Harrison v. Lavi CA2/4

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Filed 1/31/25 Harrison v. Lavi CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

BRYAN HARRISON, B328023

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STCV33234)
v.

SIMON LAVI, M.D. ET AL.

Defendants and
Appellants.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Richard L. Fruin, Judge. Affirmed.
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, Matthew G. Kleiner,
Andrea K. Williams, for Defendants and Appellants.
Gavrilov & Brooks, Michael Coleman, Matthew R. Richard,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Plaintiff Bryan Harrison (Harrison), an attorney,
represented a patient of defendants Simon Lavi, D.O. (Lavi) and
Simon Lavi, D.O., Inc. (collectively, defendants) in a personal
injury lawsuit. Lavi allegedly made unflattering statements
about Harrison on two occasions: (1) when Lavi declined to
appear for a scheduled deposition and (2) during a medical
appointment with Harrison’s client. Displeased, Harrison sued
Lavi. Defendants appeal from the denial of their special motion
to strike Harrison’s complaint under Code of Civil Procedure
section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute1). Defendants argue that
Lavi’s statements are protected under section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(2), because they were made in connection with the
pending personal injury litigation, or under subdivision (e)(4), as
protected speech in connection with an issue of public interest.
We conclude the alleged defamatory statements do not fall within
the scope of section 425.16. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Harrison’s Complaint
Harrison filed this action against defendants for slander
per se, false light, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional
interference with contractual relations. Harrison is an attorney
who was hired by non-party O.R.2 to represent him in a personal

1 SLAPP is the acronym for a strategic lawsuit against public
participation. All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.
2 We granted the parties’ applications to file their briefs and
appendix of exhibits under seal. To protect the identity of Lavi’s non-
party patient, O.R., we shall refer to him by his initials.

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injury action involving a car accident. O.R. received treatment
from several doctors, including Lavi, for injuries O.R. suffered in
the car accident.
Harrison planned for Lavi to be a non-retained expert
witness in O.R.’s personal injury lawsuit. According to Harrison,
Lavi agreed to appear for a remote deposition in early December
2021. However, Harrison alleges that on the day of the
deposition, Lavi refused to take part and “appeared for the sole
purpose of stating that he would not appear in the deposition[ ]
because he did not receive his payment to act as a non-retained
expert witness.” Harrison claims he mailed the payment to Lavi
in advance of the deposition and never heard that Lavi failed to
receive it. When Lavi appeared, he stated, “[I]t is well known
[Harrison] is ‘not trustworthy.’” Lavi made this statement in the
presence of a videographer for the deposition, court reporter,
technical assistant, and Harrison’s legal assistant.
Approximately two weeks later, O.R. had a medical
appointment with Lavi. Harrison alleges that while the purpose
of the appointment was to “evaluate [O.R.’s] physical condition
and determine whether he would need a spinal fusion, Dr. Lavi
took this opportunity to speak with [O.R.], outside of [Harrison’s]
presence, and say false and damaging statements about
[Harrison’s] character and professional conduct.” A translator
was present during the appointment.
Lavi allegedly made the following statements during the
doctor’s appointment: “‘Do you still have the same attorney? . . .
Your attorney’s a fucking piece of shit. You know what that
means? . . . And you can tell your attorney that I said that. He is
single-handedly ruining your case. He is dishonest and not
trustworthy. I could have helped you out at the very beginning

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on your case . . . , but your attorney is a piece of shit. He is
hindering your case, ok, and fighting with us when I’m on your
team.’” Lavi allegedly further stated: “‘I would have fired his ass
long ago if I were you. If it wasn’t for your attorney, you wouldn’t
be here today. I’m trying to help you because I feel bad. But he’s
a piece of garbage of a human being. Fuck him!’ [¶] ‘You know?
I’ll tell you something. He’s lucky I haven’t turned him into the
Bar. I can file a complaint against his license. And I was this
close to going to court, and filing a complaint on him. They
would’ve reprimanded him.’” Dr. Lavi continued, “‘I’ve been
trying to help you, but the problem is your attorney. He thinks
he’s hot shit; he doesn’t know anything. Your attorney is brand
new. This is the second case he’s ever handled.’”
When O.R. asked Lavi why he was saying this, Lavi
allegedly responded, “[Harrison] ‘doesn't know what he’s doing’
and ‘is inexperienced’ . . . . ‘He has zero experience. He doesn’t
know the case; he doesn’t know how to handle cases; he doesn’t
know how to handle doctors; he doesn’t know how to handle
situations.’” Harrison believes Lavi made these statements to
“damage [Harrison’s] reputation as an attorney” and to persuade
O.R. to fire Harrison and hire a different attorney with whom
Lavi had been working.
Harrison alleges he was concerned that if he examined Lavi
during the personal injury action, Lavi would be uncooperative
and hostile towards him. As a result, Harrison asked another
attorney to interact with Lavi and agreed to give the other
attorney 50 percent of the contingency fee from the case. O.R.’s
case settled for $1.775 million. Harrison alleges that but for
Lavi’s conduct, he would not have had to give half of his earnings
to the other attorney. Harrison claims that Lavi’s statement that

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Harrison is “not trustworthy” and the statements during the
medical appointment were “false and malicious” and a
substantial factor in causing him harm.

B. Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP Motion
Defendants filed a motion to strike Harrison’s claims
pursuant to section 425.16. Defendants argued Lavi’s alleged
statements were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute because
they were made in connection with O.R.’s personal injury
litigation and were conduct in connection with an issue of public
interest. Additionally, defendants argued Harrison’s claims
lacked minimal merit. Harrison opposed the motion.
After a hearing, the trial court denied defendants’ motion.
The court concluded Lavi’s statements were not protected under
the anti-SLAPP statute. Defendants timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
A. Section 425.16 and Standard of Review
The “anti-SLAPP statute is designed to protect defendants
from meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their
rights to speak and petition on matters of public concern.”
(Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 883–
884.) “A cause of action arising from a person’s act in furtherance
of the ‘right of petition or free speech under the United States
Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a
public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless
the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there
is a probability’ that the claim will prevail.” (Monster Energy Co.
v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788.)

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Anti-SLAPP motions are evaluated through a two-step
process. “First, the defendant must establish that the challenged
claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16. [Citation.]
If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts
to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by
establishing a probability of success.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1
Cal.5th 376, 384.) We review the trial court’s decision to deny an
anti-SLAPP motion de novo. (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 788.)

B. Prong One: The Claims Do Not Arise from Protected
Activity
1. Lavi’s Statements Were Not Made in Connection with
an Issue Under Consideration or Review by a Judicial
Body
Defendants first argue that Lavi’s statements are protected
speech under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) because they were
generally made in connection with O.R.’s personal injury
litigation. We disagree that the statements constituted protected
activity.
Section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) protects “any written or
oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial
body.” (§ 425.16(e)(2).) “[S]tatements, writings and pleadings in
connection with civil litigation are covered by the anti-SLAPP
statute.” (Rohde v. Wolf (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 28, 35.)
“However, protection is not accorded to statements ‘having any
connection, however remote, with an official proceeding.’” (Bassi
v. Bassi (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1080, 1096 (Bassi), quoting Paul
v. Friedman (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 853, 866 (Paul).) “Rather,

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‘[t]he statements or writings in question must occur in connection
with “an issue under consideration or review” in the proceeding.’”
(Bassi, at p. 1096.) A statement or writing is “made ‘in
connection with’” litigation under section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(2) “if it relates to the substantive issues in the
litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in the
litigation.” (Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255,
1266 (Neville), fn. omitted; Bassi, at p. 1096.)
Although the litigation privilege3 “is not substantively the
same as the anti-SLAPP protection, it may be viewed as an aid at
the first step in the anti-SLAPP analysis when deciding ‘whether
a given communication falls within the ambit of subdivisions
(e)(1) and (2)’ of section 425.16.” (Bassi, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1097, fn. 9.) “‘To be protected by the litigation privilege, a
communication must be “in furtherance of the objects of the
litigation.”’” (Id. at p. 1097.) “Put differently, the statement
must ‘“be connected with, or have some logical relation to, the
action, i.e., . . . not be extraneous to the action.”’” (Ibid.)
Defendants argue Lavi’s statement that Harrison is “not
trustworthy,” made before his deposition was supposed to begin,
is protected activity because it was made in connection with
O.R.’s pending personal injury lawsuit. Defendants assert
section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) “covers ‘any’ statement made
before or in connection with a judicial proceeding.” This is
incorrect. To be protected under subdivision (e)(2), the statement
“in question must occur in connection with ‘an issue under
consideration or review’” in a judicial proceeding. (Paul, supra,

3 The litigation privilege applies to a “publication or broadcast”
made in any legislative, judicial, or other proceeding authorized by
law. (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b).)

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95 Cal.App.4th at p. 866.) This means Lavi’s statement must
relate to the substantive issues in O.R.’s personal injury
litigation concerning the car accident. (Neville, supra, 160
Cal.App.4th at p. 1266; Bassi, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 1096.)
Defendants provide no explanation as to how the statement that
Harrison is not trustworthy relates to the substantive issues in
O.R.’s case. Lavi stated that if he made the statement, it was in
reference to Harrison’s alleged failure to make the payment for
Lavi’s deposition. But the payment of Lavi’s fees for testifying
was peripheral to the merits of the personal injury litigation.
(Bassi, at p. 1098.) Lavi’s statement did not further any
discernible object of the litigation and was extraneous to the
action.4 (Id. at pp. 1097–1098.)
Likewise, defendants argue statements Lavi made about
Harrison during O.R.’s medical appointment are protected
activity because the appointment directly related to O.R.’s
personal injury action. In support of this argument, defendants
assert the appointment was arranged by a litigation funding
company to discuss additional treatment for O.R.’s injuries.5

4 To the extent that defendants argue that Lavi was required to
explain why he was refusing to testify, defendants do not dispute that
Lavi voluntarily chose to appear for his deposition. He was not
subpoenaed. Defendants cite no authority holding that Lavi was
required to explain his refusal to testify at his deposition.
5 Harrison argues that defendants forfeited any argument
concerning the medical appointment being set up by a litigation
funding company by not raising this argument in the trial court.
Defendants, in reply, contend they did not forfeit the argument
because they argued in the trial court that the appointment was a
“litigation-related medical consultation.” Because we reject
defendants’ claims on the merits, we need not decide whether
defendants forfeited the argument.

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However, defendants fail to explain how these statements
indicating that Harrison was “ruining” or “hindering” O.R.’s case
because he was an inexperienced “piece of garbage of a human
being” related to the substantive issues the personal injury case
presented. While the statements questioned Harrison’s character
and ability to represent O.R. well, they did not address the
underlying issues in O.R’s case. Lavi’s statements were outside
the scope of any issues under consideration or review in the case.
(See Paul, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 867 [conduct unrelated to
an issue under consideration in a proceeding was not protected
activity].)
The circumstances of this case are akin to those in Paul. In
Paul, an attorney moved to strike causes of action asserted by a
securities broker. The broker alleged that the attorney, in
litigating a prior arbitration proceeding, had conducted an
intrusive investigation into the securities broker’s personal life.
In the course of the investigation, the attorney allegedly disclosed
to the broker’s clients and others personal details that had no
bearing on the alleged securities fraud at issue in the arbitration.
(Paul, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at pp. 857–858.) The attorney
argued that his conduct was protected because it was undertaken
“‘in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the
underlying arbitration.’” (Id. at p. 865.) The court of appeal held
that the attorney failed to satisfy his threshold burden of showing
the activity was protected. (Id. at p. 868.) The attorney’s
investigation and disclosures concerning the security broker’s
personal affairs were unrelated to any issue under consideration
in the arbitration. (Id. at p. 867.)
As in Paul, Lavi’s statements were not made sufficiently
“‘in connection with’ an official proceeding.” (Paul, supra, 95

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Cal.App.4th at p. 867.) It is not enough for defendants to
“generally aver a connection between” Lavi’s statements about
Harrison and O.R.’s personal injury action. (Bassi, supra, 101
Cal.App.5th at p. 1100.) “‘The statements or writings in question
must occur in connection with “an issue under consideration or
review” in the proceeding.’” (Neville, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1264.)
Additionally, relying primarily on Taheri Law Group v.
Evans (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 482 (Taheri), defendants contend
Lavi’s statements to O.R. during the medical appointment are
protected because they pertained to O.R.’s choice of counsel and
were allegedly made to persuade O.R. to fire Harrison. In Taheri,
a law firm sued another attorney, Neil C. Evans (Evans), for
improperly soliciting its client, Alexander Sorokurs (Sorokurs),
during pending litigation. (Id. at p. 485.) The law firm alleged:
“Evans knew of the economic relationship between [the law firm]
and Sorokurs, and induced Sorokurs to terminate his relationship
with [the law firm], promising ‘unobtainable and ethically
improper litigation objectives. . . .’” (Id. at pp. 485–486.) Evans’s
promise was that he would be able to enforce a settlement
agreement to which Sorokurs was a party. (Id. at p. 486.) Evans
then fulfilled that promise by filing a motion to enforce the
settlement agreement. (Id. at p. 486.)
Evans filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that his actions
were protected because they “‘all took place in connection with
pending litigation in which [the law firm’s] interests were
allegedly interfered with by [Evans] by [his] filings, letters, and
other communicative actions in pending litigation.’” (Taheri,
supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 486.) Further, Evans submitted a
declaration from Sorokurs stating Sorokurs contacted Evans

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directly about pending lawsuits against Sorokurs and Evans did
not solicit him. (Ibid.) Taheri held that the law firm’s action
arose from protected activity. (Id. at p. 489.) The complaint
“plainly show[ed] it arose from Evans’s communications with
Sorokurs about pending litigation, and from Evans’s conduct in
enforcing the settlement agreement on Sorokurs’s behalf.” (Ibid.)
Unlike Taheri, this case does not concern a client seeking
out and communicating with a second attorney about pending
litigation. Moreover, the conduct in Taheri included a motion
filed by Evans on Sorokurs’s behalf, which constituted an act in
furtherance of the right of petition in the pending litigation. In
contrast, Lavi’s statements criticizing and insulting Harrison
were not an act in furtherance of the right of petition.
In short, defendants do not demonstrate Lavi’s statements
constitute protected activity under subdivision (e)(2) of section
425.16.

2. Lavi’s Statements Were Not Made in Connection with
a Public Issue or an Issue of Public Interest
Defendants next argue that Lavi’s statement that Harrison
is not trustworthy, made before his deposition, is protected under
section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4), as a “matter of public interest
because it relates to Harrison’s competence as a professional.”
Without substantive analysis, defendants claim Lavi’s
statements to O.R. during the medical appointment also relate to
issues of public concern. We are not persuaded.
Subdivision (e)(4) of section 425.16 protects “any . . .
conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right
of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection
with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” “[A] court must

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consider the context as well the content of a statement in
determining whether that statement furthers the exercise of
constitutional speech rights in connection with a matter of public
interest.” (FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th
133, 149 (FilmOn).)
The inquiry under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4) calls
for a two-part analysis. “First, we ask what ‘public issue or [ ]
issue of public interest’ the speech in question implicates–a
question we answer by looking to the content of the speech.
(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) Second, we ask what functional
relationship exists between the speech and the public
conversation about some matter of public interest. It is at the
latter stage that context proves useful.” (FilmOn, supra, 7
Cal.5th at pp. 149–150.) In assessing context, courts consider
whether (1) the subject of the speech or activity “‘was a person or
entity in the public eye’” or “‘could affect large numbers of people
beyond the direct participants,’” (2) the activity “‘occur[red] in the
context of an ongoing controversy, dispute or discussion,’” or
(3) the speech “‘affected a community in a manner similar to that
of a governmental entity.’” (Id. at pp. 145–146.)
“[V]irtually always, defendants succeed in drawing a line–
however tenuous–connecting their speech to an abstract issue of
public interest.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 150.) However,
subdivision (e)(4) “demands ‘some degree of closeness’ between
the challenged statements and the asserted public interest.”
(Ibid.) Accordingly, “‘it is not enough that the statement refer to
a subject of widespread public interest; the statement must in
some manner itself contribute to the public debate.’” (Ibid.)
In this case, defendants fail to show Lavi’s statements
indicating Harrison is “a piece of garbage of a human being” who

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was “single-handedly ruining” O.R.’s case are connected to a
public issue or issue of public interest. There is no allegation
that Harrison “was a person or entity in the public eye.”
(FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 145.) There is no showing that
the subject of Lavi’s statements “could affect large numbers of
people.” (Ibid.) Indeed, Lavi’s statements about Harrison were
made in private to a small, specific audience: those who appeared
for the deposition, O.R., and O.R.’s translator. (Hailstone v.
Martinez (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 728, 736 [“a matter of concern to
the speaker and a relatively small, specific audience is not a
matter of public interest”].) Defendants do not allege there was
an ongoing controversy, dispute, or debate among the public as to
Harrison’s character or abilities. There is no allegation that the
speech “affected a community in a manner similar to that of a
governmental entity.” (FilmOn, at pp. 145–146.)
In sum, Lavi’s statements did not contribute to the public
discourse on a matter of public interest concerning attorney trust
and competence. (See FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 150.) The
statements were “too tenuously tethered” to such issues of public
interest and “too remotely connected to the public conversation
about those issues, to merit protection under [subdivision (e)(4)].”
(Id. at p. 140.)
Defendants cite Yang v. Tenet Healthcare Inc. (2020) 48
Cal.App.5th 939 (Yang) in asserting that professional competence
is an issue of public interest. In Yang, a surgeon sued a hospital,
its staff, and individual doctors for defamation based on
statements made about her qualifications, competence, and
medical ethics. (Id. at p. 943.) The surgeon alleged the
statements were made to “her ‘patients’” and “‘members of the
general public,’” among others. (Ibid.) Yang held that whether a

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physician was deficient in characteristics such as “‘performing
surgeries she was not privileged to perform,’ ‘was potentially
incompetent’ to perform certain surgeries, and ‘intentionally
trying to deceive the insurance providers and the hospital,’
among other actions,” was a public issue. (Ibid.)
The surgeon’s allegations that the defendants informed her
patients and the general public that she was generally
unqualified demonstrated that the defendants directly
contributed to the public issue. (Yang, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at
p. 948.) This was because the defendant hospital’s directive that
doctors should no longer refer patients to the surgeon was similar
to a statement made to aid and protect consumers. (Ibid.)
Moreover, “the defamatory statements were communicated to the
public, not just to discrete doctors or hospital staff members.”
(Ibid.) “This context is significant, because speech to the public
about a doctor’s qualifications furthers the public discourse on
that matter.” (Ibid.)
Yang is distinguishable. Here, Lavi made the alleged
defamatory statements to a few, discrete individuals present for
the deposition and to O.R. and O.R.’s translator during a medical
appointment. The statements were not communicated to the
public in such a manner as would have furthered the public
discourse on a public issue concerning attorney competence or
trust. Thus, the context in which Lavi made the statements
vastly differed from the context in Yang.
Because defendants have not satisfied prong one of the
anti-SLAPP analysis, we need not determine whether Harrison
established a likelihood of prevailing under the second prong.
(Gotterba v. Travolta (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 35, 43–44.)
Defendants remain free to challenge Harrison’s claims “on other

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grounds and through other procedural means”; we express no
view on their merits. (Department of Fair Employment &
Housing v. 1105 Alta Loma Road Apartments, LLC (2007) 154
Cal.App.4th 1273, 1288.)

DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Plaintiff Harrison is awarded costs
on appeal.

MORI, J.
We concur:

CURREY, P. J.

ZUKIN, J.

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