In re V.P. CA2/2

CourtListener 10324165Calctapp30 janv. 2025

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Filed 1/30/25 In re V.P. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re V.P., et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law. B334901

LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County Super.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Ct. No. 23CCJP03286A-B)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

N.P.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mary E. Kelly, Judge. Affirmed.
Lauren K. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Avedis Koutoujian, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________________
Newborn R.P. and his then 13–month old half-brother V.P.
(born August 2022) were detained from parental care following
R.P.’s birth on September 21, 2023, after toxicology screens of
both appellant N.P. (mother) and the infant’s umbilical cord
revealed the presence of, among other things, amphetamine,
methamphetamine and marijuana. Mother admitted having
repeatedly used methamphetamine and marijuana during her
pregnancy, and as late as a few days before R.P.’s birth.1
Mother appeals the juvenile court’s orders following a
contested adjudication and disposition hearing in which the court
removed both boys from her care and placed them temporarily in
the care of their maternal grandmother (MGM). Mother contends
the record lacks sufficient evidence to support the court’s
jurisdictional findings. Mother also asserts that the juvenile
court erred in ordering her sons removed from her care based on
its conclusion that her lack of prenatal care, admitted substance
abuse, and neglect, placed the young children at substantial risk
of physical harm. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The family came to the attention of respondent Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)
shortly after mother tested positive for methamphetamine and
marijuana at the time she gave birth to R.P. on September 21,
2023,2 and mother admitted using those drugs multiple times per

1 R.P.’s presumed father F.G. (father) is not a party to this
appeal, and we relate facts as to him only as they pertain to
mother’s appeal. V.P.’s father’s whereabouts have remained
unknown throughout these proceedings.
2 Further date references are to calendar year 2023.

2
week during her pregnancy, and as recently as three or four days
before she gave birth.
On September 25, at DCFS’ request, the juvenile court
ordered an expedited removal from mother’s care for newborn
R.P. and his toddler half-brother, V.P. The children were placed
in temporary protective custody in MGM’s care.
On September 27, DCFS filed a petition pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code3 section 300, subdivision (b)(1),
alleging that mother had a history of substance abuse before and
during her pregnancy. The petition also alleged that mother
remained an ongoing user and that her drug abuse interfered
with her ability to provide the constant care and supervision
required by her two very young sons.4
Detention
In its September 28 detention report DCFS noted that
mother said she received no prenatal care5 before R.P.’s birth
because a doctor initially told her at 12 weeks that her pregnancy

3 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.

4 The petition alleged that father was aware of mother’s
substance abuse, but failed to take action to protect R.P., and
that he had a history of substance abuse which interfered with
his ability to provide care and supervision for R.P. The petition
also alleged that father had a history of arrests and convictions
primarily related to possession of controlled substances.

5 The record is unclear on this point. Mother claimed both
that she received no prenatal care, and that she had two prenatal
visits. Father reported that mother received no such care. The
juvenile court concluded there was ample evidence of mother’s
“lack of prenatal care.”

3
was not viable, and mother elected to let it terminate naturally,
which never happened. Mother admitted using
methamphetamines and marijuana multiple times per week
throughout her pregnancy with R.P. and said she did so because
she was angry with father and wanted to retaliate against him
because he had been unfaithful and had refused to take her for
prenatal care. Mother said she had last used “meth” three or four
days before R.P.’s delivery and last smoked marijuana four or five
days before delivery.
Mother also told DCFS that it was her habit to drop V.P.
at MGM’s home, and then use drugs while the child was in
MGM’s care. Initially, mother left V.P. with MGM for only a day,
but those visits later expanded to full weekends. Mother said
that the longer V.P. stayed with MGM, the more mother used
drugs. MGM claimed no knowledge of mother’s substance abuse.
MGM was also unaware of mother’s pregnancy, which she
learned only after she was told to retrieve V.P. from the hospital
where mother was in labor. Mother told DCFS that she had
anger issues and had been diagnosed with depression. She had
been prescribed psychotropic drugs and had enrolled in therapy,
but no longer took her medication or attended counseling.
Mother informed DCFS that the parents had no supplies for R.P.,
and that neither of them was prepared to care for the newborn.
DCFS reported the hospital staff’s observation that father
appeared to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol after he
drove mother and V.P. to the hospital. The parents had argued
during mother’s labor and after R.P.’s delivery. Afterward,
mother asked to be separated from both father and her newborn.
Mother questioned why she could not be separated from R.P.
until a nurse informed her, she needed to care for the infant on

4
her own. After being informed that DCFS would intervene,
mother said she wanted to keep R.P. and proclaimed her
willingness to cooperate with DCFS, but then asked to leave the
hospital prior to her discharge date.
A DCFS social worker met with father at his home on
September 25. He acknowledged knowing about–but did not
condone–mother’s drug use during her pregnancy. Father denied
that mother had received any prenatal care before R.P.’s birth,
and conceded having made no provisions nor did he have an
appropriate plan of care for R.P. DCFS concluded that both
children were at risk of harm due to the parents’ endangering
conduct and requested that the juvenile court remove them from
parental care and order appropriate services. Both parents told
DCFS they would comply with court orders so they could reunify
with R.P.
Following a hearing on September 28, which mother
attended, the juvenile court determined that DCFS had made a
prima facie case for detention, and that the boys were persons
described under section 300. Both children were detained from
mother’s care. The court permitted mother monitored visitation
of at least three hours, thrice weekly, so long as she was not
under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and indicated she could
have daily visits if MGM (the approved monitor) was amenable.
The court ordered mother not to breastfeed her infant until she
produced at least six consecutive clean drug tests. DCFS was
given discretion to liberalize visits to overnights on the condition
that mother’s drug tests came back clean. An adjudication
hearing was scheduled for November 27.

5
Combined jurisdiction/dispositional hearing
DCFS submitted its jurisdiction/disposition report on
November 9. DCFS reported having attempted unsuccessfully to
contact mother eight times between October 26 and November 8
by text message, phone and in person. Mother never made
herself available to DCFS and failed to respond to the
dependency investigator’s (DI) attempts to reach her. Once
mother replied to a DI text message by asking “who’s this,” but
never responded after the DI identified herself. On another
occasion, mother mistakenly replied to a DI text message with a
response intended for someone else stating, “cash app
$mikeycts223.”
In November, father reiterated to DCFS that mother used
methamphetamine and marijuana before her pregnancy. After
mother told father she was pregnant, the parents visited a clinic,
at which time a doctor told them the baby had no heartbeat.
Father did not see mother again until they reunited about a
month before R.P. was born. Father said mother denied getting
high, but he believed she was using marijuana and
methamphetamine; the latter because “ ‘she got crazy.’ ” Father
told DCFS that he and mother had not lived together until very
recently due to mother’s housing instability, and the two argued
frequently. Father was around V.P. routinely prior to the child’s
detention. Father reported that he told mother to get into
programs. He had allowed her to live with him because she had
nowhere else to go and “[i]f [he didn’t] let her stay . . . she [would]
run to the streets.” Father acknowledged being a frequent
marijuana smoker and disclosed his own recent
methamphetamine use. He declined to submit to an on-demand

6
test after confirming his substance use, saying he “ ‘would rather
wait until the Judge orders it.’ ”
A maternal aunt (MA) told the DI mother had begun acting
erratically, was easily angered, slept a lot, was argumentative
and cursed and yelled at others. The aunt and MGM said they
had not known mother was pregnant until she went into labor.
When MGM visited the hospital, she believed something was
wrong because mother picked at scabs on her chest, a behavior
the MGM knew was similar to “when you see people who get
stuck on meth . . . .” MGM had seen similar marks on mother in
the past, but mother claimed were “mosquito bites.” MGM said,
“sometimes [mother’s ]behaviors didn’t make sense.” After
noticing mother had gained weight, MGM asked her if she was
pregnant; mother denied that she was. MGM said the family
suspected mother was still abusing drugs even after the children
were detained because she arrived extremely late for visits with
her sons and twice fell asleep during visits about 10 minutes
after arriving. MGM said both parents “act[ed] weird [during
visitation,] almost falling asleep.” MGM believed mother
continued to live with father because she had recently overheard
an argument in which mother yelled at father over the phone and
accused him of breaking her phone and hitting her, and father
screamed at mother to leave his home. Father acknowledged
that mother continued to live in his home.
DCFS reported that a toxicology screen of R.P.’s umbilical
cord was positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine and THC.
An initial medical screening of R.P. indicated the infant was born
to an ISAM (Infant of Substance Abusing Mother), premised on
the presence of mottled skin, and a risk of developmental delay
due to prenatal drug and alcohol exposure, and the child

7
experienced withdrawal symptoms. The hospital’s medical staff
advised that R.P.’s caretakers minimize environmental stimuli
(light and sound) by placing the newborn in a dark, quiet
environment, avoiding auto-stimulation by careful swaddling.
Caretakers were advised quickly to respond to R.P.’s signals,
adopt appropriate positioning and comforting techniques
(swaying, rocking), and to frequently give the child small
amounts of high-caloric formula to allow for adequate growth.
A follow-up was scheduled with a primary care provider and
DCFS was asked immediately to undertake Fetal Alcohol
Syndrome screening and make Regional Center referrals for both
R.P. and V.P. Medical staff had documented that V.P. had
prenatal alcohol (ethanol) exposure in utero. Both MGM and the
MA reported concerns about V.P.’s behavior, including his
“extreme and uncontrollable tantrums” following mother’s visits.
The MA also believed R.P. exhibited symptoms of withdrawal,
included trembling in his lip and leg, body shaking and
occasionally “bec[oming] stiff[,]” and told DCFS that the newborn
cried unusually often for no apparent reason.
DCFS recommended that the juvenile court sustain the
section 300 petition. The agency also recommended that the
children be removed from parental custody and that the court
order family reunification services, including parenting and
individual counseling, weekly drug tests and a full drug program
with aftercare.
The combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing was
conducted on November 27; mother did not attend. Mother’s
counsel requested that the petition be dismissed on the ground
that there was no evidence mother was currently abusing drugs.
Counsel for the children and DCFS requested that the petition be

8
sustained and that the children be removed from parental
custody.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court noted it
had considered the evidentiary record and arguments of counsel
and sustained the petition in its entirety.6 The court observed

6 As sustained, count b-1 of the petition alleged as to both
boys that mother “has a history of substance abuse [and] is a
current abuser of methamphetamine, and marijuana which
renders mother incapable of providing regular care and
supervision of the children. [Mother] abused methamphetamine
and marijuana during [her] pregnancy with [R.P.] The children
are of such a young age as to require constant care and
supervision, and [mother’s] substance abuse interferes with
providing regular care and supervision of the children. . . . [R.P.’s]
father . . . knew of [mother’s] substance abuse and failed to take
action to protect [R.P.]. [Mother’s] substance abuse and [father’s]
failure to protect [R.P.] endangers the children’s physical health
and safety, creates a detrimental home environment, and places
the children at risk of serious physical harm, damage, danger and
failure to protect.
As to father, sustained count (b-2) alleged he had “a history
of substance abuse including methamphetamine and is a current
abuser of marijuana which renders [him] incapable of providing
regular care and supervision of [R.P.] [R.P.] is of such a young
age as to require constant care and supervision and [father’s]
substance abuse interferes with [his ability to provide] regular
care and supervision of [R.P.].” The petition also alleged that
father had been arrested in March 2023 for possession of a
controlled substance while armed, and had two criminal
convictions, one for possession of a controlled substance and
another for bringing a controlled substance into prison. The
petition further alleged that “father’s substance abuse endangers
[R.P.’s] physical health and safety, creates a detrimental home

9
that mother admitted using drugs throughout her pregnancy,
often to retaliate against father. In addition, father, with whom
mother lived, admitted having recently relapsed and used meth,
and the MA saw R.P. exhibit behaviors she believed were
symptoms of withdrawal. The court noted that both children
were of tender years and found “there [was] more than ample
evidence [to assert jurisdiction] based on mother’s admissions”
of drug use, her failure to obtain prenatal care and her “obvious”
lack of intention to care for R.P. The juvenile court declared both
boys to be dependents of the court.
Proceeding to disposition, the court found by clear and
convincing evidence that there were no reasonable means to
protect the children short of removal and ordered them removed
from parental care, and to remain placed with MGM. The court
ordered DCFS to provide reunification services permitted mother
monitored visits of at least three hours each, three times per
week. This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, mother challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings
and removal order. First, she contends the evidence was
insufficient to support the court’s jurisdictional findings because
DCFS failed to prove she had an ongoing substance abuse
problem that placed the children at risk at the time of the
adjudication hearing. Second, mother insists the evidence does
not support the order removing the boys from her care because
DCFS failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that
her sons were at substantial risk of serious harm or that

environment, and places [R.P.] at risk of serious physical harm,
damage and danger.”

10
removing them from her care was the only reasonable means to
protecting them.7 Neither contention has merit.
1. The Jurisdictional Findings are Supported by
Substantial Evidence
A. Controlling Legal Principles and the Standard of
Review
The Legislature enacted section 300 to protect children who
are currently being abused or neglected and “to ensure the safety,
protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children who
are at risk of that harm.” (§ 300.2, subd. (a); In re N.R. (2023) 15
Cal.5th 520, 537 (N.R.).) The statute permits the juvenile court
to jurisdiction over a child “only so long as is necessary to protect
the child from risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness.”
(§ 300, subd. (b)(3).) Thus, “[t]he relevant inquiry . . . is whether
circumstances at the time of the jurisdictional hearing ‘ “subject

7 Mother’s appellate briefs make only passing reference to
and provide no substantive legal argument regarding the court’s
jurisdictional findings or dispositional order as they relate to the
toddler V.P. As appellant, mother bears the burden of
demonstrating error through meaningful legal analysis supported
by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that
support each claim of error. (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th
396, 408.) Mother failed to satisfy this obligation. Accordingly,
we deem her near complete failure to provide relevant argument,
or citations to legal authority and pertinent facts, regarding the
propriety of the jurisdictional findings and removal order of V.P.
from her care to be without foundation and waived. (Id. at pp.
408, 418; Friends of Juana Briones House v. City of Palo Alto
(2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 286, 313 [an appellant’s failure to make a
coherent argument in support of a contention of trial court error
constitutes waiver of the issue on appeal.].)

11
the minor to the defined risk of harm.” ’ ” (In re L.B. (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 402, 411 (L.B.).)
The juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction in this action
rests on one provision—namely, section 300, subdivision (b)(1).
In pertinent part, that provision authorizes the assertion of
dependency jurisdiction where a child “has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm
or illness, as a result of” a parent’s “failure or inability . . . to
adequately supervise or protect the child” or “inability . . . to
provide regular care for the child due to the
parent’s . . . substance abuse.” (§ 300, subds. (b)(1)(A) &
(b)(1)(D).) A jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision
(b)(1)(D), requires evidence that (1) neglectful conduct by a
parent in at least one specified form (here, prolonged and
continued drug abuse) (2) has rendered the parent unable to
provide regular care for a child and (3) this inability has caused
the child to suffer serious physical harm or illness or has placed
the child at substantial risk of such harm or illness. (N.R., supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 558.) Jurisdictional findings must be made by a
preponderance of the evidence. (§ 355, subd. (a); Cynthia D. v.
Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 248.)
We review a court’s jurisdictional findings for substantial
evidence, asking whether the record—viewed as a whole and
drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the court’s
findings—contains “ “ ‘sufficient facts to support [its
jurisdictional] findings.’ ” ” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773
(I.J.).) We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise our
independent judgment, nor do we consider whether there is
evidence from which the juvenile court could have drawn a
different conclusion. We merely determine if the record,

12
considered in its entirety, contains sufficient evidence,
contradicted or not, to support the juvenile court’s findings.
(Ibid.; accord, In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.) The
appellant bears the burden to show there is no substantial
evidence to support the juvenile court’s order. (L.B., supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at p. 412.) Substantial evidence is evidence that is
reasonable, credible and of solid value, and “may include
inferences, so long as any such inferences are based on logic and
reason and rest on the evidence.” (In re Madison S. (2017) 15
Cal.App.5th 308, 318.)
Here, the juvenile court found DCFS presented sufficient
evidence to warrant the assertion of jurisdiction based on its
conclusion that mother’s historical and ongoing substance abuse
posed a substantial risk of severe physical harm or illness to her
two young sons. The term “substance abuse” under subdivision
(b)(1)(D) is assigned “its ordinary meaning—essentially, the
excessive use of drugs or alcohol.” (N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 531.) In this analysis, “a child’s youth and maturity level can
bear upon the care that the child may require and whether a
parent’s . . . substance abuse places the child at substantial risk
of serious physical harm. Courts can properly take these facts
regarding a child into account, together with all other relevant
evidence, in deciding whether the government has met its burden
at the jurisdictional stage.” (Id. at p. 559.) The assertion of
dependency court jurisdiction based on risk posed by parental
substance abuse “requires more than just the identification of
substance abuse . . . . A court must also find that the parent . . .
is unable to provide regular care for a child and that as a result,
the child has suffered serious physical harm or illness or is at

13
significant risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness.”
(Id. at p. 556.)
“Although section 300 requires proof the child is subject to
the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing
[citations], the court need not wait until a child is seriously
abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary
to protect the child.” (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591,
601-602 (Cole L.); accord, In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227,
238 [“ ‘Although there must be a present risk of harm to the
minor, the juvenile court may consider past events to determine
whether the child is presently in need of juvenile court
protection.’ ”].) “A parent’s “ ‘[p]ast conduct may be probative of
current conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct
will continue.’ ” (Cole L., at p. 602; accord, In re J.A. (2020) 47
Cal.App.5th 1036, 1048.) However, “ ‘ “[t]o establish a defined
risk of harm at the time of the hearing, there ‘must be some
reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct
will recur.’ ” ’ ” (In re S.F. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 696, 712-713;
see also In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133 [Facts
supporting jurisdiction are cumulative, and we consider all the
circumstances affecting the child, wherever they occur, bearing in
mind that a “parent’s past conduct is a good predictor of future
behavior.”].)
B. Application
Mother maintains DCFS failed to present sufficient
evidence that she currently abused drugs at the time of the
adjudication hearing, or that her admitted historical substance
abuse rendered her unable to provide regular care and
supervision for the children or placed them at substantial risk of
serious physical harm.

14
First, the record does not support mother’s claim that her
substance abuse was purely historical. Mother told DCFS she
only used drugs during weekends when V.P. was with MGM.
However, she also admitted using drugs multiple times per week
and as late as three days before giving birth to R.P. on Thursday,
September 21, thereby belying her claim that her drug use was
limited to weekends when no child was in her care. Mother
admitted using methamphetamine and marijuana regularly
(multiple times a week) during a pregnancy, well after she must
have understood her pregnancy was viable and continued to
abuse drugs until as late as three or four days before R.P. was
born. Father corroborated that mother had engaged in substance
abuse multiple times per week throughout her pregnancy. MGM
also strongly suspected mother’s continued substance abuse even
after the children were detained, because mother was
consistently late for visitations, acted “weird” and, on at least two
occasions, abruptly fell asleep within 10 minutes of her arrival.
Moreover, despite her professed willingness to cooperate
with DCFS to retain custody of R.P., mother failed to make
herself available after his birth, despite the agency’s multiple
attempts to contact her to discuss and investigate the instant
matter and provide appropriate referrals. It was not the case
that mother was unreachable. Rather, she chose not to respond
to DCFS’s multiple attempts–by phone and in person–to contact
her. She had a working cell phone. On one occasion DCFS
contacted her, and mother simply responded, “who’s this?” but
never followed up after learning who was trying to reach her.
Another time, mother inadvertently responded to a DCFS text
with a message intended for someone else. Mother was ordered
not to breast feed until she provided at least six consecutive clean

15
tests but chose not to undergo a single drug test. The record also
contains evidence that mother’s drug use continued unabated
after her children’s detention, given MGM’s and MA’s reports of
her odd behavior during visits. The court permitted mother
monitored visitation with the children at MGM’s for up to three
hours, three days per week. However, by the time of the
November adjudication hearing, two months after the children’s
detention, MGM reported that mother had visited the children
only five times. MGM also said mother arrived very late for
visits, stayed only about 15-20 minutes and, at least twice, fell
asleep within moments of her arrival. MGM also saw mother
pick at marks on her skin, in the way methamphetamine users
picked at scabs caused by drug use. The MA also told DCFS she
avoided interacting with mother during visits, because mother
engaged in erratic behavior and was easily angered.
The record also refutes mother’s claim that she was
prepared and able to care for R.P. First, mother conceded that
she received no prenatal care even after understanding that her
pregnancy was viable (or at most, attended two prenatal visits
late in her pregnancy). After R.P. was born, mother immediately
asked to be separated from the newborn, and hospital staff had to
insist that she care for her baby. Mother professed a willingness
to cooperate with DCFS and care for the infant, but then
requested an early discharge. Mother also admitted that neither
she nor father (with whom she continued to reside after R.P.’s
birth) had undergone any preparation to care or to provide for the
infant, and had no car seat, crib or even the most basic supplies
necessary safely to care for and transport an infant. Hospital
staff had informed DCFS that, due to his positive drug tests and
symptoms of withdrawal, R.P. required special care, including

16
being kept in a dark, quiet environment free of stimuli, special
swaddling, a caretaker’s immediate response to the child’s
withdrawal symptoms, and a special feeding routine. Finally,
mother had an admitted history of mental health problems,
including depression and poor anger management skills, but
those issues remained unaddressed due to mother’s failure or
refusal to take prescribed psychotropic medication or to attend
counseling.
In sum, the record readily refutes mother’s contention that
the juvenile court failed to fulfill its statutory responsibilities by
basing its jurisdictional findings solely on a conclusion that
mother’s historical substance abuse constituted prima facie
evidence. Instead, it supports the trial court’s finding that she
was unable to provide regular care for her sons or had placed
them at substantial risk of serious physical harm.
2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Disposition Orders
A. Applicable Law and the Standard of Review
After the juvenile court exercises jurisdiction over a minor,
the court proceeds to a dispositional hearing at which it must
decide where the child will live while under juvenile court
supervision. (In re Hailey T. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 139, 145.)
To remove a child from parental custody, DCFS must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that there is a risk of substantial
harm to the child if returned home and the lack of reasonable
means short of removal to protect the child’s safety. (In re
Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 992; § 361, subd. (c)(1).)
As with the underlying jurisdictional findings, we review a
juvenile court’s dispositional orders for substantial evidence,
guided by the same parameters. (I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at
p. 773.) We draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to

17
support the juvenile court’s order and review the record in the
light most favorable to the court’s determinations, mindful of the
rule that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial
court. (Ibid.) Because section 361, subdivision (c)(1) requires
proof by clear and convincing evidence, we account for that
heightened standard by determining whether “the record as a
whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact
finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.”
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011.) “[T]he
appellant bears the burden of showing ‘ “there is no evidence of a
sufficiently substantial nature” ’ to support the dispositional
removal order.” (In re L.O., supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 245.)
B. Application
Mother insists the juvenile court’s removal orders were
unsupported by substantial evidence that showed a risk of danger
to the children at the time of the dispositional hearing. As with
her objection to the jurisdictional findings, mother asserts that
the removal orders were erroneously based on her admission of
prior drug use and an absence of prenatal care. She maintains
that neither act amounted to substantial evidence at the time of
disposition and asserts there was no evidence she was unwilling
or unable to provide regular care for her sons, take them to
medical appointments or meet their other needs.
Mother’s bare assertions ring hollow. She failed to
demonstrate an ability to adequately care for her children, nor
any intention to follow through with DCFS after this dependency
proceeding began. Rather, mother avoided DCFS’s ongoing
attempts to reach her to investigate the allegations and provide
referrals and services for the family. Following the children’s
detention, mother failed to undergo drug testing or avail herself

18
of any services afforded by the juvenile court. In short, by the
time of the disposition hearing, mother made no effort to
demonstrate her sobriety or ability safely to parent her children.
On the contrary, she demonstrated ongoing signs of substance
abuse as well as a lack of interest in caring for the children by
arriving late for the few monitored visits she did attend (at which
MGM believed both mother and father were drug impaired) and,
on multiple occasions, an inability to remain awake for more than
a few minutes after her arrival. The court acted well within its
discretion to conclude that such inattentive conduct presented an
unacceptable risk of serious harm, particularly in light of the
children’s special needs and tender ages.
In conclusion, mother’s behavior following the children’s
detention demonstrated only an inability to parent two very
young children who demanded constant attention to ensure their
physical safety. The record contains no evidence demonstrating
or suggesting that mother had made any progress by the time of
the dispositional hearing, which she failed to attend. Rather, her
lack of interest or participation in the proceedings and erratic
behavior during visits supports a conclusion that she was
engaged in ongoing substance abuse. The fact of mother’s regular
substance abuse during pregnancy, her inability to remain awake
during visits, and behavior indicating ongoing substance abuse
after R.P.’s birth, evidenced an incapacity to provide the vigilant,
necessary care required by two very young children. Considered
cumulatively, the record contains substantial evidence that the
boys would be at substantial risk of harm should they remain or
be placed in mother’s care. (See In re Benjamin D. (1991) 227
Cal.App.3d 1464, 1470 [“Facts which show the threat of future
physical injury to a minor are necessarily cumulative”].)

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Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s order removing the children from mother’s
custody.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and disposition
orders are affirmed.

RICHARDSON, J.
We concur:

LUI, P. J.

CHAVEZ, J.

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