People v. Osborne CA2/4

CourtListener 10311362Calctapp9 janv. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 1/9/25 P. v. Osborne CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B329334

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA112395
v.

JOHN OSBORNE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Judith L. Meyer, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert E. Boyce under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Daniel C.
Chang, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A jury convicted John Osborne of first-degree murder,
finding he killed his girlfriend, Nancy Romero, with
premeditation and deliberation. (Pen. Code1, § 187, subd. (a).) It
also found true allegations that he committed the murder by
personally and intentionally discharging a firearm, namely, a
handgun, which caused Romero to suffer great bodily injury and
death. (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d).) The trial court sentenced
Osborne to 50 years to life in prison, consisting of a 25-year-to-life
term for the murder and a 25-year-to-life term for the firearm
enhancement.
On appeal, Osborne contends his conviction must be
reversed because the trial court abused its discretion by allowing
the prosecution to present evidence showing that, after Romero’s
death, the police recovered firearms and firearm-related
paraphernalia from his bedroom, which were not used to commit
the murder. He also argues that his sentence must be vacated, as
the trial court abused its discretion by declining to strike the
firearm enhancement under section 1385, subdivision (c). As
discussed below, we reject Osborne’s contentions and affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

I. Prosecution Evidence
Between 6:55 and 7:00 a.m. on July 11, 2019, Mercedes
Guaspari left her home near the Long Beach courthouse to move
her car for street sweeping. As she was walking to her car, she
saw a couple – later identified as Osborne and Romero – arguing

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

2
on the sidewalk. As Guaspari tried to walk past the couple,
Romero stepped out in front of her and started walking. Osborne
followed, walking behind Guaspari. Growing uncomfortable,
Guaspari stepped off the sidewalk and began walking in the
street. Romero then quickened her pace, and Osborne followed
her. Soon thereafter, Guaspari lost sight of the couple.
Less than an hour later, at approximately 7:50 a.m.,
Romero was found lying on a sidewalk near the Long Beach
courthouse with a bloody gunshot wound to her back. An
ambulance transported Romero to the hospital, where she died.
At around 8:00 a.m., Osborne arrived at his mother’s house.
His mother testified that Osborne was upset and crying, and
appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. Osborne said he
had gotten into a fight with Romero, that he thought she was
going to leave him, and that he had shot her. A few hours later,
after shaving his head, Osborne left his mother’s home with her
boyfriend. After that, Osborne’s mother did not see or hear from
Osborne again.
During their investigation of Romero’s death, the police
recovered several items from the scene of the shooting and
nearby areas, which included the following. On the ground near
where Romero had been found, the police collected a discharged
.40-caliber cartridge casing. In a nearby alley, they found the
black leather jacket Osborne had been wearing earlier that
morning in a recycling bin. From a dumpster in the same alley,
the police recovered a black leather holster. Inside one of the
holster’s slots was a magazine marked “Sig Saur P229,” which
contained 10 .40-caliber rounds of ammunition.
Romero’s autopsy revealed the cause of her death to be a
gunshot wound to the right mid-back. A .40-caliber bullet was

3
recovered from the center of Romero’s chest. The bullet
perforated several organs, including her heart, right lung, and
liver. A .40-caliber Sig Saur P229 handgun could have fired that
bullet, along with the cartridge casing found at the scene of the
shooting. A gun of that type was registered to Osborne, but was
not recovered by the police.2

II. Defense Evidence
Osborne testified he owned several firearms, all of which
were registered to him except a .357-caliber revolver. When
outside, he always carried a .40-caliber Sig Saur P229 at the
small of his back in a concealed, custom-made holster worn
around his waist. While holstered, the Sig Saur P229 always had
a round in the chamber and was ready to shoot. The holster also
contained an extra magazine with 10 rounds of .40-caliber Smith
& Wesson ammunition. Osborne testified he carried a firearm
with him at all times because he is a strong advocate of the
Second Amendment.
With respect to his relationship with Romero, Osborne
testified that they started dating soon after they met on
Christmas Eve in 2018. Romero moved in with him two to three
months later. She used methamphetamine regularly, and they
argued often about her drug use.
A few months into their relationship, Romero became
pregnant with Osborne’s child. She continued to use
methamphetamine while pregnant. In May 2019, she had a
miscarriage, which Osborne believed was related to her drug use.

2 We discuss the firearms and firearm-related paraphernalia
later recovered from Osborne’s bedroom in part I.A of the
Discussion.

4
According to Osborne, late in the night before the shooting,
he and Romero went to a bar. Afterwards, they went to a pier by
the beach and later returned home. Romero then disappeared for
an indeterminate amount of time. When she returned home in
the early morning, Osborne suspected she had been using
methamphetamine and confronted her. At that point, they began
to argue. After a while, Romero started packing her bags, said
she was going to leave, and left the home. Osborne followed her
because he did not want her to leave and sought to get her to
come back home. Osborne was carrying his firearm when he left
the house.
Osborne testified that he and Romero left their home at
approximately 6:50 a.m. Romero started to walk around the
block, and Osborne followed her. They walked and argued for the
next 30 minutes, during which time Romero repeatedly told
Osborne she was going to leave him, and Osborne implored her to
go back home. At some point, Osborne testified, Romero “told
[him] that she’s glad she didn’t have [his] [expletive] baby.” She
then turned and started walking away from him. In response,
Osborne “snapped.” He turned around and drew his gun as he
started walking away from Romero. To do so, he reached under
his jacket and shirt, grabbed the gun’s handle, which was resting
flat against his back, and lifted the gun up six inches to unholster
it. Then, Osborne testified, he raised the gun to nearly shoulder
height and blindly fired a shot behind him, in Romero’s direction.
He heard the gun go off, but did not look back toward Romero.
Osborne testified that, after firing the gun, he did not call
or flag someone down for help. Instead, he continued to walk and
threw “everything” in trash cans in an alley. After that, he went
to his mother’s house. There, he told his mother that he thought

5
Romero was going to leave him, and that he had shot her. He
later shaved his head and left to stay at a motel. Three to four
days later, he turned himself in to the police.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion in Limine

A. Relevant Background
Osborne filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude, among
other things, any evidence relating to the firearms and firearm-
related paraphernalia found by the police in his bedroom. He
argued the evidence was inadmissible because it was irrelevant,
and its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk
of undue prejudice. At the hearing on Osborne’s motion, the
prosecution contended the disputed evidence was relevant to
showing Osborne’s identity as the shooter and whether the
killing was premeditated. The trial court denied the motion and
permitted the prosecution to introduce evidence of the firearms,
the ammunition, and a bulletproof vest recovered from Osborne’s
bedroom.
At trial, the prosecution presented evidence showing that,
during a search conducted after Romero’s death, the following
items were found in Osborne’s bedroom: (1) a loaded .357-caliber
revolver; (2) a .40-caliber Glock pistol; (3) four firearms
magazines; (4) shotgun shells; (5) a shotgun shell carrier; (6)
three boxes of ammunition; (7) a clipboard containing paperwork
for firearms; and (8) a bulletproof vest. The prosecution also
presented evidence showing the Glock pistol could not have fired
the .40-caliber cartridge casing found on the ground at the scene
of the shooting.

6
B. Governing Principles and Standard of Review
“No evidence is admissible except relevant evidence.” (Evid.
Code, § 350.) Per Evidence Code section 210, “‘Relevant evidence’
means evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a
witness . . . , having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove
any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action.” “The test of relevance is whether the evidence ‘tends
“logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference” to establish
material facts such as identity, intent, or motive.’ [Citation.] The
trial court has broad discretion in determining the relevance of
evidence, but lacks discretion to admit irrelevant relevance.”
(People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 90.)
Evidence Code section 352 confers upon the trial court
discretion to exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.”
Against the backdrop of the principles above, our Supreme
Court has addressed the admissibility of evidence regarding
weapons found in the defendant’s possession. On this point, it
held: “When the prosecution relies . . . on a specific type of
weapon, it is error to admit evidence that other weapons were
found in [the defendant’s] possession, for such evidence tends to
show, not that he committed the crime, but only that he is the
sort of person who carries deadly weapons.” (People v. Riser
(1956) 47 Cal.2d 566, 577.) This rule does not apply where the
defendant’s possession of a weapon is probative on an issue other
than the defendant’s character or disposition to commit a crime,
however. (See People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 956 [“[W]hen

7
weapons are otherwise relevant to the crime’s commission, but
are not the actual murder weapon, they may be still admissible”];
see also People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 613 [evidence that
police found a weapon and ammunition in the defendant’s house,
none of which was used in the murder, was admissible because it
was relevant to his state of mind when he shot the victim].)
“We review the trial court’s rulings on the admission of
evidence for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Cowan (2010) 50
Cal.4th 401, 462.) In so doing, “we review the [trial court’s]
ruling, not [its] reasoning and, if the ruling was correct on any
ground, we affirm.” (People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 582.)

C. Analysis
Osborne contends the trial court should have granted his
motion in limine because “[t]here was no connection between the
firearms, ammunition, and firearm related paraphernalia found
in [his] bedroom and the crime.” Thus, he asserts the evidence
was irrelevant and, consequently, its admission created
substantial danger of undue prejudice, as it “created a risk of the
jury using that evidence to convict Osborne of murder simply
because he is depicted as a violent and dangerous person who
surrounds himself with firearms.” The Attorney General
responds: “[T]he challenged firearms and firearms-related
evidence was admissible because it was probative on an issue
other than [Osborne’s] character or disposition to commit the
charged crime[ ].” For the reasons discussed below, we agree with
the Attorney General.
First, the disputed evidence was relevant to showing
Osborne’s identity as Romero’s killer. Although the murder
weapon was never recovered by the police, the prosecution
established that a Sig Saur P229 pistol chambered in .40-caliber

8
could have fired the cartridge casing recovered from the ground
near where Romero was found, as well as the projectile that
killed her. A Sig Saur P229 pistol was registered to Osborne, but
was not found amongst the firearms and firearm-related
paraphernalia in his bedroom. By showing the Sig Saur P229
pistol registered to Osborne was missing from his collection of
firearms and firearm-related paraphernalia, the disputed
evidence had the tendency to prove Osborne’s Sig Saur P229 –
rather than a gun of a different type capable of shooting the
casing found at the scene or the projectile that killed Romero, or
someone else’s Sig Saur P229 – was used to kill Romero.
In disputing the relevance of the challenged evidence,
Osborne emphasizes he “did not contest identity” at trial. This
argument is of no consequence. His concession on the identity
issue did not absolve the prosecution of its obligation to prove the
essential elements of the charged offense, all of which were put in
issue by Osborne’s not guilty plea. (See People v. Steele (2002) 27
Cal.4th 1230, 1243-1244; see also People v. Jones (2011) 51
Cal.4th 346, 372.) Indeed, when it was presenting its case-in-
chief, the prosecution could not have known Osborne was going to
concede on identity, as he deferred his opening statement to the
presentation of his case. Thus, regardless of his later concession,
the prosecution was “entitled to prove its case and especially to
prove a fact so central to the basic question of guilt as [identity].”
(People v. Steele, at p. 1243.)
The challenged evidence was also relevant to proving
Osborne’s state of mind at the time of the shooting. Osborne’s
possession of multiple firearms, ammunition, and a bulletproof
vest reflect he had firearms experience and was well aware of the
danger that loaded guns pose to the safety of others, including

9
the specific risks and potentially dire consequences of a gunshot
wound to the torso. No experienced gun owner would fail to
comprehend the potentially fatal consequences of discharging a
loaded weapon in the direction of another person. Consequently,
the disputed evidence has a tendency to prove that, rather than
blindly firing his weapon in Romero’s direction while turned
away from her, as he testified, Osborne aimed his weapon and
deliberately shot her in the center of her back with the intention
of inflicting a mortal wound.
In sum, Osborne’s relevance argument fails because the
challenged evidence had the tendency to prove two issues
material to his guilt, namely, that he shot Romero, and that he
did so with the intent to kill. In light of this conclusion, we reject
his Evidence Code section 352 argument because it erroneously
presumes the disputed evidence had little to no probative value.
Even assuming, arguendo, the trial court erred by
admitting the evidence in question, we would find no prejudice
under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman)
or People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-838 (Watson). Here,
the evidence of Osborne’s guilt was overwhelming. As discussed
above, Osborne testified that on the morning of Romero’s death,
the couple got into a heated argument, during which she packed
her bags, walked out of their home, and repeatedly said she was
going to leave him. He also testified that, after following Romero
around for 30 minutes and unsuccessfully attempting to convince
her to return home, he reached under two layers of clothing,
grabbed the handle of the Sig Saur P229 pistol resting flat
against his back, lifted the gun up six inches to remove it from its
holster, raised his arm to approximately shoulder height, and
fired the weapon at Romero while she was walking away from

10
him. Romero’s autopsy reflected she died of a single gunshot to
the center of her back, which struck her heart, right lung, and
liver. Forensics evidence confirmed a Sig Saur P229 like the one
registered to Osborne could have shot the fatal bullet, as well as
the cartridge casing found at the scene of the shooting. Osborne
later told his mother he thought Romero intended to leave him
and he shot Romero. Rather than checking on Romero’s condition
or summoning aid, Osborne discarded his gun, holster, and
ammunition. After confessing the killing to his mother, he hid in
a motel. Given this evidence demonstrating Osborne’s identity as
the killer, his motive, the deliberate means by which the killing
was accomplished, and the evidence of consciousness of guilt, we
conclude the asserted error would have been harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, and it is not reasonably probable that the
exclusion of the challenged evidence would have resulted in a
more favorable outcome for Osborne. (See Chapman, supra, 386
U.S. at p. 24; Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at pp. 835-836.)

II. Firearm Enhancement

A. Relevant Background
Following his conviction, Osborne filed a sentencing
memorandum asking the trial court to strike the 25-year-to-life
firearm enhancement under sections 12022.53, subdivision (h),
and 1385. In support of his request, Osborne contended the
evidence before the court reflected: (1) the crime was connected to
Osborne’s childhood trauma and substance abuse issues; and (2)
the enhancement’s application will result in a sentence exceeding
20 years. He also asserted there was no evidence before the trial
court showing that, if the enhancement was dismissed, he was
likely to “inflict[ ] physical injury or subject[ ] others to serious
danger.”

11
The trial court declined to strike the firearm enhancement.
In so doing, the court first noted its analysis was governed by
section 1385, subdivision (c), which – in its view – required it to
weigh the statute’s mitigating factors against whether striking
the enhancement would endanger public safety. The trial court
then rejected Osborne’s contention that Romero’s murder was
linked to any mental illness or childhood trauma on his part.
Then, in addressing “public safety,” the trial court observed
Osborne was “capable” of causing harm, noting he “carries a gun
with him pretty much all the time and has quite a bit of gun
paraphernalia in his room, [and] is quite familiar with guns.”
Subsequently, the court stated: “I just don’t see how you can say
. . . the public is safe in any shape, way, or form when you have a
man who is willing to shoot someone in the back when their back
is turned and they have no way of defending themselves
whatsoever. To me, that is the epitome of danger to public
safety.” Ultimately, the trial court concluded: “I find the
defendant is a danger to public safety. If he can, on whatever
trigger that triggered him in this particular case, shoot someone
[he loves] in the back as easily as he did and then walk away,
then he can do that to anybody in the world.”

B. Governing Principles and Standard of Review
Pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (d), “a person
who, in the commission of a felony specified in [certain statutes],
personally and intentionally discharges a firearm and
proximately causes great bodily injury . . . or death, to a person
other than an accomplice, shall be punished by an additional and
consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years
to life.” At sentencing, however, the trial court may strike or

12
dismiss this mandatory enhancement “in the interest of justice
pursuant to [s]ection 1385 . . . .” (§ 12022.53, subd. (h).)
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1) states, in relevant part:
“Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an
enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so . . . .” “In
exercising its discretion under [section 1385, subdivision (c)], the
court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by
the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances
in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of
one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of
dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.
‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the
dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or
other serious danger to others.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).) Potentially
relevant to this appeal are the following mitigating
circumstances: (1) “The application of the enhancement could
result in a sentence of over 20 years”; (2) “The current offense is
connected to mental illness” and (3) “The current offense is
connected to prior victimization or childhood trauma.” (Id., subd.
(c)(2)(C)-(E).)
In People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024 (Walker), our
Supreme Court clarified the analysis courts must employ when
deciding whether to strike an enhancement under section 1385,
subdivision (c). It held: “[A]bsent a finding that dismissal would
endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or
dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value
to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are
present. [Citation.] In other words, if the court does not find that
dismissal would endanger public safety, the presence of an

13
enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the
dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds
substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may
nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating
circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in
furtherance of justice.’” (Walker, at p. 1029.) The Supreme Court
also “emphasize[d] . . . that, in most cases, ‘if the trial court finds
that dismissal of an enhancement would endanger public safety,
then it is hard to see how dismissal would further the interests of
justice,’ notwithstanding the applicability of any mitigating
factors identified in subdivision (c)(2).” (Id. at p. 1033.)
We review for abuse of discretion both a decision not to
strike an enhancement and a determination that to do so would
endanger public safety. (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
287, 298.)

C. Analysis
Osborne contends the trial court abused its discretion by
declining to strike the firearm enhancement because it: (1)
erroneously found the enhancement’s dismissal would endanger
public safety; and (2) did not give sufficient weight to the fact
that the enhancement’s application will result in a sentence
exceeding 20 years.3 As discussed below, we are not persuaded by
either of his arguments.

3 In his opening brief, Osborne also asserts the trial court
applied “the wrong standard in denying the motion to dismiss the
enhancement” because it did not recognize section 1385’s creation
of a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissal whenever its
mitigating factors are present. His reply brief, however, does not
dispute that our Supreme Court has since rejected the
interpretation of section 1385 on which his argument is based,

14
In support of his first contention, Osborne raises two
points. First, he asserts “there is no evidence supporting the
finding that public safety would be endangered if the firearm
enhancement were dismissed.” This argument fails because the
trial court’s comments at the sentencing hearing reflect its ruling
was appropriately based on the evidence presented at trial
illustrating the circumstances of the crime, which demonstrated
Osborne’s willingness to resort to violence during his argument
with Romero and the callous, calculated means by which he
brought about her death. (See People v. Mendoza, supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at p. 299 [trial court properly considered “the
circumstances of the crime” when determining the enhancement’s
dismissal would endanger public safety].) By suggesting the trial
court should have focused on other evidence showing his sparse
criminal record, lack of violent history, and childhood abuse and
depression, Osborne essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence
and substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. This is not
our role as an appellate court reviewing for abuse of discretion.
(See People v. JTH Tax, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1250.)
Next, relying on People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th
215 (Gonzalez), Osborne argues that, in determining the
enhancement’s dismissal would endanger the public, the trial
court “erroneously relied upon an assessment of Osborne’s
current dangerousness and did not consider factors related to
Osborne’s future dangerousness including ‘the date on which the
defendant would be released under the revised sentence, and, [as

holding “section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) does not erect a
rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissal that can only be
overcome by a finding that dismissal endangers public safety.”
(Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1033.)

15
here] in the case of an indeterminate sentence, the safety valve
that exists due to the review by the Board of Parole Hearings.’”4
(Original italics.) This argument is unavailing because, as
discussed below, Gonzalez is distinguishable.
In Gonzalez, the trial court declined to dismiss an
enhancement, finding the defendant “‘presently . . . does
represent a danger to society.’” (Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th
at p. 224, italics added.) In support of its ruling, the trial court
interpreted section 1385 as “requir[ing] [it] to decide whether the
defendant ‘currently at the time of sentencing represent[s] a
danger to society.’” (Id. at p. 227.) The appellate court vacated the
sentence and rejected the trial court’s “singular focus on whether
the defendant currently poses a danger.” (Id. at p. 228, original
italics.) It explained that, in deciding whether an enhancement’s
dismissal would endanger the public, sentencing courts should
employ a “‘forward-looking inquiry’” that not only accounts for
the defendant’s current dangerousness, but also considers “the
date on which the defendant would be released under the revised
sentence, and, in the case of an indeterminate sentence, the
safety valve that exists due to the review by the Board of Parole
Hearings.” (Id. at p. 229.)
Here, the trial court’s comments at the sentencing hearing
do not demonstrate it interpreted section 1385 in the manner

4 Generally, “a point raised for the first time in [a reply brief]
is deemed [forfeited] and will not be considered, unless good
reason is shown for failure to present it before.” (People v.
Baniqued (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 13, 29.) Because Gonzalez,
supra, 103 Cal.App.5th 215, and Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th 1024,
were both decided after Osborne filed his opening brief, we find
good cause for his presentation of his arguments based on these
cases for the first time in his reply brief.

16
rejected by the appellate court in Gonzalez. Nor do its remarks
reflect that the trial court expressly limited its analysis to
Osborne’s current dangerousness. (Cf. Gonzalez, supra, 103
Cal.App.5th at p. 224.) Instead, the court found Osborne’s
capacity for violence, in conjunction with the ease by which he
acted on it to kill his unarmed girlfriend by shooting her from
behind upon being “triggered” during an argument, posed a
danger to “anybody in the world.” It did not specify, let alone
limit, the temporal nature of that risk.
On this record, we note “‘[t]he trial court is not required to
state reasons for declining to exercise its discretion under section
1385’ [citations], and ‘is presumed to have considered all of the
relevant factors in the absence of an affirmative record to the
contrary’ [citation].” (People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th
608, 637.) Accordingly, “[w]hen, as here, the record is silent as to”
whether the court conducted a forward-thinking inquiry, “we
presume that the trial court ‘“correctly applied the law.”’” (Ibid.)
Because the record does not affirmatively rebut this presumption,
we reject Osborne’s argument based on Gonzalez.
We likewise reject Osborne’s contention that resentencing
is required under Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th 1024. On this point,
he asserts “[t]he trial court failed to place ‘considerable value’ on
the mitigating circumstance that imposition of the enhancement
will result in a sentence of over 20 years.” Walker, however, held
that sentencing courts “must assign significant value” to the
presence of section 1385’s mitigating circumstances only in cases
where they “do[ ] not find that dismissal would endanger public
safety.” (Walker, at pp. 1029, 1038.) This is not one of those cases.
As discussed above, the trial court appropriately determined the
enhancement’s dismissal would endanger public safety. It

17
therefore did not run afoul of Walker by considering – but not
being swayed by – the fact that the enhancement’s application
would result in a sentence exceeding 20 years. Instead, the
court’s imposition of the firearm enhancement is consistent with
Walker, where our Supreme Court “emphasize[d] . . . that, in
most cases, ‘if the trial court finds that dismissal of an
enhancement would endanger public safety, then it is hard to see
how dismissal would further the interests of justice,’
notwithstanding the applicability of any mitigating factors
identified in [section 1385] subdivision (c)(2).” (Walker, at p.
1033.)

18
DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

CURREY, P. J.
We concur:

MORI, J.

SIGGINS, J.*

* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

19

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.