People v. Edmund CA4/3

CourtListener 10320017Calctapp23 janv. 2025

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Filed 1/23/25 P. v. Edmund CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G063578

v. (Super. Ct. No. INF064944)

NEIL AGUSTUS EDMUND, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Riverside County, John D. Molloy, Judge. Reversed and remanded with
directions.
Appellate Defenders and Jill Kent, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A.
Sevidal, James M. Toohey and Andrew Mestman, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
In 2013, a jury found Neil Agustus Edmund guilty of the first
degree murder of Juan Pablo Munoz, among other offenses. The jury also
found the murder was committed during an attempted robbery and Edmund
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, which proximately caused
great bodily injury or death to a non-accomplice.
In this appeal, Edmund challenges the summary denial of his
petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 As relevant here,
that section permits a person “convicted of felony murder or murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a
crime” to vacate the murder conviction and seek resentencing on any
remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) As we explain below, the record of
conviction before us is very limited, and for that reason, we cannot determine
that the record conclusively establishes Edmund was statutorily ineligible for
resentencing relief. Specifically, the jury was instructed on the theory of
felony murder. And when read together, the jury instructions and verdicts do
not foreclose the possibility the jury found Edmund guilty on a theory of
felony murder that is no longer valid. Accordingly, we reverse the order
denying Edmund’s petition for resentencing and remand with directions to
the trial court to issue an order to show case and conduct an evidentiary
hearing.

1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise indicated.

2
FACTS2
In 2013, a jury convicted Edmund of the first degree murder of
Juan Pablo Munoz (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1); attempted robbery of G.S. and
of Munoz (§§ 664/211; counts 2–3, respectively); and being a felon in
possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1); count 4). On count 1, the jury
found the murder was committed during the attempted robbery. (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(17)(a).) On counts 1 and 3, the jury found Edmund personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm and proximately caused great bodily
injury or death to another person, not an accomplice. (§§ 12022.53, subd. (d),
1192.7, subd. (c)(8).) And on count 2, the jury found Edmund personally used
a firearm during the commission of the offense. (§§ 12022.53, subd. (d),
1192.7, subd. (c)(8).)
After the jury rejected the death penalty, Edmund admitted
having suffered two prior strike convictions. On count 1, Edmund was
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Concurrent 25-
year terms were imposed on counts 2 and 4, and a consecutive 25-year term
was imposed on count 3 but stayed under section 654.
In Edmund I, this court modified the judgment to reduce certain
fees and, as modified, affirmed the judgment.
In May 2023, Edmund filed a form petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6 and requested counsel. Counsel was appointed for him.
Other than the form petition, the record on appeal does not contain any other

2
On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the jury
instructions, the disposition table for the instructions, and the verdict forms,
taken from the clerk’s transcript in People v. Edmund (Oct. 15, 2015,
G050700) [nonpub. opn.] (Edmund I). (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)

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briefing—filed either by the People or Edmund’s appointed counsel—on the
resentencing issue.
The colloquy at the December 2023 prima facie hearing was brief.
After the trial court called the matter and counsel stated their appearances,
the People made an “[o]ral motion” to deny the petition. We set forth the
entire argument on the oral motion:
“[The prosecutor]: Your Honor, we sent counsel a copy of the jury
instructions for this case on June the 12th of 2023. It was both the guilt and
the penalty phase. There was no violative instructions contained therein.
Nothing regarding natural and probable consequences, felony murder,
conspiracy, implied malice murder, or any other theory by which malice could
possibly be imputed to the defendant. We’d ask that the petition be denied.
“[Defense counsel]: I have confirmed everything that counsel said,
and I’ll submit.
“THE COURT: The petition is denied.”
The appellate record does not contain a written statement of the
trial court’s reasons for denying the petition. And nothing in the record
suggests the court, in denying the petition, received or reviewed the jury
instructions or any other documents or filings.
Edmund timely appealed. His court-appointed counsel filed a
brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216. This court gave
Edmund 30 days to file a supplemental brief on his own behalf. None was
filed.
After reviewing the record, we ordered the parties to file
supplemental briefing on (1) our intent to take judicial notice of portions of
the clerk’s transcript in Edmund I, specifically the jury instructions and
disposition table and the verdict forms; and (2) whether the trial court erred

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by denying the petition at the prima facie stage. (See, e.g., People v. Lopez
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1 (Lopez); People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45
(Harden); People v. Vang (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 64.) The parties filed
supplemental briefs and the People filed a responsive brief.
DISCUSSION

Effective January 1, 2019, sections 188 and 189 were amended to
eliminate natural and probable consequences liability for murder, and to
limit the scope of the felony murder rule. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 957, 959.) Section 1172.6 permits a person convicted of murder “under a
theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime” to petition for
resentencing relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1).)
“The petitioner has the burden of making a prima facie case for
relief.” (People v. Ramos (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 460, 464.) If the petitioner
makes a prima facie case, the trial court shall issue an order to show cause.
(Ibid.) Although “[t]he prima facie stage bar is ‘“very low,”’ [it is] not
nonexistent.” (Ibid.) So if the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing as a
matter of law, the court can deny the petition at the prima facie stage. (Lopez,
supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 14.) “A petitioner is ineligible for resentencing as
a matter of law if the record of conviction conclusively establishes, with no
factfinding, weighing of evidence, or credibility determinations, that (1) the
petitioner was the actual killer, or (2) the petitioner was not the actual killer,
but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder
in the first degree, (3) the petitioner was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, or

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(4) the petitioner acted with malice aforethought that was not imputed based
solely on participation in a crime.” (Ibid.) “We independently review the trial
court’s determination that the petitioner failed to make a prima facie
showing for relief.” (Ramos, at p. 465.)
Lopez is instructive. In Lopez, a jury found defendant guilty of
first degree murder and found true the special circumstance allegation that
the murder was committed during a robbery. (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at
p. 11.) The trial court instructed the jury on “murder under two theories:
(1) malice aforethought and (2) felony murder.” (Id. at p. 14.) To find the
defendant guilty of felony murder, the jury was instructed under CALCRIM
No. 540A that it “had to find he committed robbery and ‘[w]hile committing
robbery, the defendant caused the death of another person.’ (Italics added.)”
(Id. at p. 16.) To find the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation
true, it was instructed under CALCRIM No. 730 that it “had to find
defendant ‘did an act that caused the death of another person.’ (Italics
added.)” (Ibid.) And regarding causation, it was instructed that “‘[a]n act
causes death if the death is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of
the act and the death would not have happened without the act.’” (Id. at
p. 16.) The jury received no instructions on aiding and abetting, liability by
virtue of being a major participant in the underlying felony, or any other
vicarious liability theories. (Id. at p. 15.)
Based on these instructions, the Lopez court concluded “it was
possible for the jury to have found defendant guilty of felony murder, and
found to be true the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation, without
finding defendant was the actual killer.” (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 4–5.) The court held “the term ‘actual killer’ as used in the revised felony-
murder rule of section 189, subdivision (e)(1) refers to someone who

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personally killed the victim and is not necessarily the same as a person who
‘caused’ the victim’s death.” (Id. at p. 4.) Under this meaning of “actual
killer,” the court reasoned that while the record of conviction established the
defendant proximately caused the victim’s death (i.e., committed an act that
causes death), it did not necessarily establish he personally killed the victim
(i.e., was the actual killer). (Id. at pp. 17–20.) “The jury was not instructed it
had to find defendant personally killed the victim to convict him; the jury was
instructed it only had to find defendant committed an act that caused the
victim’s death.” (Id. at p. 20.) Thus, it was possible “the jury convicted
defendant of felony murder and found to be true the robbery-murder special-
circumstance allegation without finding him to have been the actual killer.”
(Ibid.) For this reason, the defendant met his burden of making a prima facie
case for relief under section 1772.6. (Id. at p. 5.)
We agree with the rationale of Lopez. To determine whether the
trial court properly denied Edmund’s petition, we ask “whether it was
possible for a juror to have (1) found [him] guilty of felony murder, and
(2) found to be true the robbery . . . special circumstance[ ] allegation[ ], as
well as the personal infliction of great bodily injury allegations, without also
finding [he] personally killed the victim[.]” (Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at
p. 54, citing Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 14.) Reviewing only the
limited record before us—as we must—we conclude the answer is “yes.”
The jury here received the same instructions as those given in
Lopez. In this case, the jury was instructed that to find Edmund guilty of
murder, the People had to prove, among other things, that “[t]he defendant
committed an act that caused the death of another person,” and it was
further instructed “[a]n act causes death if the death is the direct, natural,

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and probable consequence of the act and the death would not have happened
without the act.” (CALCRIM No. 520.)
Despite representations by the prosecutor and defense counsel at
the prima facie hearing that the jury was not instructed on felony murder,
our review of the jury instructions reveals otherwise. The jury was instructed
on two theories for first degree murder: (1) “willful, deliberate, and
premeditated” murder; and (2) felony murder during the commission of an
attempted robbery. Under the theory of felony murder, the jury was
instructed the People had to prove “1. The defendant attempted to commit a
robbery; [¶] 2. The defendant intended to commit a robbery; [¶] AND [¶]
3. While attempting to commit a robbery the defendant caused the death of
another person.” (CALCRIM No. 540A, italics added.)
On the special circumstance allegation of murder during a
robbery, the jury was instructed the People had to prove “1. The defendant
attempted to commit a robbery; [¶] 2. The defendant intended to commit a
robbery; [¶] 3. The defendant did an act that caused the death of another
person; [¶] AND [¶] 4. The act causing the death and the attempted robbery
were part of one continuous transaction.” (CALCRIM No. 730, italics added.)
And on the allegation that Edmund intentionally discharged a
firearm during the crime of first degree murder, the jury was instructed the
People had to prove “1. The defendant personally discharged a firearm during
the commission or attempted commission of that crime; [¶] AND 2. The
defendant intended to discharge the firearm.” (CALCRIM No. 3150.) The jury
was further instructed that if the People proved both elements, the jury had
to “decide whether the People also have proved that the defendant’s act
caused great bodily injury to or the death of a person.” (Ibid.)

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Although the jury found Edmund guilty of first degree murder, it
did not indicate which theory it relied on: willful, deliberate, and premediated
murder or felony murder. The instructions for felony murder left open the
possibility that the jury found him guilty of causing the death without finding
he was the actual killer. (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 4–5, 17–20.)
Given this possibility, we cannot conclude as a matter of law—at least not at
the prima facie stage and on this limited record—that Edmund was ineligible
for resentencing relief under section 1172.6.
The People acknowledge the similar jury instructions used in this
case and Lopez but argue Lopez is distinguishable because of the different
disputed factual issues at trial in the cases. In Lopez, the appellate court
relied on facts set forth in the prior unpublished opinion from the appeal of
the underlying judgment. (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 5.) The People
urge us to do the same here with Edmund I and, from those facts, determine
that the prosecution’s sole theory at trial was that Edmund was the actual
killer. We decline to do so. Section 1172.6 suggests courts may use prior
opinions only to recite the procedural history of a case, and then only at the
evidentiary stage. (See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); People v. Flores (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 974, 988 [“court may also consider the procedural history of the
case recited in any prior appellate opinion” at evidentiary hearing].)3

3
We acknowledge the trial transcript is also “part of the record of
conviction” (People v. Lopez (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 566, 572, fn. 5) and the
possibility it might have established Edmund’s ineligibility at the prima facie
stage. But because the People did not rely on the trial transcript as a basis
for denial at the prima facie stage, neither do we.

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DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order denying the section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing is reversed, and the matter is remanded for issuance of an order
to show cause and an evidentiary hearing on Edmund’s entitlement to
resentencing for his conviction for first degree murder.

DELANEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

GOETHALS, ACTING P. J.

SANCHEZ, J.

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