People v. Smith CA4/1

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Filed 1/13/25 P. v. Smith CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D082370, D082514

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. Nos.
SCN432990, SCD292714)
ALEXANDER THOMAS SMITH,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Daniel F. Link, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Richard Jay Moller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Daniel Rogers and Adrian R. Contreras, Deputy Attorneys General for
Plaintiff and Respondent.

This consolidated appeal involves two cases against defendant
Alexander Thomas Smith that culminated in a single sentence. Following
sentencing, Smith filed a notice of appeal, and his counsel filed a brief
pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We requested and
obtained supplemental briefing addressing the following issues: (1) whether

Penal Code1 section 654 required the trial court to stay punishment for four
criminal threats convictions due to Smith’s sentence for a stalking conviction,
and (2) whether the trial court made a sufficient oral pronouncement of fees,
fines, and assessments and properly imposed them without conducting an
ability to pay hearing.
First, we conclude section 654 requires the staying of Smith’s sentences
for four counts of criminal threats because the criminal threats and stalking
cannot be separated. We modify the judgment accordingly. Second, we
conclude the trial court did not make a sufficient oral pronouncement of fees,
fines, and assessments but that we can, and do, correct the error on appeal.
Finally, Smith forfeited the argument that he was entitled to an ability to
pay hearing by failing to object to the imposition of fees, fines, and
assessments without such a hearing. We affirm the judgment as modified.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the first case (D082514; SCD292714; Case B), the People charged
Smith with attempting to dissuade a witness from reporting a crime (§ 136.1,
subd. (b)(1)), making a criminal threat (§ 422), and vandalism (§ 594, subds.
(a), (b)(1)). Smith pleaded guilty to the vandalism count and an added count
of assault likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), for which
the parties agreed to a referral to Behavioral Health Court or, if not accepted,
to two years of probation and 365 days in jail releasable to a residential
treatment program. Smith was informed that he could face up to four years
and eight months in prison if he committed a new crime before sentencing.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Nevertheless, after pleading guilty and prior to sentencing, Smith was
arrested in the second case.
In the second case (D082370; SCN432990; Case A), the People charged
Smith with stalking after having a prior conviction of stalking (§ 646.9,
subds. (a) & (c)(2)) and five counts of making a criminal threat (§ 422). The
victim was a California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR) social worker assigned to Smith while on parole after serving a
prison sentence for the prior stalking conviction.
The amended information in Case A alleges that the stalking (count 1)
occurred between August 27, 2021, and April 4, 2022. According to the
information and the prosecution’s trial brief, the criminal threats allegations
consisted of the following: first, on August 27, 2021, Smith sent a text
message to the victim threatening to kill her, including stating, “I am going
to find out where you live and shoot you in the head. I am going to kill you in
your sleep. Are you ready to die bitch?” (count 2); on March 5, 2022, Smith
sent a text message to his former parole agent threating to kill the victim’s
son if the victim did not remove Smith from the mental health program
(count 5); on March 10, 2022, Smith sent text messages to a CDCR
supervising psychiatrist threatening to kill the victim if the psychiatrist did
not remove Smith from the mental health program (count 3); on April 4,
2022, Smith sent a text message to another CDCR social worker threatening
to kill the victim’s son if the victim did not remove Smith from the mental
health program (count 4); finally, also on April 4, 2022, Smith sent a text
message to his former parole agent threatening to kill the victim’s husband
and son if the victim did not remove Smith from the mental health program
(count 6).

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During that period, Smith engaged with the victim on an additional,
uncharged occasion. In December 2021, he sent the victim a text message on
her personal cell phone calling her a “stupid bitch” and “piece of shit
narcissist,” accusing her of trying to steal his medical records, wanting to
kidnap him and poison him with “chemical lobotomy”, and saying “[f]uck you”
and “you deserve to be shot.”
Prior to trial in Case A, the court held multiple hearings under People

v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden),2 and the court denied the
motions.
After a jury was selected for trial, Smith requested to represent
himself, and the court denied the request as untimely. Throughout the trial,
Smith interrupted the questioning of witnesses, spoke to the jury, and
addressed witnesses as they left the stand. The court repeatedly instructed
Smith not to do so and warned that continued interruptions could lead to
removal from the courtroom.
Smith brought two additional Marsden motions during trial, which the
court denied. After the court denied the second motion, at which time the
People had called all but one witness, Smith continued to talk out of turn
despite the court’s repeated instructions to stop. Smith continued to do so
after the jury returned, resulting in an admonition in front of the jury. Then,
Smith’s mother entered the courtroom, and Smith began addressing her and
lunged toward her. As a result, deputy sheriffs present had to restrain
Smith, and the court removed him from the courtroom. Smith was placed in
a room adjoining the courtroom, where he yelled and banged the walls while

2 At a Marsden motion hearing, the trial court must provide the
defendant with the opportunity to express his complaints regarding the
assistance he was receiving from appointed counsel. (Marsden, supra, 2
Cal.3d at pp. 123–124.)
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his attorney argued Smith should be permitted to be present for the People’s
final witness. Defense counsel also requested a mistrial. The court denied
the motion for mistrial and did not permit Smith to return for the People’s
final witness. The court instructed the jury to disregard Smith’s actions in
the courtroom.
Later that day, the court permitted Smith to return to the courtroom to
testify with instructions to answer only the questions asked. Despite the
court’s repeated instructions, Smith repeatedly failed to so limit his
responses and spoke out of turn. Consequently, the court concluded his
testimony over the defense’s objection and removed Smith from the court
room once again. The court struck his testimony and his attorney’s opening
statement with instructions not to consider that testimony, the defense’s
opening statement, or Smith’s removal from the courtroom.
The jury found Smith guilty of stalking with a prior stalking conviction
and four counts of making a criminal threat, finding him not guilty on count
3. After a bifurcated trial, the jury further found true the allegations that the
stalking and three criminal threat counts occurred while Smith was released
from custody on bail (§ 12022.1, subd. (b)), that the offenses involved the
threat of great bodily harm, that the stalking count and one criminal threat
count occurred while Smith was on parole, and that his performance while on
parole was unsatisfactory.
Prior to sentencing, Smith again made a Marsden motion, which the
court denied. The court then sentenced Smith together on both Cases A and
B, at the same hearing and as part of a single abstract of judgment.
In Case A, the court sentenced Smith to five years for stalking (the
upper term), eight months for each of the four criminal threat convictions
(one-third of the middle term, consecutive), and two years for engaging in

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stalking while released from custody on bail (consecutive). The court found
that section 654 did not apply to stay the punishment on the criminal threat
convictions. In so ruling, the court explained that “there are two separate
crimes here . . . the threat itself, and . . . the stalking as a whole,” even
though the court also understood that the stalking was an “all-encompassing
course of conduct such that did include these threats.” Finally, as to Case A,
the court stated, “All fines and fees will be imposed on that case.”
In Case B, the court sentenced Smith to one year for the assault (one-
third of the middle term, consecutive to Case A) and eight months for
vandalism (one-third of the middle term, consecutive). Again, the court
stated, “All fines and fees will be imposed on that case as well.”
On the abstract of judgment, the restitution fines appear as $10,000 in
Case A and $600 in Case B (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), an additional $10,000 in
Case A and $600 in Case B, suspended unless parole is revoked (§ 1202.45), a
$280 court operations assessment (§ 1465.8), a $210 conviction assessment
(Gov. Code, § 70373), and an additional $41 for theft. These amounts
matched the Probation Department’s recommendations for each case at the
time of sentencing. The probation report in Case A recommended a
restitution fine of $10,000 pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (b), an
additional restitution fine of $10,000 pursuant to section 1202.45, stayed
unless parole is revoked, a court security fee of $200 pursuant to section
1465.8, and a criminal conviction assessment fee of $150 pursuant to
Government Code section 70373. In Case B, the probation report
recommended a restitution fine of $600 pursuant to section 1202.4,
subdivision (b), an additional restitution fine of $600 pursuant to section
1202.45, stayed unless parole is revoked, a court security fee of $80 pursuant
to section 1465.8, a criminal conviction assessment fee of $60 pursuant to

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Government Code section 70373, and a theft fine of $41 pursuant to section
1202.5.
Appellate counsel filed briefs pursuant to People v. Wende, supra, 25
Cal.3d 436, indicating he identified no reasonably arguable issue for reversal
on appeal. We independently reviewed the record in these cases consistent
with our obligations under Wende and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
738 (Anders). Following that review, we consolidated the appeals in the cases
and requested that the parties brief two issues: (1) whether the trial court
erred under section 654 by declining to stay the sentences on Smith’s
convictions for making a criminal threat (§ 422) in light of his sentence for
stalking (§ 646.9, subds. (a) & (c)(2)), and (2) whether the trial court made a
sufficient oral pronouncement of the fines and fees that appear in the
abstract of judgment and was required to hold an ability to pay hearing prior
to imposing them.
DISCUSSION
A. Section 654
In his supplemental brief, Smith contends the trial court erred by
declining to stay the criminal threats sentences under section 654,
contending his convictions for criminal threats involved the same acts and
were motivated by the same intent or objective as his conviction for stalking.
Based on the allegations in Case A and the case People v. Roles (2020) 44
Cal.App.5th 935, 948, we agree.
The offense of stalking occurs when the defendant “willfully,
maliciously, and repeatedly follows or willfully and maliciously harasses
another person and who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that
person in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her
immediate family.” (§ 646.9, subd. (a).) The statute then defines harassment

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as “a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that
seriously alarms, annoys, torments, or terrorizes the person, and that serves
no legitimate purpose.” (§ 646.9, subd. (e).) A “ ‘course of conduct’ means two
or more acts occurring over a period of time, however short, evidencing a
continuity of purpose.” (§ 646.9, subd. (f).) A credible threat is a
communication “made with the intent to place the person that is the target of
the threat in reasonable fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her
family, and made with the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to
cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or
her safety or the safety of his or her family.” (§ 646.9, subd. (g).)
Five elements make up a criminal threat under section 422, subdivision
(a): “(1) that the defendant ‘willfully threaten[ed] to commit a crime which
will result in death or great bodily injury to another person,’ (2) that the
defendant made the threat ‘with the specific intent that the statement . . . is
to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out,’
(3) that the threat—which may be ‘made verbally, in writing, or by means of
an electronic communication device’—was ‘on its face and under the
circumstances in which it [was] made, . . . so unequivocal, unconditional,
immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of
purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat,’ (4) that the
threat actually caused the person threatened ‘to be in sustained fear for his
or her own safety or for his or her immediate family’s safety,’ and (5) that the
threatened person’s fear was ‘reasonabl[e]’ under the circumstances.” (People
v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 227–228.)
Section 654, subdivision (a), prohibits “punish[ment] under more than
one provision” for “[a]n act or omission that is punishable in different ways by
different provisions of law.” Whether section 654 bars punishment for two

8
convictions involves “a two-step inquiry”: (1) “if the different crimes were
completed by a ‘single physical act’ ” then “the defendant may not be
punished more than once for that act”; and (2) “if we conclude that the case
involves more than a single act—i.e., a course of conduct,” then we “consider
whether that course of conduct reflects a single ‘intent and objective’ or
multiple intents and objectives.” (People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307,
311–312.) “In analyzing whether section 654 bars the imposition of multiple
sentences, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
judgment and affirm the trial court’s sentencing decision—whether express
or implied—if it is supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.] Under
this standard, this court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the trial court’s finding and presume the existence of every fact the trial court
could reasonably deduce from the record . . . ‘[W]e review the trial court’s
conclusions of law de novo.’ ” (People v. Vasquez (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 732,
737.)
First, under the facts of this case viewed most favorably to the trial
court’s decision, we conclude for the purposes of section 654 that the act of
each criminal threat cannot be separated from that of stalking. The evidence
is not in question. Smith sent six text messages between August 27, 2021,
and April 4, 2022, threatening to kill or referencing killing the victim or her
family. At issue is the legal question whether the four individual convictions
for criminal threats can be punished separately from the stalking course of
conduct, which included each of those criminal threats. As the trial court
understood, the stalking “is [an] all-encompassing course of conduct such that
did include these threats.” Because the stalking course of conduct included
the criminal threats, and the two cannot be separated, we conclude section
654 prohibits separate punishment.

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In Roles, the defendant was charged with stalking and criminal threats
for leaving many threatening messages on the victim’s voicemail over the
course of two days. (Roles, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 940.) Because the
victim listened to all of the messages at once, the court determined that the
facts supported the finding of only one criminal threat charge arising out of
“a single period of sustained fear.” (Id. at p. 942.) The court then concluded
that “the acts that constituted making a criminal threat (i.e., the 15
threatening voice messages) cannot be separated from defendant’s course of
conduct in stalking [the victim]. Both crimes were based on the same phone
calls and voice messages.” (Id. at p. 947.) Thus, the court held “that section
654 applies to prohibit separate punishments for the stalking and criminal
threats convictions.” (Id. at p. 948.)
Here, even though the acts making up the criminal threats were
separated in time and the victim testified that she experienced greater fear
based on subsequent threats, each of the four text messages sent to the
victim “cannot be separated from defendant’s course of conduct in stalking.”
(Roles, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 947.) Indeed, the amended information
alleges that the stalking (count 1) occurred between August 27, 2021, and
April 4, 2022—from the date of the first criminal threat to the date of the last
criminal threat. Further, in closing argument, the prosecutor argued that
the course of conduct for stalking included the August 27, March 5, and two
April 5 text messages. Even though the stalking crime punished Smith for
doing more than each single criminal threat, the criminal threat acts were
included in the crime of stalking. (See People v. Mesa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 191,
198, 200 [“The gang crime punishes defendant for doing more than the act of
shooting the victims or possessing a firearm, but there is no question that
defendant’s act of shooting the victims or possessing a firearm is punished by

10
the gang crime,” therefore section 654 barred punishment on the gang crime
in addition to the punishment for assault with and possession of a firearm;
“Section 654 applies where the ‘defendant stands convicted of both (1) a crime
that requires, as one of its elements, the intentional commission of an
underlying offense, and (2) the underlying offense itself’ ”].)
Even if the text messages were “temporally separated in such a way as
to afford the defendant opportunity to reflect and to renew his or her intent”
to commit a new criminal threat, the temporal separation merely permitted
each text message to serve as a separate criminal threat. (People v. Gaio
(2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 919, 935 [three bribes separate in time but with the
same general intent could be punished separately under section 654].) Each
criminal threat still fell within the course of conduct of stalking.
Second, in committing each of the criminal threats and the stalking
course of conduct, Smith acted with a single intent and objective, consistent
with the similar intent requirements required under the criminal threats and
stalking statutes. That intent and objective was to threaten the victim,
causing the victim to fear for her and her family’s safety, with the goal that
she change his status in the mental health program.
We acknowledge the dicta in Roles stating, “If there was evidence in the
record that [the victim] sustained fear from individual voice messages, such
that some of the threatening voice messages could apply to the stalking
conviction and others could support the criminal threats conviction, the
People’s position [seeking separate punishment] might have merit.” (Roles,
supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 948.) Here, even with multiple incidents of
criminal threats, the People’s position does not have merit because of the
allegation and argument that each criminal threat was part of the stalking

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course of conduct and because that course of conduct was pursuant to a single

objective.3
Accordingly, we modify the judgment to stay the sentences for Smith’s
convictions on counts 2, 4, 5, and 6.
B. Fines and Fees
1. Oral Pronouncement
Smith next contends that the trial court erred by failing to orally
pronounce fines and fees on the record prior to the clerk including them in
the abstract of judgment. The People argue that Smith forfeited this
argument by failing to object.
Courts have held that the “failure to specify the amount and statutory
basis for each fine, fee, and penalty assessment is a ‘legal error[ ] at
sentencing,’ ” but that such error “can be reviewed on appeal ‘ “regardless of
whether an objection or argument was raised . . . .” ’ ” (People v. Hartley
(2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 620, 637, citing People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849,
852; People v. Hamed (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 928, 938 (Hamed) [“a
sentencing court should make a ‘detailed recitation of all the fees, fines and
penalties on the record’ ”].) To fulfill its obligation, the court may recite each
amount with its basis on the record, or it may “make a shorthand reference in
its oral pronouncement to ‘penalty assessments as set forth in the’ probation
report” or some other document. (Hartley at p. 637, Hamed at p. 939-940.)
Here, the court did not specify the amount and basis of the fines, fees, and
penalty assessments, nor did the court even make a shorthand reference to
the probation report. The trial court merely stated that “[a]ll fines and fees

3 We express no opinion whether the prosecution could plead around
section 654 by alleging stalking based on only two incidents.
12
will be imposed” in each case without specifying the amount and basis. This
statement was not sufficient.
However, the court in Hamed concluded the failure to specify the basis
can be corrected on appeal without remanding: “Since we may correct the
error on appeal, there is no need to remand this matter to the sentencing
court to orally pronounce the correct judgment.” (Hamed, supra, 221
Cal.App.4th at p. 940.) In this case, the abstract of judgment included
amounts under section 1202.4, subdivision (b), section 1202.45, section
1465.8, Government Code section 70373, and section 1202.5 for “theft” that
matched the recommendations in the probation reports. Following Hamed,
we infer that the trial court intended the statement “[a]ll fines and fees will
be imposed” to refer to the fines and fees recommended in the probation
reports, and we correct the error. In essence, the error was harmless because
Smith had notice of the amounts recommended in the probation report and
the trial court announced the intent to impose “all” fines and fees.
2. Ability to Pay Hearing
Finally, Smith contends that the trial court erred by failing to hold an
ability to pay hearing prior to imposing the section 1202.4, subdivision (b)
restitution fine and the assessments under section 1465.8 and Government
Code section 70373, citing People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, 1164
(Dueñas). In Dueñas, the court “conclude[d] that due process of law requires
the trial court to conduct an ability to pay hearing and ascertain a
defendant’s present ability to pay before it imposes court facilities and court
operations assessments under . . . section 1465.8 and Government Code
section 70373.” (Dueñas, at p.1164.) Dueñas was decided long before the
sentencing hearing in this case, giving Smith the opportunity to object in trial
court based on that case. Likewise, as to the restitution fine, section 1202.4

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expressly allows consideration of a defendant’s ability to pay when
determining whether to increase the restitution fine above the statutory
minimum of $300. (§ 1202.4, subd. (c).) Notably, Smith was aware before
sentencing that the probation department recommended imposing the
$10,000 and $600 restitution fines.
As this court has previously noted, “[t]he concept of forfeiture for
failure to raise ability to pay fines, fees or assessments is well established in
our case law prior to Dueñas[, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157]. Some of the
cases include People v. Aguilar (2015) 60 Cal.4th 862, 864 . . .; People v.
Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 853-854 . . .; People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th
198, 227 . . .; and People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 729 . . . .” (People v.
Keene (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 861, 864.) Because Smith was in the best
position to know his ability to pay, it was incumbent on him to raise the
issue. (Avila, at p. 729.) The court’s statement that all fines and fees would
be imposed provided a sufficient opportunity for Smith to raise Dueñas and
the ability to pay provision of section 1202.4. Yet he failed to do so, forfeiting
this claim of error on appeal.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified by staying the sentence on counts 2, 4, 5, and
6 as described in this opinion. The trial court is directed to prepare a minute
order and an amended abstract of judgment to reflect the modification of the
sentence and to forward a certified copy of the amended abstract to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
The oral pronouncement of fines and fees is corrected.
As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

CASTILLO, J.

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