CourtListener 10313622•Pitre v. Wal-Mart Stores CA4/3
Texte intégral
Filed 1/14/25 Pitre v. Wal-Mart Stores CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
RANDY PITRE et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, G062638
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2017-00927449)
WAL-MART STORES, INC., OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
William D. Claster, Judge. Affirmed.
Setareh Law Group, Shaun Setareh, and Thomas Segal for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Jones Day, Nathaniel P. Garrett, John A. Vogt, and David A.
Phillips for Defendant and Respondent.
* * *
In this putative class action case, plaintiffs allege that defendant
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Walmart) violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA) in the course of hiring them and others similarly situated.
Specifically, Walmart provided a disclosure stating that it intended to run a
credit check on the interviewee, but that disclosure was not in a stand-alone
document as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. 15 U.S.C. section 1681n entitles
an employee who received a deficient notice to either actual damages or
damages of between $100 and $1,000. Plaintiffs admit they have no actual
damages because they fully understood Walmart was going to run a credit
check and would have authorized it regardless, but they claim they are
entitled to statutory damages.
In 2022, the Fifth District decided Limon v. Circle K Stores Inc.
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 671 (Limon), where the court held that plaintiffs who
cannot allege an injury from a deficient notice under the FCRA do not have
standing to bring a claim. After the Limon decision, the trial court below felt
compelled to grant summary judgment in Walmart’s favor. Plaintiffs
appealed.
We affirm. Plaintiff’s principal contention on appeal is that
Limon was wrongly decided. However, in the recently published case of Muha
v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 199 (Muha),
this panel concluded that Limon was correctly decided. There is no dispute
that, under Limon, plaintiffs lack standing because they did not suffer a
concrete injury. Accordingly, we affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In June 2017, Pitre filed the underlying complaint against
Walmart on behalf of himself and the class of all others similarly situated. He
alleged that he was a former Walmart employee. According to the complaint,
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when Pitre (and others) applied for employment, Walmart ran a background
check that included a credit report. In seeking authorization for that credit
check from the prospective employee, Walmart allegedly failed to provide a
disclosure that complied with the FCRA. In particular, the FCRA requires
that employers provide a stand-alone disclosure regarding the credit check
without any extraneous information, which, according to Pitre, Walmart did
not do—Walmart’s disclosure included extraneous information. Pitre alleged
the failure was willful. Pitre also alleged that Walmart failed to provide a
“Summary of Rights” as required by the FRCA. Finally, Pitre alleged similar
state law claims.
The following month, Walmart removed the action to federal
court. The federal district court dismissed the state law claims but certified a
class to pursue the federal claims. The court also granted Pitre’s motion to
add two additional named plaintiffs.
Walmart then filed a motion for summary judgment and to
decertify the class as to the federal claims, which the district court granted in
part. As to plaintiffs’ allegation that Walmart failed to provide a “Summary of
Rights,” the court concluded that no such document was required in the
context of performing a background check on potential employees. With
respect to plaintiffs’ allegation that Walmart failed to provide an adequate
disclosure of the credit check, the federal district court concluded that
plaintiffs lacked standing because there was no case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution, and thus the federal court
lacked jurisdiction. In particular, citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (2016) 578 U.S.
330, the court concluded Pitre had not suffered a “concrete injury” to support
federal standing. (See Spokeo, at p. 341 [“Article III standing requires a
concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation. For that reason, [a
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plaintiff] could not, for example, allege a bare procedural violation, divorced
from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article
III.”].) The court relied on the fact that, during discovery, Pitre and the other
named plaintiffs had admitted they understood Walmart would conduct a
credit check and they did not object. Rather than grant summary judgment,
however, the federal district court observed that state courts are not bound
by Article III and, in October 2019, remanded the matter back to the Superior
Court.
On remand, in response to a motion for summary judgment filed
by Walmart, the Superior Court ruled plaintiffs had standing in Superior
Court to assert a cause of action for Walmart’s allegedly noncompliant
disclosure regarding a credit check.
Plaintiffs then sought to certify a nationwide class of “all persons
in the United States on whom [Walmart] obtained a consumer report for
employment purposes,” from June 20, 2012 through the date of certification.
In September 2021, the court certified a class, but it was significantly
narrower than what plaintiffs had sought. Specifically, the court certified the
following class: “From June 20, 2015 to December 11, 2017, all persons for
whom Defendants obtained a consumer report for employment purposes in
California.” The court determined that limiting the class to California
applicants was appropriate because conducting a 50-state survey of standing
laws would be burdensome, and there would be no particular benefit to
California claimants in certifying a nationwide class.
In October 2022, the Fifth District Court of Appeal decided
Limon. Two days later, Walmart filed a motion for reconsideration of the
court’s earlier denial of its motion for summary judgment, asserting that
Limon marked a change in the law. The trial court agreed with Walmart,
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concluding that Limon was controlling and required dismissal of plaintiffs’
claims on the ground that they lacked standing because they had not suffered
a concrete injury. The court entered a judgment of dismissal from which
plaintiffs timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
The question plaintiffs present in this appeal is whether they
have standing to bring a claim under the FCRA for having received
noncompliant disclosures regarding a credit check during their application to
work at Walmart. They acknowledge that they do not have standing under
the holding of Limon, but they contend Limon was wrongly decided. We
disagree.
I.
THE FCRA
Finding that there was “a need to insure that consumer reporting
agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and
a respect for the consumer’s right to privacy,” Congress declared that the
purpose of the FCRA was “to require that consumer reporting agencies adopt
reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer
credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair
and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy,
relevancy, and proper utilization of such information in accordance with the
requirements of this subchapter.” (15 U.S.C.A. § 1681, subds. (a)-(b).)
One of the requirements of the chapter applies to the
procurement of a credit report for employment purposes. Section 1681b,
subdivision (b)(2)(A), provides, “a person may not procure a consumer report,
or cause a consumer report to be procured, for employment purposes with
respect to any consumer, unless-- [¶] (i) a clear and conspicuous disclosure
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has been made in writing to the consumer at any time before the report is
procured or caused to be procured, in a document that consists solely of the
disclosure, that a consumer report may be obtained for employment purposes;
and [¶] (ii) the consumer has authorized in writing (which authorization may
be made on the document referred to in clause (i)) the procurement of the
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report by that person.” (Italics added.) “[T]he purpose of the stand-alone
requirement is to prevent consumers from being distracted by additional
information.” (Feist v. Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. (S.D. Cal. 2016) 218
F.Supp.3d 1112, 1114.)
Section 1681n, subdivision (a), provides a cause of action for a
consumer whose rights are violated: “Any person who willfully fails to comply
with any requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to any
consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the sum of-- [¶]
(1)(A) any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the
failure or damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000 . . . .”
Subdivision (a)(3) further allows a successful consumer to recover costs and
reasonable attorney fees.
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A “consumer report” is defined to include “any information by a
consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness . . . .”
(15 U.S.C.A. § 1681a, subd. (d)(1).)
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II.
STANDING
Plaintiffs contend they have standing to bring a claim despite
that they suffered no injury from Walmart’s allegedly deficient disclosure. On
appeal, they recognize that Limon is contrary to their position, but they
contend Limon was wrongly decided.
“‘“Standing” is a party’s right to make a legal claim and is a
threshold issue to be resolved before reaching the merits of an action.’” (Dent
v. Wolf (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 230, 233-234.) “[W]hen ‘[a] party lacks
standing,’ it means the party ‘does not have an actual and substantial
interest in, or would not be benefited or harmed by, the ultimate outcome of
an action.’” (In re Marriage of Marshall (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 477, 485.) “We
will not address the merits of litigation when the plaintiff lacks standing,
because ‘“California courts have no power . . . to render advisory opinions . . .
.”’’’ (Blumhorst v. Jewish Family Services of Los Angeles (2005) 126
Cal.App.4th 993, 1000.)
Federal courts are subject to Article III of the United States
Constitution, which limits federal court jurisdiction to “Cases” and
“Controversies.” This has been interpreted to impose a standing requirement
that entails three elements: “First, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury
in fact’ — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized, [Citations]; and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or
“hypothetical,”’ [Citations]. Second, there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be ‘fairly
. . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e]
result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.’
[Citation.] Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that
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the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” (Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife (1992) 504 U.S. 555, 560-561.)
In Limon the court held that California courts impose a similar
standing requirement—they require a plaintiff to have a beneficial interest,
which is equivalent “to the injury-in-fact prong of the article III test for
standing in the federal courts.” (Limon, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 697-698.)
Limon is on all fours with the present case. As here, the plaintiff
alleged the defendant violated the FCRA “by failing to provide him with
proper FCRA disclosures when it sought and received his authorization to
obtain a consumer report about him in connection with his application for
employment . . . .” (Limon, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 680.) As here, a federal
district court found the plaintiff lacked Article III standing. (Ibid.) In a
subsequent suit in the California Superior Court, the court sustained a
demurrer without leave to amend. (Ibid.) On appeal, the court held that the
plaintiff lacked standing because there was no concrete injury.
That holding is fatal to plaintiffs’ case. During discovery,
plaintiffs acknowledged that, notwithstanding the inadequate disclosure,
they understood Walmart was going to run a credit check, and they
authorized that credit check. The lack of a stand-alone disclosure, therefore,
had no effect. Accordingly, under Limon, there was no concrete injury, and
thus plaintiffs do not have standing to bring a claim.
Plaintiffs recognize that their claims cannot survive the holding
of Limon, but they contend Limon was wrongly decided. We recently
addressed this contention in Muha, supra. There, the plaintiffs alleged that
the defendant had omitted certain disclosures required under the FCRA.
However, they did not allege that the lack of disclosures caused any harm.
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A federal district court ruled that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing and
remanded to superior court. After Limon was decided, the superior court
dismissed the action, and the plaintiffs appealed, contending Limon was
wrongly decided.
We disagreed, concluding that Limon was correct in holding that
in order to sue in California state court, as a general rule, subject to
modification by the Legislature in any given case, a plaintiff must allege a
concrete injury as that term is understood in Article III jurisprudence.
Although plaintiffs invite us to reconsider whether Limon was correctly
decided, having so recently considered that exact issue, we decline the
invitation. For the reasons stated in Muha, Limon is good law, and it is fatal
to plaintiffs’ claims.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Walmart shall recover its costs
incurred on appeal.
SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, J.
DELANEY, J.
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