CourtListener 10323223•People v. Barragan CA5
Texte intégral
Filed 1/28/25 P. v. Barragan CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F086945
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. VCF350923)
v.
FERNANDO ABARCA BARRAGAN, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Nathan G.
Leedy, Judge.
Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Chung Mi
Choi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Fernando Abarca Barragan was convicted by a jury of 23 counts under Penal Code
section 288. On appeal, he challenges the consecutive sentences imposed by the trial
court on 15 of those counts. Specifically, he argues reversal is necessary because the
court was unaware it had the discretion to sentence him either consecutively or
concurrently as to these counts. We detect no error and affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Fernando Abarca Barragan was charged, by a second amended information
(information) filed in the Tulare County Superior Court, with 22 counts of lewd act upon
a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code,1 § 288, subd. (a); counts 1-20, 22, 23) and one
count of lewd act upon a child aged 14 or 15, where defendant was at least 10 years older
than the child (§ 288, subd. (c)(1); count 21).2 The information alleged an aggravated
circumstance, i.e., multiple victims, as to counts 1-20 and 22-23. (§ 667.61, subds. (b),
(e).) The information alleged, as to counts 1-6 and 9-14, that the child victim was under
the age of 14 and defendant had substantial sexual contact with the child. (§ 1203.066,
subd. (a)(8).) The information included a “statute of limitations” special allegation as to
counts 1-21 and count 23. (§ 801.1, subd. (a).)
A jury found Barragan guilty as charged. The jury also found true all the special
allegations attached to the charges. The trial court sentenced Barragan to the determinate
low term of one year on count 21; indeterminate, consecutive terms of 15 years to life on
each of counts 1-3, 7, 9-11, 15-20, and 22-23; and indeterminate, concurrent terms of 15
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Counts 1 through 6 encompassed acts committed against M.C.L.; counts 7-8
encompassed acts committed against J.L.; counts 9-20 encompassed acts committed
against M.G.L.; count 21 encompassed acts committed against M.G.L.; count 22
encompassed acts committed against N.F.; count 23 encompassed acts committed against
A.M.
2.
years to life on each of counts 4-6, 8, and 12-14. Barragan was sentenced to a total term
of one year plus 225 years to life.
We need not recite the facts underlying Barragan’s convictions as the argument
section of Barragan’s brief does not address or discuss the evidence adduced at trial. (See
People v. White (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 914, 916, fn. 2.)
DISCUSSION
I. Barragan Has Not Shown The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in
Sentencing Him
Barragan raises one claim on appeal. He contends the trial court abused its
discretion in sentencing him to consecutive terms on counts 1-3, 7, 9-11, 15-20, and 22-
23. He argues the trial court was unaware it had the discretion to impose concurrent or
consecutive sentences and that therefore the consecutive sentences imposed on these
counts should be reversed. We disagree and affirm.
A. Applicable Law
“Absent evidence to the contrary, [appellate courts] presume that the trial court
knew the law and followed it.” (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042
(Ramirez); see People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114 (Stowell); People v.
Martinez (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 686, 728 (Martinez).) Moreover, appellate courts
“presume that a judgment or order of the trial court is correct,” and “ ‘ “[a]ll intendments
and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent,
and error must be affirmatively shown.” ’ ” (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644,
666; see Martinez at p. 728.) “Thus, where a statement of reasons is not required and the
record is silent, a reviewing court will presume the trial court had a proper basis for a
particular finding or order.” (Stowell at p. 1114; see In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th
487, 499.)
“It is well established that a trial court has discretion to determine whether several
sentences are to run concurrently or consecutively.” (People v. Bradford (1976) 17
3.
Cal.3d 8, 20 (Bradford); see § 669, subd. (a).) Accordingly, a trial court’s decision
whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. (Bradford at p. 20.) Abuse of discretion will only be found in
limited circumstances, such as where a trial court is unaware of its discretion, considers
impermissible factors in the exercise of its discretion, or renders a decision “so irrational
or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v. Carmony
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377-378.)
B. The Parties’ Arguments
Barragan notes: “The court sentenced appellant consecutively on counts 1 through
3, 7, 9 through 11, 15 through 20, 22 and 23, and concurrently on counts 4 through 6, and
12 through 14.” Barragan adds: “All consecutive sentences … were based on violations
of section 288, subdivision (a).” Barragan contends: “The court and parties appear to
have assumed, as the Probation Office appeared to assume, [that] consecutive sentencing
on th[e]se counts was mandatory because of the section 667.61 multiple victim
allegation.”
Barragan points to section 667.61, subdivision (i). Section 667.61, subdivision (i)
provides: “For any offense specified in paragraphs (1) to (7), inclusive, of subdivision
(c), or in paragraphs (1) to (6), inclusive, of subdivision (n), the court shall impose a
consecutive sentence for each offense that results in a conviction under this section if the
crimes involve separate victims or involve the same victim on separate occasions as
defined in subdivision (d) of Section 667.6.” Barragan notes that “Section 288,
subdivision (a) is not an offense enumerated in paragraphs (1) through (7) of section
667.61, subdivision (c), nor an offense enumerated in paragraphs (1) though (6) of
subdivision (n).”
Barragan cites People v. Valdez (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1515, 1524, which
explains that section 667.61, subdivision (i), “by implication leaves the decision to
4.
impose consecutive or concurrent terms” for unenumerated offenses such as section 288,
subdivision (a) offenses, “to the sentencing court’s discretion under section 669.”
Barragan also cites People v. Woodworth (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1479-1480,
which clarifies that in the absence of “an express provision depriving the trial court of the
discretion afforded to it in section 669,” the trial court has the “discretion to choose
between concurrent and consecutive sentences.” Barragan concludes: “Because the
court was unaware of its discretion to impose concurrent sentences under section 667.61,
subdivision (i), these sentences must be reversed, and the matter remanded for
resentencing.”
The People respond that Barragan’s argument is not supported by the record and
amounts to “pure speculation.” The People note “the court made no mention of section
667.61 at sentencing.” We agree that Barragan’s argument is not supported by the
record.
C. The Probation Report
The probation report addressed the “criteria affecting concurrent [or] consecutive
sentences.” (Some capitalization omitted.) In listing general criteria, the probation report
observed, inter alia, that under “Section 667.6(c) a full, separate, and consecutive term
may be imposed for each violation of an offense if the crime involves the same victim.”3
(Italics added.) In its “ANALYSIS” section, the probation report noted: “Although there
are factors in mitigation that apply to this case, specifically the lack of prior criminal
3 Section 667.6, subdivision (c) provides: “In lieu of the term provided in Section
1170.1, a full, separate, and consecutive term may be imposed for each violation of an
offense specified in subdivision (e) if the crimes involve the same victim on the same
occasion. A term may be imposed consecutively pursuant to this subdivision if a person
is convicted of at least one offense specified in subdivision (e).” (Italics added.) Section
667.6, subdivision (d) mandates full consecutive terms for subdivision (e) offenses where
“the crimes involve separate victims or involve the same victim on separate occasions.”
Section 288, subdivision (a) is not an enumerated subdivision (e) offense.
5.
record, the law mandates a minimum of 15 years to life in 22 out of Mr. Barragan’s 23
convictions. Probation opines some of the charges indicate a single period of aberrant
behavior. Therefore, Probation will be recommending they be stayed pursuant to [section
654]. As to Count 21, Probation will be recommending the middle term of two (2)
years.”
As noted, the probation officer recommended a determinate middle term sentence
of two years on count 21. The probation officer indicated the remaining counts were
subject to indeterminate terms of 15 years to life. (See § 667.61, subds. (c)(8), (e)(4).)
The probation officer recommended consecutive 15 years to life terms on counts 1-3, 7,
9-11, 15-20, and 22-23 (the court eventually imposed consecutive sentences on these
counts, engendering the present appeal). With regard to counts 4-6, 8, and 12-14, the
probation officer recommended staying the 15 years to life terms pursuant to section 654.
D. The Sentencing Hearing
At Barragan’s sentencing hearing, the prosecutor preliminarily stated to the court:
“I think that probation’s report is pretty clear in the sense that for the counts, that
essentially, consecutive sentencing – there’s not much wiggle room in terms of discretion
based on the special allegation under one strike that the defendant was convicted on.”
Thereafter, with regard to counts 4-6, 8, and 12-14 (not at issue on appeal), the
court noted: “I’ve read and considered the probation report. The way I read probation’s
recommendation, it seems to me to be based on a misunderstanding between 654 and
whether sentencing should go concurrent or consecutive. [¶ ] I didn’t interpret these
convictions to be 654 to each other, but there’s certainly an argument to be made that
some of these counts can and should run concurrent to each other. [¶ ] So more or less
what I’m saying is I’m inclined to follow probation’s ultimate recommendation but not
stay terms pursuant to Penal Code Section 654 but, rather, just impose them and run them
concurrent.”
6.
Defense counsel submitted “based on the report.” The prosecutor made an
additional comment, before reading victim impact statements, as follows: “I agree with
what the court is saying in terms of 654 versus concurrent versus consecutive sentencing
in the terms of one period of – of conduct.”
The court concluded: “As I said earlier, what I will do is follow probation’s
ultimate recommendation. I’m not staying any of these terms as they recommend for
654. I’m just ordering them to run concurrent.” The court then imposed sentence.
E. Analysis
In sentencing Barragan, the trial court emphasized it would follow the probation
officer’s ultimate recommendation. At the same time, the court’s comments made clear
that it did not adopt the probation officer’s reasoning as to specific sentencing
recommendations. Similarly, there is no indication the court unquestioningly relied on
any comments made by the prosecutor.
Barragan argues the court improperly sentenced him to consecutive 15 years to life
terms on counts 1-3, 7, 9-11, 15-20, and 22-23 under section 667.61, subdivisions (c)(1)-
(7), (n)(1)-(6) and section 667.6, subdivision (e), despite the fact that these provisions do
not encompass or apply to section 288, subdivision (a) offenses. Barragan argues the
court did not understand (1) that these provisions of section 667.61 were inapplicable,
and (2) that, as to section 288, subdivision (a) offenses, it retained the discretion to
sentence him to either consecutive or concurrent terms under section 669.
We are not persuaded. The trial court did not mention sections 667.61 or 667.6 in
imposing consecutive sentences on some counts and concurrent sentences on other
counts. Nor did the court attempt to parse the facts underlying the relevant convictions to
ascertain the applicability of these provisions in the context of consecutive or concurrent
sentences. On the contrary, the record indicates the court was well aware of the proper
7.
scope of its sentencing discretion under section 669 and sentenced Barragan in
accordance with the latter provision.4
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
SMITH, J.
WE CONCUR:
FRANSON, Acting P. J.
DE SANTOS, J.
4 The People argue, in the alternative, that Barragan forfeited his sentencing claim
on appeal because he did not make a relevant objection in the trial court. We need not
address the forfeiture contention advanced by the People as our disposition has rendered
it moot.
8.
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