In re M.R. CA2/8

CourtListener 10311367Calctapp9 janv. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 1/9/25 In re M.R. CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re M.R. et al., Persons Coming B331896
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
______________________________ (Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP05324A, B)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

W.R. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from findings and orders of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Tamara Hall, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
Ernesto Paz Rey, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant W.R.
Sarah Vaona, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant K.V.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sally Son, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Both parents appeal the juvenile court’s order terminating
their parental rights to minors M.R. and J.R. K.V. (Mother)
contends reversal is warranted because the juvenile court and the
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS) failed to satisfy the initial inquiry requirements under
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et
seq.) and related California law (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 224 et
seq.). W.R. (Father) contends the juvenile court erred when it
terminated his parental rights “in the absence of a valid finding
of detriment.” Father also argues that the juvenile court erred in
finding the beneficial relationship exception to adoption did not
apply.
We agree with Mother that DCFS did not properly
discharge its statutory duty of initial inquiry. We disagree with
Father’s contentions. We conditionally reverse and remand with
directions to the juvenile court to order DCFS to ask extended
family members about the children’s possible Indian heritage
under ICWA. We affirm the juvenile court’s findings and orders
in all other respects.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Petition and Detention
On October 7, 2020, DCFS filed a petition on behalf of the
children, pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1). The petition
alleged Mother placed the children in a “detrimental and
endangering situation” on October 5, 2020 as she “drove a vehicle

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

2
at a high rate of speed while the children were passengers,”
crashed into a parked vehicle, “resulting in the family’s vehicle
repeatedly flipping over, causing the children fear.” J.R. suffered
a bloody nose and a contusion to his head, while M.R. suffered
pain to her stomach and head. Law enforcement located an
unregistered firearm and methamphetamine in the vehicle
within access to the children. Mother was arrested for child
endangerment. The petition includes an Indian Child Inquiry
Attachment—Judicial Council form ICWA-010(A)—which
provides the children have no known Indian ancestry. The
attachment indicates Mother “does not have anyone in her family
with Native American Indian Heritage.”
A children’s social worker (CSW) interviewed Mother at
jail. When asked about Native American heritage, Mother stated
there is no such heritage “in her family or [F]ather’s family.” As
to car incident, Mother “remembered . . . hitting something but
does not know what it was.” When asked about the gun and
drugs found in her car, Mother said she sells drugs “to make
money” and “us[es] the gun to protect herself.” M.R. told the
CSW she had seen a gun before and she stated, “[M]ommy had a
gun. She was trying to protect us from the bad guys. So if a bad
guy come she shoots him and protects us.”
The CSW learned Father is currently serving a seven-year
sentence at a federal prison in Herlong, California for a controlled
substance offense.
The CSW received a call from maternal aunt, who stated
she and paternal grandmother (PGM) “would like to care for the
children.” The next day, the CSW received a call from another
maternal aunt who said she would like to have the children
placed with her. Mother told the CSW she “does not want

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maternal grandmother [(MGM)] to care for her children” and
“would like her children to be placed with the paternal family.”
At the October 9, 2020 detention hearing, the juvenile court
placed the children with paternal aunt and PGM, with whom the
children had been residing for several years before the incident.
The juvenile court ordered monitored visitation and reunification
services for Mother, and “[n]o visitation to the Father unless and
until he makes contact with [DCFS].”
II. Continued Investigation and Proceedings
On October 16, 2020, the CSW received a phone call from
Father who stated he is the biological father of both children; he
denied Native American ancestry. Father indicated he is serving
a 10-year sentence for transporting drugs across the border. His
release date is April 27, 2028.
On October 26, 2020, the juvenile court ordered the federal
prison at Herlong to allow Father’s “appearance at hearing
affecting parental rights.”
On November 20, 2020, Mother filed her Parental
Notification of Indian Status—Judicial Council form ICWA-020—
and marked the box indicating she has “no Indian ancestry as far
as I know.”
On December 7, 2020, the juvenile court received a
response from the federal prison about Father’s court
appearance: “FEDERAL FACILITIES DO NOT RELEASE
INMATES FOR CHILD CUSTODY/FAMILY DEPENDENCY
CASES. UNABLE TO TRANSPORT.” Father’s counsel informed
the court: “I did actually call the federal facility myself. And
while they’re on lock-down, which is the case, they wouldn’t even
bring him to the phone. They won’t even bring them legal in
order to appear on any case. So right now they’re on COVID lock-

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down.” The juvenile court then reviewed Mother’s ICWA-020
form and found “ICWA does not apply” as it pertains to Mother.
On January 8, 2021, Father filed a Parental Notification of
Indian Status (ICWA-020 form) and indicated “No known ICWA.”
III. Jurisdiction and Disposition
Adjudication took place on January 25, 2021. The juvenile
court found Father to be the presumed father of the children.
Father made no argument, but noted he was a non-offending
parent in the section 300 petition. The juvenile court sustained
the petition as to Mother. The court found out-of-home
placement necessary and appropriate. The court ordered
monitored visitation and reunification services for Mother and
ordered DCFS to assess paternal aunt and PGM as visitation
monitors.
IV. Section 366.21 Status Review Proceedings
In the status review report filed July 16, 2021, DCFS
informed the court that Mother had been incarcerated at Folsom
State Prison since April 2, 2021. PGM reported to the CSW that
both parents have weekly telephone contact with the children.
The CSW observed the children were well cared for, had home-
cooked meals, clothing and toys, and appeared “happy.” M.R. told
the CSW that she does not want to leave PGM’s home. PGM
indicated she “does not have plans to take the children to visit
their parents” as both prisons are “far from [her] home.” PGM
wanted to provide permanent placement for the children.
At the section 366.21, subdivision (e) hearing held
September 14, 2021, the juvenile court found progress by Mother
and Father in court-ordered treatment was “minimal” and that
“the current placement continues to be necessary and

5
appropriate.” The court ordered DCFS to complete steps
necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the children.
In the status review report filed February 25, 2022, DCFS
informed the juvenile court that Mother was arrested on January
11, 2022 for drug possession and carrying a loaded gun. As to
Father, the CSW sent correspondence to him in September 2021
and February 2022 but received no response.
In a last minute information (LMI) filed April 5, 2022,
DCFS informed the court that its request for Father to
participate in the upcoming hearing (telephonically or by video)
was denied. Mother was arrested again on March 22, 2022. In
an LMI filed April 26, 2022, DCFS informed the court that the
CSW “had several missed calls from [F]ather during times that
[the CSW] was in meetings and training.” In addition, PGM’s
home was assessed for “permanent placement” of the children.
PGM stated she was interested in adopting the children.
At the section 366.21, subdivision (f) review hearing held
May 2, 2022, Father argued it is “wholly improper to move
towards terminating [his] parental rights” because he’s “a non-
offending party.” He requested the court make a finding that “no
reasonable services were offered during this review period”
because Father contacted the CSW “several” times and
“incarceration in and of itself is not enough to warrant any kind
of jurisdiction.” Father requested “home-of-parent Father order,
or . . . legal guardianship with paternal grandmother.”
The LMI filed May 16, 2022 provided that PGM wanted to
adopt the children.
At the continued section 366.21, subdivision (f) review
hearings held June 7 and 8, 2022, the juvenile court found “no
reasonable services were provided” by DCFS to Father. Father

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indicated, “If the recommendation has changed to continued
family reunification, then I will submit on that.” Later during
the hearing, Father said, “At the previous [section 366.21,
subdivision (f)] hearing, . . . I had . . . requested a home of parent
Father order. I wanted to officially on the record withdraw that
based on the new Department recommendations.”
In the status review report filed November 16, 2022, the
CSW stated Mother “denied having ICWA heritage in her
family.” The CSW asked PGM if Father has ICWA heritage, and
she denied, stating Father is from El Salvador. DCFS noted
Father “remains incarcerated and cannot provide appropriate
care for the children and/or meet their financial needs.” DCFS
recommended that reunification services terminate as to Father.
At the section 366.21 subdivision (f) review hearing on
March 7, 2023, Father argued he “was not ordered to do any
programs . . . for this case [because] he was also non-offending in
this petition.” He requested the court find “he is in compliance
with court-ordered case plan being that he was not, in reality,
ordered to do any programs.” Father “acknowledge[d] the fact
that he is incarcerated [until] roughly five years from today.
Father does desire that the minors have permanency with the
current caregiver [PGM].” Father “submit[ed] on termination of
reunification services . . . so that [DCFS] and all parties could
move forward with [the] permanent plan.”
After some discussion, the juvenile court found “the
argument that [Father] is not in compliance is misplaced. There
was nothing for him to be in compliance with. [¶] However, since
he has agreed to family reunification services being terminated
and permanent plan possibly with the [PGM], the court is going
to follow [DCFS’s] recommendation with respect to Father.”

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The court found that “return of the child[ren] to the
physical custody” of the parents “would create a substantial risk
of detriment to the child[ren], creating a continued necessity for
and appropriateness of the current placement.” The court found,
“At this juncture, the children are entitled to permanency in the
form of . . . adoption.” The matter was set for a section 366.26
hearing to select and implement a permanent plan of adoption for
the children.
V. Section 366.26 Permanency Planning
The LMI filed May 23, 2023 stated DCFS was “working on
Adoption Readiness” with PGM, who “agree[d] with the
permanent plan of adoption.” Both children wished to stay in
their present home.
In the report filed July 7, 2023, the CSW reported being
told by M.R. that while she “wants to have contact with Mother
. . . , she did not want to live with [M]other.” Both children
reported they want to be adopted by PGM.
The status review report filed August 18, 2023 stated
DCFS requested permission from Father’s correction counselor
for weekly parenting classes or individual therapy, but was
denied. In April 2023, visitation for inmates was reinstated at
Herlong. PGM transported the children to visit Father in June
2023, and the visit “went well.” The children have weekly
telephone contact with both parents.

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VI. Permanency Planning Review Proceedings
At the permanency planning review hearing held
September 5, 2023, the juvenile court found “by clear and
convincing evidence that [DCFS] has complied with the case plan
in making reasonable efforts to complete whatever steps
necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the children.”
On September 19, 2023, DCFS requested the juvenile court
“terminate parental rights and find that these children are
adoptable and that there are no exceptions to adoption at this
time.” Father argued the parental benefit exception to adoption
applied to him, as Father had weekly telephone contact with the
children, which is “the maximum amount that he’s been able to
based on his situation.” He argued “these weekly visits [have]
formed a parent-child bond” and that “it would be detrimental to
the children to sever[] that bond.” Minors’ counsel agreed with
DCFS’s recommendation and argued “the nature of the parents’
contact with the children over the past three years [does not rise]
to the level required for the court to find that an exception to
adoption applies.”
The juvenile court ruled: “[T]hese children were removed
from their parents on October 6, 2020, and placed with their
paternal grandmother on December 15th, 2020.” “Father,
unfortunately, has been incarcerated . . . for the majority of the
time of this case, and . . . in-person visitation, as [PGM] stated
. . . [is] an all-day event for the children . . . and the children have
to miss school” because of the four-hour distance between PGM’s
home and Father’s prison. Father “has maintained contact with
the children on a telephonic basis, but that does not arise to the
level of a parental-child bond.” The children have “a secured
bond” with PGM over the last three years and “look to [her] for

9
care, providence, consistency, and stability that a child will look
for in a parent, and these children do not see the parents in that
parental role.” The court found the severance of the parental
relationship did not outweigh the security and finalization of the
adoption. The court found “by clear and convincing evidence that
it would be detrimental to the child[ren] to be returned to the
parents” and that no exception to adoption applies. It terminated
parental rights and designated PGM as the prospective adoptive
parent.
Both Mother and Father filed notices of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. The Duty of Initial ICWA Inquiry Was Inadequate
The sole issue raised by Mother on appeal is whether DCFS
and the juvenile court complied with ICWA as they “failed to
complete adequate inquiry when it did not ask available paternal
and maternal relatives about the child[ren]’s possible Native
American ancestry.” The juvenile court and DCFS have “an
affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child for
whom a petition under Section 300 . . . may be or has been filed,
is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see In re Isaiah
W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 9, 11–12.) This continuing duty can be
divided into three phases: the duty of initial inquiry, the duty of
further inquiry, and the duty to provide formal ICWA notice. (In
re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566.) It is the first phase, the
duty of initial inquiry, that is at issue here. The initial inquiry,
governed by section 224.2, subdivision (b), requires DCFS to ask
“extended family members” whether the child may be an Indian
child. (§ 224.2, subd. (b).)

10
As the facts before us are not disputed, we independently
determine whether ICWA’s requirements were met. (In re D.S.
(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1051.)
Here, Mother argues the juvenile court and DCFS failed to
conduct their duty of initial inquiry by asking MGM and the
children’s aunts what they knew about possible Indian heritage.
DCFS does not oppose reversal and remand to ensure proper
initial inquiry is conducted pursuant to ICWA. We agree that
DCFS’s failure to ask MGM and the children’s aunts about any
possible Indian ancestry, especially when DCFS was in contact
with them throughout the proceedings, violated the express
mandate of section 224.2, subdivision (b). (In re Dezi C. (2024)
16 Cal.5th 1112, 1136–1137.) An inadequate ICWA inquiry
requires conditional reversal of the juvenile court’s order
terminating parental rights with directions to the juvenile court
and DCFS to conduct an adequate inquiry, supported by record
documentation. (Ibid.)
II. The Juvenile Court Made a Proper Finding of Detriment at
the Section 366.26 Hearing
Father argues, for the first time on appeal, that the
juvenile court erred when it terminated his parental rights “in
the absence of a valid finding of detriment.” Father never raised
this at the section 366.26 hearings held on September 5 and 19,
2023. The record reflects the only argument Father made was
that the parental benefit exception to adoption applied.
Nevertheless, we briefly address his argument.

11
Father is mistaken. The juvenile court made the requisite
detriment finding here; on September 19, 2023, it found “by clear
and convincing evidence that it would be detrimental to the
child[ren] to be returned to the parents” and that no exception to
adoption applies. Father also argues the juvenile court’s removal
of the children from his custody and care at the January 5, 2021
adjudication hearing was error. The order he complains of has
long since become final. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.406(a).)
III. The Beneficial Parental Relationship Exception to Adoption
Did Not Apply
Father contends the juvenile court abused its discretion
when it found the beneficial relationship exception to adoption
did not apply. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Once a court determines a child cannot be reunified with
the parents, it must select a permanent plan for the child. (In re
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630–631 (Caden C.); § 366.26.) If
the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child is
likely to be adopted, the court must select this option unless one
of certain enumerated exceptions applies, including the parental-
benefit exception. (Caden C., at pp. 630–631; § 366.26, subds. (b)
& (c)(1)(B)(i).) “In other words, when a parent establishes that
one of the exceptions applies, adoption or termination is not ‘in
the best interest of the child.’ ” (Caden C., at p. 631.)
Parents seeking to apply the parental-benefit exception
bear the burden of showing: 1) they maintained consistent
visitation to the extent permitted; 2) a relationship exists which
benefits the child; and 3) the detriment of losing the relationship

12
would not be outweighed by the benefits of the stability and
permanency of adoption. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.)
A hybrid standard of review applies. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 639.) We review a juvenile court’s findings under
the first two prongs for substantial evidence. (Id. at pp. 639–
640.) We apply the abuse of discretion standard to the juvenile
court’s findings as to the third element. (Id. at p. 630.)
B. Analysis
Father contends the juvenile court had “insufficient
evidence” to make a determination as to the applicability of the
beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption. He argues
DCFS did not include information about Father’s visitation.
The burden to show the applicability of the parental-benefit
exception is not on DCFS. It is on Father. (In re A.L. (2022)
73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1153; Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 638.) In addition, DCFS consistently reported about Father’s
contact with the children, whether it was the weekly telephone
calls or the in-person visit at Father’s prison in June 2023.
Father argues there were errors in the juvenile court’s
finding the parental-benefit exception inapplicable.
We review the three prongs.
1. Consistent Visitation
The juvenile court acknowledged Father’s limited visits
with the children due to his incarceration and the great distance
between PGM’s home and the federal prison in Herlong.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the juvenile court noted
“Father has maintained contact with the children on a telephonic
basis.” The juvenile court’s finding is supported by substantial
evidence.

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2. Existence of Beneficial Relationship
Father contends juvenile court’s analysis of the second
element was “perfunctory” and “cursory.” He also contends that
the court based its conclusion upon an improper consideration,
i.e., that Father did not occupy a parental role in the children’s
lives.
Under Caden C., the parent establishes the existence of a
beneficial relationship when “the child has a substantial,
positive, emotional attachment to the parent.” (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 636; see In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th
567, 575.) The juvenile court here found that while “Father has
maintained contact with the children on a telephonic basis,” the
children have “a secured bond” with PGM over the last three
years and “look to [her] for care, providence, consistency, and
stability that a child will look for in a parent, and these children
do not see the parents in that parental role.”
We disagree with Father that the juvenile court imposed a
requirement that Father establish he occupied a parental role in
the children’s lives. The juvenile court made findings based on
evidence that shows the minors turn to PGM for stability and
care and are thriving in PGM’s home. (See In re B.D. (2021)
66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1230 [“A positive attachment between
parent and child is necessarily one that is . . . nurturing and
provides the child with a sense of security and stability.”].)
Father has not met his burden to show that the minors have a
substantial emotional attachment to him. The juvenile court’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence.

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3. Weighing Detriment of Severance Against
Benefits of Adoptive Home
Father argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by
failing to properly balance the evidence to determine the extent of
detriment that would result from termination of parental
relationship. He contends “ ‘No delicate balancing act’ occurred
in this case.”
We are aware of no requirement, and Father points us to
none, that the juvenile court (in finding the parental-benefit
exception inapplicable) must recite specific findings as to its
conclusions about any of the three elements of the exception.
Thus, although express findings by the juvenile court in support
of its decision are helpful in conducting appellate review, they are
not required in this instance. (In re A.L., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1156.) Plus, nothing in the record indicates the juvenile
court failed to weigh the potential benefits that adoption would
afford the children against the potential harm of the loss of the
parental rights. (Ibid.) The record shows the court considered
many factors and found that severance of the parental
relationship did not outweigh the security and finalization of
adoption. The children themselves expressed a desire to stay
with PGM, with whom they felt safe. The juvenile court did not
err.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is conditionally
reversed and remanded with directions that the juvenile court
order DCFS to inquire of extended relatives as to the children’s
possible Indian heritage under ICWA. After initial inquiry has
been made, the juvenile court shall make ICWA findings at a

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noticed hearing. If the juvenile court finds ICWA inapplicable, it
shall reinstate its September 19, 2023 order terminating parental
rights. If the juvenile court concludes ICWA does apply, then it
shall proceed in conformity with ICWA and California
implementing provisions. (See 25 U.S.C., § 1912, subd. (a);
§§ 224.2, subd. (i)(1); 224.3, 224.4.) All other findings and orders
made September 19, 2023 are otherwise affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

WILEY, J.

VIRAMONTES, J.

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