CourtListener 10325194•People v. Ortega CA2/5
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Filed 1/31/25 P. v. Ortega CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B334072
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA343972)
v.
CESAR ORTEGA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Sam Ohta, Judge. Affirmed.
Patricia S. Lai, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Marc A. Kohm, Deputy
Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Cesar Ortega appeals the trial court’s order denying his
petition for vacatur of his convictions of first degree murder (Pen.
Code,1 § 187, subd. (a); count 1) and attempted murder (§§ 187,
subd. (a) & 664; count 2) and resentencing pursuant to section
1172.6. The trial court denied Ortega’s petition because he failed
to make a prima facie showing that he was eligible for relief. We
affirm the trial court’s order.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2009, Ortega was charged with first degree murder,
willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder, and
shooting at an occupied motor vehicle. As to all three counts, it
was alleged that a principal discharged a firearm, causing great
bodily injury or death, and that the crimes were gang-related.
Ortega’s codefendant, Eric Raphael Ceballos, was tried jointly
before a separate jury that received separate jury instructions.
Ortega’s jury was instructed on principals to a crime
(CALJIC No. 3.00); direct aiding and abetting (CALJIC No. 3.01);
murder (CALJIC No. 8.10); malice aforethought (CALJIC
No. 8.11); willful, deliberate, premeditated murder (CALJIC
No. 8.20); unpremeditated murder in the second degree (CALJIC
No. 8.30); attempted murder (CALJIC No. 8.66); the kill zone
theory of concurrent intent (CALJIC No. 8.66.1); and willful,
deliberate, premeditated attempted murder (CALJIC No. 8.67).
The jury was not instructed regarding felony murder or the
natural and probable consequences theory of murder.
The jury found Ortega guilty of first degree murder,
attempted murder, and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle,
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
and found the associated firearm and gang allegations true. It
found not true the allegation that the attempted murder was
willful, deliberate, and premeditated. The trial court sentenced
Ortega to nine years plus 75 years to life in state prison.
In 2023, Ortega petitioned for vacatur of his murder and
attempted murder convictions and resentencing under section
1172.6, which the People opposed. Appointed counsel filed a
reply on Ortega’s behalf. Following a hearing held pursuant to
section 1172.6, subdivision (c), the trial court denied the petition
because the record of conviction showed that the jury was not
instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine or
on the felony murder rule. The trial court found that Ortega was
not convicted under any theory of imputed liability, but rather as
a principal or direct perpetrator of the crimes.
DISCUSSION
A. Section 1172.6
“Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate
Bill 1437 ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure
that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the
actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a
major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1,
subd. (f).) In addition to substantively amending sections 188
and 189 of the Penal Code, Senate Bill 1437 added section
1170.95 [(now § 1172.6)], which provides a procedure for
convicted murderers who could not be convicted under the law as
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amended to retroactively seek relief.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 959.)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 amended
former section 1170.95. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1). As a result of
these amendments, current section 1172.6 provides that
“person[s] convicted of felony murder or murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter,”
may file a petition to have that conviction vacated under certain
circumstances. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) If a petitioner makes a
prima facie showing of eligibility under section 1172.6, the trial
court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing. (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) A
petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law if the record of
conviction shows that he or she was not convicted under any
theory of liability affected by Senate Bill 1437’s amendments to
the law of murder. (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 450
(Curiel); People v. Mancilla (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 854, 866–867.)
We independently review a trial court’s determination of
whether a petitioner has made a prima facie showing. (People v.
Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)
B. Analysis
On appeal, Ortega contends that the trial court’s order
must be reversed because the record of conviction does not
preclude the possibility that he was convicted of murder or
attempted murder under a theory that is no longer valid. Ortega
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concedes that the jury was not instructed on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or on felony murder, but asserts
that the jury could have nonetheless convicted him under an
invalid imputed malice theory because (1) the prosecutor argued
imputed malice in closing statements and (2) the instructions
permitted the jury to find that Ortega acted with premeditation
and deliberation based on his codefendant’s mental state. Ortega
further contends that the jury’s other findings do not preclude his
eligibility under section 1172.6.2 Ortega asserts that these
alleged errors violated his constitutional right to due process.
2 With respect to the attempted murder conviction, Ortega
acknowledges that the courts that have addressed the issue have
held that section 1172.6 limits eligibility to those convicted under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Ortega
nevertheless argues the Legislature intended for persons
convicted of attempted murder under another theory of imputed
malice to be eligible for relief. We agree with our sister Courts of
Appeal that the plain language of section 1172.6, subdivision (a)
limits relief to those convicted of attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine: “A person convicted
of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime, attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or manslaughter may file a petition with
the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction vacated
and to be resentenced on any remaining counts. . . .” (italics
added). (See People v. Lovejoy (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 860, 865;
People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548.) When the
language of a statute is unambiguous, we need look no further to
interpret its meaning. (See People v. Cody (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th
87, 101 [“ ‘We begin as always with the statute’s actual words,
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We reject Ortega’s arguments. First, Ortega takes the
prosecutor’s closing remarks out of context and mischaracterizes
them. The prosecutor’s comments accurately reflected the law
relating to direct perpetrator and direct aider and abettor
theories of liability for murder and attempted murder that
remain valid. Second, even assuming the trial court’s
instructions on premeditation and deliberation permitted the jury
to find that Ortega acted with premeditation and deliberation
based solely on his codefendant’s mental state, the instructions
did not impact the jury’s separate finding that Ortega acted with
malice based on evidence of Ortega’s own mental state. Finally,
in Ortega’s case it is unnecessary to consider the jury’s other
findings to determine whether he was convicted under a valid
theory of liability. The jury was properly instructed on liability
for murder and attempted murder as a direct perpetrator and as
a direct aider and abettor; the jury necessarily based its verdicts
on those valid theories. The trial court did not err; Ortega’s right
to due process is not implicated.
1. The Prosecutor’s Closing Arguments
Ortega first objects to the prosecutor’s explanation of
principals to a crime and aiding and abetting.
the “most reliable indicator” of legislative intent, “assigning them
their usual and ordinary meanings, and construing them in
context. If the words themselves are not ambiguous, we presume
the Legislature meant what it said, and the statute’s plain
meaning governs” ’ ”].) Regardless, as we discuss below, in this
case there was no other theory of implied malice under which the
jury could have convicted Ortega of attempted murder.
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“The scope of criminal liability is defined by statute: ‘All
persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether it be
felony or misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act
constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, or, not
being present, have advised and encouraged its commission, . . .
are principals in any crime so committed.’ (§ 31.)” (Curiel, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 466.)
“[T]o establish liability for murder under the theory of
direct aiding and abetting, ‘the prosecution must show that the
defendant aided or encouraged the commission of the murder
with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and
with the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or
facilitating its commission.’ [Citation.] In addition . . . an aider
and abettor may be liable for murder under a theory of implied
malice where the aider and abettor aids in the commission of a
life-endangering act, with ‘ “knowledge that the perpetrator
intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the
commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to
human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life.” ’
[Citation.] ‘Thus, proof of aider and abettor liability requires
proof in three distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus
reus—a crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider
and abettor’s mens rea’—which here includes knowledge that the
direct perpetrator intends to commit the crime or life-
endangering act, ‘and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus—
conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the
achievement of the crime.’ [Citation.]” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at pp. 466–467.)
Ortega objects to the prosecutor’s statement that: “[T]he
law doesn’t like gangs, criminal organizations, whether they’re
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white collar or street gangs or traditional gangs that we all watch
on TV as crimes. [¶] Law does not like when multiple people get
together, the chances of success and violence increase. And so
the law is going to hold everybody responsible.” This statement
was made in the context of defining principals to a crime. The
prosecutor explained that both direct perpetrators and aiders and
abettors are principals to a crime with equal criminal liability
because the Legislature has determined that criminals are more
effective and more dangerous when they operate in groups. The
prosecutor’s statement was consistent with the law relating to
principals as articulated in section 31.
Ortega also quotes, as an example of a theory proposed to
impute malice to him, a hypothetical robbery the prosecutor used
to describe aiding and abetting: “Robbery is taking somebody’s
property by force or fear. Point a gun, tell them ‘Give me your
money.’ That’s a robbery, if you point a gun at someone. What
about the driver, is he accountable for the robbery? He’s just a
getaway driver. He didn’t do any force or fear. He’s not scaring
anybody. He’s just waiting for me. [¶] Of course the law is going
to hold him equally accountable. How about the person that
scouted out that is not even there on the day the robbery occurs?
Are we going to hold them accountable? Absolutely. And that’s
this concept of aiding and abetting.”
Ortega omits that the prosecutor’s comments were made in
the course of explaining the level of liability assigned to people
involved in a crime who aid and abet but who do not personally
commit all of the specific acts that constitute the crime, such as
someone who scouts out a location to rob or who acts as a
getaway driver in the robbery hypothetical. Immediately after
the remarks Ortega quotes the prosecutor stated: “But in order
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to aid and abet, you have to know what’s going to happen. And
you have to share that same intent. So if you are going to a
liquor store, and your friend says ‘Just stop here. I’m going to
run in and get something,’ and he comes out running with a bag
of money and a gun, you had no idea he had the gun, of course
you’re not guilty. . . . If your plan was going on to act as the
driver, are you guilty of robbery? Absolutely.’ ”
Taken in context it is clear that the prosecutor accurately
described direct aiding and abetting: the aider and abettor has to
understand that the perpetrator intended to commit a robbery,
share the intent to commit that robbery, and act to facilitate the
robbery. Someone who is unaware that the perpetrator intends
to rob and unwittingly facilitates the robbery cannot be held
liable.
Finally, Ortega objects to the prosecutor’s explanation of
the firearm use allegations, which he claims permitted the jury to
find him guilty of murder and attempted murder even if he did
not discharge a firearm. This is also a mischaracterization of the
prosecutor’s remarks. The prosecutor described the firearm use
allegations and explained that if the jury found that the crimes
were gang-related, it could find true that a principal used a
firearm in commission of the crimes even if Ortega did not
personally use a firearm. This is an accurate statement of the
law under section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1), which
provide that firearm enhancements under section 12022.53 apply
to a principal in the offense if that principal violated the gang
enhancement statute and any principal in the offense “personally
and intentionally discharges a firearm and proximately causes
great bodily injury . . . or death, to a person other than an
accomplice” (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). In addition to being an
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accurate statement, the prosecutor’s comments related solely to
the firearm use enhancements and not to liability for murder.
In sum, nothing in the prosecutor’s statements urged the
jury to find Ortega guilty of murder based on imputed malice.
2. The Premeditation and Deliberation
Instruction
The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC
No. 8.20 that: “To constitute a deliberate and premeditated
killing, the slayer must weigh and consider the question of killing
and the reasons for and against such a choice and, having in
mind the consequences, [he] [she] decides to and does kill.”
Ortega argues that the instruction permitted the jury to find him
guilty of murder based on imputed malice. We reject the
argument.
With the exception of felony murder, which is not
implicated here, “in order to be convicted of murder, a principal
in the crime shall act with malice aforethought.” (§ 188, subd.
(a)(3).) Premeditation and deliberation is a distinct concept that
sets the degree of liability for murder after it has been
determined that a murder has been committed. (§ 189, subd. (a)
[all murder committed with premeditation and deliberation is
murder in the first degree].) Ortega’s jury was specifically
instructed under CALJIC No. 8.30 that it could find him guilty of
second degree murder if it found that the killing was not
premeditated. Thus, even assuming that CALJIC No. 8.20 could
be interpreted to permit the jury to find that Ortega did act
willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation based on his
10
codefendant’s mental state, it could not be interpreted to permit
the jury to find Ortega guilty of murder based on imputed malice.
It is undisputed that Ortega’s jury was properly instructed
that murder requires the perpetrator to act with malice
aforethought under CALJIC No. 8.10. It is also undisputed that
the jury was properly instructed under CALJIC No. 3.01 that if
Ortega was an aider and abettor he must both know of and share
the perpetrator’s intent—i.e., Ortega must have personally acted
with malice. Accordingly, the jury necessarily found that Ortega
was guilty of murder under a valid theory based on his own
mental state.
3. Other Jury Findings
Ortega cites Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th 433, People v.
Whitson (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 22, and People v. Offley (2020) 48
Cal.App.5th 588, to argue that the jury’s findings in his case are
insufficient to refute his eligibility for resentencing under section
1172.6. All three cases are inapposite. In each of those cases, the
jury was instructed under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine and the court held that other findings the jury made
were insufficient to preclude the possibility that the defendant
was convicted under that invalid theory—i.e., the prosecution
could not establish as a matter of law that the jury necessarily
found all of the elements to support a valid theory of murder
liability. (Curiel, at p. 468 [jury’s true finding on gang murder
special circumstance allegation requiring it to find defendant
intended to kill did not establish other mens rea requirements for
valid direct aider and abettor liability]; People v. Whitson, at
pp. 31–33 [modified conspiracy to murder instruction and
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premeditation and deliberation instruction did not require jury to
find defendant intended to kill]; Offley, supra, at p. 598 [jury’s
true finding of personal firearm use under section 12022.53,
subdivision (d), did not require it to find defendant intended to
kill or was aware of the danger to life his act posed].) In the
instant case, the trial court did not instruct on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, the felony murder theory, or any
other theory of murder by which malice could be imputed to
Ortega. Rather, the jury was properly instructed on the required
mens rea and actus reus for both direct perpetrators and direct
aiders and abettors to establish liability for murder and
attempted murder. In contrast to Curiel, Whitson, and Offley,
here there was no need to look to other jury findings to determine
whether the jury necessarily decided all required elements. The
jury’s murder and attempted murder verdicts necessarily
encompassed all of the elements to support those verdicts under
those valid theories of liability. (See Offley, at p. 599 [observing
that if jury had not been instructed on natural and probable
consequences doctrine it could not have convicted on invalid basis
and petition would have been summarily denied].)
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DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying Ortega’s petition
for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
BAKER, J.
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