In re K.C. CA2/3

CourtListener 10315212Calctapp16 janv. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 1/16/25 In re K.C. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re K.C., a Person Coming B332715
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 23LJJP00203A
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

M.F.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Jennifer W. Baronoff, Juvenile Court Referee. Reversed
and remanded with directions.
Benjamin Ekenes, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Mother appeals from the juvenile court’s assertion
of jurisdiction and its dispositional judgment as to her son
K.C. The juvenile court declared K.C. and two of his younger
half siblings dependents of the court after mother had been
arrested for child endangerment for walking in the street with
the two younger children, and after mother had admitted to
substance abuse and mental health issues. After declaring
K.C. a dependent, the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction
as to him and entered a juvenile custody order awarding father
sole legal and physical custody. Mother contends there was no
substantial evidence that K.C.—who did not live with mother and
had lived with father for the past six years—was at substantial
risk of serious harm due to mother’s conduct. We agree and
reverse the juvenile court’s orders as to K.C.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother and father, who is not a party to this appeal,
share one child, K.C. (born September 2009). Mother has other
children with different fathers. Two of them—J.C. (born January
2018) and I.W. (born March 2021)—also are the subject of this
dependency proceeding but are not the subject of this appeal.
1. Child-welfare history
In 2014, the Los Angeles County Department of Children
and Family Services (DCFS) initiated a juvenile dependency
action on behalf of K.C. and his half sister A.A. (born November
2011)—another of mother’s children—on allegations mother and
A.A.’s father exposed A.A. to domestic violence. The juvenile

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court dismissed the petition without prejudice under Welfare
and Institutions Code1 section 301.
DCFS initiated another dependency proceeding in July
2017 on behalf of K.C. and A.A. on allegations mother left
A.A. alone for extended periods and her lack of supervision
also placed K.C. at risk of serious physical harm. The juvenile
court assumed jurisdiction over both children in June 2018
and terminated jurisdiction with custody orders awarding
their respective fathers full custody and mother unmonitored
visitation.
Mother appealed the orders as to K.C. On March 25, 2019,
this court reversed the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings
as to K.C. and remanded the matter to the juvenile court with
directions to vacate the jurisdiction and custody orders as to K.C.
(In re K.C. et al. (Mar. 25, 2019, B291186) [nonpub. opn.].)
We affirmed the orders as to A.A. (Ibid.)
2. Events leading to current dependency proceeding
In June 2023, DCFS received a report alleging a motorist
nearly struck mother, who had been walking—at about 4:00 a.m.
—in the middle of the street against traffic with J.C. and I.W.
Mother was arrested for child endangerment. Further
investigation revealed the two children were living with
maternal grandmother and aunt because mother was
homeless and abused drugs. Mother intermittently lived there.
The grandmother and aunt did not know mother had taken
the children from the home in the middle of the night.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.

3
Law enforcement was concerned because maternal relatives had
no legal standing to prevent mother from removing the children
from their care if she chose to do so.
A DCFS social worker spoke with a jailer at the sheriff’s
station who said mother had been uncooperative, was incoherent,
and had taken her pants off in the jail cell. The social worker
interviewed mother at the jail. Mother said she had been trying
to see her children; she wanted to see K.C. “because he [was]
in danger.” When the social worker questioned mother further,
mother just stared and spoke in slow, slurred speech.
The social worker interviewed maternal relatives.
Maternal grandmother told the social worker mother would
go missing for days at a time, was abusing drugs, and had mental
health issues. Mother usually left J.C. and I.W. with maternal
grandmother or maternal great-grandmother. Sometimes
she took the children with her. At times, the family sent the
children to stay with different relatives to prevent mother from
taking them and placing them in an unsafe situation. Mother
had accused maternal grandmother of kidnapping the children.
Maternal aunt said maternal relatives had taken care of
the children “ ‘for years.’ ” Mother had been “clean” from the end
of March through April but had relapsed in mid-May. Maternal
great-grandmother said mother’s drug addiction had worsened
over the past two years. She stated mother would sneak out
of the home with J.C. and I.W. The family was limited in
what they could do to protect the children without formal
custody orders. The great-grandmother said, “ ‘We have called
authorities, but they don’t do anything about it.’ ” Maternal aunt
stated she had tried to stop mother from taking the two children
in the past, but that resulted in a physical altercation. In

4
November 2022, maternal great-uncle saw mother using drugs
in front of I.W. He intervened, but mother became angry and
confrontational. He also said J.C. and I.W. had seen mother
get “jumped,” apparently by people to whom she owed money
for drugs.
K.C. and A.A. lived with their respective fathers. Father
told the social worker he had had custody of K.C. for the past
six years. He stated he would go to court the next day and ask
for a modification to his family law order to restrict mother’s
visits.2 Father did not allow mother to visit K.C. unsupervised—
he was concerned about her drug use. He also did not allow K.C.
to go to maternal grandmother’s home alone or to be in the home
alone with mother. Father stated he “is present with . . . mother
and [K.C.] because he doesn’t trust mother’s judgment. She
is under the influence and unpredictable.” He reiterated he
“doesn’t allow his son to be with mother alone.”
Father said K.C. last visited mother—with father—about
a week earlier. Mother stayed in the bathroom during his visit.
About two months earlier, mother had come to father’s home with
her two younger children demanding to see K.C.; she was “high.”
The police took mother back to maternal grandmother’s home,
“but nothing else was done.” Father stated “law enforcement
didn’t do anything about the situation.” Father also said mother
had moved in with maternal grandmother about three weeks

2 As discussed, the custody order the juvenile court entered
in 2018 was vacated in 2019. There is no custody order in the
appellate record other than the order that is part of this appeal.
It appears, therefore, that no custody order was in place for K.C.
at that time.

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earlier. Mother had tried to stay at his home, but father
did not want K.C. to see her in that condition: mother was
“ ‘incoherent sometimes’ ” and was “ ‘in and out of it, and bizarre
sometimes.’ ”
Father reported mother had involved K.C. in shoplifting.
In May 2023, K.C. went shopping with mother while father
waited in the car. Mother “ ‘had promised . . . to get [K.C.]
earrings.’ ” After father took mother home, K.C. told him mother
had “ ‘stuffed her basket, and without paying had him push the
cart out of the store.’ ” Father called mother and confronted her;
she hung up. Father wanted mother to have “ ‘monitored visits
with my son, and for her to go to rehab.’ ”
K.C. confirmed he visited mother while father was present.
He knew about mother’s drug abuse from others. K.C. could tell
mother was under the influence during most of their visits—she
would lose focus and fall asleep. K.C. told the social worker he
wanted mother to get better so that mother could talk to him and
see him. K.C. also confirmed the shoplifting incident. He said
mother had returned items she hadn’t purchased and left with
the items she couldn’t return. He stated there had been a similar
incident a year earlier when he was with mother and A.A., but
he had not told father about it.
A.A.’s father let A.A. visit maternal grandmother’s home
but asked the family not to leave A.A. alone with mother.
According to A.A., mother “ ‘gets high inside the bathroom
at [maternal] grandmother’s house.’ ” A.A. said maternal
grandmother “ ‘doesn’t let us go around my mother when she
is on drugs.’ ” A.A. had been spending the night at maternal
grandmother’s house when mother took J.C. and I.W.

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J.C. and I.W. were detained from mother and placed with
maternal great-uncle. K.C. remained in father’s care. DCFS
recommended a family law order “be set in place for . . . father
to get sole physical custody of [K.C.] with monitored visits with
. . . mother.”
On June 15, 2023, DCFS filed a section 300 petition
on behalf of K.C., J.C., and I.W. The petition alleged K.C.
came within section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). As relevant
to K.C., the petition alleged the child was at risk of serious
physical harm based on (1) mother’s failure to provide for
J.C. and I.W. and having left them with maternal relatives
without having created an appropriate plan for their supervision
(counts b-1 and j-1); (2) mother’s “history of mental and emotional
problems, including visual and auditory hallucinations, spatial
thoughts, delusion, hostile behaviors, aggression, self-harming
behaviors, paranoia, incoherent thoughts and statements, and
erratic and impulsive behaviors” that rendered her incapable of
regularly caring for and supervising the children, self-harming
behavior in January 2023, and her failure “to consistently
participate in mental health treatment services” (count b-2); and
(3) mother’s “history of substance abuse including prescription
medication, methamphetamine, and ecstasy,” and current abuse
of illicit substances that rendered her incapable of regularly
caring for and supervising the children, and her having been
under the influence while the children were under her care
and supervision (count b-3).
Mother did not appear at the June 16, 2023 initial hearing.
The juvenile court ordered K.C. detained from mother and
released to father.

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3. DCFS’s reports
According to the DCFS dependency investigator (DI),
mother admitted the first allegation—that she had failed to make
an appropriate plan for J.C.’s and I.W.’s care—was true. Mother
said the mental health allegation (count b-2) also was true.
Mother stated that on the night of the incident, she had been
hearing voices telling her she had to take the children because
someone was trying to take them from her. She said she
hallucinated and heard voices when under the influence of drugs.
Mother further admitted her years-long problem with
drugs and that being under the influence of drugs prevented
her from caring for her children appropriately—that is why she
took the children to her family’s home. Mother said she became
addicted to Oxycodone and Norco, and her street drugs of choice
were fentanyl and methamphetamine. She understood her
drug use and untreated mental health issues were harmful
to her children. She acknowledged she needed help.
Father reported mother used to leave her younger children
with him and his wife for days at a time. There were times when
father let mother stay with his family. Father told the DI his
co-parenting relationship with mother had gotten progressively
worse over the years because mother “became malicious and
would keep their son away from him.” Father said K.C. had
been in his care since he was eight years old when A.A. was
taken from mother and K.C. was placed with him. He said
mother last saw K.C. when they went to the store and she
“had [K.C.] steal stuff.” Father did not want K.C. to be around
mother if she was going to have him do illegal things.
When the DI interviewed K.C. about the allegations, he
“appeared very protective of . . . mother and was careful to only

8
speak well of her.” K.C. stated he never saw mother use drugs
but heard others talk about her “being on drugs.” He said “he
would like to believe that it’s not true.”
On August 29, 2023, mother, who remained incarcerated,
enrolled in the in-custody START program—an eight-week
substance treatment and re-entry transition program. Mother
also was attending anger management, relapse prevention,
domestic violence, parenting, and life skills group sessions.
4. Adjudication and disposition
The court adjudicated the matter on October 11, 2023. The
court admitted the DCFS reports and attachments in evidence
and heard testimony from K.C. and mother (and from maternal
grandmother as to placement of the younger children).
K.C. testified he essentially was in his father’s full-time
care. Every time he visited mother, father was with him. During
visits, mother sometimes “dozed off” while he was talking to her.
K.C. answered “yes” when asked if he wanted to live with mother
again. When asked if he was “okay with waiting a couple months
before moving back in with your mom,” K.C. responded, “Yes.”
Father interjected, “He’s not moving back in with her.”
K.C. testified he did not want to visit mother currently
but would like to see her “[w]hen she’s doing better.” When
asked to describe his relationship with mother, K.C. testified,
“I had a good connection with my mom, but I knew she wasn’t
always there. Like sometimes she was under the influence.”
K.C. testified he felt more comfortable living full time with
father for now. He was aware mother was in a substance abuse
treatment program—that made him more comfortable with
future interactions with her.

9
Mother testified. She again admitted to the allegation that
she failed to make an appropriate plan for J.C.’s and I.W.’s care.
She agreed her addiction interfered with her ability to parent.
Mother admitted she “was on drugs” but testified her drug of
choice was fentanyl, not the drugs or prescription medications
mentioned in the petition. She also denied selling drugs. Mother
now denied having any mental health issues, however. She
denied having told the DI she heard voices the night she took
J.C. and I.W.
Mother had been participating in the START program and
attending anger management classes. She testified her brother,
mother, and husband (I.W.’s father)3 were her support system.
She wanted to participate in services to be able to reunify with
K.C. Mother believed father would allow her to have monitored
visits with K.C. if the case closed with a custody order.
The court sustained the petition’s allegations pertaining
to mother as pleaded under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j).4
As to disposition, DCFS asked the court to declare K.C. a
dependent and terminate jurisdiction with a family law order
providing custody to father and monitored visits for mother.
K.C.’s counsel represented K.C.’s “strong preference” was to
remain with father. Counsel argued it was in K.C.’s best interest
“to close the case and have him stay with his father.” Mother’s

3 The final count of the petition referred to I.W.’s father’s
drug abuse and I.W.’s paternal half sibling’s dependency status
due to I.W.’s father’s substance abuse.
4 The court dismissed the count relating to I.W.’s father,
who was incarcerated.

10
counsel objected to closing the case. Counsel argued the case
should remain open to give mother a chance to reunify with K.C.
Counsel asked that K.C. be placed in mother’s custody with
K.C. to live with maternal grandmother while mother was
incarcerated, or alternatively that mother have unmonitored
visitation with K.C. If the court were inclined to close the case,
mother’s counsel asked that parents share custody.
The court sustained the petition and found K.C. was
a person described by section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j).
The court declared K.C. a dependent of the court, and ordered
jurisdiction terminated subject to receipt of a juvenile custody
order giving father full legal and physical custody and mother
monitored visits. The court noted that, based on mother’s
testimony, it had become “clear” to the court by mother’s “either
unwillingness or inability to discuss her mental health issues,
her significant substance abuse, that there’s a long road ahead
for [mother].” The court did not think it was “fair to [K.C.] to
keep his case open waiting for his mother to get the help that
she so desperately needs when he has a parent who is providing
him with stability.”
Mother filed a notice of appeal the next day. On
October 18, 2023, the court received, signed, and filed the
juvenile custody order awarding father sole custody of K.C.,
with monitored visitation for mother, and terminated its
jurisdiction over K.C. We granted mother’s application to
construe her notice of appeal to include the October 18, 2023
orders and her motion to augment the record with them.

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DISCUSSION
1. Standard of review and applicable law
“ ‘In reviewing the jurisdictional findings and the
disposition, we look to see if substantial evidence, contradicted
or uncontradicted, supports them. [Citation.] In making this
determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the
evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency
court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the
court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and
credibility are the province of the trial court.’ ” (In re R.T. (2017)
3 Cal.5th 622, 633; In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 (I.J.).)
Inferences that are the result of speculation or conjecture,
however, are insufficient to support a finding. (In re B.D.
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 315, 324.) “ ‘The parent has the burden
on appeal of showing there is insufficient evidence to support
the juvenile court’s order.’ ” (In re L.B. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
402, 412 (L.B.).)
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) authorizes the juvenile
court to assume jurisdiction when, as relevant here, “there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm
or illness, as a result of . . . [t]he failure or inability of the child’s
parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child . . . [or] to
provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s . . . mental
illness . . . or substance abuse.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(A), (D).) The
statute permits jurisdiction under this subdivision “only so long
as is necessary to protect the child from risk of suffering serious
physical harm or illness.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(3).) Thus, “[t]he
relevant inquiry under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), is whether
circumstances at the time of the jurisdictional hearing ‘ “subject

12
the minor to the defined risk of harm.” ’ ” (L.B., supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at p. 411.) The juvenile court need not wait for the
child actually to be abused or neglected before it can assume
jurisdiction, however. (I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
Subdivision (j) in turn authorizes dependency jurisdiction
where the child’s sibling was “abused or neglected, as defined in
subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a substantial risk
that the child will be abused or neglected, as defined in those
subdivisions.” (§ 300, subd. (j).) In determining whether conduct
toward the child’s siblings places the child at substantial
risk of harm, the juvenile court considers “the circumstances
surrounding the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the age and
gender of each child, the nature of the abuse or neglect of the
sibling, the mental condition of the parent or guardian, and
any other factors the court considers probative in determining
whether there is a substantial risk to the child.” (Ibid.)
“ ‘The broad language of subdivision (j) clearly indicates that
the trial court is to consider the totality of the circumstances of
the child and his or her sibling in determining whether the child
is at substantial risk of harm, within the meaning of any of the
subdivisions enumerated in subdivision (j). The provision thus
accords the trial court greater latitude to exercise jurisdiction
as to a child whose sibling has been found to have been abused
than the court would have in the absence of that circumstance.’ ”
(I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 774.)
“ ‘[A] reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding
of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases
for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported
by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need
not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory

13
grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’ ” (I.J.,
supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
2. Substantial evidence does not support finding
K.C. was at substantial risk of harm
Mother does not challenge the jurisdictional findings
as to K.C.’s half siblings J.C. and I.W. Rather, she contends
substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s finding
that K.C.—who lived with father and was not permitted to have
unmonitored contact with mother—was at substantial risk of
serious harm due to mother’s drug addiction, mental health
issues, or inadequate supervision of J.C. and I.W.5 DCFS
argues that, without a formal custody order granting father
full custody, K.C. remained at substantial risk of harm. DCFS
contends substantial evidence supports “the limited assumption
of jurisdiction over K.C. for purpose of granting father sole
custody.”
Mother engaged in troubling behaviors that she
admitted placed J.C. and I.W. at substantial risk of harm.
She acknowledged her unresolved drug addiction and mental
health issues affected her ability to parent appropriately and
that she needed help. The record supports the juvenile court’s
conclusion that “there’s a long road ahead for [mother].”
As to K.C., he confirmed mother was visibly under the
influence during his visits with her. He also confirmed mother
had involved him in shoplifting on two occasions—a year earlier

5 DCFS alleged K.C. was subject to the court’s jurisdiction
under subdivision (j) based on the identical allegations in the
b-1 count—that mother failed to make an appropriate plan for
J.C.’s and I.W.’s care and supervision.

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and about a month before mother’s arrest. Mother had
demanded to see K.C. two months earlier, requiring father
to call law enforcement. And, at the jail after she had been
arrested, mother told the social worker she wanted to see K.C.
because he was in danger.
As mother argues, however, K.C. is differently situated
from his half siblings. Even considering the totality of the
circumstances, it is unreasonable to conclude K.C. was at similar
risk of being left without an appropriate plan of supervision or
care because K.C. had not been in mother’s care for more than
six years. Except for the occasion when father waited for K.C.
in the car while he went into a store with mother (and the
incident father did not know about a year earlier), it is
undisputed K.C.—in contrast to J.C. and I.W.—never had
unmonitored contact with mother and had been living with father
full time. Moreover, K.C., who was 14 years old by the time
of the jurisdictional hearing, was able to speak up—and did—
if mother acted inappropriately. J.C. and I.W., on the other
hand, were only five and two years old, respectively, when
mother left them without an appropriate plan for their care
and supervision. In short, it is not reasonable to infer from
mother’s inability to care for K.C.’s younger siblings that K.C.
was at substantial risk of harm from mother when he had
not been alone in her care except for at most two occasions
in a public place.
Nor does the record support the findings that K.C. was
at substantial risk of physical harm due to mother’s substance
abuse and mental illness. Again, it is undisputed K.C. did
not live with mother and had been in father’s full-time care.
The evidence shows mother was under the influence in K.C.’s

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presence, but there is no evidence K.C. ever was alone with
mother when she was under the influence, or when she was
suffering from a mental health crisis. Rather, the only inference
to be drawn from the record is that father protected K.C. from
mother. Father and K.C. both repeatedly stated father always
was present when K.C. saw mother. Father stated he did not
allow K.C. to go to maternal grandmother’s home alone or to be
in the home alone with mother. K.C. himself confirmed father
always was present when K.C. visited mother. He testified,
“Every time my mom came, I was with my dad. So I never
left with her.” K.C. testified he had been living with father for
seven years, enjoyed living with him, and felt safe in his care.
About a month before these proceedings began, father did
allow K.C. to shop with mother temporarily unsupervised in a
store. There is no evidence mother was under the influence at
that time, however. Mother’s involvement of K.C. in shoplifting
was inappropriate to say the least, but there is no evidence K.C.
ever was at risk of physical harm or endangered while in the
store with mother. Moreover, father did not allow mother to have
unfettered access to K.C.—he drove mother and K.C. to the store
and waited for them in the car. Even if that event could be
construed as posing a risk of harm to K.C., we cannot reasonably
infer from the record that a similar incident could recur in the
future to substantiate the jurisdictional finding. (In re C.V.
(2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 566, 572 [“Jurisdiction ‘may not be based
on a single episode of endangering conduct in the absence of
evidence that such conduct is likely to reoccur.’ ”].) As soon as
K.C. told father about the shoplifting incident, father decided
he did not want K.C. to be around mother. According to father,
mother in fact had not seen K.C. since then. Nothing in the

16
record suggests father would allow K.C. again to be alone with
mother in a store or otherwise.
We find mother’s reliance on In re A.G. (2013) 220
Cal.App.4th 675 (A.G.) instructive. There, a mother was unable
to provide regular care for her children due to her mental illness
that included delusions and auditory hallucinations. (Id. at
pp. 677–678, 684.) The father, who lived in the home with
mother and the children, ensured an adult other than mother
supervised the children at all times. (Id. at p. 684.) The mother
had been left alone with the children once, but “no harm to them
had been reported.” (Id. at pp. 677, 684.) The father also slept
in the children’s room with the door locked when advised to do so,
temporarily moved out of the home with the children to protect
them from mother, and sought orders in the juvenile court
restricting mother’s visitation. (Id. at pp. 680, 684.) The juvenile
court sustained a petition that alleged mother’s mental illness
endangered the children and terminated jurisdiction with a
custody order awarding father sole custody. (Id. at pp. 681–682.)
Division One of this court reversed the judgment, concluding
the juvenile court erred in sustaining a petition based solely
on mother’s inability to care for the children due to her mental
illness where the father “has always been, and is, capable of
properly caring for them.” (Id. at p. 686.)
Here, father similarly protected K.C. by ensuring he was
not alone with mother except on one recent occasion—albeit
in a public setting—where K.C. also was not physically harmed.
Significantly, K.C. did not live with mother and thus was even
less likely than the children in A.G. to be at substantial risk
of harm due to mother’s conduct. (See In re Ana C. (2012) 204
Cal.App.4th 1317, 1319, 1322 [17-year-old daughter who did not

17
live in home with father was not at substantial risk of harm
based on sexual abuse by father of stepsister who lived in the
home].)
We acknowledge that in A.G., the parents had initiated
divorce proceedings where the father could seek a custody order.
(A.G., supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at pp. 678, 686.) The appellate
court noted “the juvenile court should have dismissed the
petition, staying the order until Father obtained from the family
court an award of custody to him and monitored visitation to
Mother.” (Id. at p. 686.) Here, in contrast, there was no pending
family law case that father similarly could have used to seek
a custody order before the dismissal of the petition. The lack
of a formal custody order is not a basis to assert dependency
jurisdiction, however.
As DCFS concedes, “[a] child shall not be found to be a
person described by [section 300, subdivision (b)] solely due to
. . . [t]he failure of the child’s parent . . . to seek court orders
for custody of the child.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(2)(B).)6 Nevertheless,
DCFS contends that, “[g]iven the extent of Mother’s drug
addiction and mental health issues and how they manifestly
placed the children at risk, Father rightly received assistance
from the juvenile court to get orders in place to protect [K.C.].”
DCFS argues father’s lack of a custody order “meant Mother

6 It appears father may have believed the 2018 vacated
custody order still was in effect. After learning of the incident
with K.C.’s half siblings, he apparently told the social worker
he would go to court the next day and ask for “a modification
to his family law order as to mother’s visits.”

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posed a risk to K.C.,” as father “had no legal authority to limit
Mother’s visits.”
We disagree. As the custodial parent, even in an informal
custody arrangement, father had the right—indeed, the duty—
to protect K.C. from mother by not allowing her to interact with
K.C. unless supervised. That is what the record shows father
has been doing all along. The record makes clear father will not
allow K.C. to have unmonitored contact with mother, nor allow
mother to take physical custody of K.C. Father even spoke out
of turn at the hearing when mother’s counsel posed a question
that assumed K.C. would be moving back in with mother,
insisting, “He’s not moving back in with her.”
Nor can we infer from the record that the lack of a formal
custody order has affected—or will affect—father’s ability to
protect K.C. from mother. DCFS argues K.C.’s “safety could not
be assured without court orders in place,” noting a “history of
resistance from police officers to limit [m]other’s access to the
children without court orders.” That history, however, is related
to maternal relatives’ inability to prevent mother from removing
J.C. and I.W. from their care. As law enforcement noted,
maternal relatives had no legal standing concerning the children.
But as to K.C., father did and does. Moreover, there is no
evidence in the record suggesting law enforcement could not
prevent mother from taking K.C. from father’s home without
father’s permission. Nor does the record suggest a risk that
law enforcement would require father—the parent with whom
K.C. lives full time—to surrender K.C. to mother’s custody absent
a court order awarding custody to mother. (See In re Phoenix B.
(1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 787 [affirming dismissal of dependency
petition where the child was released to the father, who was

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“willing and able to provide for [the child’s] care,” after mother
was involuntarily hospitalized, and that the mother’s remedy
was to assert her custody rights in family court].) Indeed, when
mother demanded to see K.C. at father’s home, law enforcement
came—presumably at father’s request—and removed mother
from father’s premises. Father thus was able to prevent mother
from gaining access to K.C. even without a court order.
As DCFS asserts, mother’s drug addiction and mental
health issues are extensive. We also agree with DCFS that
mother’s conduct was “alarming.” There is no doubt mother
should not be permitted to have unmonitored contact with K.C.
at this time. But father understood that to be the case—and
ensured K.C. was not alone with mother—even before mother
endangered K.C.’s half siblings, triggering this dependency
proceeding.
The only reason DCFS appears to have included K.C. in
the petition with J.C. and I.W. is that father had not yet sought
a formal custody order.7 As discussed, that is not a valid basis
for dependency jurisdiction. Because we conclude substantial
evidence does not support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional

7 DCFS notes that it did not include A.A.—who actually was
sleeping at maternal grandmother’s home when mother left with
J.C. and I.W. in the middle of the night—in the petition because
“she was protected by a family law custody order issued in 2018,
granting her father primary physical custody.” A.A.’s father also
had “indicated he planned to have [m]other’s visits restricted in
family court.”

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findings as to K.C., the dispositional orders and judgment as to
K.C. also must be reversed.8

8 As noted above, the record suggests father was unaware
that his previous 2018 juvenile custody order was vacated as
a result of this court’s reversal of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
and disposition orders in 2019. We note father is not a party
to this appeal and has no reason to be involved in any ongoing
dependency proceedings regarding K.C.’s half siblings. On
remand, the juvenile court and/or father’s trial counsel should
ensure that father is made aware of this court’s disposition,
so that father may seek custody orders in the family court
should he so choose.

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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional, dispositional, and
custody orders and judgment as to K.C. are reversed. The matter
is remanded with directions to the juvenile court to vacate the
adjudication and custody orders relating to K.C. and to enter
a new order dismissing the petition as to K.C.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, Acting, P. J.

We concur:

ADAMS, J.

HANASONO, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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