CourtListener 10326137•Baer v. Grammer CA4/3
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Filed 2/3/25 Baer v. Grammer CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
DAN W. BAER et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents, G062855
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2020-01143063)
DONALD B. GRAMMER, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Lon F. Hurwitz, Judge. Affirmed.
Blank Rome, Gregory M. Bordo, Christopher J. Peterson and
Benjamin Wigley for Defendant and Appellant.
Newmeyer & Dillon, Benjamin P. Pugh and Michelle D. Brunson
for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
* * *
INTRODUCTION
In May 2011, a judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs in
this action, Dan W. Baer and Southern California Sunbelt Developers, Inc.
(SCSD) (collectively, Plaintiffs) and against several limited partnerships. As
prevailing parties, Plaintiffs were entitled to recover costs of suit but due to
various twists and turns, including appeals, bankruptcies, and motions to tax
costs by the limited partnerships, a judgment incorporating the actual
amount of costs was not entered until January 2019. In May 2020, Plaintiffs
filed a complaint to enforce the judgment for costs against defendant Donald
B. Grammer (Defendant) and two limited partnerships on the ground they
were at relevant times the general partners of the judgment debtor limited
partnerships.
The trial court granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings
brought by Plaintiffs and judgment was entered in their favor. Defendant
appealed from the judgment.
Defendant makes one contention on appeal: He contends that
Plaintiffs’ complaint is time-barred because it was subject to the three-year
statute of limitations of Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (a)
(section 338(a)) for “[a]n action upon a liability created by statute.” Plaintiffs
argue, and the trial court concluded, the complaint was timely filed because it
was subject to the 10-year statute of limitations of Code of Civil Procedure
section 337.5, subd. (b) (section 337.5(b)) for “[a]n action upon a
judgment . . . of any state within the United States.”
We do not decide which is the applicable statute of limitations
because Plaintiffs’ complaint was timely under the shorter statute of
limitations of section 338(a). Plaintiffs’ cause of action did not accrue until
January 2019, when a judgment incorporating the amount of costs was
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entered. Before that time, Plaintiffs could not have prosecuted an action to
recover those costs from the general partners. The complaint was timely
because it was filed within three years of January 2019. We therefore affirm
the judgment.
FACTS
I.
THE VAN DAN LITIGATION AND THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT
Banyan Limited Partnership (Banyan), Pear Tree Limited
Partnership (Pear Tree), Orange Blossom Limited Partnership (Orange
Blossom), and Apple Orchard Limited Partnership (Apple Orchard) are
Nevada limited partnerships. Apple Management Services, LLC, (Apple
Management) is a Texas limited liability company.
In 1996, several limited partnerships, including Banyan, Pear
Tree, and Orange Blossom, sued Plaintiffs in a case titled Van Dan Limited et
al. v. Dan W. Baer et al., Orange County Superior Court case No. 764271 (the
Van Dan Lawsuit). After four lengthy phases of trial, Banyan, Pear Tree and
Orange Blossom were awarded no recovery from Baer, and Banyan and
Orange Blossom were awarded no recovery from SCSD.
A judgment (the Original Judgment) was entered in May 31,
2011. At that time, Grammer was the general partner of Pear Tree and
Orange Blossom, and Apple Orchard was the general partner of Banyan. In
July 2013, Apple Management became Banyan’s general partner in place of
Apple Orchard, and Apple Management became the general partner of Pear
Tree and Orange Blossom in place of Grammer.
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II.
APPEALS, MOTIONS TO TAX COSTS, BANKRUPTCIES,
AND THE CORRECTED JUDGMENT
Banyan, Pear Tree, and Orange Blossom appealed the Original
Judgment. Baer appealed a postjudgment order granting certain plaintiffs’
motion for a new trial and modifying the statement of decision.
In August 2011, Baer and SCSD each filed a memorandum of
costs. Banyan, Pear Tree, and Orange Blossom brought a motion to tax and
or strike those costs (the motion to tax costs). In November 2011, the trial
court stayed the hearing on the motion to tax costs until the pending appeals
were resolved.
Plaintiffs brought a motion to correct clerical errors in the
Original Judgment. The trial court granted the motion and, in November
2011, a Corrected Final Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc (the Corrected Judgment)
was entered. Both the Original Judgment and the Corrected Judgment left
blanks for the amounts of costs.
In August 2013, we issued an opinion in Banyan Limited
Partnership et al. v. Baer (Aug. 12, 2013, G045584) (nonpub. opn.) affirming
the judgment, an opinion in Banyan Limited Partnership et al. v. Baer (Aug.
12, 2013, G045797) (nonpub. opn.) reversing the postjudgment order for a
new trial, and an opinion in Banyan Limited Partnership et al. v. Baer (Aug.
12, 2013, G046428) (nonpub. opn.) affirming a postjudgment order denying
attorney fees to both sides. Remittiturs for all three appeals were issued on
October 15, 2013.
But in September 2013, before issuance of the remittiturs,
Banyan, Pear Tree, and Orange Blossom each filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
Plaintiffs sought relief from the automatic bankruptcy stay in order to allow
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the trial court to determine the amounts of their recoverable costs. The
bankruptcy court granted relief from stay in August 2014.
On November 13, 2014, following a hearing, the trial court
entered an order partially granting and partially denying Banyan, Pear Tree,
and Orange Blossom’s motion to tax costs. The court’s order resulted in net
cost awards of $42,091.48 to Baer and $40,749.24 to SCSD. The court granted
Banyan and Orange Blossom’s motion to strike $281,264.94 in costs claimed
by SCSD for a court-appointed receiver.
Banyan, Pear Tree, and Orange Blossom appealed the order on
the motion to tax costs. In August 2016, we issued an opinion in Banyan
Limited Partnership et al. v. Baer (Aug. 17, 2016, G051282) (Banyan I)
affirming the order as to Baer. SCSD also appealed the order granting the
motion to strike the costs of the court-appointed receiver. In a published
opinion, Southern California Developers, Inc. v. Banyan Limited Partnership
(2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 910 (Banyan II), we reversed the order granting the
motion to tax costs and remanded with directions to the trial court to decide
whether to award receivership costs. (Id. at pp. 915, 934.) Remittitur was
issued on October 19, 2016.
In August 2017, Plaintiffs filed a memorandum of costs for their
costs incurred in connection with the two appeals of the order on the motion
to tax costs. Banyan, Pear Tree, and Orange Blossom filed motions to strike
or tax those costs. The trial court denied the motions in October 2017.
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III.
THE CORRECTED FINAL JUDGMENT
On January 15, 2019, a Further Corrected Final Judgment Nunc
Pro Tunc (the Corrected Final Judgment) was entered in the Van Dan Lawsuit.
The Corrected Final Judgment incorporated the dollar amounts of the
prejudgment and appellate costs previously awarded to Plaintiffs. The fees
totaled $42,091.48 in favor of Baer, $331,321 in favor of SCSD, and $1,933.93
in favor of Plaintiffs.1
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 26, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this lawsuit,
which asserted a single cause of action for general partner liability against
Defendant, Apple Orchard, and Apple Management. Plaintiffs requested a
judgment finding that Defendant, Apple Orchard, and Apple Management
were liable for the costs reflected in the Corrected Final Judgment. Plaintiffs
alleged that Defendant was personally liable for the monetary costs of suit
awarded against Pear Tree and Orange Blossom in the Corrected Final
Judgment by virtue of having been the general partner of Pear Tree and
Orange Blossom as of May 2011. Plaintiffs also alleged that Defendant,
though never a general partner of Banyan, was personally liable for the
1 The specific amounts were: (1) $42,091.48 in favor of Baer and
against Banyan, Orange Tree, and Pear Tree; (2) $40,749.24 in favor of SCSD
and against Banyan and Orange Tree; (3) $281,264.94 in receivership fees in
favor of SCSD and against Banyan and Orange Blossom; (4) $1,933.93 in
appellate fees in favor of Plaintiffs and against Banyan, Orange Blossom and
Pear Tree for Banyan I, and (5) $9,306.77 in appellate fees in favor of SCSD
and against Banyan and Orange Blossom in Banyan II.
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monetary costs of suit awarded against Banyan by virtue of having been a
general partner of Apple Orchard as of May 2011.2
Apple Orchard did not respond to the complaint and its default
was taken.
In June 2021, Plaintiffs brought a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. The evidence presented with the motion established that
Defendant, Apple Orchard, and Apple Management were at relevant times
the general partners of Banyan, Pear Tree, and Orange Blossom; the costs
reflected in Corrected Final Judgment had not been paid; and Banyan, Pear
Tree, and Orange Blossom were insolvent.
Defendant and Apple Management opposed the motion for
judgment on the pleadings on the ground the complaint was time-barred.
They argued the applicable statute of limitations was three years under
section 338(a) and Plaintiffs cause of action accrued in May 2011 when the
Original Judgment was entered.
The trial court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on the
pleadings. The court found that Plaintiffs had satisfied every element
necessary to enforce the costs judgment against Defendant, Apple Orchard,
and Apple Management, with one exception not pertinent to this appeal. The
court concluded the complaint was an action upon a judgment and therefore
subject to the 10-year statute of limitations of section 337.5.
2 Plaintiffs alleged Apple Management was liable for the costs of
suit awarded against Pear Tree and Orange Blossom in the Corrected Final
Judgment by virtue of having been the general partner of Pear Tree and
Orange Blossom as of January 2019. Plaintiffs alleged Apple Orchard was
liable for the costs of suit awarded against Banyan by virtue of having been
Banyan’s general partner as of May 2011, and Apple Management was liable
for those costs by virtue of having been the general partner of Banyan as of
January 2019.
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Judgment in favor of Plaintiffs was entered in May 2023. Defendant
timely appealed. Apple Management did not appeal the judgment.
DISCUSSION
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for judgment on the pleadings is equivalent to a
demurrer and is governed by the same de novo standard of review. (Adams v.
Bank of America, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 666, 670.) We may affirm a
judgment on the pleadings on any ground for upholding the trial court’s
decision regardless of whether the trial court relied on that ground. (Pacific
Merchant Shipping Assn. v. Newsom (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 711, 725.)
II.
PLAINTIFFS’ CAUSE OF ACTION WAS TIMELY UNDER
THE THREE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A. Relevant Statutes of Limitations and Accrual
The statute of limitations is 10 years for “[a]n action upon a
judgment or decree of any court of the United States or of any state within
the United States.” (§ 337.5(b).) Plaintiffs contend this 10-year limitations
period applies to their complaint because, they argue, it is an action to
enforce the Final Corrected Judgment. The statute of limitations is three
years for “[a]n action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty
or forfeiture.” (§ 338(a).) Defendant contends this three-year limitations
period applies to Plaintiffs’ complaint because, he argues, it sought to impose
liability against a general partner for the debts of a limited partnership, and
limited partnerships are a creature of statute.
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Under both section 337.5 and section 338, the limitations period
does not commence until the cause of action has accrued. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 312; see Travis v. County of Santa Cruz (2004) 33 Cal.4th 757, 773 [section
338]; Kertesz v. Ostrovsky (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 369, 373 [section 337.5].)
“Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues at ‘the time when the cause of
action is complete with all of its elements.’ [Citations.]” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-
Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806-807.) “The applicable statute of
limitations does not begin to run until the cause of action accrues, that is,
‘“until the party owning it is entitled to begin and prosecute an action
thereon.”’ [Citation.]” (Romano v. Rockwell Internat., Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th
479, 487.)
B. Plaintiff’s Cause of Action Accrued No Earlier Than the Date of Entry of
the Final Corrected Judgment
1. Summary
Plaintiffs’ complaint, if deemed to be an action upon a judgment,
was timely under section 337.5 because it was filed within ten years of the
date of entry of the Original Complaint, the date on which Defendant
contends the cause of action accrued. Defendant does not deny the complaint
is timely under the 10-year statute of limitations.
Plaintiffs’ complaint, if deemed to be an action upon a liability
created by statute, was timely under section 338(a) because it was filed
within three years of the date on which the cause of action accrued.
Plaintiffs’ cause of action to hold the general partners liable for the Corrected
Final Judgment accrued no earlier than that January 15, 2019 because that
was the date on which a judgment incorporating the amount of costs was
entered. Plaintiffs could not have prosecuted their cause of action against
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Defendant until they had an enforceable money judgment against Banyan,
Pear Tree, and Orange Blossom.
2. The Nevada Limited Partnership Liability Statutes
Banyan, Pear Tree, and Orange Blossom are Nevada limited
partnerships governed by Nevada law. For that reason, Defendant contends
the statutes which would create liability are the Nevada statutes governing
limited partnerships. California law governing limited partnerships is
substantially the same. The California equivalents of the Nevada statutes are
cited.
Under Nevada Revised Statutes section 88.455(2), a general
partner of a limited liability partnership has the same liabilities as a general
partner in a partnership without limited partners to persons other than the
partnership and other partners. (See Corp. Code, § 15904.04.) A person who
becomes a general partner of a limited liability partnership is not personally
liable for obligations of the limited partnership incurred before that person
became a general partner. (Nev. Rev. Stat., § 87A.365(2); see Corp. Code,
§ 15904.04, subd. (b).)
Under Nevada Revised Statues section 87A.370(1), “a general
partner may be joined in an action against the limited partnership or named
in a separate action.” (Italics added.) A judgment against a limited
partnership is not in itself a judgment against a general partner, and a
judgment against a limited partnership may not be satisfied from a general
partner’s assets unless there is also a judgment against the general partner.
(Nev. Rev. Stat., § 87A.370(2); see Corp. Code, § 15904.05, subd. (b).)
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A judgment creditor may not levy execution against the general
partner’s assets to satisfy a claim against the limited partnership unless
(1) the general partner is personally liable for the claim under Nevada
Revised Statutes section 87A.365 and (2) any one of five conditions is met.
The condition relevant here is, “[a] court grants permission to the judgment
creditor to levy execution against the assets of a general partner based on a
finding that limited partnership assets subject to execution are clearly
insufficient to satisfy the judgment.” (Nev. Rev. Stat., § 87A.370(3)(d); see
Corp. Code, § 15904.05, subd. (c)(4).)
3. Plaintiffs Did Not Have an Enforceable Money Judgment
Until Entry of the Corrected Final Judgment
Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit in order to obtain a judgment
under section 87A.370 by which the Corrected Final Judgment could be
enforced against the general partners of Banyan, Pear Tree, and Orange
Blossom. In granting Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, the
trial court found that Plaintiffs had satisfied the requirements of sections
87A.365 and 87A.370 and found, pursuant to section 87A.370(3)(d), the assets
of the limited partnerships were “clearly insufficient to satisfy the judgment
against them.”
The liability created by the Nevada statutes against a general
partner cannot arise unless and until there is an enforceable judgment
against the limited liability partners for the liabilities of a limited liability
partnership. That would mean, in this case, the liability would not have been
created until entry of a judgment incorporating the actual amount of costs
incurred by Plaintiffs. Although Plaintiffs filed their first cost memoranda in
August 2011, as required by California Rules of Court, rule 3.1700(a)(1)), a
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memorandum of costs itself is not enforceable. “‘[T]rial court costs are a mere
incident of the main judgment and not separately enforceable.’” (Rostack
Investments, Inc. v. Sabella (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 70, 78.) “When a judgment
includes an award of costs and fees, often the amount of the award is left
blank for future determination. [Citation.] After the parties file their
memoranda of costs and any motions to tax, a postjudgment hearing is held
and the trial court makes its determination of the merits of the competing
contentions. When the order setting the final amount is filed, the clerk enters
the amounts on the judgment nunc pro tunc. [Citation.]” (Grant v. List and
Lathrop (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 993, 996-997; see Lucky United Properties
Investments, Inc. v. Lee (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 635, 650 [“the amount of the
cost award is incorporated into the judgment”].)
Because an award of costs is not separately enforceable, a cause
of action to enforce a costs-only judgment can only accrue once a judgment
incorporating the amount of costs is entered or upon the entry by the clerk of
the amount of costs onto an existing judgment. Further, a money judgment
must be for a sum certain. (Crider v. Superior Court (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th
227, 233; see Miller v. Superior Court (1937) 9 Cal.2d 733, 736 [a money
judgment “adjudicates the amount owing”].) Before entry of the Final
Corrected Judgment in January 2019, Plaintiffs could not have prosecuted an
action under the Nevada Statutes to recover their prevailing party costs from
Defendant and the other general partners because the Original Judgment
and the Corrected Judgment did not include the amount of those costs and
thus was not for a sum certain.
Nevada Revised Statutes section 87A.370 speaks of a “levy
execution” against the assets of a general partner to satisfy a judgment,
which cannot happen without a money judgment to execute upon. The trial
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court could not have found that the limited partnership assets were “clearly
insufficient to satisfy the judgment” (Nev. Rev. Stat., § 87A.370(3)(d)) until a
judgment in an amount certain had been entered.
Not until January 2019, with entry of the Final Corrected
Judgment, did Plaintiffs have a money judgment against the limited partners
to enforce against the general partners. Only then, at the earliest, was any
liability against Defendant created by the Nevada limited partnership
statutes.
Defendant argues the general partners’ liability for costs was
incurred when the Original Judgment was entered. The Corrected Final
Judgment was rendered nunc pro tunc, and Grammer’s liability for costs is
thus deemed to have been incurred when the Original Judgment was entered
in May 2011. But incurrence of liability for costs is not the same as accrual of
a cause of action to recover those costs. While Grammer’s liability for costs is
deemed to have been incurred in May 2011, Plaintiffs’ cause of action to
recover those costs did not accrue until January 15, 2019, when a judgment
incorporating the amount of those costs was entered.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiffs may recover costs on appeal.
SANCHEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’LEARY, P. J.
GOETHALS, J.
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