CourtListener 10318202•People v. Magallon CA2/6
Texte intégral
Filed 1/21/25 P. v. Magallon CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B331729
(Super. Ct. No. 19CR03216)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
MANUEL NAVARRO
MAGALLON,
Defendant and Appellant.
Manuel Navarro Magallon appeals a judgment following
his no contest plea for committing sexual penetration of a minor
10 years old or younger (Pen. Code,1 § 288.7, subd. (b)) (counts 1–
4); lewd acts on a child under 14 years of age (§ 288, subd. (a))
(counts 6–14); and using a minor for recording sexual acts
(§ 311.4, subd. (c)) (counts 15–30).
The trial court sentenced Magallon to a consecutive 15-
years-to-life term on each count for counts 1 through 4 for an
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
aggregate indeterminate term of 60 years to life. It sentenced
him to eight years on count 6, plus a consecutive two-year term
on each count for counts 7 through 14, plus a consecutive eight-
month term on each count for counts 15 through 30, resulting in
an aggregate determinate term of 34 years eight months. It
imposed this determinate term of 34 years eight months
consecutive to his indeterminate term of 60 years to life.
We conclude: 1) a certificate of probable cause was not
required; 2) the trial court could reasonably find the prohibition
against multiple punishments under section 654 does not apply
to the facts of this case; and 3) the abstract of judgment is
incomplete. We remand for the trial court to prepare a corrected
abstract of judgment. In all other respects, we affirm.
FACTS
Jane Doe, a young child, lived with her mother and two
developmentally disabled brothers in their Santa Barbara home.
Magallon worked as “a caregiver” to provide “in-home caregiving
and transportation services” for Doe’s brothers. He had
“unsupervised access to Doe at the family home.”
“During a seven-year period, commencing when [Doe] was
age seven, [Magallon] repeatedly molested and sexually abused
Doe. He also captured video footage of the molestations and
sexual abuse he committed.”
In 2019, Doe found two hidden cameras in the bathroom.
Magallon was the only one who had access to that room. Doe’s
mother contacted the police. The police obtained a search
warrant for Magallon’s home. They seized cameras “disguised to
look like phone chargers,” three laptop computers, cell phones,
“memory cards,” and flash drives. The memory cards and flash
2
drives “stored numerous videos of [Magallon] molesting Doe, who
appeared to be eight to ten years old at the time.”
After his arrest, Magallon admitted to police that he
touched Doe’s vagina and penetrated her anus with his finger
when she “ ‘was about seven years old.’ ” He said Doe wanted
him to touch her vagina and anus and wanted him to take
pictures.
Magallon was charged with 30 counts that included sexual
penetration of the child, lewd conduct, and recording his sexual
acts with Doe. He pled not guilty. After two days of trial,
Magallon entered a no contest plea. He admitted that on four
occasions he “sexually penetrated Jane Doe” by placing his
“finger inside” her anus when she was under 10 years old (counts
1–4), and he made videos of this “sexual conduct” with the child
(counts 15–18). He admitted that these were “[s]erious and
[v]iolent [f]elonies within the meaning of Penal Code [sections]
667.5(c) and 1192.7(c)(7).” He admitted that on nine occasions he
committed lewd acts on the child (counts 6–14), that these were
“serious and violent felonies,” and that on 16 occasions he created
videos of his sexual conduct with the child (counts 15–30).
Pursuant to the plea agreement, count 5 was dismissed.
The trial court imposed a term of 34 years eight months
consecutive to a term of 60 years to life.
DISCUSSION
Certificate of Probable Cause
The People contend this appeal must be dismissed because
Magallon did not obtain a certificate of probable cause. They
claim he is challenging his conviction based on his no contest plea
which requires a certificate of probable cause. (§ 1237.5.)
3
But Magallon is not challenging his no contest plea or the
conviction on any count. He claims the sentence the court
imposed is unauthorized and the trial court abused its discretion
in imposing it.
“[A] certificate of probable cause is not required to
challenge the exercise of individualized sentencing discretion
within an agreed maximum sentence.” (People v. Buttram (2003)
30 Cal.4th 773, 790.) “Accordingly, such appellate claims do not
constitute an attack on the validity of the plea, for which a
certificate is necessary.” (Id. at p. 791.) An appellant may obtain
relief from a current unauthorized sentence. (In re G.C. (2020) 8
Cal.5th 1119, 1130.)
The People claim that in his plea agreement Magallon
entered into “a negotiated sentence imposed as part of a plea”;
consequently, his challenge to the sentence is “a challenge to the
validity of the plea,” and a certificate of probable cause is
therefore required. But the record does not support this claim.
In his plea agreement, Magallon checked the box that
provides, “No one has made any other promises to me about what
sentence the court may order.” Magallon and the district
attorney stated this was an “open plea.” The plea agreement
listed the potential maximum and minimum sentences. The
People’s sentencing brief said the trial court has “discretion in
this case to decide whether to impose consecutive or concurrent
sentencing.” (Italics added.) Magallon requested the court to
exercise its discretion to impose “15 years to life, to run
concurrent to all other sentences.” The court therefore had
discretion to impose a sentence it believed was appropriate.
Magallon’s challenge to the exercise of the court’s sentencing
discretion is not an attack on the plea that requires a certificate
4
of probable cause. (People v. Buttram, supra, 30 Cal.4th at
p. 790.) Here, as in People v. Hilburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189,
199, the plea agreement “contemplated that the court [would]
choose from among a range of permissible sentences” (italics
added); therefore, Magallon was not challenging the validity of
the plea by challenging the court’s sentencing choice.
Prohibition on Multiple Punishment (§ 654)
Magallon contends the trial court erred because his
sentences for recording his sexual penetration and lewd acts with
the child (§ 311.4, subd.(c)) should have been stayed under
section 654 because they involved the same conduct and intent as
his convictions for committing those sexual acts on the child. On
four occasions, he “made recordings while sexually assaulting
Doe when she was under the age of 10” (counts 1–4 and 15–18);
and on multiple occasions he “made recordings while performing
lewd acts on Doe when she was under the age of 14.”
“Section 654 prohibits multiple punishments for a single
physical act that violates different provisions of law.” (People v.
Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 358.) “In some situations, physical
acts might be simultaneous yet separate for purposes of section
654.” (Ibid.)
“ ‘The trial court has broad latitude in determining whether
section 654, subdivision (a) applies in a given case.’ ” (People v.
Vasquez (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 732, 737.) “ ‘If [the defendant]
entertained multiple criminal objectives which were independent
of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished
for independent violations committed in pursuit of each objective
even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of
an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.’ ” (Ibid.)
5
“A trial court’s express or implied determination that two
crimes were separate, involving separate objectives, must be
upheld on appeal if supported by substantial evidence.” (People
v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618.)
“[M]ultiple sex acts committed on a single occasion can
result in multiple statutory violations. Such offenses are
generally ‘divisible’ from one another under section 654, and
separate punishment is usually allowed.” (People v. Scott (1994)
9 Cal.4th 331, 344, fn. 6.)
“ ‘[S]ection 311.4 is part of a statutory scheme “ ‘to combat
the exploitive use of children in the production of
pornography.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Shields (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 323,
332.) It “ ‘ “prohibits the employment or use of a minor . . . in the
production of material depicting that minor in ‘sexual
conduct.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) The Legislature was “particularly
concerned” about sexual visual displays of children in videotapes.
(Ibid.)
A trial court could reasonably find Magallon’s sexual
penetration and lewd conduct offenses were separate and
divisible from his section 311.4, subdivision (c) video recording
crimes. Section 311.4, subdivision (c) punishes a specific act; it
“targets the person actually filming the pornographic material.”
(People v. Hobbs (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1, 6.) That is an
independent crime, and his sexual assaults may be committed
independently without filming them.
Magallon’s claim that his section 311.4, subdivision (c)
convictions involved only a single lewd act is incorrect. Physical
lewd conduct on a child is one act; filming the child is another.
(People v. Hobbs, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 6.) For each
section 311.4, subdivision (c) count conviction, Magallon admitted
6
that: 1) he committed a lewd act on Doe, and 2) he filmed her. By
doing so, he created child sex pornography. These acts resulted
in distinct consequences: 1) Doe was a victim of a physical sexual
assault, and 2) she was an involuntary participant in a child sex
tape. The People note that to make his videos required multiple
acts: 1) retrieving “a recording device,” 2) setting it to “capture
himself sexually abusing [Doe],” 3) stopping the recording, 4)
storing “the videos on a USB flash drive,” and 5) storing the
drives in his bedroom. This planning procedure is
distinguishable from the single act of a sexual assault.
Those who commit child sexual assaults and those who
videotape them are different types of offenders. Many child sex
offenders do not record their crimes because it is evidence that
could incriminate them. Their goal is to keep these crimes a
“secret” (People v. Whitlock (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 456, 464) and
prevent the creation of corroborating physical evidence. By
recording his crimes, Magallon showed that he did not share that
concern and had a different goal.
The trial court could find Magallon committed his sexual
penetration and lewd conduct offenses to satisfy his immediate
physical lust for the child, but his video recordings of his child
sexual offenses (§ 311.4, subd. (c)) had a different long term goal.
The Legislature enacted the statute to extinguish “the market for
child pornography.” (People v. Shields, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at
p. 332.) By taking his videos, Magallon was able to create lasting
images of his crimes to create child pornography.
In the People’s sentencing brief, they noted that Magallon’s
intent was to create “child pornography” that he could later view
for his pleasure, and he “admitted to watching the videos
multiple times to detectives.”
7
The probation report indicates Magallon made the videos to
“preserve them,” to “watch them in the future, and possibly share
them with other sexual predators.” These are goals that are
different than committing his sexual assaults. The Legislature
sought to independently punish those who create child
pornography, and it did so by authorizing “a separate conviction”
for each such “ ‘piece of media created.’ ” (People v. Haraszewski
(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 924, 945.) Imposing consecutive
sentences is consistent with that legislative goal.
Magallon’s videotaping of his offenses also had a unique
impact on the victim. They subjected her to a continual fear of
future exposure by his ability to rebroadcast the crimes and
increase the potential “market for child pornography.” (People v.
Shields, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 332.) Doe and her mother
discovered Magallon’s hidden cameras years after he committed
his sexual assaults. They then had to deal with the psychological
impact of learning what his videos depicted. In 2023, Doe’s
mother said, “[I]t was very difficult for her to talk about the
instant offenses and the impact they have had on Doe and
herself.” Doe said she did not previously disclose these crimes
because it would “ ‘hurt the family.’ ” She did not want to
“discuss the incidents or remember them.” But the discovery of
these videos that Magallon had maintained for years now
brought these events back to life, forced her to remember, and
revictimized the victim.
In People v. Kongs (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1741, 1754, the
court noted the enactment of these offenses is to “protect the
dignity and psychological well-being of children by forbidding
child pornography.” “A child should not have to face a lifetime of
8
knowing that a permanent record has been made of his or her
abasement.” (Ibid.)
Magallon made numerous videos of his sexual assaults on
the child. The trial court could reasonably find separate
punishment was proper for each video he made. (People v.
Shields, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 332.) “Each additional
photograph further exploits the minor victim, and the Legislature
clearly intended to prevent that exploitation by criminalizing its
creation.” (Ibid.) “[S]ection 311.4’s plain language authorizes
multiple convictions.” (Ibid.) There was no error.
Abstract of Judgment
The People correctly claim the abstract of judgment is
incomplete and must be corrected. It does not include the
sentence on count 23. The trial court is required to prepare an
abstract of judgment that is accurate and complete. (People v.
Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.) Where the abstract is
incorrect, “the appellate court itself should order the trial court to
correct the abstract of judgment.” (Id. at p. 188.)
DISPOSITION
The case is remanded to the trial court to prepare a
corrected abstract of judgment. In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:
BALTODANO, J. CODY, J.
9
Michael J. Carrozzo, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Michael Reed, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jason Tran and Chelsea Zaragoza, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.