People v. Green CA2/2

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Filed 1/22/25 P. v. Green CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B330515

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA419591)
v.

BERLINDA GREEN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.

Emry J. Allen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Roberta L. Davis and Yun K. Lee, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Berlinda Green (defendant)
appeals from the order denying her petition for vacatur of her
manslaughter conviction and for resentencing pursuant to Penal
Code section 1172.6, entered following an evidentiary hearing.1
Defendant contends the ruling was not supported by substantial
evidence.

BACKGROUND
An information was originally filed against defendant in
March 2014 after a preliminary hearing. In November 2016 an
amended information charged defendant and codefendants
Ernest Lamont Williams, Thomas Woodson, and Anthony
Boochee (also known as Tone) with the 1998 murder of Arlando
Bryant (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1) and conspiracy to commit
murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1), count 2). The murder was alleged to
be intentional and carried out for financial gain within the
meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(1). It was also alleged
to be intentional and committed by means of lying in wait within
the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(15). Both counts
were alleged, pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), to
have been committed for the benefit of a gang.
In 2016, defendant entered into a plea agreement under
which she pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter (§ 192,
subd. (a)) and admitted the gang allegation. Defendant was
sentenced to a total of 21 years in prison, comprised of 11 years
for the voluntary manslaughter plus 10 years for the gang
enhancement.

1 All further unattributed code sections are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise stated.

2
Defendant’s petitions for resentencing
In 2019 defendant filed a petition for resentencing under
former section 1170.95. As originally enacted by Senate Bill
No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), former section 1170.95 did not
extend its provisions to persons convicted of manslaughter. (See
Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) The trial court thus summarily denied
the petition on that ground, and we affirmed the order in People
v. Green (May 6, 2020, B296326) (nonpub. opn.). Effective
January 1, 2022, the statute was amended to allow petitions by
not only those convicted of murder but also those convicted of
attempted murder and manslaughter. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2).
Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10; see § 1172.6, subd.
(a)(2).)
Section 1172.6 provides a procedure to petition for
retroactive vacatur and resentencing for those who could not be
convicted of murder under sections 188 and 189 as amended
effective January 1, 2019. (See People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 957.) Sections 188 and 189, the laws pertaining to felony
murder and murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, were amended “to ensure that murder
liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer,
did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant
in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to
human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)
In 2022, defendant again filed a petition for resentencing.
The prosecution was ordered to file a response. The trial court
appointed counsel for defendant, considered further briefing, and
ruled defendant had made a prima facie case for relief. The court
then conducted an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6,

3
subdivision (d)(3), based upon the preliminary hearing and plea
transcripts.2 As defendant was charged with murder, the
prosecution was required to prove at the evidentiary hearing
that, beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant is guilty of murder
under the 2019 amendments to section 188 or 189, despite the
plea to voluntary manslaughter. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
On April 27, 2023, after hearing argument from both
counsel the court concluded the prosecution had met its burden,
found the evidence showed defendant was guilty of express
malice murder, and denied the petition.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the court’s
order.
Preliminary hearing testimony
The 1998 murder
The evidence presented at the preliminary hearing for
defendant and codefendants Williams, Woodson, and Boochee
established that on December 20, 1998, defendant’s husband
Bryant was shot and killed while sitting in his parked car, in
front of his home on Dwight Avenue. Bryant’s life was insured
for $119,900 and his policy named defendant and his three
children as the beneficiaries.
The reopened investigation
In 2013, Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department cold case
homicide investigator Detective Dean Camarillo was assigned as
one of the investigating officers in this case. In August and
September 2013, he obtained warrants and conducted wiretap
surveillance on the telephones of defendant and her

2 Defendant did not object to the use of the preliminary
hearing transcript or any of the testimony. The plea transcript
has not been included in the appellate record.

4
codefendants. He then conducted “stimulation activities” to
encourage the targeted persons to speak on their phones.
On August 29, Detective Camarillo and his partner went to
the Dwight Avenue house, spoke to the current resident, tenant
Cynthia Thomas, who said she did not know defendant.3 The
detectives then went to the home of defendant’s mother,
identified themselves, and told her they were looking for
defendant so they could introduce themselves and let her know
the case was again being actively investigated. The detectives
added that on September 4 they would be filming an episode of
L.A.’s Most Wanted with Fox 11 News (Fox News) concerning the
case. Detective Camarillo left his business card. Shortly after
their visit with defendant’s mother, the detectives listened to an
intercepted call between defendant and her mother in which
Bryant was mentioned, calling him by his nickname “Rev.”
Defendant said, “they just left my house, too. The lady just called
me.”
On September 4, when the detectives and Fox News arrived
at the Dwight Avenue house, Thomas called defendant, saying
she felt uncomfortable and that defendant needed to come to the
location. When defendant arrived, Detective Camarillo
introduced himself, told her the case was being reinvestigated,
and they were reaching out to the public. She was not told she
was a suspect. Detective Camarillo asked defendant whether she
wanted to go on camera to ask the public for help in catching her
husband’s killer. She refused. The episode aired on September 7,
2013. No one on the show accused defendant of involvement in

3 Immediately after the detectives left, a call was intercepted
from Thomas to defendant.

5
the murder. In several phone calls made by defendant, she
indicated having seen the show and sounded upset and disgusted.
Thereafter Detective Camarillo again spoke to defendant’s
mother at home, giving her the “good news” they had a sketch of
a possible suspect and would distribute flyers throughout
Compton. Flyers were prepared indicating investigators had
received a tip as a result of the Fox News show, including a
sketch of a suspect, drawn to resemble codefendant Williams,
using a 1998 booking photo. Also on the flyer was a photograph
of Bryant. Detective Camarillo distributed these flyers to
defendant’s mother and to Thomas. He then posted flyers at
businesses and intersections around the neighborhood. Pole
cameras were set up to monitor the flyers in certain areas
including stores frequented by codefendants Boochee and
Williams and near Williams’s residence. Boochee was captured
by camera looking at a flyer outside one of the stores.
Flyers were also distributed door to door. At Williams’s
home, a flyer was handed to Myesha C.4 and to Williams’s aunt.
Williams soon called Christopher Williams to get his big brother
Tone’s number because Williams needed to talk to him about
some “old shit.” Immediately after that call, Williams phoned
Boochee but received no answer. A few minutes later, Myesha
called and Boochee answered. She passed the phone to Williams,
who said, “Hey, Tone, I need you—I need to see you. I got
something I need to show you.” Boochee replied that he already
knew what Williams was talking about and said, “It ain’t
nothing.” Williams countered, “This is some serious shit,” and he

4 We use witnesses’ first names for their safety because a
witness received a threatening text sent from Williams’s cell
phone.

6
did not want to talk over the phone. Boochee continued saying it
was nothing. In the background Myesha yelled, “It’s some old
shit,” which Williams repeated, and Boochee said, “Don’t worry
about it.” Before hanging up, Williams told Boochee, “Love you,
dog.”
Myesha was briefly hospitalized, and she wanted Williams
to visit. As her phone calls with Williams were intercepted,
Williams was heard to say he did not want to go out, and he could
not show his face. The camera monitoring Williams’s home did
not show him leaving the house for two weeks after the flyers
were distributed.
Detective Camarillo learned from Bryant’s insurance
company the proceeds of the insurance policy had been paid to
defendant and the other beneficiaries in March 2000. A search
warrant for defendant’s home was obtained and served on
December 19, 2013, the day of defendant’s arrest. Documents
pertaining to the victim’s insurance policy, including letters to
defendant’s attorney from the insurance company were found.
One letter dated March 1999 explained the company would not
pay then because the death was being investigated as a homicide.
A February 2000 letter informed defendant the company would
hold all payments until there was an arrest in the case.
Myesha C.
Myesha identified Williams in court as her ex-boyfriend,
having been in a relationship for three years before breaking up
seven months before the February 6, 2014 preliminary hearing.
She testified to being at Williams’s home on September 12, 2013,
when police officers handed her a flyer that read: “[O]n
December 20, 1998 Arlando Bryant was shot and killed in front of

7
his house on Dwight Avenue, Compton, on his way to work . . . .”
The flyer also said: “Information wanted, murder investigation.”
Myesha read the flyer and then showed it to Williams,
because the police were handing it out everywhere in the
neighborhood and it contained a sketch that resembled Williams,
alongside a description of the “suspect.” There was also a
photograph of the “victim Arlando Bryant.” After a minute
Williams crumpled the flyer and told her to throw it away. A
couple days later, Williams told Myesha the sketch was like
looking at himself in the mirror.
Sometime within the year before the flyer came out,
Williams told Myesha about a murder in which he was involved
15 years earlier, when he was paid to kill someone. Williams said
Boochee offered to pay him $10,000 to kill a person he said was a
“D.A.” who had done something to him. Williams, Woodson and
Boochee then rode to the victim’s location in Boochee’s car and
parked there. Boochee drove, Williams was in the front
passenger seat, and Woodson was in the back seat, drunk and
asleep. A man was sitting in his car reading a newspaper.
Williams, who wore a rag over his face, got out, went to the
victim, tapped on the window and shot him in the head through
the window.
In the days after the flyer came out, Myesha noticed
Williams made many phone calls and was acting nervous. He
was “jumpy all of the time.” When she saw one of the flyers
posted in the area, she tore it down because Williams’s aunt told
her to do so.
Anita W.
Anita W. testified she had known Boochee since 1993 or
1994. They had a sexual relationship and remained good friends

8
for many years. Boochee spoke to her quite a bit about
defendant, with whom he was having a sexual relationship
(defendant was then known as Berlinda Bryant) and was married
to someone else. Boochee claimed relationships with many
women and Anita denied it bothered her. She explained she was
satisfied with the sexual nature of her relationship with Boochee,
and “[w]hatever he was doing with others, that was on him.”
Sometimes, after seeing defendant, Boochee returned to
Anita “crying and sad,” saying defendant would belittle him when
they argued. Boochee also told Anita he had an apartment where
he would meet defendant, or they would meet at her home. He
also said defendant’s husband worked at Boeing Aircraft and
Boochee obtained medical care using Bryant’s name. Anita never
met defendant but saw her once in the early 2000’s, standing on
her porch as Anita passed by.
Anita found out about defendant’s husband’s murder
sometime after it happened, but not right away. When she asked
Boochee about it he was nonchalant and did not seem worried or
scared until sometime later. Boochee told Anita he and
defendant were waiting for some insurance money. When asked
whether he had anything to do with the murder, Boochee said
nothing. Anita said, “[Y]ou done F’d up your whole life for her, a
married woman, over lust and greed.” Boochee replied, “yeah.”
Anita asked whether defendant was involved in the murder, and
Boochee replied, “All the way up to her eyeballs.” Otherwise
Boochee never told Anita about defendant’s involvement.5 Anita

5 Defense counsel objected in the preliminary hearing
claiming this was an uncorroborated statement of an alleged
coconspirator. The objection was overruled based on People v.

9
claimed Boochee said nothing about why defendant’s husband
was murdered and never admitted or denied he had anything to
do with the murder. However Anita then recalled she told
detectives he said defendant wanted her husband dead for
“money.”6 Anita assumed Boochee contracted someone to kill
defendant’s husband at defendant’s request.
In 2002 Anita sent a four-page document to an
investigating detective in this case with information regarding
the murder. She wrote that the shooter hangs out in Kelly Park
and was mentally a little slow. It also gave the address of the
apartment where Boochee and defendant met up,7 writing she
assumed defendant was expecting insurance proceeds.
On cross-examination Anita testified that in 1998 Boochee
had an Astro van with multiple rows of seats. Anita also
admitted she was convicted in 1986 of filing a false income tax
claim, and in 2008 she was convicted of bankruptcy fraud.

Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, and People v. Cervantes
(2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 162. (See generally, People v. Washington
(2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 19, 30–31.)
6 Boochee once told Anita that after he asked defendant for
money for school clothes for his children, defendant refused,
saying “everything was on the wait list, waiting on the insurance
file to be paid.”
7 The owner of the building testified defendant rented the
apartment in October 1998, and in November 1998 Boochee
moved in with her. Defendant moved out and Boochee became
the sole renter on the rental agreement in January 1999. Boochee
moved out in April 1999. In 2002, defendant and Boochee
submitted an application to move back into the building but were
turned down.

10
Williams’s interview
Williams agreed to be interviewed by Detective Camarillo
on October 16, 2013, at the sheriff’s station. Detective Camarillo
showed him the flyer, and Williams denied both that the sketch
looked like him and that he committed the crime. Williams said
if he had done it, he would have worn a rag over his face, and the
sketch showed a plain face. Detective Camarillo had interviewed
Myesha two weeks earlier. She told him when describing the
murder to her, Williams said his face was covered by a rag during
the crime so there was no way anyone saw him, and Williams did
not understand how the sketch came about.
Woodson’s interview
On October 29, 2013, Detective Camarillo interviewed
Woodson, who initially denied involvement in the murder, then
admitted participating in what he thought was a robbery. He
and Williams met Boochee who was driving an Astro van.
Williams got into the front passenger seat and Woodson got into
the back. Williams said, “Let’s get this guy and get paid.” They
sat parked on Spruce Street facing Dwight Avenue and waited for
hours. Woodson fell asleep and woke up when the van door was
slammed shut. He then saw Williams, who was out of his seat
and asked Woodson if he wanted to get out. Woodson declined
and fell back to sleep. Minutes later, the door slammed shut
again, and he saw Williams in his seat. They returned to the
place where Williams had left his car. As they exited the van,
Woodson saw Williams hand Boochee a semiautomatic handgun.
A couple of weeks later, Woodson and Williams walked to
the shop where Boochee worked. Woodson waited outside while
Williams went in. Williams returned with some money he used

11
to buy Woodson some clothes and shoes, and himself a car and
drugs.

DISCUSSION
I. Section 1172.6 procedure and substantial evidence
review
Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to
support the trial court’s finding she was guilty of malice murder.
We apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (See
People v. Sifuentes (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 217, 233–234.) On
appeal from the denial of a petition after hearing, our task is to
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have made the
same determination beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v.
Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951.)
In conducting an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3), the trial court sits as an independent fact
finder (People v. Vargas, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 951) and
must “‘review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve
contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility, all
under the reasonable doubt standard . . .’” (People v. Oliver (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 466, 480, quoting People v. Clements (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 276, 298). Under the usual substantial evidence
standard, “we must view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the People and must presume in support of the judgment the
existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the
evidence.” (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) “The
standard is deferential, but the evidence in support of the
judgment must be reasonable, credible, and of solid value; ‘a mere
possibility’ or ‘[s]peculation is not substantial evidence’
[citation].” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 120.) We defer to

12
the trial court’s resolution of conflicts and credibility
determinations. (People v. Clements, supra, at p. 298.) “The
same standard applies when the conviction rests primarily on
circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978,
1053.) “An appellate court must accept logical inferences that the
[trier of fact] might have drawn from the circumstantial
evidence.” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.)
Reversal on a substantial evidence ground “is unwarranted
unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conclusion of the
trier of fact].’” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
We “begin with the presumption that the evidence . . . was
sufficient, and the defendant bears the burden of convincing us
otherwise.” (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567,
1573.) “[T]he defendant must present his case to us consistently
with the substantial evidence standard of review. . . . [Citation.]
If the defendant fails to present us with all the relevant evidence,
or fails to present that evidence in the light most favorable to the
People, then he cannot carry his burden of showing the evidence
was insufficient because support for the [ruling] may lie in the
evidence he ignores.” (Id. at p. 1574.)
II. Substantial evidence supports the trial court order
Defendant has failed to meet her burden to convince us
that there is insufficient evidence of her participation in this
crime as an aider and abettor. The trial court stated it based its
ruling on the record of conviction. In particular, the court had
considered the petition, the parties’ briefs, the plea transcript,
and all five volumes of the preliminary hearing transcript, except
the evidence admitted pursuant to section 872, subdivision (b).
Defendant has not objected to the use of the preliminary hearing

13
transcript on appeal or any testimony contained therein,8 nor has
she identified any testimony admitted pursuant to section 872,
subdivision (b). In her briefs defendant has failed to explain the
evidence contained in the preliminary hearing transcripts, except
a few passages in her page-and-a-half summary, but then only in
the light most favorable to her arguments. Nor has defendant
referred to or included in the record on appeal a transcript of her
plea, which could have contained an admission. (See People v.
Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217, 235.)
Instead, defendant has referred to arguments made in the
briefs filed in the trial court regarding the petition and an
augmented clerk’s transcript filed at defendant’s request,
containing volume 5 of the preliminary hearing transcript, mostly
consisting of counsel’s arguments to the court. Defendant is
required to summarize and discuss all relevant evidence, not the
argument of counsel, particularly argument on her behalf. (See
People v. Sanghera, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1573.)
Defendant’s briefs have addressed selected arguments made
below and in the People’s appellate brief without any attempt to
summarize the relevant evidence.
After the opening brief was filed this court granted the
People’s motion for augmentation of the record, which contained
five volumes of preliminary hearing transcripts and copies of
minute orders filed at the time of the preliminary hearing.
Defendant did not file an amended or supplemental opening
brief, nor did she correct her statement of facts in her reply brief
though it was filed nearly five months after the People’s

8 During the preliminary hearing, counsel objected to some
testimony, but defendant did not renew any of the objections in
the section 1172.6, subdivision (d) hearing.

14
augmentation. Also, defendant cites cases in which similar
arguments were made based upon evidence adduced in those
cases, not this case. “When we decide issues of sufficiency of
evidence, comparison with other cases is of limited utility, since
each case necessarily depends on its own facts.” (People v.
Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 516.)
Defendant argues the prosecution witnesses at the
preliminary hearing were not credible because their testimony
was inherently unreliable, and thus the trial court’s finding the
witnesses were credible is not entitled to deference. Unless it is
inherently improbable or physically impossible, we accept
testimony believed by the trial court. (People v. Barnes (1986) 42
Cal.3d 284, 306.) Evidence is not inherently improbable unless
its falsity is apparent without resorting to inferences or
deductions. (People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 150.)
Here, defendant has resorted to inferences or deductions and has
not shown inherent improbability. Defendant states: “Anita [W.],
a former lover of Boochee who was intensely jealous of
[defendant], and who had suffered two fraud-related convictions
testified at the preliminary hearing in this case that Boochee told
her that [defendant] was involved in the murder of the victim.”
Defendant points to no evidence of jealousy, other than
defendant’s own inference drawn from Anita’s sexual relationship
with Boochee.
Defendant also cites Anita’s testimony that Boochee gave
no details of defendant’s involvement and denied all his
involvement. However, defendant did not object at the section
1172.6, subdivision (d) hearing to Anita’s testimony given after
she refreshed her memory by listening to a recording of her
interview with detectives in which she said Boochee did tell her

15
why defendant wanted her husband dead—“money.”9 Defendant
did not object to Anita’s “assumption” Boochee contracted with
someone to kill defendant’s husband at defendant’s request, or to
her telling detectives she thought defendant was the mastermind.
Boochee said after he asked defendant for money, defendant
refused and said that everything was waiting for insurance file to
be paid.
The trial court did not find any of the witnesses to be
incredible and based its findings on the totality of the evidence.
Defendant has not shown the witnesses’ testimony was
inherently improbable or physically impossible; we therefore
defer to the trial court’s credibility determinations. (See People v.
Barnes, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 306; People v. Clements, supra, 75
Cal.App.5th at p. 298.)
Defendant argues Boochee could have planned the murder
on his own after he learned about the insurance policy and the
time Bryant usually left for work, which he could have done
through his relationship with defendant. Defendant also claims
there was absolutely no evidence she had advance knowledge of
Boochee’s plan to kill Bryant or that she participated in such a
plan, apparently equating “circumstantial evidence” with “no
evidence.” “‘“‘Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to
connect a defendant with the crime and to prove [her] guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.’”’” (People v. Howard (2010) 51
Cal.4th 15, 34.) Defendant has drawn inferences in her favor
without consideration of the evidence and inferences thereto upon
which the trial court relied. We must draw all reasonable

9 The parties have not made the recordings or other exhibits
part of the appellate record.

16
inferences the trial court might have drawn from the evidence,
including circumstantial evidence. (See People v. Maury, supra,
30 Cal.4th 342, 396.) As explained below, we find the more
reasonable inference to be drawn, and the one apparently found
by the trial court, is defendant knew of and participated in the
plan to kill Bryant and shared Boochee’s intent to bring it about.
The evidence supports the conclusion Boochee arranged the
murder, and by his admission to Anita, he “[messed] up [his]
whole life” for defendant. The trier of fact could properly
construe a defendant’s silence in the face of an implied accusation
of crime as an adoptive admission. (See People v. Jennings (2010)
50 Cal.4th 616, 661.) Such an inference is further strengthened
by Boochee’s “yeah” reply to Anita’s challenge. Add to the mix,
Williams’s expectation to “get paid” for Bryant’s murder and
Boochee’s years-earlier offer to pay Williams $10,000 to kill a
person described as a D.A. Two weeks after Williams killed
Bryant, he went to Boochee’s place of business to collect enough
money to buy clothing for Woodson and a car for himself. A
defendant aids and abets murder by encouraging or facilitating
its commission sharing the perpetrator’s intent to kill. (In re
Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 585.)
A conspiracy to commit a specific intent crime is an
agreement among two or more persons to commit the crime, with
an express agreement regarding specific intent. (People v. Tran
(2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1221; see §§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 184.)
Thus one who aids and abets or conspires to commit a murder
who shares the coconspirator’s or perpetrator’s intent to kill is
guilty of the murder committed by the perpetrator. (People v.
Anthony (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1144.) “‘“[A] conspiracy
may be inferred from the conduct, relationship, interests, and

17
activities of the alleged conspirators before and during the
alleged conspiracy.”’” (People v. Tran, supra, at p. 1221.)
Similarly, in determining the knowledge and intent of an aider
and abettor, factors that may be considered include “‘presence at
the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and
after the offense.’” (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015,
1054.)
Whether Boochee or defendant came up with the scheme to
kill defendant’s husband for his life insurance proceeds,
defendant’s relationship with Boochee and her actions and
statements before and after the murder show she was integrally
involved in the plan. Boochee’s relationship with defendant was
close, as evidenced by his frequently speaking of defendant to
Anita. Detective Camarillo testified that defendant’s name was
the only woman’s name tattooed on Boochee’s body. Though
defendant’s treatment of Boochee would at times make him cry,
he remained in the relationship. Defendant also rented an
apartment where he and defendant could meet, and a month
before the murder he moved in there with defendant. Boochee
received medical care through defendant’s insurance using
Bryant’s name. Taken together these facts establish quite a close
relationship between Boochee and defendant.
After the murder, although Boochee did not give Anita
details of how defendant was involved in her husband’s murder,
he said defendant was involved “[a]ll the way up to her eyeballs”
and that defendant told him the reason why she wanted her
husband dead was for money.
Before the wiretaps were in place, defendant and Boochee
communicated with each other on their cell phones in excess of
125 times between January 1, 2013, and August 29, 2013. On

18
August 29, after defendant learned the investigation to find
Bryant’s killer had resumed, she and Boochee met in person, in a
parking lot. Thereafter they ceased all further communication
with one another by phone. Detective Camarillo testified that
defendant’s refusal to go on camera to ask the public for help in
finding her husband’s killer was perplexing, in that she had not
been informed she was a suspect. In intercepted phone calls soon
after the airing of L.A.’s Most Wanted, defendant sounded upset
and disgusted. In one such call, defendant sounded irate and
said she was “fighting for her life” even though she still had not
been informed she was a suspect in the case.
Defendant argues her refusal to cooperate with the
investigation was just as consistent with the conduct of an
innocent person wrongly targeted by the police as well as a
reasonable exercise of her Fifth Amendment right under the
federal Constitution to remain silent. We again reject
defendant’s self-serving inferences. Defendant had not yet been
named as a suspect, was not questioned by law enforcement
regarding her involvement, and did not remain silent. Moreover,
she did not object to the evidence on that basis, and has thus
forfeited any Fifth Amendment argument. (People v. Huggins
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 240, fn. 18.)
We conclude defendant has not met her burden of
demonstrating the evidence was insufficient to support the
court’s ruling. Furthermore, we find the evidence discussed
above and the reasonable inferences the trial court likely drew
from them to be amply sufficient to support the court’s finding
that defendant could presently be convicted of murder under
section 188 as amended effective January 1, 2019, such that any
rational trier of fact could have made the same determination

19
beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Vargas, supra, 84
Cal.App.5th at p. 951.)
III. The People’s argument
Defendant contends this court should reject the People’s
argument to the trial court that she was ineligible for relief under
section 1172.6 “because she could not have been convicted of
malice murder on a theory of ‘imputed malice’ under current
Penal code sections 188 and 189.” As the argument was made to
the trial court, it is not this court’s role to accept or reject it. The
appellate court reviews lower court orders and judgments, and as
defendant asserts the prosecutor erred, but makes no assignment
of trial court error based upon this issue and has not claimed
prejudice, we decline to address the issue.
IV. Constitutional contentions
Defendant contends that if section 1172.6 is deemed
inapplicable to her it would violate her state and federal
constitutional rights to equal protection and due process, and the
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.
Citing People v. Schell (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 437, 444, the
People point out that section 1172.6 is an act of lenity and does
not afford the petitioner all the constitutional rights available at
trial. (See People v. Palacios (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 942, 954–
955.) In reply, defendant concedes that “this may be true,” but
argues the People have mischaracterized defendant’s claim.
Defendant explains her assertion as: “[A]ssuming [defendant] is
in fact eligible for relief, but resentencing relief is nevertheless
denied to [her], such denial would be arbitrary and capricious
and in violation of a state created liberty interest and [her] state
and federal constitutional due process rights.”

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We cannot assume defendant is in fact eligible for relief
under section 1172.6 because, as discussed in part II above, we
have reviewed the evidence the parties placed before the trial
court as well as the parties’ arguments here and below, and we
rejected defendant’s claim that defendant’s guilt of murder was
not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. As we have rejected the
assignment of error on which defendant bases the alleged
constitutional errors, we need not reach her constitutional claims.
(See People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 441, fn. 17.)

DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.

________________________
CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

________________________
LUI, P. J.

________________________
ASHMANN-GERST, J.

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