CourtListener 10330389•People v. Wilkerson CA2/8
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Filed 2/10/25 P. v. Wilkerson CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B334616
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA104954)
v.
MARQUIS ANTHONY
WILKERSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Tony Cho, Judge. Affirmed.
Cynthia L. Barnes, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Deepti Vaadyala, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
**********
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497
(Romero) held that Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (a) permits
a trial court “to strike prior felony conviction allegations in cases
brought under the Three Strikes law.” (Romero, at pp. 529-530.)
Defendant and appellant Marquis Anthony Wilkerson, who
admitted two prior strike convictions, was sentenced as a third
strike offender. He appeals from the judgment of conviction,
contending the trial court abused its discretion in declining to strike
one of his prior convictions. We find no abuse of discretion and
therefore affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
In 2023, defendant was convicted by jury of 10 felonies arising
from a series of assaults he committed against his former girlfriend
and her brother, among them attempted voluntary manslaughter
(Pen. Code, §§ 192, 664), assault with a semiautomatic firearm
(§ 245, subd. (b)), kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)), domestic violence
causing injury (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) and making criminal threats
(§ 422, subd. (a)). Both victims sustained serious injuries in the
attacks, including broken bones and gunshot wounds. The jury
found true personal firearm use allegations, infliction of great
bodily injury allegations, and allegations that several of the offenses
involved a high degree of cruelty, viciousness and callousness.
In a bifurcated proceeding before the court, defendant
admitted two prior strike convictions, a 2013 first degree burglary
conviction and a 2021 robbery conviction. Defendant filed a Romero
motion, asking the court to strike his 2013 burglary conviction. The
court denied the motion, explaining that defendant’s convictions
were “numerous,” and he had continued to commit multiple offenses
since that 2013 conviction.
The court imposed a third strike sentence pursuant to Penal
Code section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and section 1170.12,
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subdivisions (a) through (e). Defendant was sentenced to an
aggregate state prison sentence of 75 years to life, plus 50 years,
four months.
This appeal followed. We grant the People’s request to take
judicial notice of records from the superior court pertaining to
defendant’s prior conviction in 2013. While there was an apparent
error in the probation report, the parties agree (as reflected in the
court records submitted for judicial notice) that the 2013 strike was
for residential burglary.
DISCUSSION
Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court
abused its discretion in declining to strike his 2013 prior conviction
for first degree burglary. He says the conviction was remote in
time, he was only 19 when he committed the burglary, and he was
suffering from substance abuse issues. Defendant argues that a
second strike sentence would still have provided lengthy
punishment, and the sentence imposed by the court was excessive
and “serves no rational purpose.”
Trial courts are vested with the discretion to strike prior
felony convictions in accordance with Penal Code section 1385 and
the interests of justice. (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 529-531.)
Romero instructs that the statutory phrase “ ‘in furtherance of
justice’ ” requires a sentencing court to consider both “ ‘ “the
constitutional rights of the defendant, and the interests of society
represented by the People.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 530, italics omitted.)
People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 describes the inquiry
generally as follows: The sentencing court “must consider whether,
in light of the nature and circumstances of [the defendant’s] present
felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the
particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the
defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in
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part.” We review the trial court’s ruling under the deferential
abuse of discretion standard. (Romero, at p. 530.)
In ruling on defendant’s motion, the trial court acknowledged
defendant committed the 2013 strike 10 years before he committed
the multiple violent and vicious crimes in this case. But, as the
court also aptly noted, defendant’s criminal record was lengthy and
uninterrupted, with the current charges involving serious and
violent conduct against two separate victims. Defendant suffered
two juvenile adjudications in 2010 and 2011. His first adult
conviction (vehicle theft) occurred in 2012. While still on probation
for that offense, defendant was convicted of drug possession in
April 2013. Two months later, defendant suffered his first strike
conviction (first degree burglary) for which he was sentenced to
five years in prison. Defendant was paroled in October 2015. In
2017, he was convicted of robbery for which he served 333 days in
jail and was placed on three years’ probation. While still on
probation, defendant was convicted for carrying a concealed
weapon. In 2021, defendant was convicted of his second strike for
robbery. The present charges arose from incidents that began in
July 2021 and carried over into March 2022. While the present
charges were pending, defendant was charged with bringing
contraband into a custodial facility.
Our Supreme Court has said that “the three strikes law not
only establishes a sentencing norm, it carefully circumscribes the
trial court’s power to depart from this norm and requires the court
to explicitly justify its decision to do so. In doing so, the law creates
a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to these
sentencing norms is both rational and proper.” (People v. Carmony
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378.) A trial court ordinarily will be found to
have abused its discretion in declining to strike a prior strike
conviction where the court was not aware of its discretion to do so,
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or it considered impermissible factors in denying the request.
(Ibid.)
There is nothing in the record to suggest the court considered
impermissible factors or was unaware of the scope of its statutory
authority in ruling on defendant’s motion. Moreover, plainly,
defendant may not be deemed outside the spirit of the three strikes
law sentencing scheme either in whole or in part.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
GRIMES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
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