CourtListener 10321144•Rivas v. Dynamic Nursing Services CA2/1
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Filed 1/27/25 Rivas v. Dynamic Nursing Services CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
JENNIFER RIVAS, B337901
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC699897)
v.
DYNAMIC NURSING
SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Theresa M. Traber, Judge. Affirmed.
Garrell Cohon Kennedy, Jeffrey M. Cohon, and John M.
Kennedy for Defendant and Appellant.
Sherri Nazarian Law Firm, Sherri Nazarian; Employment
Rights Law Firm, and Payam Aframian for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
__________________________________
Respondent Jennifer Rivas sued appellant Dynamic
Nursing Services, Inc. for various employment claims, including
disability discrimination, wrongful termination, failure to engage
in an interactive process, and failure to reasonably accommodate
her disability. The parties had signed an arbitration agreement
that, among other things, required the arbitrator to follow
California substantive law. After a three-day arbitration, the
arbitrator (retired judge Rex Heeseman) issued a final award
finding in Rivas’s favor only on the interactive-process claim, and
awarding $30,000 in damages, $75,000 in attorneys’ fees, and
$4,600 in costs. The trial court granted Rivas’s petition to
confirm the award and denied Dynamic’s motion to vacate it.
On appeal, Dynamic contends the arbitrator exceeded his
powers because he ruled in Rivas’s favor in contravention of
California law—which the arbitration agreement required him to
follow—and thus the trial court erred in confirming and refusing
to vacate the award. Both appellate parties also ask that we
sanction the other—Rivas claims that Dynamic has taken a
frivolous appeal solely for the purposes of delay, and Dynamic
claims that Rivas failed to adhere to the California Rules of Court
in submitting her respondent’s appendix. We conclude that the
trial court did not err, and we decline to sanction either party.
We therefore affirm.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
A. Rivas Files a Complaint; Dynamic Compels
Arbitration
In March 2018, Rivas filed a complaint against Dynamic,
alleging various employment causes of action relating to
disability discrimination and wrongful termination. In June
2018, Dynamic moved to compel arbitration based on an
“Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreement” that the parties
signed. The agreement provided that “[i]n the event that any
employment claim or dispute arises between” Dynamic and Rivas
relating to her “employment, wage and hour issues, termination
of employment or any other alleged other claim or dispute,” the
parties would first mediate the claim and then, should the claim
remain unresolved, “submit the claim or dispute to final and
binding arbitration.” The agreement also provided that the
“arbitrator shall comply with California substantive law,” that
the “discovery process shall proceed, and be governed, consistent
with the standards of the California Code of Civil Procedure,” and
that the “applicable substantive law shall be the law of the State
of California.” In August 2018, Rivas filed a statement of non-
opposition to Dynamic’s motion and the court ordered the case to
meditation followed by arbitration.
B. Rivas Files a First Amended Complaint
The parties selected retired judge Rex Heeseman as the
arbitrator. In December 2021, Rivas filed a first amended
complaint in arbitration, alleging that Dynamic employed her as
1 We limit our summary to the facts and procedural history
relevant to the issues raised on appeal.
3
a caregiver for over one-and-a-half years until December 2016,
when it wrongfully terminated her. Rivas claimed that, in
January 2016, she “developed and/or aggravated and/or sustained
perceived and/or physical disability(s) including, but not limited
to, left shoulder injuries, associated conditions and others.” She
placed Dynamic “on notice” of her injury and “requested and/or
was entitled to and/or was granted CFRA and/or other medical
and/or other negotiated leave in order to recuperate and heal,
from February 2016 and continuing.”
In May 2016, Dynamic received a letter from the California
Department of Social Services, stating that Rivas’s application to
be listed on the Home Care Aide Registry was incomplete, and
that she had until June 2016 to furnish the missing information.
Although the letter stated it was also sent to Rivas, she never
received it. Rivas alleged that Dynamic purposely did not tell her
about the letter at the time because it was “convenient and
advantageous” for Dynamic if Rivas lacked clearance from the
Department of Social Services as that would prevent her from
returning to work.
In September 2016, Rivas’s doctor “released her to work
with a twenty-five (25) pound lifting restriction.” After Rivas
informed Dynamic, Dynamic promised it would “get back to her
regarding a position,” but never did. In December 2016, Dynamic
terminated Rivas. Based on these allegations, Rivas alleged
seven causes of action: (1) perceived and/or physical disability
harassment, discrimination, and retaliation in violation of the
Fair Employment and Housing Act; (2) harassment,
discrimination, and retaliation in violation of the California
Family Rights Act; (3) violation of California Labor Code section
923; (4) retaliation and wrongful termination in violation of
4
public policy; (5) failure to accommodate in violation of FEHA; (6)
failure to engage in a good faith interactive process in violation of
FEHA; and (7) declaratory relief.
At the start of the arbitration, Rivas’s attorney stated that
she would dismiss the following claims: “her second cause of
action in full for CFRA”; “[h]er third cause of action”; “[t]he
seventh cause of action for declaratory relief”; “[t]he harassment
and retaliation portion of the first cause of action only”; and “[t]he
retaliation portion of the fourth cause of action.” Remaining
were: “disability discrimination, first cause of action; wrongful
termination, fourth cause of action; failure to accommodate, fifth
cause of action; [and] failure to engage in the interactive process,
sixth cause of action.”
C. Rivas Partially Prevails at Arbitration
The parties arbitrated the case over three days in August
2022. In November 2022, the arbitrator issued an interim award.
The arbitrator ruled against Rivas for disability discrimination,
finding that she failed to prove she could perform a caregiver’s
essential job duties. The arbitrator correspondingly ruled against
Rivas on her wrongful termination claim, as it was based entirely
on the disability discrimination claim. Regarding Rivas’s claim
that Dynamic failed to reasonably accommodate her, the
arbitrator ruled against Rivas because she did not show that “a
‘sitter’ or a ‘clerical position’ (or anything similar) was available
for” her.2 But the arbitrator ruled in Rivas’s favor on her
interactive-process claim, finding that Dynamic made an
insufficient effort to engage with Rivas. Citing Wysinger v.
2 A “sitter” position was apparently one that would have
met Rivas’s disability restrictions if she were licensed.
5
Automobile Club of Southern California (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th
413 (Wysinger), the arbitrator found that “[a]n accommodation
claim and an interactive claim require different proofs, ‘and a
finding the employer did not fail to accommodate is not
inconsistent with a finding of a failure to satisfy the interactive
process.’ ” The arbitrator noted that Rivas was seeking an award
of $5,000 in damages for each of the 11 times that she claimed
Dynamic had failed to engage in an interactive process and
awarded Rivas $55,000 in damages. The arbitrator also ruled
that Rivas was entitled to attorneys’ fees.
D. The Arbitrator Issues a Modified Final Award
Ten days after the issuance of the interim award, Dynamic
asked the arbitrator to reconsider his ruling in favor of Rivas.
Dynamic contended that, under California law, an employee who
claimed that the employer failed to engage in an interactive
process had the burden of suggesting and proving the existence of
a reasonable accommodation. Dynamic argued that: (1) Rivas did
not suggest a reasonable accommodation; and (2) because the
arbitrator had ruled that Rivas had not met her burden to show
the existence of a reasonable accommodation in her failure-to-
accommodate claim, the arbitrator was also required to find that
she did not meet her burden to show the existence of a reasonable
accommodation in her interactive-process claim. Dynamic
additionally argued that the damages award was punitive and
did not comport with California law.
In March 2023, the arbitrator issued an amended interim
award. While the amended interim award did not change the
arbitrator’s ruling on any of the claims before him, it augmented
the discussion regarding the interactive-process claim.
Specifically, the arbitrator noted that Rivas “inquired about other
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jobs besides ‘caregiver,’ and more than one of Respondent[’s]
employee referred to a ‘sitter’ position.” The arbitrator also
discussed CACI No. 2546, stating that the jury instruction’s use
note “indicates a split of authority as to whether the employee
must prove the actual existence of the reasonable accommodation
in question.”3 Finding “a distinction between ‘identifying’ a
reasonable accommodation and ‘proving’ its actual existence,” the
arbitrator “cho[]se to join the rank of opinions such as Wysinger,”
elaborating that “there is a difference between ‘interactive
process’ and ‘reasonable accommodation’ as ‘process’ focuses on
the employee-employer interaction, while ‘accommodation’
focuses on the actual position itself.” The arbitrator concluded
that “[a]n employer which in effect does nothing to find a
reasonable accommodation during the interactive process should
not prevail due to an absence of actual proof by the employee.”4
In the interim award, the arbitrator also “chose a different
approach” to damages and reduced the amount awarded from
$55,000 to $30,000.
In March 2023, Rivas moved for attorneys’ fees, requesting
$384,474 in fees and $8,804 in costs. The final award provided
for $30,000 in damages, $75,000 in attorneys’ fees, and $4,600 in
costs. The final award also added an “alternative ground” to the
arbitrator’s ruling on Rivas’s interactive-process claim: that
3 CACI No. 2546 is entitled “Disability Discrimination -
Reasonable Accommodation - Failure to Engage in Interactive
Process.”
4 In the hearing on Dynamic’s motion for reconsideration,
the arbitrator voiced a suspicion that “more than a majority of
the judges and more [than] a majority of the arbitrators would
conclude not the way I did.”
7
“ ‘[a]rbitrators are not bound to award on principles of dry law,
but may decide on principles of equity and good conscience, and
make their award ex aequo et bono according to what is just and
good.’ ”
E. The Court Confirms the Arbitration Award
In June 2023, Rivas filed a petition to confirm the
arbitration award. In July 2023, Dynamic opposed the petition,
arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his powers because he failed
to follow California law. Specifically, Dynamic contended Rivas
“could not prevail on her interactive process claim . . . because
Plaintiff did not establish that a reasonable accommodation was
available at the time the interactive process should have
occurred, as required by California law,” and the arbitrator failed
to follow California law by nevertheless ruling in Rivas’s favor.
One day later, Dynamic filed a petition to vacate the arbitrator’s
award, making the same arguments as in its opposition to Rivas’s
petition to confirm.
In her opposition to Dynamic’s petition (and her reply to
Dynamic’s opposition to her petition), Rivas argued that: (1) the
award was not subject to review for errors of law or fact; and (2)
the arbitrator did follow California law—specifically Wysinger
and other authorities—which permitted a finding that Dynamic
was liable for failing to engage in an interactive process.
In December 2023, the trial court granted Rivas’s petition
to confirm and denied Dynamic’s petition to vacate. The court
found that “the arbitrator’s decision to apply Wysinger and
Claudio [v. Regents of the University of California (2005) 134
Cal.App.4th 224 (Claudio)], rather than the cases urged by
Defendant, was consistent with California law and the discretion
granted to lower tribunals confronting a split in appellate
8
authority.” The court stated that, because it concluded the
arbitrator followed California law, it did not need to address
whether the arbitrator was also permitted to issue a ruling based
on “ ‘principles of equity and good conscience and make [his]
award ex aequo et bona according to what is just and good.’ ”
In February 2024, the court entered judgment in Rivas’s
favor. Dynamic timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. The Arbitrator’s Award Is Not Reviewable for an
Error of Law
Our Supreme Court has held that “while the statutory
grounds for correction and vacation of arbitration awards do not
ordinarily include errors of law, contractual limitations on the
arbitrators’ powers can alter the usual scope of review.” (Cable
Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1334, 1356.)
Dynamic contends that the usual scope of review has been
altered here because the arbitration agreement required the
arbitrator to follow California law, and we can only determine
whether the arbitrator adhered to this mandate by reviewing his
legal reasoning. In other words, Dynamic contends that in failing
to follow California law, the arbitrator exceeded his powers, and
the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a court shall vacate an
arbitration award if “[t]he arbitrators exceeded their powers and
the award cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the
decision upon the controversy submitted.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(4).) We hold that, in this case, the parties did
not agree to alter the usual scope of review and thus, even had
the arbitrator failed to follow California law, such an “error”
would not be a basis to vacate the arbitration award.
9
“Even where application of a particular law or body of law
is required by the parties’ arbitration agreement, an arbitrator’s
failure to apply such a law is not in excess of an arbitrator’s
powers within the meaning of section 1286.2, subdivision (d).”
(Marsch v. Williams (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 238, 244 (Marsch).)5
“[I]n considering application of section 1286.2, we are not
concerned about what law the parties have chosen. Rather we
are required to determine whether the parties have agreed that
an arbitrator’s mistake in either determining the appropriate law
or applying it are reviewable in a court of law.” (Id. at pp. 244–
245.) Further, an agreement calling for “binding arbitration
‘embodies the expectation that the arbitration award will be
accorded a finality not given the judgment of a trial court and for
that reason it must be accorded a different scope of judicial
review. It is for this reason that the courts may not review a
binding award for mere error of law or fact.’ ” (Id. at p. 245.)
Noting that the arbitration agreement in Marsch contained “no
explicit reference to a broadened scope of judicial review of an
arbitration award,” the appellate court rejected the appellant’s
argument that the arbitration panel’s failure to apply a required
statute meant the panel exceeded its powers because “there is
nothing in the parties’ arbitration agreement which suggests that
such an error of law is subject to expanded judicial review.”
(Ibid.)
We find instructive the case of Baize v. Eastridge
Companies, LLC (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 293, in which our
5 At the time that the Court of Appeal issued Marsch, Code
of Civil Procedure section 1286.2, subdivision (d) provided
“statutory grounds to vacate an award exist whenever arbitrators
exceed their power.” (Marsch, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 244.)
10
colleagues in Division Three were faced with an almost identical
factual situation. There, as here, “the parties to a wrongful
termination action agreed to submit their dispute to binding
arbitration, pursuant to an agreement by which the arbitrator
was required to apply California law.” (Id. at p. 296.) After the
arbitrator ruled in favor of the employee and the employee
petitioned to confirm the award, “[t]he employer opposed, and
moved to vacate the award, on the basis that the arbitrator had
failed to correctly apply California law.” (Ibid.) The trial court
confirmed the award, and Division Three affirmed, agreeing that
the trial court “lacked jurisdiction to review the arbitrator’s
award for errors of law” and that a “contractual provision
requiring that the arbitrator apply California law does not
mandate a different conclusion.” (Ibid.) Specifically, the
agreement in Baize provided that “(1) ‘The Arbitrator shall have
the authority of a sitting judge with respect to handling this
matter and shall apply California law’; (2) ‘The Arbitrator shall
apply the substantive law (and the law of remedies, if applicable)
of the state of California, as applicable to the issues presented in
this case. The Arbitrator is without jurisdiction to apply any
different substantive law or the law of remedies’; and (3)
‘Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary that may be
contained in the Rules[6] the Arbitrator shall be constrained by
the rule of law and any arbitration award shall be based
thereon.” (Id. at p. 297.)
After reviewing the cases of Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.
Superior Court (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 576 and Marsch, the Baize
6 In a footnote at this point, the court explained that it was
construing the “Rules” as “the rules of evidence.”
11
court explained that “it is clear that the parties to an arbitration
agreement could not render an arbitrator’s decision reviewable
for errors of law merely by providing in the agreement that the
arbitrator must apply California law. Instead, the parties could
obtain court review of the merits of the arbitrator’s decision only
if the arbitration agreement expressly provided that the
arbitrator’s errors of law were reviewable in court.” (Baize,
supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 301.) Because the parties bargained
only “for a binding arbitration in which the arbitrator applied
California law,” and the appellant did not claim that the
arbitrator applied a law other than California’s—only that the
arbitrator applied California law incorrectly—the appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s confirmation of the arbitration award.
Here, too, we find nothing in the parties’ agreement that
indicates they agreed on expanded judicial review. Instead, like
the parties in Baize, they agreed only that the arbitrator was to
apply California law. The only claim is that the arbitrator erred
in applying California law.7 Therefore, Dynamic’s claim that the
arbitrator committed an error of law was not reviewable and was
thus not a basis to vacate—or refuse to confirm—the award.8
7 While the arbitrator stated his award was supported by
principles of equity, he expressly named this as an “alternative
ground” of support. By initially stating that he “cho[]se to join
the rank of opinions such as Wysinger,” the arbitrator made clear
that he was following a line of cases that he believed was still
viable under California law.
8 Furthermore, it is unclear that the arbitrator failed to
follow California law. Wysinger has not been overruled, and our
Supreme Court denied a request to review or depublish it.
(Wysinger (Guy) v. Automobile Club of Southern California (Feb.
(Fn. is continued on the next page.)
12
B. We Decline to Sanction Either Party
In her appellate brief, Rivas asks that we sanction Dynamic
for allegedly misrepresenting the appellate record, failing in its
duty of candor, and taking a frivolous appeal for the sole purpose
of delay. Dynamic, in turn, asks that we sanction Rivas for
improperly submitting a respondent’s appendix. We deny both
requests.
Regarding Rivas’s request, rule 8.276(a) of the California
Rules of Court provides in pertinent part that: “On motion of a
party or its own motion, a Court of Appeal may impose sanctions
. . . on a party or an attorney for: [¶] (1) Taking a frivolous appeal
or appealing solely to cause delay.” As we are not imposing
sanctions on our own motion, we may impose sanctions for a
frivolous or dilatory appeal only on a party’s motion.
Additionally, a motion for sanctions “must include a declaration
supporting the amount of any monetary sanction sought and
20, 2008, S159777) [“Petition for review & depublication
request(s) denied”].) While Dynamic correctly notes that, in
Shirvanyan v. Los Angeles Community College Dist. (2020) 59
Cal.App.5th 82, 96, we found that Wysinger and Claudio could be
“ ‘synthesize[d]’ with cases requiring an available accommodation
to support liability,” we note that the Judicial Council of
California opined that there was “a split of authority as to
whether the employee must also prove that a reasonable
accommodation was available,” contrasting Shirvanyan and
Nadaf-Rahrov v. The Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2008) 166
Cal.App.4th 952 with Wysinger and Claudio. (CACI No. 2546,
Directions for Use.) “[W]here there is more than one appellate
court decision, and such appellate decisions are in conflict . . . ,
the court exercising inferior jurisdiction can and must make a
choice between the conflicting decisions.” (Auto Equity Sales, Inc.
v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 456.)
13
must be served and filed before any order dismissing the appeal
but no later than 10 days after the appellant’s reply brief is due.”
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(b)(1).) Because Rivas failed to file
such a motion or declaration, we deny her request.9
Dynamic claims that Rivas’s appendix fails to comply with
several procedural requirements listed in rule 8.124 of the
California Rules of Court and requests that we sanction Rivas for
her non-compliance. Rule 8.124(g) provides that we “may impose
monetary or other sanctions for filing an appendix that contains
inaccurate copies or otherwise violates this rule.” Because
Rivas’s non-compliance does not rise to the level of warranting a
monetary sanction, we deny Dynamic’s request.
9 Moreover, while we find Dynamic’s appeal to be without
merit, we would not necessarily find it frivolous. “[A]n appeal
should be held to be frivolous only when it is prosecuted for an
improper motive -- to harass the respondent or delay the effect of
an adverse judgment -- or when it indisputably has no merit --
when any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is
totally and completely without merit.” (In re Marriage of
Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650.) “An appeal that is simply
without merit is not by definition frivolous and should not incur
sanctions.” (Ibid.)
14
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded her
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
M. KIM, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
BENDIX, J.
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