez next argues that the verdict forms and the prosecutor’s
explanation of the forms allowed the jury to convict him on the illegal theory
that there were two violations of section 246 because there were two car
occupants. The Attorney General responds that the instructions and the
prosecutor’s explanation of the elements of the crime were proper. Further,
the Attorney General argues the verdict forms and the explanation of those
forms did not mislead the jury or allow the jury to convict Rodriguez based
solely on the fact that there were two occupants of the car. The Attorney
General points to the prosecutor’s emphasis of the fact that the crime could
be completed even if Rodriguez was not aware that the car was occupied.
We agree with the Attorney General that the references to the victims
in the verdict forms, and by the prosecutor during her explanation of the
forms, did not present an illegal theory on which Rodriguez could be
convicted. Because it was undisputed that Rodriguez fired four shots at
A.P.’s car, the references to A.P. and M.H. were irrelevant. This point is
illustrated by the two cases that Rodriguez cites in support of his illegal
theory argument: People v. Stutelberg (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 314 (Stutelberg)
and People v. Medellin (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519 (Medellin).
In Stutelberg, the defendant used a box cutter during an assault, and
was charged with assault with a deadly weapon. (Stutelberg, supra, 29
Cal.App.5th at p. 317.) Because the jury was not fully instructed on the legal
definition of a deadly or dangerous weapon, the jury could have misclassified
a box cutter as an inherently deadly or dangerous weapon when it is not as a
matter of law. (Id. at p. 317.) The Court of Appeal, therefore, concluded that
had the prosecutor pleaded and proved conduct directed at multiple victims of
the threats. (Id. at pp. 198‒199.)
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the instruction allowed for the possibility that the jury convicted the
defendant based on a legally incorrect theory regarding a required element of
assault with a deadly weapon. (Id. at pp. 318‒319.)
In Medellin, the defendant was charged with assault likely to cause
great bodily injury, and the jury instruction defined great bodily injury as
“greater than minor or moderate harm.” (Medellin, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 531‒532.) Highlighting the word “or” in the instruction, the prosecutor
argued that a moderate injury would suffice because the prosecution only
needed to prove the injury was “more than minor.” (Ibid.) On appeal, the
court concluded, and the Attorney General conceded, that the prosecutor
plainly misstated the law. (Id. at p. 533.) Because the instruction allowed
the jury to convict the defendant based on a misstatement of the law and the
trial evidence would allow the jury to convict on the misstated law, the error
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at pp. 534‒535.)
Unlike the jury instructions at issue in Stutelberg and Medellin, the
instructions given in this case did not fail to provide or adequately define a
required element of the offense of shooting at an occupied vehicle. Rather,
the instructions stated that the prosecution was required to show Rodriguez
twice willfully and maliciously shot a firearm, he shot the firearm at an
occupied motor vehicle, and he did not act in self-defense. The instructions
properly defined the terms “willfully,” “maliciously,” “motor vehicle,” and
“firearm.” The verdict forms and the prosecutor’s statements did not mislead
the jury on these elements. Rather, they quantified the number of offenses
using the number of vehicle occupants instead of the shots fired. Under the
evidence in this case, this is a distinction without consequence. Because
section 246 does not require any finding regarding the occupants—except the
fact that the vehicle is occupied—and there was no dispute that multiple
15
shots were fired, the instructions given here do not suffer from the illegal
theory problem identified in Stutelberg and Medellin.
3. The Multiple Victim Exception to Section 654 Applies
Finally, Rodriguez contends the case must be remanded for
resentencing so the court may exercise its discretion to stay one count under
section 654. The Attorney General responds that because there were two
victims of the two offenses, the multiple victim exception to the statute
applies and the trial court properly imposed separate, consecutive sentences
for counts 5 and 6. We agree with the Attorney General.
Section 654 provides in pertinent part: “An act or omission that is
punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished
under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be
punished under more than one provision.” (§ 654, subd. (a).) The statute
prohibits punishment for two offenses arising from the same act or from a
series of acts constituting an indivisible course of conduct. (People v.
Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311.) “A ‘course of conduct’ may be
considered a single act within the meaning of section 654 and therefore be
punishable only once, or it may constitute a ‘divisible transaction’ which may
be punished under more than one statute.” (People v. Kwok (1998) 63
Cal.App.4th 1236, 1252.)
As noted however, courts have long held that “ ‘the limitations of
section 654 do not apply to crimes of violence against multiple victims.’ ”
(Oates, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1063; see People v. King (1993) 5 Cal.4th 59, 78
and Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 20 [recognizing multiple
victim exception to section 654].) When a defendant commits an act of
violence with the intent to harm more than one person or by means likely to
cause harm to several persons, his greater culpability precludes application of
16
section 654. (People v. Centers (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 84, 99; see Oates, at
p. 1063 [“ ‘A defendant who commits an act of violence ... by a means likely to
cause harm to several persons is more culpable than a defendant who harms
only one person.’ ”]; People v. Solis (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1002, 1023
[defendant properly punished for two counts of making a criminal threat
because his threatening messages were heard by two individuals].)
Courts have applied the multiple victim exception in the context of
shots fired at an occupied building or a vehicle under section 246. (See People
v. Masters (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1124, 1128‒1130 [section 654 did not
require a stay of sentence for violation of section 246 and assault with a
deadly weapon arising from the same shooting where four or five shots were
fired at a car occupied by three people]; People v. Cruz (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th
427, 434 [multiple punishments proper where multiple shots fired at multiple
people].) One court has concluded the exception applies even when only one
shot was fired that endangered multiple people. (See People v.
Dydouangphan (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 772, 781–782.) Here, as discussed, it
is undisputed that Rodriguez fired four shots at a car occupied by two people.
Accordingly, the multiple victim exception to section 654 applies.
Given these facts, the trial court and parties reasonably assumed it was
unnecessary to address section 654 because it was clear the multiple victim
exception precluded a stay. Rodriguez’s argument that the trial court erred
in not staying one of the sentences because it did not make a factual finding
that the multiple gunshots constituted separate and distinct acts is without
merit. Rodriguez’s argument ignores the fact that no such finding was
required because each of the violations of section 246 indisputably involved
two victims. Accordingly, Rodriguez was properly sentenced on both counts.
17
II
The Additional Enhancements Must Be Stricken
Rodriguez asserts, and the Attorney General agrees, that the court
erred by stating it was both staying and striking the enhancements, and not
simply striking them. The parties also agree that because the trial court’s
intention to strike the enhancements is clear in the record, this court should
correct the judgment to strike them. We agree with the parties that the court
erred by both striking and staying the enhancements and that the judgment
should be corrected to state the enhancements are stricken.
A
Additional Background
Prior to sentencing, defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss the
firearm, great bodily injury, and prior conviction enhancements pursuant to
section 1385. Counsel argued that the mitigating circumstances set forth in
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), subparagraphs (B), (C), (E) and (H)
warranted the dismissal of the enhancements in his case. The prosecutor
addressed the enhancements in her sentencing brief and argued that the trial
court should impose terms of 25 years to life for the section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) firearm enhancements on counts 5 and 6, and stay the terms
on the remaining enhancements.
At sentencing, the trial court stated that it was going to impose a term
of 25 years to life for the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement on
count 5 and strike the remaining enhancements. The trial court explained:
“I am going to strike all of the enhancements except for the 25 to life
enhancement on count 5. So that is the one enhancement that will remain.
The remainder are—the language that I’m using is, they are stayed but may
be deemed stricken pursuant to 1385(c). And that is—the exception, though,
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is the enhancement under count 5 pursuant to Penal Code Section
12022.53(d). And I’d like to briefly explain my reasoning. If you read the
statute, it’s fairly forceful language about the requirement that the Court
dismiss enhancements. In particular, applicable in this case, (b), which is
multiple enhancements are alleged in this case. And this code section
provides in this instance all enhancements beyond a single enhancement
shall be dismissed. And, (c), the application of an enhancement could result
in a sentence of over 20 years. In this instance the enhancement shall be
dismissed.”
The court continued, “Now, there is a big exception. Which is unless
the Court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public
safety. Which means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the
enhancement would result in physical injury or serious danger to others. The
conduct in this case illustrates that the defendant, whatever his age, is
unfortunately and regrettably prone to drug addiction. And when he is ...
under the influence of drugs, which appears to have been the case in this
case, when he committed the offense conduct, he is capable of, and in fact, in
this case has committed grave act of senseless violence against innocent
victims. People just sitting in their car and he opened fire against them and
shot both of them.”
The minute order from the sentencing proceeding states,
“Enhancements are stayed but may be deemed stricken pursuant to
PC1385(c).” Similarly, the abstract of judgment notes, “Sentenced for a total
indeterminate term of: 75 years to life. Enhancements are stayed but may
be deemed stricken pursuant to PC1385(c).”
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B
Analysis
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1) states, “Notwithstanding any other law,
the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to
do so.” (Italics added.) The statute’s plain language mandates dismissal of
the enhancements and not imposition of a stay. “[S]triking an enhancement,”
e.g. dismissing the enhancement, “and staying an enhancement are not the
same thing.” (People v. Eberhardt (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1112, 1122‒1123.)
“ ‘The difference between “striking” and “staying” is not a mere linguistic
difference. ... [S]triking the enhancements [implies] a finding that they were
insupportable in the interests of justice or would have required mitigating
factors. (§§ 1385, 1170.1, subd. (g).) The decision to “stay” is, on the other
hand, a sentencing method; that is, a sentence may be “imposed” or
“stayed.” ’ ” (Eberhardt, at p. 1123.)
Here, the trial court stated explicitly it was striking all enhancements
except for the firearm enhancement on count 5, but then went on to state “the
language” it was using would be that the enhancements “are stayed but may
be deemed stricken pursuant to 1385(c).” The trial court did not explain why
it attempted to also stay the stricken enhancements. We agree with the
parties that despite the court’s confusion as to how to word its judgment, the
trial court’s statements make clear it intended to strike all the enhancements
except the firearm enhancement on count 5. Because this intention is clear,
we modify the judgment to reflect that the remaining enhancements are
stricken. (See People v. Mendoza (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 535, 539 [“When a
trial court’s intention is clear, we ‘need not remand for resentencing, but can
modify the judgment to reflect the intent of the trial court.’ ”]; see also People
v. Gutierrez (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 804, 816 [when a trial court’s intention is
20
clear, we “need not remand for resentencing, but can modify the judgment to
reflect the intent of the trial court”] and § 1260.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to strike (1) the personal infliction of great
bodily injury enhancements (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) attached to counts 1, 3, 4, 5
and 6; (2) the personal discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury
enhancements (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) attached to counts 1 and 6; (3) the
personal use of a firearm enhancements (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) attached to
counts 3 and 4; and (4) the prior serious felony convictions enhancements
(§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court is directed to prepare an amended
abstract of judgment reflecting this modification and to forward a certified
copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. As modified, the
judgment is affirmed.
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
IRION, J.
KELETY, J.
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