CourtListener 10318207•People v. Aviles CA2/5
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Filed 1/21/25 P. v. Aviles CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B328461
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. BA469608)
ROBERTO JAVIER AVILES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, David R. Fields, Judge. Affirmed.
California Appellate Project, Richard B. Lennon and Anna
Rea, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and Nicholas J.
Webster, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
******
Roberto Javier Aviles (defendant) appeals his conviction for
resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code, § 69)1 on the grounds
that the trial court erred (1) in denying his challenge to the
prosecutor’s exercise of a peremptory challenge under Code of
Civil Procedure section 231.7, and (2) in not sua sponte
instructing on the lesser-included offense of simple assault (§
240). Concluding there was no error, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
In the early afternoon of March 19, 2018, Los Angeles
Sheriff’s Deputy Juan Cruz (Deputy Cruz) was overseeing a
“module” of inmates within the Men’s Central Jail in downtown
Los Angeles.
Defendant and another inmate were standing outside of
their cells at a time when they were not supposed to be. Because
part of Deputy Cruz’s job was to “rehouse” such inmates back into
their cells, Deputy Cruz verbally asked defendant and the other
inmate to return to their cells. The other inmate complied, but
defendant did not.
Deputy Cruz asked defendant another five or six times to
return to his cell, but defendant did not comply.
After radioing another custodial officer for assistance,
Deputy Cruz calmly approached defendant and asked him again
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2
to return to his cell. Defendant again refused, and said he was
getting a haircut; this was not a permissible reason.
Deputy Cruz asked defendant to comply again, and
explained that he would have to place defendant in handcuffs and
escort him to his cell if defendant did not comply. Again,
defendant refused to comply.
As Deputy Cruz approached defendant and extended his
hand toward defendant’s wrist, defendant pulled back his arm
and punched Deputy Cruz’s chest.
As defendant began to land further blows on Deputy Cruz’s
head and face, Deputy Cruz ordered defendant to stop; when
defendant did not stop, Deputy Cruz “protect[ed] [him]self” by
landing four to five punches on defendant as defendant continued
to punch him.
Other custodial deputies arrived and ended the fistfight by
forcing defendant to the ground, where he was placed in
handcuffs while still “actively resisting.”
Neither defendant nor Deputy Cruz had any visible
injuries, although Deputy Cruz’s face was red.
The entire incident was captured on video.
II. Procedural Background
The People charged defendant with resisting an executive
officer (§ 69) by “unlawfully attempt[ing] by means of threats and
violence to deter and prevent [Deputy Cruz] . . . from performing
a duty imposed upon [him] by law” and by “knowingly resist[ing]
by the use of force and violence [Deputy Cruz] in the performance
of his[] duty.”2
2 The People also charged defendant with battery with injury
upon a peace officer (§ 243, subd. (c)(2)), but dismissed that
charge before trial.
3
The matter proceeded to trial in late April and early May
2022. The sole witnesses were Deputy Cruz and Deputy Rene
Salas.
The trial court instructed the jury on the elements of the
crime of resisting an executive officer through the “use[ of] force
or violence,” including the requirement that the officer be
“performing his lawful duty” and that an officer “is not lawfully
performing his . . . duties if he . . . is using unreasonable or
excessive force in his . . . duties.” Defendant did not request that
the jury be instructed on the crime of simple assault as a lesser-
included offense.
The jury found defendant guilty.
After denying defendants’ motion for a new trial, the trial
court imposed a mid-term sentence of two years in jail.
Defendant filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Improper Exercise of Peremptory Challenge
A. Pertinent facts
Prior to voir dire, the trial court explained its procedure for
jury selection: The court and attorneys would question 24 jurors,
the first 12 of whom would be seated in the jury box. After any
excusals for cause, the parties would then be able to exercise
peremptory challenges against any prospective juror in the jury
box, which enabled the attorneys to “know who is coming up
next.”
While questioning the first 24 jurors, Juror No. 39
indicated that (1) she works two jobs (as a substance abuse
counselor and as a case manager helping the homeless find
housing) and also devotes time to being a freelancer writer; (2)
she lives in Van Nuys with a partner who is studying to be a
4
medical social worker; (3) she has never served on a jury; (4) she
has no children; (5) she has never been arrested; and (6) she has
no relatives or close friends in law enforcement. Juror No. 39
stated she could be fair and impartial when hearing testimony
from law enforcement officers. When asked if she had ever been
the victim of a crime, she replied that she did not “feel
comfortable” responding in open court.
At a sidebar, Juror No. 39 stated she had been the victim of
a rape 23 years earlier. She explained that she did not try to
have the perpetrator prosecuted because the perpetrator was one
of her parents.3 When asked, Juror No. 39 indicated that this
incident would not affect her ability to be fair.
During further questioning of all prospective jurors in open
court, defense counsel asked Juror No. 39 what she thought
about the fact that the charged incident occurred while defendant
was in custody; Juror No. 39 replied, “I have no opinion about it.”
The prosecutor asked Juror No. 39 if she could convict defendant
based on the testimony of a single witness, as the law provides;
3 [Juror No. 39:] “I was the victim of rape 23 years ago.”
[The Court:] “Okay. And was the person prosecuted
for that?”
[Juror No. 39:] “No.”
[The Court:] “Did you try to have that person
prosecuted?”
[Juror No. 39:] “No.”
[The Court:] “Okay.”
[Juror No. 39:] “It was – it was a parent so . . . .”
[The Court:] “It was one of your parents?”
[Juror No. 39:] “Yeah.”
5
Juror No. 39 replied that she could. Those were the only further
questions posed to her.
After dismissing six jurors inside the jury box for cause and
repopulating the box with already-questioned jurors, the
prosecutor accepted the panel. Defendant sequentially exercised
peremptory challenges against two jurors seated in the jury box,
and each time, the prosecutor accepted the newly constituted
jury. When defendant exercised a third peremptory challenge,
Juror No. 39 was seated in the jury box.
The prosecutor then exercised a peremptory challenge
against Juror No. 39. Defendant objected, noting that Juror No.
39 and defendant are both Latinx. In response to the trial court’s
question, the prosecutor offered two reasons for exercising the
strike—namely, that (1) the prosecutor preferred other “jurors
coming up down the line,” and (2) Juror No. 39 indicated “she was
a victim of [what] sounds like a very violent crime but didn’t get
the police involved.” In response to the court’s follow-up
question, “And the fact [Juror No. 39] is a victim of rape how does
that sound to you?,” the prosecutor responded, “It sounded like it
was a traumatic experience. She never called the police and I
just worried that perhaps that past experience for whatever
reason may cloud her experience in a criminal court system.”
The court overruled defendant’s objection, finding no
“implicit or purposeful discrimination” because the prosecutor
had “valid reason[s] for wanting to kick off Juror No. 39 based on
[(1) the juror’s] prior traumatic experience as a rape victim, not
getting the police involved” and (2) the prosecutor’s “anticipat[ion
of] other jurors coming down the road.”
After defendant exercised one further peremptory
challenge, both the prosecutor and defendant accepted the panel.
6
B. Analysis
1. Pertinent law
To supplement and supplant the intent-based,
constitutional framework for evaluating the misuse of
peremptory challenges embodied in Batson v. Kentucky (1986)
476 U.S. 79, 89 (Batson) and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d
258, 278 (Wheeler), our Legislature enacted Code of Civil
Procedure section 231.7.
In criminal cases where jury selection begins on or after
January 1, 2022, section 231.7 prohibits the “use [of] a
peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror on the basis
of the prospective juror’s [actual or perceived] . . . ethnicity,” as
well as six other protected characteristics. (Code Civ. Proc., §
231.7, subds. (a), (i).) Once an objection is made, the party
exercising the strike must “state the reasons the peremptory
challenge has been exercised.” (Id., subd. (c).) The court’s
evaluation of that reason or reasons turns on what those reasons
are. If the party’s stated reasons for the strike match any of a list
of 13 statutorily enumerated reasons,4 the peremptory challenge
“is presumed to be invalid unless the party . . . can show by clear
and convincing evidence that [(1)] an objectively reasonable
person would view the rationale as unrelated to a prospective
juror’s . . . ethnicity . . . , [and (2)] the reasons articulated bear on
the prospective juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in the
4 The statute lists three other “presumptively invalid”
reasons that deal with the juror’s behavior or demeanor in court
or when answering questions. (Id., subd. (g); People v. SanMiguel
(2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 880, 888-889 (SanMiguel) [noting how
subdivisions (e) and (g) “provide two separate lists of
presumptively invalid reasons for exercising a peremptory
challenge”].)
7
case.” (Id., subd. (e).) This standard is met only if “it is highly
probable that the reasons given for the exercise of a peremptory
challenge are unrelated to conscious or unconscious bias and are
instead specific to the juror and bear on that juror’s ability to be
fair and impartial in the case.” (Id., subd. (f).) But if the party’s
stated reasons are not presumptively invalid (or if the
presumption of invalidity is rebutted), then the trial court is
charged with “evaluat[ing] the reasons given . . . in light of the
totality of the circumstances,” including a list of statutorily
enumerated “circumstances,” to “determine[ whether] there is a
substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person”—
that is, a person who is “aware that unconscious bias, in addition
to purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the unfair
exclusion of potential jurors in the State of California”—“would
view [actual or perceived] . . . ethnicity . . . as a factor in the use
of the peremptory challenge.” (Id., subds. (d)(1), (d)(2)(A), (d)(3);
People v. Gonzalez (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1, 16 (Gonzalez).) We
review de novo a trial court’s determination that a strike was
valid, and the sole remedy for any violation is reversal of the
conviction. (Id., subd. (j); People v. Uriostegui (2024) 101
Cal.App.5th 271, 279 (Uriostegui).)
2. Application
a. Presumptive invalidity
Although defendant did not make this argument to the trial
court, defendant argues on appeal that the prosecutor’s stated
5
reasons for striking Juror No. 39 were presumptively invalid
5 The People urge that defendant’s failure to make this
specific objection to the trial court constitutes a forfeiture and
invited error. For the reasons we explain below, even assuming
defendant did not forfeit the argument, it fails on the merits.
8
because they indicated that Juror No. 39 was struck for
“[e]xpressing a distrust of or having a negative experience with
law enforcement or the criminal legal system.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 231.7, subd. (e)(1).) We reject this argument. Although the
prosecutor worried that Juror No. 39’s past victimization might
“cloud her experience” in the courtroom, at no point did the
prosecutor cite Juror No. 39’s distrust of, or negative experience
with, law enforcement or the criminal legal system as a basis for
the strike. Nor was the prosecutor’s stated reason a proxy for
such distrust or negative experience. Although Juror No. 39
indicated that she did not report her rape to law enforcement, she
also indicated, when asked, that her decision not to do so was
based on the close family relationship she had with the
perpetrator rather than to any ill feelings about law enforcement
or the criminal legal system. (Cf. Uriostegui, supra, 101
Cal.App.5th at pp. 279-280 [prosecutor’s stated reason of striking
a juror due to “lack of life experience” is akin to the
presumptively invalid reason of the juror’s lack of employment or
underemployment].)
Defendant resists this conclusion with what boils down to
two arguments. First, he argues that “[i]t is precisely because
Juror [No.] 39 did not express a negative view of law enforcement
nor the criminal legal system that implicates the prosecutor’s
proffered reasoning for excusing [her].” To the extent defendant
is suggesting that the prosecutor was being deceptive in not
basing his challenge on Juror No. 39’s negative experiences, we
reject that suggestion because Juror No. 39 relayed no such
experiences. Second, defendant argues that a ruling in his favor
is dictated by two further cases—namely, People v. Jimenez
(2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 535 (Jimenez) and Gonzalez, supra, 104
9
Cal.App.5th 1. However, neither of those cases is on point. (Cf.
Jimenez, at pp. 541-543, 546-547 [upholding exercise of
peremptory strike against a juror who believed law enforcement
had a “racial bias” and who was employed by a school district];
Gonzalez, at p. 16 [upholding exercise of peremptory strike
against juror who “expressed bitterness towards law
enforcement”].)
Thus, the prosecutor’s stated reasons are not presumptively
invalid.6
b. Non-presumptive invalidity
Where, as we have concluded here, the prosecutor’s stated
reasons are not presumptively invalid, our task under Code of
Civil Procedure section 231.7 is to evaluate whether “there is a
substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person”—
that is, a person who is “aware that unconscious bias, in addition
to purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the unfair
exclusion of potential jurors in the State of California”—“would
view [actual or perceived] . . . ethnicity . . . as a factor in the use
of the peremptory challenge.” (Id., subds. (d)(1), (d)(2)(A).)
We conclude this standard is not met, and do so for two
reasons.
First, neither reason proffered by the prosecutor—that is,
(1) Juror No. 39 being the “victim” of “a very violent crime”
constituting a “traumatic experience” that “may cloud her
experience in a criminal court system,” nor (2) the prosecutor’s
preference for other “jurors coming up down the line”—is
explicitly based on Juror No. 39’s ethnicity.
6 We therefore have no occasion to decide whether the
presumption of invalidity was rebutted.
10
Second, the statutorily enumerated “circumstances”
bearing on the trial court’s determination do not establish a
substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person
would view ethnicity to have been a factor in the prosecutor’s
strike. Although defendant and Juror No. 39 are both Latinx, so
are the victim of defendant’s conduct (Deputy Cruz) as well as the
only other witness who testified at trial (Deputy Salas). (Code
Civ. Proc., § 231.7, subd. (d)(3)(A); Gonzalez, supra, 104
Cal.App.5th at p. 19 [looking to surnames for perceived racial
identity is appropriate].) The ethnicity of those pertinent
individuals does not “bear on the facts of the case to be tried.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 231.7, subd. (d)(3)(B).) The prosecutor’s
questioning of Juror No. 39 was comparable to (and just as brief
as) her questioning of other jurors; although the prosecutor did
not question Juror No. 39 about either concern proffered as the
reasons for the strike, that is because the court had already
asked Juror No. 39 about the first concern (whether the
traumatic experience of being raped might “cloud her experience
in a criminal court system”) by asking whether Juror No. 39
could be “fair,” and because it would make no sense for the
prosecutor to ask Juror No. 39 about the second concern (whether
other jurors “down the line” were better for the prosecution). (Id.,
subd. (d)(3)(C).) There is also no evidence that the prosecutor did
not exercise a peremptory strike against “other prospective
jurors” who “provided similar, but not necessarily identical,
answers” and “who [were] not” Latinx. (Id., subd. (d)(3)(D).)
Neither of the prosecutor’s reasons is disproportionately
associated with an ethnicity, as rape by a parent could affect a
person of any ethnicity and hoping for better jurors down the line
is not associated with any ethnicity. (Id., subd. (d)(3)(E).)
11
Defendant notes that the prosecutor did not seek to strike Juror
No. 42, who was a victim of domestic violence, but the prosecutor
could reasonably infer that the effect of Juror No. 39’s rape by a
parent was ostensibly more traumatic to that juror (because only
Juror No. 39—and not Juror No. 42—indicated discomfort
discussing the domestic violence incident in open court) and,
more to the point, the record is silent on the ethnicity of Juror
No. 42. The prosecutor’s two stated reasons were each supported
by the record. (Id., subd. (d)(3)(F).) And there is no evidence that
the prosecutor’s office has a “history of prior” discriminatory
peremptory strikes. (Id., subd. (d)(3)(G).)
Defendant resists this conclusion with three arguments.
First, defendant argues that an objectively reasonable person
would view Juror No. 39’s ethnicity as a factor in the prosecutor’s
strike because the prosecutor did not question Juror No. 39 in
greater detail about being raped by her parent and the rape’s
traumatic effect on her and her ability to be fair and did not
question her about her views on law enforcement. We reject this
argument. The lines of questioning defendant suggests, apart
from being indelicate, were also unnecessary: Juror No. 39’s
request for a sidebar because she did not feel “comfortable”
discussing the rape spoke volumes about the incident’s traumatic
effect on the juror; the court preemptively asked Juror No. 39 if
she could be fair after she relayed the incident; and Juror No.
39’s answer that she did not report the incident to law
enforcement because her assailant was a parent indicates that
her reason for not reporting stemmed either from a desire not to
turn in a parent or pressure from that parent to remain quiet—
not from any animosity toward law enforcement. Second,
defendant argues that we are required to ignore the prosecutor’s
12
further explication, at the trial court’s behest, of the original two
stated reasons for her strike. Although we are to give “special
scrutiny” to any prompted explanations, we may still consider
that more fulsome explanation (People v. Ortiz (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 768, 799-800); more to the point, the prosecutor’s
initial reason—that Juror No. 39 “was a victim of [what] sounds
like a very violent crime but didn’t get the police involved”—was
akin to her further comment that Juror No. 39’s victimization
was a “traumatic experience” that “may cloud her experience in a
criminal court system.” Third and lastly, defendant argues that
the prosecutor’s strike also violated Batson/Wheeler, but we
conclude there was no Batson/Wheeler violation for the same
reasons we conclude Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 was
not violated. (Ortiz, at p. 808.)
III. Lesser-Included Offense Instruction
A trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct a jury in a
criminal case on any lesser offense necessarily included in a
charged offense “if there is substantial evidence that only the
lesser crime was committed.” (People v. Smith (2013) 57 Cal.4th
232, 239 (Smith).) In other words, “[s]ubstantial evidence . . . is
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the
defendant committed the lesser, but not the greater, offense.”
(People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 96.) We review de novo
whether the trial court erred in not instructing on a lesser-
included offense. (People v. Licas (2007) 41 Cal.4th 362, 366.)
Section 69 can be violated in one of two ways—namely, (1)
“attempting by threats or violence to deter or prevent an officer
from performing a duty imposed by law”; or (2) “resisting by force
or violence an officer in the performance of his or her duty.”
(People v. Brown (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 140, 149.) Where, as
13
here, the charging document and jury instructions instruct on the
second way of violating section 69, the crime of assault is
“necessarily a lesser included offense” because “it is not possible”
to use force or violence “without [also] committing an assault.”
(Id. at p. 153; Smith, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 242-243.) Thus,
whether a trial court errs in not instructing on the lesser-
included offense of assault turns on whether a reasonable jury
could conclude that the defendant committed the lesser offense of
assault, but not the greater offense of resisting an executive
officer. Because an officer’s use of excessive or unreasonable
force justifies resisting arrest under section 69, a defendant can
be found guilty of assault but not resisting an executive officer if
the charged incident involves the officer’s use of excessive or
unreasonable force; whether the court erred in not instructing on
the lesser-included crime of assault in this case therefore turns
on whether a reasonable jury could conclude that the officer
resisted by the defendant used excessive or unreasonable force.
(Brown, at pp. 154-155; People v. White (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d
161, 168.) The failure to instruct on a lesser-included offense
requires reversal in a noncapital case only if “an examination of
the entire record establishes a reasonable probability that the
error affected the outcome.” (People v. Wyatt (2012) 55 Cal.4th
694, 698.)
Even if we assume for purposes of argument that the trial
court should have given a lesser-included instruction on assault,
there is no reasonable probability that a jury would have
convicted defendant solely of assault (rather than resisting an
executive officer) because there is no reasonable probability that
a jury would have found that Deputy Cruz used excessive or
unreasonable force. The facts at trial were relatively
14
uncontroverted, as they came solely from Deputy Cruz and
Deputy Salas. Those facts indicate that defendant swung at
Deputy Cruz and punched him in the chest as Deputy Cruz was
reaching for defendant’s wrist, and thus before Deputy Cruz ever
touched defendant. Thus, Deputy Cruz did not use any force—let
alone unreasonable or excessive force—prior to defendant
punching him. (See, e.g., Susag v. City of Lake Forest (2002) 94
Cal.App.4th 1401, 1415-1415 [granting summary judgment on
excessive force claim where there was no evidence the defendant-
officers “had any physical contact” with the plaintiff].)7
Defendant urges that Deputy Cruz should not have reached for
defendant’s wrist in the first place (because, according to
defendant, it was against Sheriff’s Department policy to do so
without waiting for backup), but this argument does not alter the
fact that Deputy Cruz did not physically touch defendant at that
time, and thus his actions cannot constitute a use of force. The
only time Deputy Cruz used force was in punching defendant four
or five times while “protect[ing] [him]self” from defendant’s
onslaught of punches to Deputy Cruz’s head and face; given that
this use of force was in self-defense, that this use was of the same
level of force as the defendant (that is, fists), and that defendant
did not suffer any injury, it is not reasonably probable that a jury
would have found this use of force to be unreasonable or
excessive. (See Brown v. Ransweiler (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 516,
527 [“An officer ‘“may use reasonable force to . . . overcome
resistance”’”]; § 835a, subds. (b), (d) [an officer “shall not be
7 An officer’s act in drawing a firearm may constitute an
unreasonable or excessive use of force without physical contact,
but no such weapon was used here.
15
deemed an aggressor or lose the right to self-defense by the use of
objectively reasonable force . . . to overcome resistance”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P.J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, J.
BAKER
_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)
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