CourtListener 10320026•In re D.G. CA2/4
Texte intégral
Filed 1/23/25 In re D.G. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re D.G. et al., B336409
Persons Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County
Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP04453AB)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
S.G.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Nancy Ramirez, Judge. Affirmed.
Liana Serobian, by appointment of the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County
Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
S.G. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings
and dispositional orders awarding S.G. (mother)1 sole physical custody of
their children D.G. and L.G. Father argues the trial court’s findings were not
supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Father and mother were married from 2008 to 2015; D.G. was born in
2010, and L.G. was born in 2013. Father filed for divorce in 2015, the divorce
was finalized in 2017, and family law custody proceedings have recurred
since then. As of 2019, father had primary physical custody of D.G. and L.G.
I. Referral
On December 7, 2023, the Department of Children and Family Services
(Department) received a hotline referral reporting that D.G. and L.G. had
been abused by both father and their paternal grandmother, who lives with
father. The report indicated father had placed D.G. in a chokehold in a store
parking lot, slapped him, threatened to kill him, and kept a firearm in the
house. The report also referred to several other incidents, some of which
involved the paternal grandmother.
A Department case worker and a police officer interviewed father, D.G.,
and L.G. the same day the referral was received. Father denied the
allegations and blamed mother, claiming the report must have been a
response to their family law disputes. D.G. confirmed the report and
provided a picture of his hand where father had slapped him; he also reported
that father had thrown a slipper at L.G. L.G. said she saw father put D.G. in
1 Father and mother share the same initials.
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a chokehold but thought “they were just playing.” She said father threw a
coat hanger at her and the paternal grandmother would pull her hair and
grab her arm, pointing to a scratch she said her grandmother had caused.
Both D.G. and L.G. expressed fear of father.
The children were immediately removed from father’s care. The
Department case worker interviewed mother, who provided text messages in
which D.G. told her father had choked him. Mother said the children had
reported similar incidents before.
The Department interviewed several other people who interacted with
the children, including the driver father hired to take the children to school,
D.G.’s therapist, a maternal cousin, the family’s joint therapist, a daycare
provider, and a friend of father. D.G.’s therapist said D.G. had spoken with
her about being abused by father. The maternal cousin said the children had
told her similar things. The family’s joint therapist “denied having any
safety concerns, and reported the children have never disclosed any abuse or
neglect by anyone.” The driver, daycare provider, and father’s friend all
likewise reported no concerns.
Father and mother were both interviewed again in the days following
the referral. The Department also attempted to speak with the paternal
grandmother, unsuccessfully.
II. Petition
On December 29, 2023, the Department filed a dependency petition on
behalf of both D.G. and L.G. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
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subdivisions (a), (b)(1), (c), and (j).2 D.G. was 13 years old and L.G. was 10
years old at the time. The petition contained 14 counts.
Counts a-1, b-1, and j-1 alleged father had physically abused D.G. by
choking him, striking him, pushing him, pinning him in a corner, threatening
to kill him, and brandishing a knife. Counts a-2, b-2, and j-2 alleged father
had physically abused L.G. by throwing a clothes hanger and other objects at
her, threatening to remove her from his home, threatening to kill her, and
brandishing a knife. Counts b-3 and j-3 alleged the paternal grandmother
had physically abused L.G. by pulling her hair and scratching her arm, and
father had failed to protect L.G. Counts b-4 and j-4 alleged that both father
and mother failed to obtain necessary mental health services for D.G. Counts
b-5 and j-5 alleged that both father and mother failed to obtain necessary
mental health services for L.G. Count c-1 alleged father emotionally abused
D.G., and that mother emotionally abused D.G. by failing to obtain mental
health care for D.G. Count c-2 alleged father emotionally abused L.G., and
that mother emotionally abused L.G. by failing to obtain mental health care
for L.G.
The trial court held its initial hearing in January 2024. Father
“submit[ted] the issue of detention to the court” without argument. The court
ordered the children detained from father and released to mother.
III. Jurisdiction/Disposition
The court made its jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders in
March 2024. Prior to the hearing, the Department submitted an
interlineated petition which removed counts b-4, b-5, j-4, and j-5. This
2 All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code, unless otherwise stated.
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eliminated any allegation that mother or father failed to obtain necessary
mental health services for D.G. or L.G. The interlineated petition also
removed mother from the allegations in counts c-1 and c-2. No allegations
against mother remained in the petition.
The trial court divided the hearing into two phases, taking the
jurisdictional portion first and the dispositional portion second. The court
began its jurisdictional analysis by finding D.G. and L.G. credible and finding
no evidence they had been coached. The court sustained counts a-1, a-2, b-1,
b-2, j-1, and j-2, finding that father had physically abused both D.G. and L.G.,
though it amended the language of the counts to say that father had “placed
his hand on” a knife rather than “brandished” it. The court also sustained
counts b-3 and j-3, finding that father had failed to protect L.G. from physical
abuse by the paternal grandmother. However, the court dismissed counts c-1
and c-2, finding the Department had failed to meet its burden of proving
emotional abuse.
In the dispositional phase of the hearing, father requested
enhancement services and reunification services. He also objected to any
determination that mother should have sole legal custody. The court ordered
that father and mother would have joint legal custody, but directed that
mother would have sole physical custody of the children. Father was
permitted monitored visits every other Saturday for four to six hours.
Having made these orders, the court terminated jurisdiction.
Father timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Father argues the trial court’s jurisdictional findings were not
supported by substantial evidence. He also argues the trial court failed to
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make the required findings at the dispositional stage or state the basis for
those findings. Finally, he argues that even if the required findings were
made, they were not supported by substantial evidence. We conclude all the
required findings were made and were sufficiently supported. We also
conclude father has forfeited any argument that the trial court failed to state
the basis for its findings.
I. Jurisdictional Findings
“We review the decision of the juvenile court under the substantial
evidence test, considering whether there is substantial evidence, whether
contradicted or not, that supports the position of the trier of fact. We resolve
conflicts in favor of the decision, and do not reweigh the evidence or
determine the credibility of the witnesses.” (In re Roberto C. (2012) 209
Cal.App.4th 1241, 1254 (Roberto C.).)3
The trial court found D.G. and L.G. credible. D.G. reported father
choking him, pinning him in a corner, striking him, and threatening him.
While L.G. thought the choking incident might have been playful, she
reported the same events as D.G. D.G.’s therapist said D.G. had spoken to
her about these events as well.
L.G. reported that father threatened her and threw various items at
her (including a slipper and a coat hanger) and that paternal grandmother
scratched her and pulled her hair. D.G. confirmed L.G.’s account.
3 As the Department points out, we may affirm the trial court’s
jurisdictional order if even one of the counts is supported by substantial
evidence. (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.) However, both
parties treat the petition as a single unit; neither provides a count-by-count
analysis. Therefore, we also discuss the petition as a whole.
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Mother and the maternal cousin indicated both children had reported
similar events to them. Mother provided text messages from the children
containing some of these reports. The trial court noted the consistency of the
children’s statements to the Department and to the interviewing police
officer. The testimony of one witness is sufficient to prove a fact; here there
are two, and their credibility was supported by the consistency of their
statements. (See In re S.A. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1148.)
Father points to other evidence he contends contradicts the children’s
statements and argues the children were reacting to events in the existing
family law custody dispute. However, “we resolve conflicts in favor of the
decision.” (Roberto C., supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 1254.) The trial court
found the children credible, and we do not reconsider that determination on
appeal. (Ibid.) The trial court’s jurisdictional findings are supported by
substantial evidence.
Father claims this is a custody battle which belongs in family court,
citing In re John W. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961 (John W.), superseded by
statute on unrelated grounds as noted in In re Marriage of David & Martha
M. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 96, 102–103. In John W., multiple abuse
allegations were made against both parents of an infant boy, but the court
never ruled on the allegations; instead, the parents stipulated to continued
juvenile court jurisdiction based on the “tense” emotional environment
created by their custody battle. (Id. at pp. 965–968.) The juvenile court
eventually terminated jurisdiction and ordered joint physical custody because
it could see no reason to prefer one parent over the other. (Id. at pp. 968–
969.) The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the case to family court at
the request of both parents, observing that the juvenile court should not have
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accepted the stipulation to jurisdiction, which resulted in the custody dispute
being carried out in the wrong forum. (Id. at pp. 974–977.)
Here there was neither a stipulation to jurisdiction nor a joint request
made on appeal to transfer the case to family court, as in John W. The
juvenile court made a ruling after a contested hearing, and father challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the ruling. John W. does not apply.
II. Dispositional Orders
Section 361, subdivision (c) provides that “[a] dependent child shall not
be taken from the physical custody of [their] parents . . . with whom the child
resides at the time the petition was initiated, unless the juvenile court finds
clear and convincing evidence of any of the following circumstances listed in
paragraphs (1) to (5).” The trial court here applied paragraph (1), which
requires “a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned
home, and . . . no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can
be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . .
physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) Section 361, subdivision (e) also
requires the court to “make a determination as to whether reasonable efforts
were made to prevent or to eliminate the need for removal of the minor from
[their] home . . . [and] state the facts on which the decision to remove the
minor is based.”
Father argues the trial court failed to apply the clear and convincing
evidence standard and failed to evaluate whether a reasonable alternative to
removal existed. This is not what the record shows. Both the transcript and
the court’s orders expressly reflect findings made by clear and convincing
evidence. They also reflect a finding that reasonable efforts were made to
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prevent removal, but that no reasonable means existed to protect the children
short of removal.
Father also contends the trial court failed to state the facts on which its
decision was based. However, father forfeited this argument by failing to
raise the issue at the hearing. (In re Daniel B. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 663,
672.) His counsel objected to termination of jurisdiction, the length of an
anger management course, a counseling requirement, and the potential
award of sole legal custody to mother. But at no point did counsel object to
the removal of physical custody, much less suggest the court had failed to
explain the basis for that decision.
The Department argues father forfeited all challenges to the trial
court’s disposition by failing to object to the physical custody order. However,
a party only forfeits all challenges if they expressly submit to the
Department’s recommendation and the court subsequently adopts that
recommendation. (In re N.S. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 167, 170–171.) Even
though father did not object to the physical custody portion of the court’s
dispositional order, he retains his right to challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting it. (Ibid.)
Father’s argument regarding the evidence to support the dispositional
orders is identical to his argument regarding the evidence to support the
jurisdictional findings. He does not discuss any difference between the legal
standards or factual elements, nor does he explain how the court should have
reached a different result at disposition than it did on jurisdiction.
Where the trial court has found a fact by clear and convincing evidence,
we consider whether “a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly
probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th
989, 996.) For the reasons given in the previous section, it was reasonable for
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the court to find D.G. and L.G. credible. Having done so, it was also
reasonable to find it highly probable that returning the children to father’s
custody would create a substantial danger to their physical health, safety,
protection, or physical well being. The juvenile court’s dispositional order is
supported by substantial evidence.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ZUKIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
CURREY, P. J.
MORI, J.
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