CourtListener 10321057•In re T.R. CA2/1
Texte intégral
Filed 1/27/25 In re T.R. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re T.R. et al., B333504
Persons Coming Under the (Los Angeles County
Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 18LJJP00038)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff,
v.
TIFFANY W.,
Defendant and Appellant;
T.R. et al.,
Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Stephanie M. Davis, Judge. Affirmed.
Christopher R. Booth, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Respondents.
_____________________
In this appeal, Tiffany W. (Mother) challenges the terms of
a 2023 final juvenile custody judgment, commonly called an exit
order. Dependency proceedings that began in 2018 resulted in
the removal of minors T.R. (born 2009) and S.R. (born 2014) from
Mother and David R. (Father). The juvenile court terminated
jurisdiction in May 2021 by appointing maternal grandmother as
the children’s legal guardian. In connection with the
guardianship, the court granted Father unmonitored visitation
and Mother monitored visitation due to her failure to make
substantial progress in court-ordered programs including drug
abuse treatment. In January 2022, Mother relocated to Alabama;
Father remained in Los Angeles County.
The juvenile court reasserted jurisdiction in August 2023
when Father filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions
Code1 section 388 for a new custody order after maternal
grandmother passed away. On September 21, 2023, the court
entered an exit order terminating dependency jurisdiction and
awarding Father sole legal and physical custody, with Mother
having unmonitored virtual visits and monitored in-person visits
1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
in California. The court found monitored visitation remained
appropriate because of Mother’s failure to make substantial
progress in court-ordered drug abuse treatment and other
programs.
Mother asks us to reverse the exit order, asserting the
court abused its discretion in making its custody determinations.
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS) has not filed a brief, asserting that it is not a
proper respondent. Father is also not a party to this appeal. The
minor children, however, have responded and dispute Mother’s
contentions. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We limit our factual and procedural summary to the
portions relevant to Mother’s arguments concerning the
September 21, 2023 exit order.
A. Initial Dependency Proceedings
On January 16, 2018, DCFS filed a petition pursuant to
section 300 alleging among other things that Mother’s substance
abuse and Father’s inability to provide ongoing parental care and
supervision placed T.R. and S.R. at substantial risk of serious
harm.2 The juvenile court sustained these allegations, asserted
jurisdiction, and removed the children from parental custody.
The court ordered unmonitored visitation for Father and
monitored visitation for Mother. Father was ordered to
2 The proceedings also involved two other children of
Mother, one an older sibling of T.R. and S.R. and the other a half-
sibling born of a different father, who are not the subject of this
appeal. We accordingly do not discuss them.
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participate in a parenting program and individual counseling.
Mother was ordered to participate in a full drug/alcohol program
with aftercare and random testing, a parenting program, and
individual counseling.
It appears that during the dependency proceedings
visitation by both parents with T.R. and S.R. went well.
However, both parents struggled to comply with court-ordered
services. Mother was in and out of drug treatment programs,
tested positive for alcohol twice and opioids once, failed to appear
for multiple drug tests, and admitted to methamphetamine use
after DCFS received a referral about it. Father failed to comply
with his case plan requirements related to parenting classes and
individual counseling. Mother told DCFS she completed
individual counseling, but then stated she stopped attending
counseling in September 2018.
At a six-month review hearing on August 8, 2018, the court
found Mother was in partial compliance and Father in minimal
compliance with ordered services. At a 12-month review hearing
on May 17, 2019, the court terminated reunification services for
Father and continued services for Mother. In June 2019, Mother
was arrested for robbery and later pleaded guilty to assault with
a deadly weapon. Mother did not inform DCFS or the
dependency court of her arrest or conviction; DCFS found out
about it from another source. The court terminated Mother’s
reunification services at the 18-month review hearing on
September 19, 2019, after finding her compliance not substantial.
At a section 366.26 hearing on May 10, 2021, the court
terminated jurisdiction after maternal grandmother accepted
guardianship of the children. The court ordered thrice-weekly
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monitored visitation with T.R. and S.R. for Mother, and thrice-
weekly unmonitored visitation for Father.
B. Events Between Dependency Court Proceedings
After the dependency proceedings terminated in May 2021,
Mother lived with maternal grandmother for a period of time and
helped take care of the children. In July 2021, the children
moved into Father’s house and remained residing there. In
January 2022, Mother moved to Alabama. She remained there at
all times relevant to this appeal.
C. The Juvenile Court Reasserts Jurisdiction
In May 2023, maternal grandmother passed away after
battling cancer for several years. On June 7, 2023, Father filed a
section 388 request to change the governing court order in light of
the guardian’s death. Father asserted T.R. and S.R. had been
living with him, his partner, and his partner’s two children and
that the children were thriving. Father requested the court
award him sole legal and physical custody, that the children
remain living with him, and that the court provide “no visitation
for [M]other until she appears before the court.”
Mother told DCFS she was aware T.R. and S.R. were living
with Father, and felt they were safe and well cared for. Mother
said she did not speak with T.R. or S.R. very often, and last saw
them in person in June 2022. She stated she was “okay” with
Father having primary custody; she asked for visitation in
Alabama during summers and holidays, telephone calls, and
visitation when she was in Los Angeles County. Mother
expressed concern that Father was hindering the children from
contacting her, and that Father would “erase” them from her life.
During Father’s DCFS interview he was cooperative and
coherent. Father explained that after maternal grandmother
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became ill, Father and maternal grandmother arranged for him
to provide daily care for the children. Father stated he had
worked hard to set his life straight, obtain housing, and prepare
to take custody. DCFS observed Father’s home, which had five
bedrooms, to be clean and tidy with adequate furniture. Father
denied he was keeping the children away from Mother. He stated
Mother did not call or ask about the children, and that the
children had come to accept her lack of interest.
Father’s partner provided DCFS with details about the
children’s medical care and schooling, and stated she and Father
had done what they could do on those issues given the limitations
posed by not being legal guardians. T.R. was doing well in school.
S.R. fell behind academically during the COVID-19 pandemic,
and Father and his partner paid for a tutor to help S.R. start
reading again at grade level, which he was now doing.
T.R. and S.R. told DCFS that Father and his partner took
good care of them. T.R. played on the school volleyball team; S.R.
was involved in basketball. Both children wanted to remain
living with Father.
After reasserting jurisdiction and making certain interim
orders, the court entered an exit order on September 21, 2023,
granting Father sole legal and physical custody. The court
ordered Mother was to have unmonitored visits by telephone and
video a minimum of once per week, and that the children could
call Mother as often as they liked. The court limited Mother’s in-
person visitation to taking place in California with a monitor
present. The court based the monitoring requirement on
Mother’s failure to make substantial progress in drug abuse
treatment as well as with previously ordered parenting classes
and individual counseling.
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DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Mother does not dispute the juvenile court appropriately
entertained a section 388 petition to modify the guardianship
order after maternal grandmother’s death. (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).)
Mother disputes only the custody determinations made in the
resulting exit order. Section 362.4 permits a juvenile court to
issue custody and visitation orders when terminating
jurisdiction. (Id., subd. (a).) “When making a custody
determination in any dependency case, the court’s focus and
primary consideration must always be the best interests of the
child.” (In re Nicholas H. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251, 268.)
“[T]he court is not restrained by ‘any preferences or
presumptions.’ [Citation.] Thus, for example, a finding that
neither parent poses any danger to the child does not mean that
both are equally entitled to half custody, since joint physical
custody may not be in the child’s best interests for a variety of
reasons.” (Ibid.)
Custody determinations are “committed to the sound
discretion of the juvenile court, and the trial court’s ruling should
not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly
established.” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.) An
abuse of discretion requires that “ ‘ “the trial court has exceeded
the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious,
or patently absurd determination.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
B. The Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion
1. Sole Legal and Physical Custody Award
Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in
awarding Father sole custody because she “posed insufficient risk
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of detriment to justify denial of shared custody.” We reject this
claim, which suffers from at least two flaws.
First, Mother’s argument presumes that shared custody is
the preferred outcome unless a parent poses detrimental risk to a
child. Such a presumption is “inconsistent with the purpose of
juvenile court law.” (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 206.)
“ ‘[T]he juvenile court has a special responsibility to the child as
parens patriae and must look at the totality of the child’s
circumstances.’ This purpose would obviously be frustrated if a
juvenile court, on termination of dependency jurisdiction
pursuant to section 362.4, were required to presume that joint
legal and physical custody was in the best interest of a minor.”
(Ibid.; see also In re Nicholas H., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at
p. 268.)
Second, Mother’s argument disregards our standard of
review. “When the parties present either contradictory evidence
or evidence from which different inferences may be drawn, the
substantial evidence standard of review requires the reviewing
court to resolve all contradictions and draw all inferences in favor
of the judgment or order being appealed.” (In re Alexandria P.
(2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 331, 338, fn. 4.) Mother highlights evidence
such as her efforts to address her substance abuse problems, that
her monitored visits went well, and that T.R. is old enough to call
for help if Mother posed any risk when entrusted with the
children. But there is also evidence that during the dependency
proceedings Mother relapsed on several occasions, committed an
assault with a deadly weapon, withheld important information,
and got into an argument with maternal grandmother during the
period maternal grandmother was taking care of the children
sufficiently serious that police were summoned and the juvenile
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court required continued monitoring of Mother’s visits. Mother
asserts her situation improved when she moved to Alabama; the
court could discount those claims (including with regard to her
sobriety) as uncorroborated.
That the juvenile court could have drawn inferences
favorable to Mother from certain evidence does not mean it
abused its discretion in drawing adverse inferences based on
other evidence. In reviewing a custody decision, “[w]hen two or
more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for
that of the trial court.” (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at
p. 319.) The juvenile court could reasonably conclude on the facts
before it that awarding Father sole custody was in the children’s
best interests. The children were established in Father’s home
and thriving. Mother relocated to Alabama several years earlier
and was not in regular contact with T.R. or S.R.; the court could
rationally find Father was thus better positioned to make
informed legal custody decisions on the children’s behalf. As for
physical custody, the children’s lives (including their friends,
schools, and extracurricular activities) were in California, not
Alabama. The children (who were 14 and nine years old at the
time of the exit order) wished to remain in California with Father
and not relocate for a significant portion of the year to Alabama
as a joint physical custody order would have required. The
juvenile court therefore did not err in awarding Father sole
custody.
2. Monitored In-person Visitation
Mother alternatively argues that the court abused its
discretion in continuing the requirement of a monitor for any in-
person visits. When ordering visitation, the juvenile court may
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“ ‘impose any . . . conditions or requirements to further define the
right to visitation in light of the particular circumstances of the
case before it.’ ” (In re Shawna M. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1686,
1690, quoting In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 757.)
As explained above, there was evidence including Mother’s
substance abuse and incomplete drug treatment from which the
court could reasonably conclude that in-person visits should
continue to be monitored. The court accordingly did not abuse its
discretion in requiring a monitor for any in-person visits.
DISPOSITION
The September 21, 2023 judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
M. KIM, J.
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