CourtListener 10326951•People v. Sandoval CA2/2
Texte intégral
Filed 2/4/25 P. v. Sandoval CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B333610
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA057123)
v.
DAVID SANDOVAL, JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, David W. Stuart, Judge. Affirmed.
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and Charles S. Lee, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
Defendant and appellant David Sandoval, Jr., appeals from
the trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing under
Penal Code section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95).1 Because
defendant is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law,
we affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Preliminary Hearing
The following evidence was adduced at defendant’s
preliminary hearing, held on April 16, 2007.
On the evening of January 27, 2006, Chris Alvarado
(Alvarado) was in a car with his friend Shawn Bryant (Bryant)
when Bryant received a phone call and parked his car in an
alleyway. Cynthia Picco (Picco) came out, opened a gate, and led
Alvarado and Bryant to an apartment. They went inside, and
Picco shut the door.
Defendant and Daniel Lefler (Lefler) emerged from a
hallway in the apartment. Defendant held a knife and a crowbar;
Lefler held a shotgun. Lefler struck Bryant with the butt of the
shotgun. Lefler and Bryant started wrestling on the ground.
Defendant, still holding the knife and crowbar, “cornered”
Alvarado in the dining room. Picco stood by the door.
When Alvarado took a step toward Bryant to help him,
defendant told Alvarado to go back to the corner. Lefler and
Bryant continued wrestling on the floor. Alvarado saw Lefler on
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was
renumbered section 1172.6, with no substantive change. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For simplicity, we refer to the section by its
new numbering.
2
top of Bryant, pinning him down. Bryant swung a switchblade
knife at Lefler.
On three or four occasions, defendant went over to Bryant,
stabbed him multiple times with the knife, and struck him with
the crowbar. While stabbing and hitting Bryant, defendant
repeatedly told him “[t]o turn cold.” Bryant died within seconds
after the stabbing stopped.
The parties stipulated for purposes of the preliminary
hearing that an autopsy report showed that Bryant died from
multiple stab wounds.
II. Charges
In an information filed by the Los Angeles County District
Attorney’s Office, defendant, Lefler, and Picco were charged with
the murder of Bryant (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1) and the false
imprisonment of Alvarado by violence (§ 236; count 2). The
information alleged as to both counts that defendant and Lefler
personally used a knife (§§ 12022, subd. (b)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a))
and that a principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022,
subd. (a)(1)).
III. Plea and Sentencing
At the same hearing held on February 2, 2009, defendant,
Lefler, and Picco each pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter.
(§ 192, subd. (a).) As to the voluntary manslaughter, defendant
admitted to personally using a deadly and dangerous weapon, a
knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)); Lefler admitted to the personal use
of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)); and Picco admitted to being
armed with a shotgun (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). Picco also pled no
contest to false imprisonment by violence.
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The trial court sentenced defendant to serve 23 years,
Leffler to 21 years, and Picco to 12 years eight months in state
prison.
IV. Section 1172.6 Petition
In September 2022, defendant filed a petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. The trial court
appointed counsel to represent defendant in connection with the
petition.
The People opposed the petition, arguing that the
preliminary hearing transcript demonstrated that defendant was
prosecuted as the actual perpetrator of the crime. As exhibits,
the People attached transcripts of the preliminary hearing and
the plea and sentencing hearing.
Defendant’s appointed counsel filed a brief asserting that
the record did not conclusively establish that defendant was
ineligible for relief.
V. Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court held a hearing on defendant’s section 1172.6
petition in September 2023. At the beginning of the hearing, the
court noted that Lefler and Picco were codefendants in this case
and that “the record of conviction include[d] the preliminary
hearing transcript—which was live testimony, not Prop 115—all
of the court records in this case, the abstract of judgment as well
as the plea transcript . . . .” The parties submitted on their
briefing.
The trial court denied the petition, explaining: “In this
case [defendant] was prosecuted as the actual perpetrator. The
case involved first Mr. Lefler hitting Mr. Bryant with a shotgun,
and then [defendant] came in. While the two were wrestling on
the floor, [defendant] stabbed Mr. Bryant multiple times with a
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knife. So that’s it. He was the actual perpetrator. Mr. Bryant
died of stab wounds as was testified to at the preliminary
hearing. And so legally there was no way that any other co-
defendant’s state of mind can be imputed to [defendant] as he
was stabbing Mr. Bryant. He repeatedly told Mr. Bryant to turn
cold. I know he said that a few times.”
The trial court continued: “So for this particular motion, it
just simply doesn’t apply to [defendant]. . . . [I]n other words, he
could have been prosecuted for murder for his acts on that day
even after the change in the law.”
VI. Appeal
Defendant timely appealed from the order denying his
section 1172.6 petition.
DISCUSSION
I. Relevant Law
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) substantively amended sections 188 and 189 to
“eliminate[] natural and probable consequences liability for
murder as it applies to aiding and abetting[] and limit[] the scope
of the felony-murder rule. [Citations.]” (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) The bill also added what is now
section 1172.6 to provide “a procedural mechanism for defendants
who could not be convicted of murder under the amended laws to
seek retroactive relief. [Citations.]” (People v. Rodriguez (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 451, 457.) Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.) subsequently expanded the class of defendants entitled to
relief to those convicted of voluntary manslaughter. (People v.
Lezama (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 583, 588.)
In order to obtain resentencing relief, a defendant must
first allege that an information was filed against him allowing
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the prosecution to proceed under either (1) a theory of murder
under the felony murder rule, the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or any “other theory under which malice
is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation
in a crime[,]” and/or (2) a theory of “attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(1).) The defendant must also allege that he was
convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(2)), and that he could not now be convicted
“because of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).)
Upon the filing of a properly pleaded petition for
resentencing, the trial court must conduct a prima facie analysis
to determine the defendant’s eligibility for relief. (§ 1172.6,
subds. (b)(3) & (c); People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708;
Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957, 960.) “[T]he . . . prima facie
inquiry . . . is limited. . . . ‘“[T]he court takes [a] [defendant]’s
factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the [defendant] would be entitled to relief if
his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must
issue an order to show cause”’” and set the matter of an
evidentiary hearing. (Lewis, at p. 971.)
In making this assessment, the trial court may consider the
defendant’s record of conviction. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 970–971.) “The record of conviction will necessarily inform
the trial court’s prima facie inquiry . . . allowing the court to
distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are
clearly meritless.” (Id. at p. 971.) However, “the court should not
make credibility determinations or engage in ‘factfinding
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involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 974.)
When a defendant’s conviction follows a plea rather than a
trial, the record of conviction includes the transcript of the
defendant’s preliminary hearing if the transcript “reliably
reflect[s] the facts of the offense for which the defendant was
convicted.” (People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 223 (Reed); see
also People v. Patton (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649, 657 (Patton),
review granted June 28, 2023, S279670.)
“Courts of Appeal are split on the import of the preliminary
hearing transcript in determining whether a petitioner has made
a prima facie case for resentencing under section 117[2.6].”
(People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 989 (Flores).)
Some courts have concluded that a trial court may properly
rely on a preliminary hearing transcript to determine a
defendant’s prima facie eligibility for relief. (See People v. Mares
(2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1158, 1167 (Mares), review granted May 1,
2024, S284232 [record of conviction, including preliminary
hearing transcript, supported no theory other than defendant
acted alone as the actual killer]; People v. Pickett (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 982, 990–993, review granted Oct. 11, 2023,
S281643 (Pickett) [courts can rely on preliminary hearing
transcripts to determine prima facie eligibility even if a
defendant does not stipulate to it as a factual basis for a plea];
Patton, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 657–658 [court may rely on
preliminary hearing transcript at prima facie stage if evidence
contained therein is uncontroverted].)
Other courts have found it error to do so. (See People v.
Alazar (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1100, 1104, review granted
Dec. 31, 2024, S287917 [a defendant who stipulates that the
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preliminary hearing transcript contained a factual basis for a no
contest plea “is not barred, as a matter of law, from resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6”]; People v. Williams (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 375, review granted Sept. 11, 2024, S286314
[even if a preliminary hearing transcript provides probable cause
that a defendant was the actual perpetrator, an information
containing a generic charge of murder would still permit the
prosecution to proceed at trial under an invalid theory of
murder]; People v. Davenport (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 476, 481
[trial court erroneously relied on preliminary hearing transcript
in making prima facie determination because defendant did not
stipulate to the transcript as a factual basis for his plea].)
We are persuaded by the line of cases allowing trial courts
to rely on preliminary hearing transcripts to assess whether a
defendant has made a prima facie showing under section 1172.6.
(See, e.g., Mares, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th 1158; Pickett, supra,
93 Cal.App.5th 982; Patton, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th 649.)
II. Standard of Review
We review de novo the trial court’s denial of a section
1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage. (People v. Coley (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 539, 545.)
III. The Trial Court Did Not Err
Applying these legal principles, we conclude that the trial
court properly denied defendant’s section 1172.6 petition because
the record of conviction establishes that he is ineligible for
resentencing as a matter of law.
As described above, a successful prima facie case for
section 1172.6 relief requires a defendant to aver, inter alia, that
he could no longer be convicted “because of” the 2019 changes to
sections 188 and 189. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) Those legislative
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changes “did not affect actual killer theories.” (Mares, supra,
99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1166.) It follows that “[a]s a matter of law,
resentencing relief under section 1172.6 is not available to an
‘actual killer.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Garcia (2022)
82 Cal.App.5th 956, 973 (Garcia).)
Here, the record of conviction conclusively establishes that
defendant was prosecuted and convicted as the actual killer of
Bryant. The evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing—the
transcript of which is a part of the record of conviction (Reed,
supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 223)—advanced only one theory of how
Bryant was killed: Defendant stabbed Bryant multiple times
with a knife, while repeatedly telling him “[t]o turn cold.” Bryant
died within seconds after defendant stopped stabbing him, which
is consistent with the medical examiner’s conclusion that
Bryant’s cause of death was multiple stab wounds. Defendant
admitted to personally using a knife in the commission of the
voluntary manslaughter. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) Although
codefendants Lefler and Picco were present at the scene of the
killing and also pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter,
neither admitted to any enhancement allegation regarding the
use of a knife.
Thus, taken together, the preliminary hearing transcript
and the specific pleas and admissions made by defendant, Lefler,
and Picco, establish that only defendant was convicted as the
direct perpetrator of the voluntary manslaughter. As the actual
killer, he is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law.
(See Garcia, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 973.)
Resisting this conclusion, defendant argues that “nothing
in [the] record of conviction dispositively establishes the identity
of the actual killer, and nothing in the information precluded the
9
prosecution from pursuing more than one theory of the case,
including accomplice liability based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or the felony murder rule.” But the
instant case is one in which “the record of conviction conclusively
establishes the People were advancing only one theory of the
crime at the time the defendant entered a plea.” (People v.
Muhammad (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 268, 277 (Muhammad).)
“[T]hat is the theory of the crime and, once . . . defendant
enter[ed] a plea, the theory of the conviction. Whether the People
could have landed on a different theory had there been no plea
and the case had gone to trial is . . . not the question, since . . .
defendant did enter a plea, and the People created a record that
made only one theory available at the time of that plea.” (Ibid.)
Because “that sole theory is not invalid under current law, . . .
defendant cannot meet the threshold requirement of section
1172.6.” (Ibid.)
In his reply brief, defendant argues that Lefler’s and Picco’s
pleas cannot be relied upon to deny defendant’s section 1172.6
petition because they “are not part of [defendant]’s record of
conviction” (italics omitted). In support, he cites Flores, supra,
76 Cal.App.5th at page 988, where the Court of Appeal explained
that the opinion in a codefendant’s direct appeal was not a part of
the section 1172.6 petitioner’s record of conviction. Here,
however, Lefler’s and Picco’s pleas were entered at the same
hearing where defendant pled no contest to voluntary
manslaughter; the transcript of that single hearing is part of
defendant’s record of conviction.
Finally, defendant asserts that the trial court’s denial of his
petition without issuing an order to show cause and allowing him
to present evidence at an evidentiary hearing violated his state
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and federal procedural due process rights. “A [section 1172.6]
petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only if undisputed
facts contained in the record of conviction do not demonstrate the
petitioner’s ineligibility for relief as a matter of law. [Citations.]”
(Muhammad, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 282.) Here, we have
concluded that the court did not err in finding that defendant was
ineligible for relief as a matter of law; accordingly, he had no due
process right to an evidentiary hearing. (See ibid.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST
We concur:
________________________, P. J.
LUI
________________________, J.
RICHARDSON
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