CourtListener 10327818•People v. Moore CA2/4
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Filed 2/5/25 P. v. Moore CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B336067
Plaintiff and (Los Angeles County
Respondent, Super. Ct. No. BA162022)
v.
BRUCE MICHAEL MOORE,
Defendant and
Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, George G. Lomeli, Judge. Affirmed.
Cynthia L. Barnes, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
In 1998, a jury convicted appellant Bruce Moore (Moore) of
10 felony counts, and he was sentenced to 135 years to life in
prison. In 2023, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s office
(District Attorney) recommended recall of his sentence and
resentencing pursuant to Penal Code, section 1172.1,
subdivision (a)(1).1 Moore appeals from the order recalling his
sentence and resentencing him. His appellate counsel filed a
brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo) raising no arguable issues, and Moore filed a
supplemental brief. After reviewing the contentions raised in
Moore’s brief, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Most of the following background facts and procedural
history are taken from our opinion in Moore’s direct appeal of his
conviction. (People v. Moore (Jan. 31, 2000, No. B124938)
[nonpub. opn.] (Moore I).)
A. Trial and Sentencing
“The facts of this case are not in dispute.” (Moore I, supra,
at p. 2.) Moore “was involved in a ‘take over’ robbery of a fast
food restaurant in Los Angeles on January 8, 1998, pointing a
gun at several employees and obtaining money not only from the
register but from sales of the drive-through window while
appellant waited for the manager to open the time-delay safe.
Unfortunately for [Moore], the time delay allowed an employee to
notify the police, who responded and arrested [him].” (Ibid.) He
“was convicted by a jury of five counts of second degree robbery
1 All statutory references in this opinion are to the Penal Code.
2
with the personal use of a firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 12022.53)
and five counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Pen.
Code, § 245, subd. (b)) with findings that he had personally used
a handgun within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.5,
subdivision (a)(1) as to all ten counts.” (Moore I, supra, at p. 2.)
A “second, separate phase” of trial concerned the People’s
allegations under the Three Strikes law2 (§§ 1170.12; 667,
subds. (b)-(i).) (Moore I, supra, at p. 2.) The operative second
amended information alleged that Moore suffered juvenile
adjudications for assault with a deadly weapon and robbery in
1988 and 1990, respectively, and “the prosecutor introduced
various documents to prove the prior convictions.” (Id. at pp. 3–
4.) “[T]he jury found that [Moore] had suffered two prior juvenile
adjudications which qualified as ‘strikes’ within the meaning of”
the Three Strikes law. (Id. at p. 2.)
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard and denied
Moore’s “Romero3 motion” to strike the prior strike allegations,
finding “[t]here is no ground for granting the motion.” On count 1
(robbery), Moore was sentenced to a base term of 25 years to life
in prison, plus 10 years for the personal use of a handgun
enhancement. On counts 2, 3, 4, and 10 (assault with a
2 “Under the three strikes law, a trial court must sentence a
defendant with two or more qualifying prior felony convictions or
strikes to an indeterminate term of life imprisonment.” (People v.
Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 552.) Qualifying prior felony convictions
are sometimes referred to as “strikes.” (People v. Henderson (2022) 14
Cal.5th 34, 43–44].))
3 In People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 529–
530 (Romero), our high court held section 1385, subdivision (a)
“permit[s] a court acting on its own motion to strike prior felony
conviction allegations in cases brought under the Three Strikes law.”
3
semiautomatic firearm), Moore was sentenced to 25 years to life
in prison, to run consecutively with the count 1 sentence. The
court explained consecutive sentences were imposed “based upon
the nature of the offenses, the victims were terrorized[,] and
various factors in aggravation[ ] as stated on the record” and
because Moore “had ample chance to correct his life.” Sentencing
was stayed as to count 5 (assault with a semiautomatic firearm)
and counts 6, 7, 8, and 9 (robbery).
In the direct appeal of his conviction, Moore asserted that
the evidence was “insufficient to support the finding that his two
prior juvenile adjudications qualified as strikes, that the court
erred in instructing the jury about the priors, and that his
sentence constitute[d] cruel and unusual punishment.” (Moore I,
supra, at p. 2.) We affirmed the judgment. (Id. at p. 18.)
In 2008, Moore filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
based on ineffective assistance of counsel, and he argued again
that the prior juvenile adjudications did not qualify as strikes.
(In re: Bruce Moore (Jan. 9, 2009, No. B212898) [nonpub. order]
(Moore II).) We denied the petition, concluding that it “is
repetitive of issues previously raised and rejected on appeal and
fails to demonstrate entitlement to relief . . . .” (Id. at p. 1.)
B. Resentencing
In 2023, the District Attorney filed a recommendation for
recall of Moore’s sentence and resentencing pursuant to section
1172.1, subdivision (a)(1). The recommendation pointed to
Moore’s current age, his age (25 years old) when he committed
the offenses, a low risk of recidivism based on his California
4
Static Risk Assessment (CSRA),4 and inmate classification5
scores, and few prison rules violations. The only victim the
District Attorney was able to locate did not oppose resentencing.
The District Attorney acknowledged Moore was at a high
risk for substance abuse and was found in possession of a
controlled substance earlier that year. However, he had “low”
COMPAS6 scores for “anger historical, criminal personality,
employment problems and educational problems” and a high
family support rating. Resentencing Moore to 25 years to life, the
District Attorney wrote, would make him “immediately eligible
for parole,” would provide for an assessment of whether he could
be safely released, and would ensure that upon release, he would
go into a program to assess his substance abuse issues.
The District Attorney requested that the court strike the
allegation of Moore’s personal use of a firearm. On count 1
(robbery), the court was asked to resentence Moore to a term of
25 years to life. On count 2 (assault with a semiautomatic
4 The CSRA is “an actuarial tool that computes the likelihood to
re-offend (incur a felony arrest within a three-year period after release
to parole), and uses static indicators that do not change. These
indicators include gender, age and offense history of the offender.”
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3768.1, subd. (c).)
5 Classification scores are used to determine the level of security
needed to house an inmate. (In re Jenkins (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1167,
1174.)
6 Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative
Sanctions (COMPAS) is a “validated automated needs assessment tool”
that “identif[ies] criminogenic needs which are most predictive of
criminal behavior.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3375.6, subd. (a).) It
“identifies a needs value that demonstrates the level of need from high
to low” and is “utilized to assist in placing the incarcerated person in a
rehabilitative program.” (Ibid.)
5
firearm), the court was asked to resentence Moore to a low term
of two years. As for counts 3, 4, and 10 (assault with a
semiautomatic firearm), the District Attorney asked that Moore
be resentenced to a low term of two years on each count, to be
served concurrently with the count 2 term. As to counts 2
through 10 only, the court was asked to strike one of Moore’s
juvenile adjudications, and as to counts 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9,
sentencing would remain stayed.
The resentencing court conducted a hearing, recalled
Moore’s original sentence, and resentenced him. The count 1
sentence of 25 years to life in prison, plus 10 years, was
unchanged. However, on counts 2, 3, 4, and 10, Moore was
resentenced to a middle term sentence of 6 years on each count,
to run concurrently with each other and count 1. “In counts 2
through 10 only,” the court struck “all prior strike convictions”
under the Three Strikes law and struck the firearm
enhancements.
Moore timely appealed from the resentencing order. We
appointed appellate counsel for him, and counsel filed a brief
raising no issues and requesting that we proceed pursuant to
Delgadillo. Moore was advised of his right to file a supplemental
brief, despite his counsel’s finding of no arguable issues to raise
on appeal, and he did so. Under Delgadillo, if an appellant files a
supplemental brief, “the Court of Appeal is required to evaluate
the specific arguments presented in that brief and to issue a
written opinion.” (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)
6
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law
The statutory recall and resentencing procedure is “an
exception to the common law rule that the court loses
resentencing jurisdiction once execution of sentence has begun.”
(Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 455.) Section 1172.1,
subdivision (a)(1) authorizes a trial court, “at any time upon the
recommendation of” certain public officials to “recall the sentence
and commitment previously ordered and resentence the
defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been
sentenced, whether or not the defendant is still in custody, and
provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial
sentence.” The officials permitted to make a recall and
resentencing recommendation include the district attorney of the
county in which the defendant was sentenced. (Ibid.) The court
is empowered, in the interest of justice, to “[r]educe a defendant’s
term of imprisonment by modifying the sentence.” (§ 1172.1,
subd. (a)(3)(A); People v. McMurray (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1035,
1040 (McMurray) [recommendation under former § 1170.037
“furnishes the court with jurisdiction it would not otherwise have
to recall and resentence and is ‘an invitation to the court to
exercise its equitable jurisdiction’”].)
When a request for recall and resentencing is initiated, the
statute provides for “a presumption favoring recall and
resentencing of the defendant, which may only be overcome if a
court finds the defendant is an unreasonable risk of danger to
7 Recall and resentencing language appeared in former section
1170, subdivision (d)(1). This language was moved to section 1170.03,
which was renumbered as section 1172.1. (See People v. E.M. (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1080 and fn. 3 (E.M.).)
7
public safety . . . .” (§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2); McMurray, supra, 76
Cal.App.5th at p. 1040.) This presumption, however “is intended
to apply to the initial determination of whether to grant a request
to recall and resentence, but that the sentence ultimately
imposed by the court is left to its discretion without any further
application of the presumption.” (People v. Braggs (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 809, 819 (Braggs).)
We review a resentencing order for abuse of discretion (see
People v. Frazier (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 858, 863) and will not
disturb the order absent a showing that the resentencing court
exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.
(People v. Mendez (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 347, 353 (Mendez).)
B. Moore’s Claims of Error
In his supplemental brief, Moore argues that the
resentencing court abused its discretion in two ways. First, he
asserts that the District Attorney recommended the striking of
his prior strikes, his immediate release from custody, and no life
sentence, and the court erred by failing to adopt these
recommendations. Second, he argues that the court should have
stricken his prior strikes pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (a)
“due to the length of time appellant has been in prison 26 y[ears]”
and because he is “currently taking groups demonstrating
rehabilitation so that he can be a positive citizen of society.” He
argues that the court failed to exercise its discretion because it
was under the mistaken belief that two of his juvenile convictions
resulted in prison terms, when in fact he had been committed to
the California Youth Authority.
8
C. Forfeiture
Moore forfeited his claims of error by failing to make his
arguments to the resentencing court. “Parties are required to
raise certain issues at the time of sentencing; the lack of a timely
and meaningful objection results in forfeiture of the claim.”
(People v. Brannon-Thompson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 455, 464
[defendant forfeited challenge to upper term sentence by failing
to make an objection to the resentencing court].) Similarly, “any
failure on the part of a defendant to invite the court to dismiss
[an allegation of an accusatory pleading] under section 1385
following Romero waives or forfeits his or her right to raise the
issue on appeal.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375–
376 (Carmony).) Moore was represented by counsel during the
resentencing proceedings. However, there is no indication in the
record that he objected to the District Attorney’s recommended
sentence of 25 years to life on count 1 or the new sentence, after
it was announced, and there is no indication that he invited the
resentencing court to strike the prior juvenile adjudications
pursuant to section 1385.
Moore’s arguments are forfeited. However, even if he had
preserved issues for our review, he has not shown an abuse of the
resentencing court’s discretion.
D. Failure to Adopt Purported Recommendation
Moore’s first claim of error misstates the resentencing
recommendation. The District Attorney did not recommend his
release or the striking of his prior strikes for count 1; to the
contrary, it recommended a sentence of 25 years to life for that
count. Moreover, even if the recommendation actually had
contained the terms Moore asserts, the resentencing court was
9
not required to adopt that recommendation. (See Braggs, supra,
85 Cal.App.5th at p. 819 [no prejudicial error shown where court
“in fact recalled defendant’s sentence and resentenced him” under
former § 1170.03; there was no “presumption in favor of the
Secretary[ ] [of the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation’s] particular recommended sentence”].)
E. Failure to Strike Moore’s Prior Strikes
Moore also failed to show that the resentencing court’s
failure to strike his prior strikes with respect to all of the counts
was an abuse of discretion. (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th
148, 162 (Williams) [decision whether to dismiss a prior strike
conviction is reviewed for abuse of discretion].) There is a “strong
presumption” that any sentence that conforms to the Three
Strikes law is “both rational and proper.” (Carmony, 33 Cal.4th
at p. 378.) A trial court “will only abuse its discretion in failing to
strike a prior felony conviction allegation in limited
circumstances,” such as where the court was unaware of its
discretion or considered impermissible factors. (Ibid.) “‘[I]t is not
enough to show that reasonable people might disagree about
whether to strike one or more’” prior conviction allegations.
[Citation.] Where the record is silent [citation], or ‘[w]here the
record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant
facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the
spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial court’s ruling, even if
we might have ruled differently in the first instance.’ [Citation.]”
(Ibid.)
The circumstances under which a defendant can be deemed
to fall outside the spirit of the Three Strikes must be
“extraordinary,” such that “no reasonable people could disagree
10
that the criminal falls outside the spirit of the three strikes
scheme.” (Carmony, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) Courts “consider
whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present
felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and
the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the
defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or
in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not
previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent
felonies.” (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161.)
Moore, in his direct appeal, conceded that his two juvenile
adjudications for robbery were qualifying strikes. (Moore I,
supra, at pp. 9–10.) We also concluded that another juvenile
adjudication for assault with a deadly weapon—predicated on
allegations that Moore threw a bicycle at a truck, broke the
windshield, and then attacked the driver with a pole—also was a
qualifying strike. (Id. at pp. 10–11.) For these crimes and
several others, Moore was committed to the California Youth
Authority in 1990 for a term “not to exceed 8 years 10 months.”
(Id. at p. 4.) By early 1998, he robbed a restaurant and
“terrorized” multiple victims with a semiautomatic firearm. The
resentencing court would have been within its discretion to find
that Moore fell within the spirit of the Three Strikes law and that
there were no extraordinary circumstances that warranted the
striking his prior strikes with respect to all of the counts.
11
DISPOSITION
The resentencing court’s order is affirmed.
MORI, J.
We concur:
COLLINS, Acting P. J.
ZUKIN, J.
12
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