People v. Bonilla CA2/2

CourtListener 10318529Calctapp22 janv. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 1/22/25 P. v. Bonilla CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B336027

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA320049)
v.

JOSEPH ARMANDO
BONILLA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
Sydney Banach, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Joseph Armando Bonilla appeals
from the denial of his petition for recall and resentencing
pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d).1 Defendant
contends the trial court erred in finding him ineligible under the
statute. The People agree, as do we. We reverse the order of
denial and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND
In 2007, defendant was convicted of first degree murder
(Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), with a true finding by the jury that
defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
proximately causing the victim’s death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)),
that a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
proximately causing the victim’s death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) &
(e)(1)), and that the murder was gang-related (§ 186.22, subd.
(b)(1)). Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 50
years to life in prison. The judgment was affirmed on direct
appeal in People v. Bonilla (Mar. 19, 2009, B205363) (nonpub.
opn.).
In August 2023, defendant filed a petition for recall and
resentencing pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (d). Following
a hearing on November 8, 2023, the trial court found defendant
ineligible for relief under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), and
denied the petition.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the order of
denial.

1 All further unattributed code sections are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise stated.

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DISCUSSION
The trial court ruled, as a matter of law, defendant did not
qualify for resentencing under section 1170, subdivision (d).
Defendant contends the trial court erred, and the People agree.
“When a defendant who was under 18 years of age at the
time of the commission of the offense for which the defendant was
sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of
parole has been incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant
may submit to the sentencing court a petition for recall and
resentencing.” (§ 1170, subd. (d)(1)(A).) Defendant’s petition
alleged these three required conditions and stated he committed
the offense with at least one adult codefendant. Defendant also
described his work towards rehabilitation.2 (§ 1170, subd.
(d)(2)(C)–(D).) The petition also alleged none of the disqualifying
circumstances of section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(B) applied to
defendant.3
Both parties agree the trial court should have followed
People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 (Heard), as defendant
argued in his petition and in court. In Heard, the appellate court
noted section 1170, subdivision (d) expressly applies to a juvenile

2 At the hearing on the petition defendant’s counsel
acknowledged that a statement regarding remorse was also
required but not filed and requested leave to do so. The request
was denied, as the trial court intended to deny the petition on
another ground.
3 Defendant alleged “[i]t was not pled and proved that the
victim was tortured as described in section 206 or that the victim
was a public safety official, any firefighter, or ‘any other officer in
any segment of law enforcement who is employed by the federal
government, the state, or any of its political subdivisions.’”

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offender whose sentence was explicitly designated life without
parole (LWOP) that is imposed for a single offense. (Heard, at
p. 624.) It is a “functional equivalent of life without parole . . .
when a defendant receives multiple sentences for multiple
offenses, or an offense plus one or more enhancements, that add
up to a lifelong prison commitment with no realistic opportunity
for release.” (Ibid., citing People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th
349, 356–357 & People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 268–
269.) “[A] sentence is the functional equivalent of LWOP if it
includes a ‘term of years with a parole eligibility date that falls
outside the juvenile offender’s natural life expectancy.’” (People
v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 443 (Sorto), quoting People
v. Caballero, supra, at p. 268.)
The Heard court found under a plain reading of section
1170, subdivision (d)(1) only a juvenile sentenced to an explicitly
designated term of LWOP was eligible for relief. (Heard, supra,
83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 625–626.) However, the Heard court was
unable to identify a rational basis for making juveniles sentenced
to an explicitly designated LWOP term eligible to petition for
resentencing under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1), but not
juveniles sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP.
(Heard, at pp. 633–634.) The court concluded that denying such
a juvenile the opportunity to petition for resentencing under this
provision violated the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the laws. (Ibid.; accord, Sorto, supra, 104
Cal.App.5th at p. 440.)
The trial court found the weight of authority was in conflict
with Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608 and declined to follow it,
relying on several cases that held excluding youthful offenders
(young adults between 18 and 25) with LWOP sentences from

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eligibility for relief under section 3051 did not deny equal
protection.4 Among those cases, the trial court found People v.
Morales, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th 326 persuasive because the
appellate court held there was no equal protection violation for
youthful offenders with LWOP sentences, not only due to their
statutory exclusion from section 3051 but also section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1). Here defendant, at the time the crime was
committed, was not classified as a youthful offender but as a
juvenile. Therefore as we consider our Supreme Court’s 2018
finding that a 50-year-to-life sentence is the functional equivalent
of LWOP coupled with the Heard court’s 2022 equal protection
analysis involving juveniles, we join the growing number of
appellate courts that conclude although defendant is not eligible
for recall and resentencing under the plain language of section
1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), he is nonetheless entitled to seek
recall and resentencing relief under that section in light of his
right to equal protection of the laws. (See Heard, supra, 83
Cal.App.5th at p. 626; Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 440.)

DISPOSITION
The November 8, 2023 order denying defendant’s petition is
reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court for a hearing

4 See, e.g., People v. Ngo (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 116, 123–126,
review granted May 17, 2023, S279458; People v. Bolanos (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 1069, 1077, review granted Apr. 12, 2023,
S278803; In re Murray (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 456, 463; People v.
Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326, 343–349; People v. Acosta
(2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 779–781; In re Williams (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 427, 434–437.

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on the recall and resentencing pursuant to section 1170,
subdivision (d), in view of this opinion.

___________________________
CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

_______________________________
ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J.

_______________________________
RICHARDSON, J.

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