CourtListener 10329324•People v. Barragan CA2/8
Texte intégral
Filed 2/7/25 P. v. Barragan CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B335687
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA152980
v.
JUAN BARRAGAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Sean D. Coen, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Law Offices of Andy Miri and Andy Miri for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Shezad Thakor and Lauren N. Guber, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
We remand for resentencing. Unspecified code citations
are to the Penal Code.
We stated the circumstances of Juan Barragan’s crime in
our 2023 opinion. In brief, Barragan and another man beat the
victim at a gas station and robbed him of his car. We grant the
prosecution’s request to take judicial notice of the record in that
appeal. (See People v. Barragan (Jan. 12, 2023, B318424)
[nonpub. opn.] (Barragan I).) We now incorporate all facts from
that 2023 opinion.
In 2023, we upheld Barragan’s carjacking conviction but
vacated his 23-year prison sentence. (Barragan I, supra.) The
sentencing issue hinged on changes to section 1170, which
governs this sentencing. (See id.)
Barragan argued the trial court incorrectly imposed the
upper term for carjacking based on aggravating factors the jury
did not consider. This would violate subdivisions (b)(1) and (2) of
the amended statute. We noted appellate courts were split on the
standard for harmless error and reversed based on another part
of the amended statute: new subdivision (b)(6) required the
lower term in certain circumstances, and the trial court did not
correctly apply this provision. (Barragan I, supra.) We
remanded for resentencing under amended section 1170,
subdivision (b). (Id.)
On remand, in September 2023, the trial court held a brief
hearing and imposed the same sentence—23 years—consisting of
the upper term of nine years for carjacking, doubled due to a
prior strike, plus five years for a prior serious felony conviction
enhancement.
Before imposing this sentence, the trial court weighed
mitigating and aggravating factors as outlined in subdivision
2
(b)(6). The court, however, did not state a sufficient basis for
imposing the upper term. (See § 1170, subd. (b)(5) [“The court
shall set forth on the record the facts and reasons for choosing the
sentence imposed”].)
The court appeared to impose the upper term by relying on
aggravating circumstances that no jury found true beyond a
reasonable doubt and that the defense did not concede. The
statute requires an approach the court did not take.
The court appeared to find Barragan’s carjacking crime
involved both great violence and a particularly vulnerable victim,
in addition to relying on Barragan’s certified record of conviction.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1) & (3).)
This was error because, absent a defense stipulation, and
excluding prior convictions and court trials, it must be a jury that
finds each aggravating fact used to justify an upper term.
(§ 1170, subds. (b)(1)–(3); People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730,
755 & 757 (Lynch).)
After trial, trial courts cannot make this finding on their
own. Jury involvement is essential, but here was missing. “[T]he
facts supporting every aggravating circumstance upon which the
trial court relies to justify imposition of the upper term must be
properly proven as the statute requires. . . . [T]he defendant is no
longer eligible for the upper term simply because an aggravating
fact exists. Instead, the defendant may be properly sentenced to
an upper term only if the jury finds facts that, in the trial court’s
view, justify an upper term sentence.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th
at p. 757, italics added and quotation marks omitted.)
The prosecution acknowledges the trial court’s error but
argues it was harmless.
3
We cannot say the omission of jury findings was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt as to every aggravating fact used to
justify this upper term sentence. (See Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
pp. 768, 775, 776.)
A reasonable jury might conclude this victim was not
particularly vulnerable. (See Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp.
775–776 [vulnerable victim aggravating circumstance requires an
imprecise quantitative or comparative evaluation of the facts,
which may make it difficult to conclude with confidence how a
jury would have resolved this question].)
“A victim is considered particularly vulnerable ‘where the
age or physical characteristics of the victim, or the circumstances
under which the crime is committed, make the defendant’s act
especially contemptible. [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Lewis (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 1125, 1138 (Lewis), disapproved of on other grounds
by Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th 730; see also Lewis, supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at p. 1138 [expanding on “particularly vulnerable”
and “vulnerability”].) Examples of particularly vulnerable
victims include people attacked while asleep or unconscious,
elderly victims living alone who are attacked at home, and
victims of gross vehicular manslaughter. (Ibid.)
The video footage of Barragan’s crime showed him
approach the victim’s car at a gas station—a public place with
security cameras—while the victim stood by another car. The
victim then approaches Barragan, and there appears to be a
quick verbal exchange between the two that we cannot hear. The
victim seems larger than middle-aged Barragan. The victim does
not appear to be infirm, incapacitated, or taken by surprise.
Barragan fights the victim, and his nephew joins in the
attack. A minute of violence ensues.
4
A reasonable jury could conclude this crime did not involve
a victim who was particularly vulnerable at the outset of the
violence. (Cf. People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 86 & 155
[child victim was particularly vulnerable because defendant
approached her while she walked home from school alone,
represented himself to be a teacher needing help, and then drove
her to a motel where he sexually assaulted and killed her].)
Remand for resentencing thus is warranted. (See Lynch,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 768 & 776.)
We note Barragan did not establish the trial court abused
its discretion in refusing the lower term. (See People v. Salazar
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 428, fn. 8 [applicable standard is abuse of
discretion].) A trial court properly may reject the lower term if it
concludes aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors
such that imposing the lower term would run contrary to the
interests of justice. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) The court has broad
discretion in making this determination. (People v. Hilburn
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189, 204–205.)
The trial court accepted that Barragan had experienced
past trauma but concluded there was no nexus between any
mental health issue and Barragan’s crime. The court also found
aggravating factors outweighed mitigating factors. We cannot
say the court’s balancing was unsound, particularly because
Barragan has not included in our record the key documents the
trial court considered—a psychologist report and medical records.
///
///
///
5
DISPOSITION
We reverse the resentencing order and remand for further
proceedings and resentencing consistent with Lynch and this
opinion. We express no opinion as to what sentence the trial
court should impose.
WILEY, J.
We concur:
STRATTON, P. J.
GRIMES, J.
6
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.