CourtListener 10311872•People v. Sanchez CA2/3
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Filed 1/10/25 P. v. Sanchez CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B331843
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA095230)
v.
VICTOR SANCHEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Jacqueline Lewis, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
1
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
In 2015, defendant and appellant Victor Sanchez pled
guilty to voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192 subd. (a))1
and admitted he personally used a firearm in the commission of a
felony (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). A codefendant pled no contest to
voluntary manslaughter and admitted the allegation that a
principal was armed with a firearm in the commission of the
felony (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). In 2022, Sanchez filed a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6. At the prima facie stage, the
trial court concluded Sanchez was ineligible for relief based on
evidence in the preliminary hearing transcript that Sanchez was
the actual killer, and the absence of a natural and probable
consequences instruction at an earlier trial that ended in a
mistrial.
On appeal, Sanchez contends the record of conviction does
not conclusively establish he was the actual killer, and the
charging document did not preclude the prosecution from
pursuing a theory of liability based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or the felony murder rule. We agree that
the record of conviction does not demonstrate Sanchez’s
ineligibility for relief as a matter of law. We therefore reverse the
trial court order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 31, 2011, Manuel Morales was shot and killed in
front of his home. In 2012, the People charged Sanchez and a
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
codefendant, Christian Velasquez, with Morales’s murder in
violation of section 187, subdivision (a). The information also
alleged that Sanchez personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm, which caused great bodily injury and death to Morales
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)); personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)); and personally used a firearm
(§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). No firearm enhancements were alleged as
to Velasquez. The trial ended in a mistrial.
The parties subsequently reached a plea agreement. In
February 2015, Sanchez pled guilty to an amended count of
voluntary manslaughter. He also admitted personal use of a
firearm in the commission of a felony (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
Velasquez pled no contest to an amended count of voluntary
manslaughter and admitted the allegation that a principal was
armed with a firearm in the commission of a felony (§ 12022,
subd. (a)(1)). Sanchez’s counsel stipulated to a factual basis for
the plea and admissions based on the preliminary hearing
transcript and the trial transcript.2 The trial court sentenced
Sanchez to 14 years in prison.
In April 2022, Sanchez filed a form petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6. The trial court appointed
counsel. The People filed an opposition, to which they attached
the preliminary hearing transcript and the reporter’s transcript
from Sanchez’s guilty plea. Sanchez did not file a reply.
2 Sanchez executed a written advisement of rights, waiver,
and plea form, indicating he stipulated and agreed there was a
factual basis for his plea and admissions, and that he was
pleading guilty to take advantage of a plea bargain, pursuant to
People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595.
3
In June 2023, the trial court denied Sanchez’s petition after
determining he failed to establish a prima facie case for relief.
The trial court reasoned that the preliminary hearing transcript
established Sanchez was the actual shooter, and the jury was not
instructed on a natural and probable consequences theory at the
first trial. The court concluded it therefore appeared that the
People had not relied on that theory.3
Sanchez timely appealed from the denial of his petition.
DISCUSSION
I. Senate Bill No. 1437 and Section 1172.6
In 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) “to amend the felony murder rule and the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to
murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); see also People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 707–708 (Strong); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957
(Lewis); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843
(Gentile).) The bill amended section 188 by adding the
requirement that, except as stated in section 189, subdivision (e),
“in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall
3 It is unclear from the record whether the trial court
reviewed the transcript or other portions of the record from the
previous trial. The parties did not present the trial court with
any materials from the trial and the court did not expressly state
that it had reviewed the trial transcript or any other portion of
the record from the earlier trial. Aside from the original
information, the record on appeal does not include any documents
related to the proceedings that ended in a mistrial.
4
act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a
person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.”
(§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) The amendments to the Penal Code did not
invalidate murder convictions based on the theory that the
defendant was the actual killer. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1,
subd. (f); People v. Mares (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1158, 1166,
review granted May 1, 2024, S284232 (Mares); People v. Garcia
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 967 [Sen. Bill No. 1437 imposed
heightened mens rea requirement only for persons who were not
actual killers].)
Senate Bill No. 1437 created a procedure, now codified at
section 1172.6, in which persons convicted of qualifying offenses
under the former law may seek resentencing if they could no
longer be convicted of those offenses under amended section 188.
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
p. 847.) A defendant must file a petition declaring that, among
other things, the defendant could not presently be convicted of
murder under the current law. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 708.) If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing of
entitlement to relief, the court must issue an order to show cause.
“If the court declines to make an order to show cause, it shall
provide a statement fully setting forth its reasons for doing so.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
II. Prima Facie Stage and Standard of Review
At the prima facie stage, “ ‘ “the court takes petitioner’s
factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his
or her factual allegations were proved.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 971.)
5
“While the trial court may look at the record of
conviction . . . to determine whether a petitioner has made a
prima facie case for section [1172.6] relief, the prima facie inquiry
under subdivision (c) is limited.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 971.) Courts may not engage in “ ‘factfinding involving the
weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ [Citation.]”
(Id. at p. 972.) Rather, “[t]he record should be consulted at the
prima facie stage only to determine ‘readily ascertainable facts,’
such as the crime of conviction and findings on enhancements.”
(People v. Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798, 815.) The court
may make credibility determinations adverse to a petitioner only
if the record of conviction “ ‘ “contain[s] facts refuting the
allegations made in the petition” . . . .’ ” (Lewis, at p. 971.)
The trial court’s denial of a resentencing petition at the
prima facie stage “ ‘is a purely legal conclusion,’ ” which appellate
courts review de novo. (People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90,
101 (Ervin); People v. Patton (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649, 656,
review granted June 28, 2023, S279670 (Patton).)
III. The Record Does Not Conclusively Establish Sanchez
is Ineligible for Relief as a Matter of Law
Sanchez contends the trial court erred in finding him
ineligible for relief because the record of conviction does not
establish the identity of the actual killer and nothing in the
charging document precluded the prosecution from pursuing a
now-invalid theory of murder. The People assert the charges and
the plea were sufficient to demonstrate Sanchez is ineligible for
relief.
The record in this case was very limited. Although
Sanchez’s opening brief addresses at great length the current
split in authority as to the proper use of evidence admitted at a
6
preliminary hearing in evaluating a section 1172.6 petition, the
People concede the trial court erred in considering preliminary
hearing testimony in this case to find Sanchez ineligible for relief.
We agree with this concession. At the preliminary hearing, a
detective testified pursuant to Proposition 115, codified as
section 872, subdivision (b), relaying non-party witness
statements identifying Sanchez as the sole shooter and actual
killer.4 But section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), explicitly precludes
the use of hearsay evidence admitted in a preliminary hearing
pursuant to section 872, subdivision (b), at a section 1172.6
evidentiary hearing, and we agree with the courts that have
concluded this prohibition must also extend to the prima facie
stage. (Patton, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 652, fn. 2, review
granted; People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 988, fn. 9
(Flores).)
When the testimony admitted pursuant to section 872,
subdivision (b) is excluded, the remainder of the preliminary
hearing evidence failed to establish Sanchez was convicted on a
theory that remains valid. A detective testified that based on
video footage from the victim’s home surveillance system,
multiple shots were fired from a car pulling away from the front
4 The detective testified that an associate of the defendants,
Adalberto Castillo, admitted he was in the car with Sanchez and
Velasquez when Morales was shot. Although Adalberto could not
see who was shooting, he believed the shots were fired from
within the car, and he could see Velasquez, who was not shooting.
Adalberto’s brother, Jesus Castillo, told the detective he was not
present for the shooting, but he said Sanchez told him after the
shooting that “he [Sanchez] had gotten” Morales. Jesus also told
the detective that Velasquez said Sanchez shot and killed
Morales in the belief that Morales may have had a gun.
7
of the victim’s house. Because it was dark, the video footage did
not reveal the number or identity of individuals in the car. The
shots came from the passenger side of the vehicle. The murder
weapon was not recovered. There were multiple nine-millimeter
shell casings found on the street and sidewalk in front of
Morales’s residence. Although law enforcement found a gun in
Sanchez’s possession during the investigation, it was inconsistent
with the type of gun that could have fired nine-millimeter bullets.
The vehicle’s license plate number and exact color were not
visible in the video, and the detective could not identify the type
of car from the video. Another detective reviewed the video
footage and identified the vehicle as a 1998 Toyota Camry, and
the vehicle in the video looked similar to a 1998 Toyota Camry
that belonged to Velasquez. This evidence did not establish that
the People only pursued a theory that Sanchez was the actual
killer or a direct perpetrator rather than an accomplice.
Similarly, the People do not argue that the trial court could
permissibly rely on the transcript or other portions of the record
from the earlier trial. We agree with Sanchez that following the
mistrial, the People were not bound to pursue the same theories,
rely on the same evidence, request the same jury instructions, or
make the same arguments asserted in the prior trial.
Thus, all that remains are the charging documents and
Sanchez’s and Velasquez’s pleas. The People assert this limited
record was sufficient to establish that Sanchez was convicted as
“the direct perpetrator” or the “actual perpetrator.” We disagree.
The original information charged Sanchez with murder. Because
murder was generically charged and the information “did not
specify or exclude any particular theory of murder,” the charge
alone does not indicate Sanchez was ineligible for resentencing as
8
a matter of law. (Flores, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 987; see also
People v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328, 337–338 (Estrada);
People v. Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217, 233 (Rivera).) The
charge was broad enough to encompass theories that Sanchez
was guilty as an aider and abettor under a natural and probable
consequences or felony murder theory.
Sanchez’s guilty plea also does not preclude relief as a
matter of law. In entering his plea, Sanchez did “not admit to or
stipulate to any particular theory of murder.” (Flores, supra, 76
Cal.App.5th at p. 987.) He simply pled guilty to voluntary
manslaughter. (See People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th
1206, 1212–1213 (Gaillard) [petitioner admitted guilt but record
did not establish specific theory; admission was to an aiding and
abetting voluntary manslaughter in generic terms; the admission
to voluntary manslaughter “would not refute his allegation that
he could not presently be convicted of murder on a direct aiding
and abetting theory”].)
Sanchez’s stipulation that the preliminary hearing and
trial transcripts provided a factual basis for his guilty plea also
does not conclusively preclude relief in this case. “Courts have
consistently differentiated between an admission that a
document or recitation contains a factual basis for a plea and an
admission that statements in that document or recitation are
true.” (People v. Hiller (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 335, 349.) “A
defendant is not required to personally admit the truth of the
factual basis of the plea, which may be established by defense
counsel’s stipulation to a particular document, such as a police
report or a preliminary hearing transcript.” (People v. French
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 50–51.) “Thus, absent an indication that a
defendant admitted the truth of particular facts, the stipulation
9
to a factual basis for the plea does not ‘constitute[ ] a binding
admission for all purposes.’ ” (Rivera, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at
p. 235, quoting French, at p. 52.) Here, Sanchez did not admit
the truth of any particular facts as part of the stipulation that a
factual basis for his plea to voluntary manslaughter existed.
Further, as explained above, without considering the evidence at
the preliminary hearing admitted pursuant to section 872,
subdivision (b), the remaining evidence did not indicate the
People were pursuing a theory that remains valid under existing
law.
Sanchez’s admission that he personally used a firearm
under section 12022.5, subdivision (a), also does not conclusively
establish that he was convicted as the actual killer or that he was
convicted as an aider and abettor who acted with malice.5 (People
v. Davenport (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 476, 485 [plea to firearm
enhancement under § 12022.5, subd. (a), does not bar relief as a
matter of law at prima facie stage].) As the California Supreme
Court has explained in a different context in People v. Jones
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084 (Jones), when there are multiple
participants in a crime, a true finding on a section 12022.5
personal use enhancement as to one participant does not
necessarily establish the participant was the actual killer. As the
court noted, if, for example, two participants in a felony “display
guns” for intimidation, and one “shoots and kills a victim, both
5 Section 12022.5, subdivision (a), provides: “Except as
provided in subdivision (b), any person who personally uses a
firearm in the commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be
punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment
in the state prison for 3, 4, or 10 years, unless use of a firearm is
an element of that offense.”
10
[participants] could be found to have personally used a gun in . . .
the felony murder, even though only one is the actual killer.”
(Jones, at p. 1120; see Estrada, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 338
[admission of enhancements for the personal use of a deadly
weapon and infliction of great bodily injury did not establish
defendant acted with the intent to kill or refute that he was
convicted on a theory of imputed malice]; People v. Berry (1993)
17 Cal.App.4th 332, 335 [in § 12022.5, subd. (a), “use
encompasses a situation where the defendant is armed and uses
his firearm in furtherance of a series of related offenses that
culminates in a fatal or near fatal shooting even though the
defendant does not personally fire the actual shot”].)
Further, as indicated in Jones, personal use encompasses
conduct such as displaying or brandishing a firearm, in addition
to firing a weapon. (See e.g., People v. Bryant (2011) 191
Cal.App.4th 1457, 1472; People v. Arzate (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th
390, 399–400.) Thus, an admission or true finding of personal
firearm use when there are multiple armed participants leaves
open the possibility that the defendant “used” the gun to aid and
abet a target crime short of murder, while a different participant
intended to, and did, shoot to kill. Here, in the portions of the
record properly considered, there was no evidence conclusively
establishing the People’s theory of conviction was that, of the two
defendants, or of the three individuals in the car, only Sanchez
had or used a gun.
This case is therefore unlike Patton, in which this court
concluded that the defendant, who as part of his plea admitted
that he personally used and discharged a firearm in the course of
an attempted murder, was ineligible for resentencing because the
evidence indicated he was the “sole perpetrator.” (Patton, supra,
11
89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 649, 656–657, review granted; cf. People v.
Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 743–744 [in a robbery
involving two perpetrators, where evidence showed only one
displayed and used gun, true finding on personal use
enhancement established the individual identified with the sole
weapon as the actual killer and ineligible for resentencing].)
The People also argue the record of conviction establishes
Sanchez was the direct perpetrator because, while he admitted
the personal use allegation, Velasquez only admitted the
allegation that a principal was armed with a firearm under
section 12022, subdivision (a)(1). The People assert that when
viewed together, these pleas establish Sanchez was convicted as
the direct perpetrator, and they together eliminate the possibility
that he could have been convicted of murder under an imputed
malice theory.
This contention presents a closer case. When viewed
together, the amended charges and the two pleas strongly
suggest that the basis on which the People pursued the charge
against Sanchez was that he was the actual killer, and Velasquez
was an accomplice. After all, if the theory was that Velasquez
fired a weapon instead of, or in addition to, Sanchez, one would
expect the People also would have charged Velasquez with a
personal use firearm enhancement.
However, at the prima facie stage, we cannot engage in any
factfinding involving the weighing of the evidence, and the
“ ‘prima facie bar was intentionally and correctly set very low.’ ”
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) It is appropriate to deny a
petition at the prima facie stage only if the record conclusively
establishes that the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter
12
of law. (Id. at p. 971; Gaillard, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1211;
Ervin, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 101.)
Velasquez’s admission that a principal was armed with a
firearm in the commission of a felony under section 12022,
subdivision (a)(1), does not conclusively establish that the
People’s sole theory was that only Sanchez was armed or used a
gun. Section 12022, subdivision (a)(1), provides that “[t]his
additional term [of imprisonment] shall apply to a person who is
a principal in the commission of a felony or attempted felony if
one or more of the principals is armed with a firearm, whether or
not the person is personally armed with a firearm.” (Italics
added.) This provision therefore allows for multiple principals
with firearms, including the person making the admission.
(Ibid.; People v. Paul (1998) 18 Cal.4th 698, 707 [§ 12022,
subd. (a)(1), provides that a defendant is armed “if a principal is
armed in the commission of the offense, whether or not the
defendant personally is armed”].) Stated differently,
section 12022, subdivision (a)(1) allows for both personal and
vicarious liability. (People v. Superior Court (Pomilia) (1991) 235
Cal.App.3d 1464, 1469.)
In People v. Bland (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, the California
Supreme Court, in interpreting several subsections of
section 12022, observed that by “making the liability for
increased punishment extend to any principal whether or not
‘personally armed,’ subdivision (a)(2) of section 12022 imposes
both personal and vicarious liability.” (Id. at p. 998, fn. 3, italics
added.) Thus, the principal armed allegation does not
categorically exclude liability for an individual who is personally
armed or personally uses a firearm.
13
On the record before us, the People’s theory could have
been that all occupants of the car were armed, Sanchez
brandished a firearm, and he aided and abetted Velasquez or
another person in the car in perpetrating an assault or other
crime short of murder, without personally harboring an intent to
kill. While the Sanchez and Velasquez pleas considered together
suggest the People’s theory was that Sanchez was the direct
perpetrator and only shooter, we cannot determine that the pleas
conclusively establish that was the theory of conviction.
The People assert that only one person had a firearm and
fired shots at the victim. However, they do not cite any such
evidence in the record of conviction. Instead, they assert the only
“logical conclusion” from the “pre-plea proceedings, plea, and
section 1172.6 proceedings” was that Sanchez shot Morales with
an intent to kill. While a logical conclusion, we disagree that it is
the only permissible theory that can be deduced from the
admissible portions of the record of conviction.
This case is therefore unlike those in which the record of
conviction contains facts refuting the petition’s allegations.
Sanchez was not the only person involved in the shooting that
killed the victim. (Cf. Patton, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 649, 656–657, review granted; People v. Pickett (2023) 93
Cal.App.5th 982, 986, review granted Oct. 11, 2023, S281643.)
The portions of the preliminary hearing testimony that could be
considered did not conclusively identify the murder theory the
People were pursuing. (Cf. Mares, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1167, review granted [preliminary hearing transcript showed
People offered only an actual killer theory]; People v. Nguyen
(2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 1154, 1166 [only theory put forth by the
prosecutor at the preliminary hearing, and otherwise, showed
14
defendant convicted of murder as direct aider and abettor].) We
cannot determine, as a matter of law, that Sanchez is ineligible
for relief. (See Mares, at p. 1173 [“If a defendant who faced a
murder charge before Senate Bill 1437 pled guilty and the record
contains any indication he had an accomplice who may have been
the killer, a prima facie case ordinarily would be readily
established, even by conclusory assertions in a form petition.”].)
15
DISPOSITION
The order denying Sanchez’s petition for resentencing is
reversed with the direction to the trial court to issue an order to
show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing consistent with
Penal Code section 1172.6.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
I concur:
BERSHON, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
16
Egerton, Acting P.J., Concurring.
I concur in the result.
EGERTON, Acting P.J.
1
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