CourtListener 10325133•People v. McDermott CA2/3
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Filed 1/31/25 P. v. McDermott CA2/3
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B336664
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA052445)
v.
ROHAN MCDERMOTT,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kathryn A. Solorzano, Judge. Affirmed.
Marc Eric Norton for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
In 2006, a jury convicted Rohan McDermott of first degree
murder with true findings on special circumstance allegations.
The trial court sentenced him to life without parole. Years later,
McDermott petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section
1172.6,1 which limited accomplice liability for murder. After an
evidentiary hearing under that section, the trial court found that
McDermott was a major participant in a felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life and denied the petition.
McDermott now appeals from the trial court’s order denying his
petition, contending there was insufficient evidence to support
the trial court’s finding he acted with reckless indifference to
human life. We disagree and affirm the order.
BACKGROUND
I. Evidence at McDermott’s trial
Finding it to be an accurate summary of the evidence at
McDermott’s underlying trial, we take the background, with
some additions in brackets, from this division’s opinion affirming
as modified McDermott’s judgment of conviction on direct appeal,
People v. McDermott (June 27, 2007, B193585) [nonpub. opn.].2
1
All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
2
Both parties rely on the statement of facts from the opinion
and neither contends that the opinion inaccurately summarizes
the evidence. An appellate opinion is part of the record of
conviction in section 1172.6 proceedings, and a trial court at an
evidentiary hearing may consider the procedural history of the
2
“1. Prosecution evidence.
“On April 28, 2004,[3] Dwane Godoy met with defendant
McDermott and Alcliff Daley. They asked if Godoy knew anyone
who could get marijuana for them. Godoy promised to check
around. He contacted Troy Lewis’s uncle Dave, who
subsequently called back to say Lewis could get the marijuana.
“On the night of April 29, McDermott, Daley, Godoy, Lewis,
Dave, and Lewis’s girlfriend Karla DeDunn got together at a
house on 36th Street. McDermott said he wanted to buy 100
pounds of marijuana. Godoy testified the price for this amount of
marijuana was between $28,000 and $35,000. Lewis had 33
pounds of marijuana in DeDunn’s S.U.V. McDermott inspected it
and said ‘he could work with the stuff,’ but he wanted to buy the
entire hundred pounds at one time. The group agreed to meet
the following day. Godoy testified McDermott had been doing all
the negotiating during this first meeting. Later that night, Lewis
called Godoy to say he had acquired the rest of the marijuana and
the deal could take place in the morning.
“On the morning of April 30, Godoy returned to the house
on 36th Street. McDermott, Daley, Lewis and DeDunn were
already there. This surprised Godoy, because McDermott and
Daley only knew Lewis through him; Godoy feared McDermott
and Daley might be trying to cut him out of the deal. The
marijuana was in the back of DeDunn’s S.U.V. McDermott was
case as recited in the opinion. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972.)
[3 ] “All further calendar references are to the year 2004 unless
otherwise specified.”
3
holding a Converse tennis shoe box. Lewis said, ‘Let’s count the
cash.’ McDermott opened the Converse box, but then both he and
Daley started ‘to fidget around,’ ‘acting ... nervous.’ McDermott
took some money out of the box. The money was wrapped in
plastic. Then McDermott put the money back into the Converse
box and said he wanted a scale. Lewis said, ‘We don’t play
games.... It’s a hundred and three [pounds] there. If you short,
we gonna give you that.’ Godoy testified he said, ‘This is
business. We could do it right here if the cash is right.’ But
McDermott replied, ‘Well, I need a scale. I want to weigh out
everything.’
“They agreed to go to Daley’s apartment in Hawthorne
because McDermott said he had an electric scale there.
McDermott and Daley left in McDermott’s rental car and took the
Converse box with them. Lewis and Godoy went in Godoy’s car,
and DeDunn drove the S.U.V. Lewis told DeDunn to drive
around until everything was settled. At one point, the two cars
pulled over. DeDunn was nowhere in sight. McDermott
indicated he would complete the drug deal right there, that he
would give them the money when they put the marijuana in his
car. However, a police car drove past just then. McDermott
panicked and said he had to get out of there. Lewis jumped into
McDermott’s car and Godoy drove by himself.
“Godoy called Lewis on his cell phone to ask what was
happening. Godoy thought McDermott was trying to convince
Lewis to do the deal without him. Godoy told them to pull over so
he could catch up. When he did, there were more negotiations
and then the four of them again agreed to go to Daley’s
apartment. Lewis got back into Godoy’s car. Meanwhile, Lewis
4
stayed in phone contact with DeDunn, who was still driving the
marijuana around in her S.U.V.
“Godoy and Lewis got to Daley’s apartment complex first.
There was a 7-Eleven nearby and Lewis told DeDunn to wait
there until it was time to bring the marijuana. When the others
arrived, Godoy and Lewis got into McDermott’s car and he drove
through the security gate into the parking garage. Godoy
thought they were going to complete the transaction right there,
but McDermott handed the Converse box to Daley and then drove
back out onto the street. Daley, Lewis and Godoy went upstairs
to Daley’s apartment.
“Inside apartment 200, Daley put the Converse box down
on a table. He showed Godoy and Lewis pictures of a house he
was building in Jamaica. Meanwhile, McDermott telephoned
Daley repeatedly. During these calls, Godoy could hear
McDermott asking Daley what they were doing. At one point,
Lewis went over to the Converse box and said, ‘Let’s count the
money.’ Daley told him not to touch it because it was
McDermott’s money and he didn’t want McDermott ‘to come
upstairs and say ... something is missing....’ Finally, McDermott
showed up. He did not look at Godoy and Lewis when he came
in; he kept his head down and just walked into the kitchen with
the Converse box and sat down.
“Daley went into a back room and suddenly reappeared
with a gun. He ordered Godoy and Lewis not to move, and he
told McDermott to get the tape and tie them up. [McDermott did
not seem scared when Daley told him to get the tape. Lewis
pleaded with McDermott and Daley not to kill him and said he
had a daughter. Godoy similarly told them that they did not
have to go through with ‘this.’] Daley said he was going to kill
5
Godoy and Lewis ‘and just leave us in the closet to stink up.’ He
ordered them onto the floor, where McDermott taped their hands
and legs. Godoy got his hands free, but when Daley noticed it he
put the gun to Godoy’s head and said, ‘If you do that again, I’m
gonna kill you.’ McDermott re-taped Godoy’s hands.
“Daley announced he was going after the marijuana. He
told McDermott to ‘get the other gun’ and guard Godoy and
Lewis. But when Daley left the apartment, McDermott walked
out right behind him. Godoy again managed to free his hands
and he got to the front door. But as he pulled it open, McDermott
suddenly appeared and said, ‘You’re not going nowhere.’ A
struggle ensued, during which a window broke. Godoy got away
and started screaming for help.
“With McDermott chasing after him, Godoy ran from the
apartment complex and hid underneath a car in a neighboring
yard. A man holding a shotgun told Godoy he was trespassing,
but Godoy refused to leave. When the man’s daughter
intervened, Godoy begged her to call the police, saying he and a
friend had just been ‘jacked in that apartment building over
there.’ The woman called the police, who arrived 40 minutes
later.
“Godoy gave police a false story, saying he and his friend
had been walking down the street when they were kidnapped.
He didn’t tell the truth because he realized he could be
prosecuted for drug trafficking. When the police took Godoy back
to the apartment complex to look around, he did not tell them
about apartment 200 or Lewis being tied up there.
“Anna Fitzgerald lived in apartment 201. On the afternoon
of April 30, she heard a single gunshot, followed by breaking
glass and then someone saying, ‘Hey, get back here.’ Fitzgerald
6
looked out and saw that apartment 200’s security screen door
was open and that the doorknob had smashed backward into the
kitchen window.
“On the afternoon of April 30, Edna Martinez, assistant
manager at Daley’s apartment complex, received several
telephone messages about a problem in apartment 200. That
night, she went to apartment 200. The security screen door had
apparently been slammed into the kitchen window, cracking it.
Inside the apartment she found Lewis’s dead body.
“Lewis had been shot in the head. His hands were behind
his back, bound with tape. The Converse tennis shoe box was on
the kitchen counter. Inside the box there were several bundles of
cut up newsprint. Each bundle was covered by a little paper
money and wrapped in cellophane. A similar bundle was found
under the front seat of McDermott’s car. The total amount of real
money in all the bundles was $1,120.
“That night, Godoy’s uncle convinced him to go to the
police. At first, Godoy repeated his story about having been
kidnapped off the street, but after learning Lewis had been killed
he described the marijuana deal and what took place inside
apartment 200. Godoy gave police the license number of
McDermott’s rental car, which was found parked in front of
Daley’s apartment complex.
“Godoy testified he did not have either the marijuana or a
gun in his car that day, nor did he have a gun on him when he
went up to apartment 200.
“2. Defense evidence.
“McDermott testified he was living in Florida in 2004. In
late April, he flew to Los Angeles in order to retain an attorney to
represent him in a forfeiture proceeding. In November 2003,
7
officers had taken $14,000 from him when he flew into Long
Beach, and he wanted to reclaim that money. He was planning
to stay with Daley in Hawthorne. Because Daley did not own a
car, McDermott rented one.
“On April 29, Daley gave McDermott a ride to the corner of
Slauson and Western Avenue, where Daley met with Godoy and
spoke to him about buying marijuana. Godoy seemed to know
McDermott, but McDermott couldn’t place him until he
remembered Godoy’s cousin had once introduced them. That
night, while McDermott stayed at Daley’s apartment, Daley
borrowed the rental car; McDermott didn’t know where he went.
“On April 30, McDermott drove Daley to 36th Street to
meet Godoy again. Godoy showed Daley a small plastic bag of
marijuana. There was an S.U.V. there with a female driver and a
male passenger who McDermott later learned was Lewis. When
Daley got back in the car, he told McDermott he had ordered
some marijuana from Godoy. McDermott thought Godoy was
going to call them to set up the exchange. McDermott and Daley
drove to a restaurant to get take-out food. There was never a
discussion about a scale and they did not stop anywhere on the
street to discuss the drug transaction.
“When they got to Daley’s apartment complex, Lewis and
Godoy were waiting for them in front. McDermott drove them
into the garage and then went to park his car. He suddenly felt
uncomfortable about Godoy and Lewis going up to Daley’s
apartment because he didn’t like their ‘vibes.’ McDermott made
a series of phone calls to the apartment, during which he urged
Daley to tell Godoy and Lewis to leave. But Daley kept hanging
up on him. Finally, Daley told McDermott to come upstairs and
McDermott complied.
8
“When he got inside apartment 200, McDermott went to
the kitchen to get something to drink. Then he heard his name
called. He walked into the living room and saw Daley pointing a
gun at Godoy and Lewis. When Daley ordered McDermott to tie
them up, McDermott ‘said, “Man, I don’t want to get involved in
this.” And when I said that, I was about to leave. But the
expression on [Daley’s] face change[d], and I tied them up.’ Then,
when Daley turned his back, McDermott fled from the
apartment. As he was running, he heard a loud noise.
McDermott could not find his car key, so he ran ‘all the way to
Century.’ He took a cab to where a friend of his worked.
“Several weeks later, McDermott was apprehended in
Florida.
“McDermott denied having any more than $100 on him
when he landed at Long Beach in April 2004. He testified that
when the $14,000 was taken from him at the Long Beach airport
in November 2003, he told the detaining officer he lived in
Florida. McDermott specifically denied telling the officer he lived
in Los Angeles.
“3. Rebuttal evidence.
“Michael Vanagas testified he worked at the Long Beach
airport as part of a California Department of Justice task force
intercepting shipments of drugs and drug money. On November
24, 2003, he seized $14,000 from McDermott. On that day,
Vanagas asked McDermott where he lived and McDermott said
Los Angeles.
“Vanagas testified he was working the same assignment on
April 21, 2004, when he again came into contact with McDermott.
Because he remembered McDermott from before, Vanagas
searched him and found he was carrying approximately $2,000.
9
Vanagas did not take possession of this money because the policy
was to seize only amounts over $5,000.” (People v. McDermott,
supra, B193585.)
II. Verdict and sentence
Daley and McDermott were tried separately. McDermott’s
jury convicted him of first degree murder committed during an
attempted robbery and kidnapping (§§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2,
subd. (a)(17)) and found true a principal gun use allegation
(§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). In April 2006, the trial court sentenced
McDermott to life without parole plus one year.
III. Postconviction petition for resentencing
In 2019, McDermott petitioned for resentencing under
section 1172.6. The trial court issued an order to show cause and
scheduled an evidentiary hearing.4 In their briefs submitted for
the hearing, the parties agreed that the issue was whether
McDermott was a major participant in the felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life under current law, although
McDermott’s counsel conceded that McDermott was a major
participant in the felony.
At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court relied on the
transcripts from McDermott’s underlying trial. The parties did
not offer any new or additional evidence.5 As to whether
McDermott acted with reckless indifference to human life, the
4
The evidentiary hearing was not held until 2024 due to
intervening appellate proceedings.
5
In his opening brief on appeal, McDermott asked this court
to take judicial notice of two declarations, but he withdrew that
request in his reply.
10
trial court found that McDermott planned to rip off the victims
and lured them to the apartment to steal the marijuana. The
trial court made it clear it was not finding that McDermott was
the actual killer or in the room when Lewis was shot, based on
the jury finding only a principal-armed allegation true as to
McDermott. Even so, the trial court disbelieved McDermott’s
trial testimony that he did not want to participate in the robbery
and only tied up the victims because Daley made him. The trial
court found crucial to its analysis that McDermott “immobilized
somebody knowing that your accomplice is armed and knowing
that a primary witness … has successfully escaped the scene and
doing nothing, doing nothing except saving your own skin. That
to me is reckless indifference.” The trial court accordingly denied
McDermott’s petition for resentencing.
DISCUSSION
I. Senate Bill No. 1437 and standard of review
To the end of ensuring a person’s sentence is commensurate
with the person’s individual criminal culpability, Senate Bill
No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) limited
accomplice liability under the felony-murder rule, eliminated the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to
murder, and eliminated convictions for murder based on a theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime. (See generally People v. Reyes
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 986; People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th
952, 957, 959; People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843.)
As relevant here, Senate Bill 1437 amended the felony-murder
rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e), which provides that a
participant in the perpetration of qualifying felonies is liable for
11
felony murder only if the person (1) was the actual killer, (2) was
not the actual killer but, with the intent to kill, acted as a direct
aider and abettor, or (3) was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human
life, as described in section 190.2, subdivision (d). (Gentile, at
p. 842.)
Senate Bill 1437 also created a procedure, codified at
section 1172.6, for a person convicted of murder under the former
law to be resentenced if the person could no longer be convicted of
murder under the current law. (People v. Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 959; People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.)
A defendant commences that procedure by filing a petition
containing a declaration that, among other things, the defendant
could not presently be convicted of murder under the current law.
(People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.)
If a petition establishes a prima facie case for relief, the
trial court must appoint counsel if requested, issue an order to
show cause, and hold an evidentiary hearing at which the parties
may offer new or additional evidence and the trial court sits as an
independent factfinder to determine beyond a reasonable doubt
whether the defendant is guilty of murder under a valid theory.
(§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(3), (c), & (d)(1); People v. Garrison (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 735, 745.) At a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing,
the trial court must give preclusive effect to a jury’s finding.
(People v. Arnold (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 376, 386–387 [jury’s not
true finding on knife use allegation has preclusive effect at
§ 1172.6 evidentiary hearing].)6
6
At the evidentiary hearing here, the trial court took note of
Arnold. It is unclear whether on appeal McDermott is making an
12
On appeal, we review the trial court’s findings after a
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), evidentiary hearing for
substantial evidence. (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
276, 298; accord, People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575,
591.) Under that standard of review we “ ‘ “examine the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine
whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that
is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that would support a
rational trier of fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a
reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (Clements, at p. 298.) We presume in
support of the judgment the existence of every fact that can be
reasonably deduced from the evidence. (People v. Owens (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1022.) We do not resolve credibility issues
or evidentiary conflicts. (Ibid.) Substantial evidence includes
circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn
from that evidence. (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57.)
Before we may set aside a trial court’s order, it must be clear that
“ ‘ “upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial
evidence to support [it].” ’ ” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th
327, 357.)
argument that the trial court misunderstood Arnold or its duty to
act as an independent factfinder to determine beyond a
reasonable doubt that McDermott was guilty of murder under a
valid theory. To the extent McDermott makes any such
argument, we reject it. The trial court properly gave effect to the
jury’s principal gun use finding and otherwise applied the correct
standard of review.
13
II. Banks/Clark factors
The trial court found McDermott guilty of felony murder as
a major participant in a felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life under current law. This area of law
has its genesis in two United States Supreme Court cases:
Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 and Tison v. Arizona
(1987) 481 U.S. 137. Enmund held that the death penalty could
not constitutionally be imposed on an armed robbery getaway
driver who was a minor participant in the crime, was not present
when the murder was committed, and had no intent to kill.
(Enmund, at pp. 798, 801.)
In contrast, Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at page 139,
did not preclude imposing the death penalty for two defendants,
brothers, who had helped their father and his cellmate—both
convicted murderers—escape from prison. The defendants gave
them guns, and the group later kidnapped a family of four. The
defendants then stood by while their father debated whether to
kill the family and proceeded to shoot the family, including a
toddler and a teenager. (Id. at pp. 139–141.) The court held that
the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit imposing the death
penalty on a nonkiller who lacked the intent to kill, but whose
“participation [in the crime] is major and whose mental state is
one of reckless indifference to the value of human life.” (Id. at
p. 152; see also id. at pp. 157–158.)
Years later, in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788
(Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), our
Supreme Court addressed Enmund and Tison and substantially
clarified the “major participant” and “reckless indifference to
human life” requirements. Banks, at page 794, considered “under
what circumstances an accomplice who lacks the intent to kill
14
may qualify as a major participant.” The court listed various
factors that should be considered in making that determination:
“What role did the defendant have in planning the criminal
enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What role did the
defendant have in supplying or using lethal weapons? What
awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers posed by
the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or
conduct of the other participants? Was the defendant present at
the scene of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the
actual murder, and did his or her own actions or inaction play a
particular role in the death? What did the defendant do after
lethal force was used?” (Id. at p. 803, fn. omitted.)
The court then turned its attention to “reckless indifference
to human life” in Clark. Reckless indifference to human life is
“ ‘implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to
carry a grave risk of death.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 616.)
It “encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in
killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not
specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions.”
(Id. at p. 617.) Recklessness has both a subjective and an
objective component. (Ibid.) Subjectively, the defendant must
consciously disregard risks known to him. Objectively,
recklessness is determined by “what ‘a law-abiding person would
observe in the actor’s situation,’ ” that is, whether defendant’s
conduct “ ‘involved a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person in the actor’s situation would
observe.’ ” (Ibid.)
Clark listed factors to consider when determining whether
reckless indifference existed: “Did the defendant use or know
that a gun would be used during the felony? How many weapons
15
were ultimately used? Was the defendant physically present at
the crime? Did he or she have the opportunity to restrain the
crime or aid the victim? What was the duration of the interaction
between the perpetrators of the felony and the victims? What
was the defendant’s knowledge of his or her confederate’s
propensity for violence or likelihood of using lethal force? What
efforts did the defendant make to minimize the risks of violence
during the felony?” (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677
[summarizing Clark factors].)
In evaluating the sufficiency of evidence to support a trial
court’s finding that the Banks/Clark factors are established, no
one factor “ ‘is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily
sufficient.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618.) Rather, we
evaluate the factors under the totality of the circumstances to
determine a petitioner’s place on the culpability spectrum. (In re
Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 675.)
III. Sufficient evidence supports the finding that McDermott
was a major participant in a felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life
McDermott conceded below that he was a major participant
in the robbery, so he now focuses on whether there was sufficient
evidence he acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Cognizant that the Banks and Clark factors overlap, we focus our
analysis on that prong of the inquiry. (See generally Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615 [significant overlap exists between
factors establishing two prongs].)
The first Clark factor we examine is whether McDermott
used a lethal weapon or knew one would be used. (See generally
Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617.) The evidence shows that two
guns were used or available for use during the attempted
16
robbery. Although there was no evidence that McDermott
supplied the guns, the evidence shows that he knew about them.
That is, McDermott was heavily involved in planning and
executing the robbery: he led the negotiations to buy marijuana,
inspected the marijuana, had the Converse box containing fake
money, and remained in telephonic contact with Daley until
McDermott arrived at Daley’s apartment. Crucially, after Daley
retrieved one gun in the apartment, he told McDermott to get the
“other” gun. The totality of this evidence raised a reasonable
inference that McDermott knew guns would be used and planned
to use one himself. Moreover, given the risk involved in the plan
to steal the marijuana from Godoy and Lewis, it is reasonable to
infer that McDermott planned to use force to implement the
robbery. While the mere fact a robbery involved a gun is
insufficient by itself to support a finding of reckless indifference
to human life, the presence of lethal weapons is nonetheless
relevant to the required mens rea and weighs in favor of the trial
court’s conclusion, even if it is not dispositive. (See generally In
re Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 682 [anyone who plans or
participates in armed robbery anticipates lethal violence might
be used, given that one in 200 armed robberies results in death,
even though that alone does not establish reckless indifference to
human life].)
Next, McDermott was present during most of the events.
McDermott was heavily involved in planning the robbery and in
executing it. He was in the apartment with the victims, leaving
only to pursue the fleeing Godoy. (See People v. Mitchell, supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 592 [reckless indifference found where
defendant was present at every stage of crime: “planning,
execution, dividing the spoils, and flight”].) Although the trial
17
court could not find that McDermott was present when Lewis
was shot, McDermott’s presence during other key events supports
the trial court’s reckless indifference finding.
Given his presence during key events, McDermott was in a
position to restrain the crime and Daley. Yet, there is no
evidence that McDermott tried to prevent the murder. Instead,
he followed Daley’s instructions to tie up Godoy and Lewis.
Moreover, McDermott tied them up while Daley issued multiple
threats to kill Godoy and Lewis. Daley’s intent to kill was
therefore clear. Indeed, when Godoy loosened his restraints,
Daley put a gun to his head and repeated that he would kill
Godoy if Godoy did that again. Despite Daley’s renewed threat to
kill, McDermott retaped Godoy’s hands. Therefore, there is a
reasonable inference that McDermott tied up the victims to
facilitate their murder. (See, e.g., People v. Bascomb (2020) 55
Cal.App.5th 1077, 1089 [defendant enabled murder by using gun
to keep victims at bay during bank robbery].)
For these reasons, McDermott’s argument that he was not
in a position to restrain the crime or Daley because he left the
apartment is unpersuasive. McDermott is not like defendants
who had no opportunity to restrain the actual killer and did not
know of the actual killer’s intent. (See, e.g., In re Scoggins,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 679 [quickness of shooting suggested
defendant lacked control over accomplices’ actions]; People v.
Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 989 [defendant lacked
meaningful opportunity to intervene when he and shooter were
on opposite sides of victim’s car, and attempted carjacking was
quickly executed]; In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 452
[defendant present during robbery but not “ ‘close enough’ ” to
restrain shooter].) McDermott had multiple opportunities to
18
restrain the crime. (See, e.g., In re McDowell (2020) 55
Cal.App.5th 999, 1014 [after accomplice fired warning shot,
defendant had “brief but critical opportunity” to intervene]; In re
Loza (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 38, 54 [shooter said he would count to
five and then shoot but defendant did not intervene during
countdown].) When Daley threatened to kill the victims,
McDermott could have told Daley they were not going to do that.
When Daley told McDermott to tie up the victims, McDermott
could have refused. And when Godoy fled, McDermott could have
let him go and stayed to help Lewis. He did none of those things.
Instead, he tied up the victims, inferentially to make them easier
to kill. And McDermott was only absent from the room when
Lewis was killed because the plan went awry when Godoy
escaped and McDermott pursued him, inferentially to bring him
back to the apartment.
This same evidence shows that McDermott did not try to
minimize the risk of violence but instead heightened it.
(Compare People v. Owens, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 1024
[bank robbery posed high risk of violence because it occurred
during business hours with 20 people present and robbers were
armed], with Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 621–622 [plan to rob
closed store minimized risk of violence]; In re Scoggins, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 677 [defendant’s plan to beat victim and steal his
money did not involve use of weapons].) Tying up the victims,
violently struggling with Godoy, and pursuing the escaping
Godoy all escalated the violence. (See, e.g., In re Harper (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 450, 466 [although defendant had no opportunity
to minimize risk of violence during planning stage, he could have
minimized risk of violence when “original plan . . . unraveled”].)
19
Next, there is no evidence McDermott knew about any
propensity for violence Daley had before these events. (See
generally In re Bennett (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1002, 1025 [finding
“ ‘significant’ ” the lack of evidence that the petitioner knew of his
confederates’ “violent propensities”].) However, Daley’s violent
nature became clear during the events. (See generally People v.
Nieber (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 458, 479 [although Nieber did not
know about cohorts’ likelihood of killing, he knew they brought a
weapon and were using it].) That is, Daley instructed McDermott
to restrain the victims. Daley also had a gun and told McDermott
to get the other gun. And Daley said multiple times that he was
going to kill the victims. At that point, Daley’s violent intent was
unmistakable.
The next factor we examine is the crime’s duration, because
there is generally a greater opportunity for violence when victims
are restrained for prolonged periods. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 620.) This event occurred over several days, beginning with
meetings between the parties to negotiate. Then, on the morning
of the robbery, the parties met at a house and drove to Daley’s
apartment where, once McDermott arrived, McDermott
restrained the victims with tape while Daley held them at bay
with a gun. When Godoy was able to free his hands, Daley held
the gun to Godoy’s head, said he would kill him if he did that
again. McDermott retaped Godoy’s hands. When Godoy freed his
hands again, he violently struggled with McDermott, but Godoy
was able to get away. Although the actual duration of the event
in the apartment is unclear, it was long enough for McDermott to
tie up two victims, to restrain Godoy a second time, and to engage
in a violent struggle with Godoy. This factor therefore also
supports the reckless indifference finding.
20
Finally, the evidence raises a reasonable inference that
when McDermott ended his pursuit of Godoy, McDermott did not
return to the apartment to help Lewis, whom he knew was
restrained and alone with an armed Daley who had said he would
kill Lewis and leave his body to rot. This is exactly what
happened: Lewis was shot in the head and his bound body was
not discovered until later that day. Such callous behavior in
leaving a restrained victim to be executed supports the reckless
indifference finding. (See, e.g., In re Parrish (2020) 58
Cal.App.5th 539, 544 [reckless indifference shown by failure to
aid or comfort victim]; People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1,
10 [petitioner “displayed no interest in moderating violence or in
aiding his bloody and suffering victim” and instead picked his
pocket].)
The totality of the factors here supports the trial court’s
ultimate finding that McDermott was a major participant in the
attempted robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human
life. In particular, McDermott immobilized Godoy and Lewis
while Daley repeatedly threatened to kill them. As the trial court
found, this factor established the reckless indifference to human
life prong. The trial court therefore did not err by denying
McDermott’s petition.
21
DISPOSITION
The order denying Rohan McDermott’s Penal Code section
1172.6 petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
EDMON, P. J.
We concur:
EGERTON, J.
HANASONO, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
22
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