CourtListener 10312690•People v. Murphy CA4/1
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Filed 1/13/25 P. v. Murphy CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D082908
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
(Super. Ct. No. SCE359335)
ALFRED EARL MURPHY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Patricia K. Cookson, Judge. Affirmed.
Joanna McKim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistance
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson, Seth M. Friedman and Felicity Senoski, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2017, a jury convicted Alfred Earl Murphy and two codefendants of
first degree murder. Since then, California passed Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-
2022 Reg. Sess.), which provides that defendants who had been convicted of
murder may be eligible for resentencing relief, if the conviction was based on
a now discredited theory of imputed malice. Murphy petitioned for such
relief, and the trial court denied his petition at the prima facie stage, without
conducting an evidentiary hearing.
On appeal, Murphy contends that the trial court erred when it denied
his petition because the record of conviction did not establish his ineligibility
for relief. We disagree. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In an information, Murphy and codefendants Danielle Dumont and
Nicoy Smith were charged with the murder of Prince Brown. The
information alleged that Murphy intentionally and personally discharged a
firearm, causing great bodily injury and death “to a person” within the
meaning of Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d).1 The information
further alleged that each of Murphy’s codefendants, “although not personally
armed with a firearm, was himself a principal in the commission and
attempted commission of the above offense and was vicariously liable” within
the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (a)(1).
The court instructed the jury both as to murder (“the defendant
committed an act that caused the death of another person”) and as to felony
murder. The felony murder instructions included CALCRIM No. 540A
1 All unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
(“defendant allegedly committed fatal act”)2 and CALCRIM No. 540B
(“coparticipant allegedly committed fatal act”).
In closing argument, the prosecutor stated that “Mr. Murphy is the
murderer. He’s the one that shot Prince Brown.” He further stated that the
codefendants, Dumont and Smith, were “not the ones that killed Prince
Brown.” He explained to the jury that the instruction “for Mr. Murphy is
540A, the one that applies to Ms. Dumont and Mr. Smith is 540B.”
The jury convicted Murphy and his codefendants of first degree
murder. As to Murphy, it found true the allegation under section 12022.53,
subdivision (d). As to Smith and Dumont, the jury found true the allegations
under section 12022, subdivision (a)(1).
On February 6, 2023, Murphy filed a petition for resentencing under
former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6). The court appointed counsel to
represent Murphy.
The People filed an initial response, contending that Murphy was
prosecuted as the actual killer because the information alleged that he
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, but did not make the same
allegation as to his codefendants. The response attached the complaint, the
information, the clerk’s minutes of the jury verdict and the sentencing and
resentencing after direct appeal, the verdict form, the abstracts of judgment,
and the decision of this court on direct appeal. Murphy’s reply brief argued
2 The CALCRIM No. 540A instruction stated in relevant part, “To prove
that a defendant is guilty of first degree murder under [a theory of felony
murder], the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant committed
Robbery; [¶] 2. The defendant intended to commit Robbery; [¶] AND [¶]
(3) While committing Robbery the defendant caused the death of another
person. [¶] A person may be guilty of felony murder even if the killing was
unintentional, accidental or negligent.”
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that neither the jury verdict nor the jury’s true finding on the enhancement
established his ineligibility for relief.
After hearing arguments from counsel, the court denied the petition,
concluding that Murphy had not made a prima facie showing and was not
eligible for relief as a matter of law. The court stated:
“The verdict established that [Murphy] personally used a
weapon during the murder and intentionally killed the
victim during the robbery. Thus, he was the actual killer.
He had the intent to kill. [¶] The guilty verdicts were not
based on the petitioner being liable because malice was
imputed to him due to his participation in this crime. His
liability for the murder could only be the result of the
petitioner personally and intentionally killing the victim
based on the [section 12022].53] allegation finding.”
Murphy filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Murphy argues that the trial court erred in concluding that
the jury’s verdict and the true finding on the firearm enhancement allegation
established that he was the actual killer or that he intended to kill.
A. Standard of Review
Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) provides a procedure by which a
convicted person may seek resentencing under the new law. After the
offender files the appropriate petition, the court must appoint counsel to
represent the offender, and the matter is set for hearing to determine
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that he or she is
entitled to relief. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 at pp. 961–963, 967
(Lewis).)
When a trial court reviews a petition for resentencing under section
1172.6, it must first ensure that the appellant has established a prima facie
case for relief under the statute. A denial at the prima facie stage is only
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appropriate if the record of conviction3 establishes that the petitioner is
ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th
90, 101 (Ervin).) In making an evaluation, the court may only review the
record of conviction—the court may not engage in factfinding at the prima
facie stage. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 955.)
A court’s decision to deny a resentencing petition at the prima facie
stage is purely a legal conclusion, which an appellate court reviews de novo.
(Ervin, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 101). If the denial of Murphy’s petition
was legally correct, we affirm it regardless of the trial court’s reasoning.
(People v. Camacho (2022) 14 Cal.5th 77, 123–124.)
B. The First Degree Murder Conviction Conclusively
Establishes that Murphy is Ineligible for Resentencing
Relief as a Matter of Law
Under section 189, subdivision (e), as it has now been amended, to be
guilty of first degree murder, the prosecution must prove one of three possible
scenarios:
“(1) The person was the actual killer.
“(2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the
intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded,
induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual
killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.
“(3) The person was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human
life, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.”
3 “Record of conviction” does not include everything contained within the
record below. Generally speaking, the record of conviction includes the
charging documents; the plea form or verdict forms; and the instructions that
were given to the jury. (See, e.g., People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
1244, 1247, fn.3.) It also includes closing arguments. (People v. Flores (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1170; People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 13
(Lopez).)
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The jury instructions given at Murphy’s trial stated that Murphy was
being prosecuted for murder under either of two theories, namely malice
aforethought or felony murder, and the jurors were told that the members of
the jury did not need to agree on the same theory. The instructions further
explained that for first degree murder, it must find that the defendant acted
with premeditation in that the defendant “decided to kill before completing
the act that caused death”. Thus, it may be said that the jury instructions
allowed the jury to have convicted Murphy of first degree murder on the first
possible theory set forth in section 189, subdivision (e), i.e., that he was the
actual killer.
Alternatively, the jury could have convicted Murphy of first degree
murder under a felony murder theory. CALCRIM 540A provided that to be
guilty under this theory, the jury must find that the defendant intentionally
committed robbery and while committing the robbery, the defendant caused
the death of another person, even if the killing was unintentional. The
prosecutor made clear in closing argument that it was this instruction that
applied to Murphy.
The question then becomes whether a finding that Murphy “caused the
death” of the victim equates to proof that Murphy was the “actual killer”, as
contemplated in section 189, subdivision (e)(1). We conclude that on the facts
of this case, it does.
Appellant disagrees, relying on Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 4–5.
In Lopez, as here, the jury was instructed with two possible theories, malice
murder and felony murder. There, as here, the jury was instructed that it
could convict the defendant if he committed a robbery and while committing
the robbery, he caused the death of another person. The court rejected the
contention that “causing the death of another person” is synonymous with
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being the actual killer, as required by section 189, subdivision (e)(1), holding
that: “We conclude the term ‘actual killer’ as used in the revised felony-
murder rule of section 189, subdivision (e)(1) refers to someone who
personally killed the victim and is not necessarily the same as a person who
‘caused’ the victim’s death.”
However, as explained in People v. Beaudreaux (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th
1227, 1246, in Lopez, the jury was instructed with a definition that “ ‘[a]n act
causes death if the death is the direct, natural, and probably consequence of
the act,’ ” which created a possibility that “the jury could have believed a
second assailant was in the apartment but concluded the defendant was
actively involved only in the robbery, which justified convicting him of felony
murder without any need to find he was the actual killer.” (Ibid.) In
Beaudreaux as in this case, no such “proximate cause” instruction was given.
In the absence of such an instruction, the “plain meaning” of the term
“caused the death” meant nothing more than that the defendant shot the
victim to death. (Ibid.)
So too here. By finding that Murphy caused the death of Brown under
CALCRIM No. 540A, in the absence of any “proximate cause” instruction that
may have muddied the waters, the plain meaning of the finding establishes
that Murphy was Brown’s actual killer. This conclusion is buttressed by the
jury’s true finding that Murphy personally discharged a firearm, causing
great bodily injury and death within the meaning of Penal Code section
12022.53, subdivision (d), particularly when combined with the true finding
that his codefendants were not personally armed with a firearm but were
vicariously liable, within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (a)(1).
Because the first degree murder conviction establishes Murphy’s
ineligibility for sentencing relief as a matter of law, we do not reach
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appellant’s further argument as to the significance of the jury’s true finding
on the enhancement.
For the reasons discussed above, the record of conviction conclusively
establishes Murphy’s ineligibility for relief.
III. Disposition
The order denying Murphy’s petition for resentencing under section
1172.6 is affirmed.
KELETY, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
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