People v. Kness CA2/6

CourtListener 10323221Calctapp29 janv. 2025

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Filed 1/29/25 P. v. Kness CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B332542
(Super. Ct. No. F000278122)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Luis Obispo County)

v.

ALLEN REED KNESS,

Defendant and Appellant.

Allen Reed Kness appeals a postevidentiary hearing order
denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1
section 1172.6. Kness contends the evidence is insufficient to
support a second degree murder conviction. We affirm.

1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
In 1998, 45-year-old Richard Wall lived with Blaine
Richardson, who was 22 years old and stronger than Wall. Wall
was physically weak because he suffered from emphysema and
liver disease. Wall and Richardson argued frequently.
Kness did not know Wall but was good friends with
Richardson. Kness and Richardson spent the day together
drinking. Richardson told Kness that Wall was an “asshole” and
that he was going to “take [Wall] out.” Kness said he would “back
[Richardson] up.” The two of them walked back to Wall’s
apartment, where Wall was drinking beer and watching
television.
Richardson and Kness continued to drink at the apartment.
Kness told Wall, “Don’t fuck with this guy or I’ll kill you.” At
some point in the evening, Richardson began arguing with Wall
and stabbed him several times in the bedroom.
After Wall was killed, Kness placed salad tongs on Wall’s
back and urinated on him. Kness and Richardson took money
from Wall’s wallet, bought more beer, and returned to the
apartment where they drank and watched a video before passing
out. Richardson and Kness left the apartment the next morning.
Wall’s body was discovered by a neighbor and manager of
the apartment complex. He had been stabbed six times with two
different knives and had blunt force injuries on his scalp and
torso. The fatal injury was a stab wound to Wall’s neck. Police
discovered two knives in the kitchen that could have produced
Wall’s injuries. One of the knives had a bent blade and appeared

2 As no new evidence was submitted, the facts are taken
directly from our previous unpublished opinion, People v. Kness
(March 1, 2023, B317045) [nonpub.opn.] (Kness III).

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to have been washed. Kness’s fingerprints were found on a
drinking glass in the kitchen, but not on the knives; Richardson’s
fingerprints were found throughout the apartment.
Kness was arrested the next day, and Richardson turned
himself in. Richardson initially told the police that Kness had
killed Wall. A police officer placed Kness and Richardson
together in a patrol car and recorded their conversation.
Richardson said he turned himself in for questioning because he
“figured [the police] would stick [Kness] with everything.” Kness
responded, “If you remember right, I was the one that was trying
to get you out of it. Like before we passed out, I was trying to
dump the body.”
Kness also said that “pathologists” already examined the
apartment and the police already knew “what went down.” He
also said the police already had their fingerprints in the
apartment and “they pretty much know . . . how it happened or
what happened.” Richardson replied, “There’s only two missing
elements. I asked for the knife, you got em and I killed him. I
swear to God, that’s exactly what happened, and you were just
standing there, remember? That’s exactly what happened.”
Kness responded, “Hm.” Richardson continued, “And I said get
me a different one Allen, you got me a different one. Then you
like kicked him, put tongs on him, did weird things, you peed on
him [and] then you told me to pee on him.” Kness said, “[I]t’s
pretty much cut and dried . . . you know, we’re going to prison [¶]
. . . [¶] [c]ause now, that you told them that I did bring you the
knife, I’m accessory to murder.”
Richardson pleaded guilty to second degree murder and
admitted he personally used a knife. At Kness’s trial, Richardson
testified that Kness had been in the living room when Richardson

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stabbed Wall in the bedroom. Richardson acknowledged Kness
had done strange things after the killing, such as urinating on
the body, but testified that Kness did not bring him the knives
and did not otherwise participate in the murder.
At Kness’s jury trial, the trial court instructed the jury that
Kness could be convicted of murder on two theories: first, as a
direct aider and abettor, and second, under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine with the target crimes of
brandishing a deadly weapon, simple assault, or assault with a
deadly weapon. The prosecution argued both theories of murder.
The jury found Kness not guilty of first degree murder, but
it convicted him of second degree murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189,
subd. (b)). It did not specify whether the conviction was based on
direct aiding and abetting or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. Kness was sentenced to 15 years to life in
state prison.
The instant appeal is the fourth appeal before us. In Kness
I, we affirmed the judgment in an unpublished decision. (People
v. Kness (May 7, 2001, B139989) [nonpub.opn.] (Kness I).)
Following the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg.
Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), Kness filed a resentencing petition
alleging he was prosecuted for and convicted of murder under a
theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine and could not now be convicted of
murder. The trial court denied the petition on constitutional
grounds. In Kness II, we reversed and remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with section 1172.6.
(People v. Kness (August 24, 2020, B299645) [nonpub. opn.]
(Kness II).) On remand, the trial court denied the petition after
holding an evidentiary hearing. In Kness III, we reversed and

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remanded the matter once again because the trial court
erroneously applied the wrong standard of proof at the
evidentiary hearing.
On remand from Kness III, the trial court conducted a new
evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) at
which neither party presented new evidence nor filed new briefs.
The trial court denied the petition, finding the evidence proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that Kness directly aided and abetted
implied malice murder.
DISCUSSION
Kness contends there was insufficient evidence to support a
second degree murder conviction. We disagree.
Senate Bill 1437 amended the felony murder rule and the
natural and probable consequences doctrine to ensure that
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual
killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life. (People v. Martinez (2019) 31
Cal.App.5th 719, 723.) Senate Bill 1437 also established
resentencing relief for eligible defendants. (§ 1172.6.) If a
defendant makes a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief, the
court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing. (Id., subds. (c) & (d).) At the hearing, “the burden of
proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted
murder under California law as amended by changes to Section
188 or 189.” (Id., subd. (d)(3).) The court “may consider evidence
previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is
admissible under current law . . . . The court may also consider
the procedural history of the case recited in any prior appellate

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opinion. . . . The prosecutor and the petitioner may also offer new
or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.” (Ibid.)
On appeal, we review the trial court’s findings for
substantial evidence. (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
276, 298.) “Our job on review is different from the trial judge’s
job in deciding the petition. While the trial judge must review all
the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and
make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable
doubt standard, our job is to determine whether there is any
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a
rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Ibid.)
We review the record in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s finding and determine if there is substantial evidence to
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ibid.) “We
will not reverse unless there is no hypothesis upon which
sufficient substantial evidence exists to support the trial court’s
decision.” (People v. Didyavong (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 85, 97.)
Here, the trial court found Kness was guilty of second
degree murder as a direct aider and abettor to implied malice
murder. Murder is committed with implied malice when “the
killing is proximately caused by ‘ “an act, the natural
consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was
deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct
endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious
disregard for life.” ’ ” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139,
143.) Direct aiding and abetting implied malice murder remains
a valid theory of second degree murder following Senate Bill
1437. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 990.) To be liable
for an implied malice murder, “ ‘the direct aider and abettor
must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the

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life-endangering act . . . . The mens rea, which must be
personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge
that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid the
perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act
is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for
human life.’ ” (Id. at p. 991, italics omitted.)
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
Kness directly aided and abetted implied malice murder. Before
the murder Kness expressed his support and said he would “back
[Richardson] up” after Richardson said that he was going to “take
[Wall] out.” Later at the apartment, Kness threatened Wall’s life,
telling him, “Don’t fuck with [Richardson] or I’ll kill you.”
Richardson then got into an argument with Wall in the bedroom
and stabbed him multiple times, with one fatal knife injury
causing Wall’s death. During a later conversation in a patrol car,
Kness did not deny assisting Richardson by bringing him the
knives. From this evidence, the trial court could have reasonably
found that Kness’s words and conduct—particularly, bringing
Richardson knives—aided Richardson in the life-endangering act
of stabbing Wall. The court could also infer that Kness knew of
Richardson’s intent to kill Wall based on Richardson’s statements
earlier in the day and his request for the knives. And, it could
further infer that when Kness retrieved the knives, he intended
to aid Richardson in the stabbing, knew Richardson’s act was
dangerous to Wall’s life, and acted with conscious disregard for
Wall’s life. (See People v. Schell (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 437, 443
[direct aider and abettor guilty of murder where the evidence
showed the defendant knew he was aiding and abetting in a
violent attack, knew dangerous weapons were being used, and
intended to stop the victim from escaping or defending himself].)

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Kness’s conduct after the murder was further evidence of
his state of mind. Kness placed salad tongs on Wall’s back and
urinated on him. He and Richardson then took Wall’s money,
continued to drink, and passed out until the next morning all
while Wall was dead in the other room. During a conversation in
the patrol car, he never denied his role in the murder. Instead,
he stated, “[N]ow, that you told them that I did bring you the
knife, I’m accessory to murder.” (See People v. Glukhoy (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 576, 599 [circumstances relevant to determining
whether a defendant aided and abetted murder include presence
at the crime scene and failure to prevent it, companionship and
conduct before and after the crime, and motive].)
Kness contends that the trial court’s finding of implied
malice murder was unreasonable because the court’s factual
findings could only support a first degree murder conviction,
which the jury rejected. He asserts that “had the jury accepted
the factual scenario set forth in the trial court’s factual findings,
it would necessarily have found appellant guilty of willful,
deliberate and premeditated murder” and no reasonable jury
could have returned a verdict other than first degree murder. We
reject this contention. First degree murder is an unlawful killing
with malice aforethought, premeditation, and deliberation.
(§ 189, subd. (a); People v. Hernandez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th
1327, 1332.) Second degree murder is the unlawful killing with
malice aforethought, but without the additional elements of
premeditation and deliberation. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 188; People v.
Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 102-103.) A first degree
murder conviction is proper when the perpetrator killed as a
result of careful thought and weighing of consideration,

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deliberate judgment or plan, or preconceived plan. (People v.
Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26.)
Here, the jury could have reasonably found the evidence
was insufficient to prove that Richardson and Kness developed a
preconceived and deliberate plan to kill Wall but was sufficient to
prove implied malice murder. A reasonable factfinder could have
found that the killing, which occurred after an argument, was a
result of a rash and unconsidered action rather than a deliberate
plan and weighing of considerations. Thus, nothing about the
trial court’s findings or its conclusion that the evidence supported
second degree murder was unreasonable.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.

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Craig B. van Rooyen, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Emry J. Allen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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