In re R.K. CA6

CourtListener 10308515Calctapp7 janv. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 1/7/25 In re R.K. CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re R.K. et al., Persons Coming Under H052053
the Juvenile Court Law. (Santa Cruz County
Super. Ct. Nos. 22JU00162,
22JU00163)
SANTA CRUZ COUNTY HUMAN
SERVICES DEPARTMENT,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

D.L. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

Appellants D.L. (Father)1 and Ry.K. (Mother), parents of R.K. and N.K. (together,
children), appeal from orders terminating their parental rights as to both children. Father
and Mother are an intact couple who have a history of substance abuse. Appellants
separately contend the juvenile court erred in refusing to apply the beneficial parental
relationship exception. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)2 Respondent
Santa Cruz County Human Services Department (the Department) disagrees the parents
established that the children would benefit from continuing their relationship with the
parents and that termination of the relationship would be detrimental to the children.

1
D.L. was found to be the presumed Father of both children at the detention
hearing. There is no question as to paternity.
2
Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Although we recognize the extent of the parents’ affection for R.K. and N.K., we
conclude that the juvenile court based its decision on substantial evidence and a proper
application of the law to that evidence. For the reasons explained here, we affirm the
juvenile court’s order.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
Mother gave birth to R.K. in June 2021 and N.K. in September 2022. Both
children were exposed to methamphetamine and other illegal substances at birth. In
2021, the Department received a referral of general neglect of R.K. after he was
diagnosed with a failure to thrive. The outcome of the referral was inconclusive because
the Department was unable to locate the family. A couple weeks prior to N.K.’s birth,
the Department received another referral of general neglect of R.K. after an anonymous
source requested a welfare check at the family’s parked minibus. Law enforcement was
unable to locate the family but determined that the minibus was unsafe and uninhabitable.
At N.K.’s birth, the Department received the current referral indicating N.K. had
tested positive for fentanyl and methamphetamine. N.K. was placed into protective
custody, and Mother left the hospital against medical advice. Law enforcement then
conducted a welfare check and located both parents and R.K. at their recreational vehicle.
The officers did not believe Mother was under the influence or that there was any
immediate threat of safety to R.K., so R.K. was not detained under a section 300 hold.

3
Mother filed two prior related appeals: H050594 (appeal based on section 300
jurisdictional findings) and H051228 (appeal based on termination of reunification
services for Mother). Both appeals were dismissed as abandoned because counsel for
Mother filed a “no issue statement” and Mother did not submit a supplemental brief on
her own behalf. (See In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835.) In H051228, we took
judicial notice of appeal number H050594. Father now requests we take judicial notice
of the records from both prior appeals, and the Department adopts Father’s suggested
notations. We grant the request and take judicial notice of the records in both appeals.
(See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)

2
A few days later, the Department filed a section 300 petition on behalf of R.K. and
N.K. and requested that R.K. be detained. The Department alleged that the parents were
in violation of section 300, subdivision (b), due to their substance abuse history, and
section 300, subdivision (j), due to the abuse or neglect of the children’s half-siblings.
One half-sibling, Mother’s biological child, was placed into protective custody due to
Mother’s substance use and released to the child’s father, and the other half-sibling,
Father’s child, was adopted after Father failed to reunify. At the detention hearing, the
court made prima facie findings on the petition and found that there was a substantial
danger to the children’s health, ordered the children detained in the temporary custody of
the Department, and set a jurisdiction hearing. R.K. and N.K. were placed in a resource
family home with their adopted older half-sibling.
A. Visitation Between the Children and Their Parents4
1. Both Parents Maintained Regular Visitation
Both parents visited the children consistently throughout the dependency, but
neither parent moved past supervised visitation. After the children’s initial detention,
both parents were afforded supervised visitation at a minimum of three times per week.
Both parents consistently visited the children prior to the jurisdictional hearing. At the
jurisdictional hearing, the court sustained the Department’s section 300 petition, ordered
the children removed from parental custody, and commenced reunification services for
both parents. The parents’ case plan required them to participate in counseling, parenting
education, substance abuse testing, and a drug/alcohol assessment. The court advised the
parents that, due to the children’s young ages, there could be a termination of
reunification services and an order to develop a permanent plan of adoption if there was
not substantial compliance with the service plan within six months.

4
Because the parents’ appeals raise only the issue of the beneficial relationship
exception, we omit many of the facts related to their individual progress in their
reunification plans as not relevant to our disposition.

3
The court then set the six-month review hearing and maintained supervised
visitation at a minimum of three times a week for one hour. Both parents attended their
visits but had difficulty arriving on time because of factors such as bad weather that left
them unhoused and without transportation or charged phones. At least one parent still
attended 40 of the 48 scheduled visits during this period.
In its six-month reunification report, the Department, recognizing that both parents
had shown some progress but that no drug tests had been completed, recommended that
the children remain in the out-of-home placement and reunification services continue for
the parents. The children’s counsel contested the Department’s recommendations but,
highlighting the extenuating circumstances caused by the weather, requested a settlement
conference to provide more time for the parents to demonstrate compliance with their
plan. Prior to the settlement conference, Father visited with the children on a regular
basis but missed a few visits. He suffered from a relapse but consistently engaged in
services. Mother missed a handful of visits with the children, did not engage in any
services, and did not complete any drug testing.
After an unsuccessful settlement conference and due to Father’s continuing
inability to address his substance abuse, the Department requested termination of family
reunification services and asked that the matter be set for a permanency hearing. Father
recognized that his relationship with Mother impacted his sobriety and ability to find
stable housing, but he continued to be with her. Both parents visited the children prior to
the contested six-month hearing. Father was consistently on-time to his visits with the
children and made the effort to see them at their developmental assessments and therapy
programs.5 Mother was on time to her visits but missed an equivalent number, although
she was at a detox program during a few missed visits.

5
At an interim hearing, the court signed an order authorizing developmental
assessments for both children because both parents had refused to sign the authorizations.

4
At the six-month contested hearing, which was continued a month to account for
Father’s compliance with his plan, the court noted the parents’ struggles with sobriety
and found that return of the children to the parents would create a substantial risk of
detriment to the children’s safety. The court found that Mother had made no progress
towards mitigating the causes necessitating placement of the children in foster care and
terminated her services, reducing supervised visits to once per month. But because
Father was attempting to make progress and entered a residential substance abuse
program the day of the hearing, the court granted him additional family reunification
services and scheduled a 12-month review hearing. Father was still allowed three
supervised visits a week.
From June to August 2023, Father was in his residential treatment program and
was consistent and on-time to his visits with the children. In August 2023, the
Department increased Father’s visits to 1.5 hours and moved them to a park. Later that
month, however, Father left his residential program due to a suicidal letter from Mother,
and the couple began living in their car. The Department then moved Father’s visits back
to the county building and reduced them to one hour. In the weeks following his
departure from the residential treatment program, Father was on-time to many of his
visits but missed and cancelled an equivalent number. During this period, Mother
cancelled and missed a few visits but was on-time to the majority of them.
By the time of the 12-month review hearing, the Department recommended
termination of services for Father and requested that the court select a permanency plan
under section 366.26. At the contested 12-month hearing, the court adopted the
Department’s recommendations and found that return of the children to the parents would
create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well-being of the children. The court emphasized that, under the law, the parents were
required to make substantial progress in their case plan by six months due to the
children’s young ages, and the additional six months provided to the parents was an

5
exception. However, Father missed 10 visits with his children, left his residential
treatment after two months and stopped attending services and counseling, and was still
testing positive for methamphetamine and fentanyl. The court terminated reunification
services for Father and set the matter for a selection and implementation hearing. Mother
and Father were afforded a minimum of one supervised visit per month prior to the
section 366.26 hearing.
After the matter was set for a permanency hearing, visitation continued as it had
throughout the dependency. Father and Mother attended some supervised visits and
missed others.
2. Visitations with Both Parents Were Loving and Appropriate
The parents’ visits with the children were positive and without significant incident,
but the children increasingly sought out their resource parents for comfort over the course
of the dependency. During the supervised visits, both parents were attentive, brought
age-appropriate snacks and books for the children, and played with the children. At the
12-month review hearing, Father testified that his visits with the children were
“[w]onderful” and “great,” and that the children had a good time with him. He explained
that R.K. called him “daddy” and N.K. knew “I’m her daddy or somebody special to
her.”
However, the children’s relationship with their parents did strain over time. Prior
to the six-month review hearing, a Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA advocate)
noted that R.K. “absolutely adore[d]” his resource parent and that N.K. only wanted to be
held by her resource parent when getting ready for a nap. A few months later, R.K.’s
medical evaluation revealed that he had some attachment difficulties after visits with his
biological parents. For example, R.K. was distressed when his resource parent was not in
front of him during visits and confused his resource parents with his biological parents.
Prior to the section 366.26 hearing, both children sought out their resource parent by the
end of their visits with Father. Mother had difficulty understanding R.K.’s speech, was

6
unsure how much N.K. could eat, and was nervous when the children would cry. N.K.
also pointed towards the lobby and called out “mamma” towards the resource parent
during multiple visits with Mother.
The parents’ sobriety during the visits remained uncertain. Father and Mother
nodded off a few times throughout the dependency. Prior to the contested six-month
review hearing, Mother left her detox program and disrupted Father’s visit by barging
into the room and “upset[ting] the children and dad” to the extent that Father began to cry
and had to step out for a few minutes to collect himself.
In its section 366.26 report, the Department described the parents’ interactions
with the children as “a close friend or extended family member.” The Department wrote:
“[w]hile the interactions appear to be positive, they do not rise to the level where there is
significant emotional meaning and benefit to [R.K. and N.K.]. . . . [R.K. and N.K.’s]
interactions with their parents do not reflect significant emotional bond to either parent.”
The Department determined that Mother’s substance abuse use history and minimal
behavioral changes interfered with her ability to safely parent her children and hindered
any possible benefit with her children. Similarly, Father’s history of substance abuse and
choice to focus on his relationship with Mother rather than on his own recovery to
reunify with his children also interfered with his ability to safely parent his children and
hindered any possible beneficial relationship with his children.
The Department wrote that R.K. had spent more than half his life in the care of his
resource parents and that N.K. had spent her entire life in the care of the resource parents.
Both children had special needs and a history of in-utero drug exposure but had made
significant progress in their development after being placed with their resource parents.
Both children had developed secure relationships and strong parent-child bonds with their
resource parents. They looked to their resource parents to meet their daily needs and
provide them with security, stability, permanency, and well-being. The resource family
was fully committed to meeting the children’s needs and adopting R.K. and N.K. The

7
Department argued that, on balance, the harm of terminating the relationship with their
parents was not outweighed by the security provided to both children by their resource
family.
B. Termination of Parental Rights
In its report prepared in anticipation of the section 366.26 hearing, the Department
recommended termination of parental rights and implementation of a plan of adoption
with the children’s resource parents. The parents contested the Department’s
recommendation and filed a section 388 petition, asking the court to vacate the section
366.26 hearing and extend reunification services for another six months. Mother
informed the court that she had learned how to achieve stability in her sobriety, had been
sober for three months, and believed she was a safe parent. She submitted documentation
from her treatment facilities, sponsors and support network, and roommate. Father
submitted paperwork indicating that he had been clean for 30 days. The court set a joint
section 388 and section 366.26 hearing.
Both parents testified at the joint hearing. Father testified that his visits went great
and that he loved seeing both children. R.K. always lit up as soon as Father came into the
room, and N.K. was growing and developing well. Father testified that when R.K. first
left his parents’ care, he was “obviously traumatized” because he “went mute” and his
“face would go blank” during goodbyes. This behavior went on for months, but R.K.
eventually began talking again due to speech therapy and Father’s reassurance that they
would bring him home. When the court ordered reduced visits, N.K. also stopped
wanting to sit on Father’s lap, although she is a “daddy’s girl”, but Father believed that
she had been doing better and seemed a lot happier after visitation increased. Father
testified that he gave the children a lot of love and taught them how to have a good
relationship. He fiercely contested the Department’s characterization of his relationship
with the children as a close friend or extended family member, testifying that the children

8
had emotional ties with their parents and that he was sure the resource parents could
attest that the children acted out when they could not see their parents.
Mother testified that she had the opportunity to visit her children but did miss
some visits. She stated that she read to and played with the children and that the children
called her mama.
The court first decided the section 388 petition. While the court agreed with the
Department’s position that Father had not demonstrated changed circumstances required
for a section 388 petition, it found Mother had demonstrated a change of circumstances
by attending counseling, residential treatment, outpatient treatment. Still, the court found
that a proposed change to the parents’ care would not be in the best interest of the
children as they were stable with their resource family. Therefore, the court denied that
section 388 petition.
After taking evidence and hearing argument on the section 366.26 petition, the
court adopted the Department’s recommendations. The court noted the young ages of the
children and found that two of the three elements required to establish the parental-
benefit exception under In re Caden (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.) were not met.
The court stated: “this is not an easy case for a .26. One of the reasons that legislatures
have decided that the timeline has to be so small for children under the age of three is
how quickly they bond with the people that are giving them the parental role and giving
them the love on a daily basis and meeting their needs on a daily basis because from birth
to three those bonds are being created so much, so quickly, and so strongly. And it’s very
necessary for them to have this permanency and stability because those first three years
set the foundation for their lives.” It continued: “[Both children] have securely bonded
and attached to their resource family. They have been observed seeking out [the resource
mother] for both reassurance and emotional support during visits with their biological
parents. Their interactions with their parents have been positive, but don’t rise to the
level of significant meaning, emotional attachment, or benefit to [R.K. and N.K.]. Losing

9
their relationship with their parents would not harm [the children] as much as it will harm
their parents. However, it will also not harm [R.K. and N.K.] to the extent that it would
outweigh the benefit that the security they get from the resource family benefits them.
With the resource family they have created a child and parental relationship and they
have bonded with the other children in the home, and severing those relationships would
be more detrimental to them.” The court found the children to be adoptable and
terminated Mother and Father’s parental rights.
Father and Mother timely appealed from the orders terminating their parental
rights.6
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, both parents contend the juvenile court erred in refusing to apply the
beneficial parental relationship exception.7 The beneficial parental relationship exception
allows the juvenile court to decline to terminate parental rights and to select a permanent
plan for the child other than adoption in situations where the parent demonstrates, by a
preponderance of the evidence, “[(1)] that the parent has regularly visited with the child,
[(2)] that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship, and [(3)] that
terminating the relationship would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 629-630.) “[This] exception applies in situations where a child cannot
be in a parent’s custody but where severing the child’s relationship with the parent, even

6
Both parents appealed the section 388 and section 366.26 orders. In his opening
and reply briefs, Father only addressed the beneficial parent exception under section
366.26, and Mother joined his argument. As neither parent addressed the section 388
appeal, we conclude the parents forfeited their section 388 challenge.
7
Mother joins Father’s brief pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule
8.200(a)(5). Mother also argues that, in the absence of error as to Mother, the order
terminating Mother’s parental rights must be reversed if Father’s is reversed because the
juvenile court may not terminate the rights of only one parent unless the other parent is
deceased or has relinquished their rights under California Rules of Court, rule 5.725(a).
Mother contends that if Father’s rights are reinstated, adoption would be unattainable,
and the children should retain any benefit from Mother.

10
when balanced against the benefits of a new adoptive home, would be harmful for the
child.” (Id. at p. 630.)
It is undisputed, and the record shows, that the parents had regular visits and
contact with their children. The juvenile court concluded that the other two elements of
Caden C. had not been met. The court highlighted the children’s young ages and found
that the children’s interactions with their parents had been positive but did not rise to the
level of significant meaning, emotional attachment, or benefit to the children. It
determined that the children losing their relationship with their parents would not harm
the children as much as it would harm their parents. The court also found that the
children had created a child and parental relationship with their resource family and had
bonded with the other children in the home, and that severing those relationships would
be detrimental to them. It noted that the children sought out their resource parent for
reassurance and emotional support during visits. The court determined that losing their
relationship with their parents would not harm the children to the extent that it would
outweigh the benefit and security they obtain from the resource family.
The parents contend that the juvenile court reviewed the parents’ relationship with
the children in a cursory manner when evaluating the second element and improperly
focused on the benefit the children would obtain from being adopted by their resource
family rather than the benefit the children would obtain from continuing their relationship
with both parents. The parents maintain that because the court failed to conduct a proper
analysis under the second element, it could not accurately weigh the benefits of
preserving the parent-child relationship against the benefits of adoption under element
three.
The Department argues that the juvenile court properly evaluated the facts and
record to find no substantial positive, emotional attachment under the second element. It
maintains that the court need not turn a blind eye to who the children consider to be
parental figures in their lives when evaluating the circumstances under the Caden C.

11
elements. The Department further contends that the court did not need to make express
findings when concluding that the beneficial relationship did not apply, as the court’s
finding was supported by the record, and that the emotionally charged nature of the
hearing implies that the ruling did not reflect all the court’s impressions. Lastly, the
Department argues that the court need not reach the third element given that the parents
failed to meet their burden as to element two.
We apply a “hybrid” standard to review the juvenile court’s application of the
beneficial parental relationship exception. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.) The
substantial evidence standard applies to the first two elements: that the parent has
regularly visited with the child and that the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship. (Id. at pp. 639-640.) As to the third element, we review the juvenile court’s
factual determinations for substantial evidence, but review the ultimate decision—
whether terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the child—for abuse of
discretion. (Id. at p. 640.) Where, as here, the juvenile court concludes that appellants
did not carry the burden of proof at the hearing below, we ask “ ‘whether the appellant’s
evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and
weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support
a finding.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 654, 671.)
A. Parents Failed to Show a Substantial Benefit to the Children from Their
Relationship
The juvenile court found that, while the parents’ relationship with the children was
loving and positive, the parents had not established that the children would benefit from
continuing a relationship with them. This finding is supported by substantial evidence.
To successfully show a beneficial relationship, a parent “must show that the child
has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment
implying that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) Whether continuing a relationship with the parent is in a

12
child’s best interest depends on many factors: the age of the child, the portion of the
child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, and the effect interaction with the parent has on
the child. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 (Autumn H.).) Courts can
“consider how children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their parents
[citations],” and can rely on observations of others who have observed visitation to
formulate conclusions. (Caden C., at pp. 632-633.)
Those who observed the parents’ visits with the children throughout the
dependency indicated that they were “attentive,” “loving”, and “affectionate.” Both
parents engaged with the children by reading, playing, and eating snacks together. While
the foregoing points to a loving and affectionate relationship with the children, the
evidence is reflective of the “incidental benefit” that “[i]interaction between natural
parent and child will always confer” (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575), rather
than the “substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent” required by the
exception (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) “[S]ignificant attachment from child
to parent results from the adult’s attention to the child’s needs for physical care,
nourishment, comfort, affection and stimulation,” a relationship that arises from “day-to-
day interaction, companionship and shared experiences.” (Autumn H., at p. 575.) But the
record does not include evidence of day-to-day interactions and shared experiences
beyond those incidental to the one-to-three supervised visits per month shared between
the parents and the children. R.K. has spent more than half of his life in care of his
resource parents, and N.K. has never lived with her parents. Their relationship with their
parents was established entirely through supervised visits, resulting in a relationship that
amounts to “little more than play dates” with a loving adult. (In re Bailey J. (2010) 189
Cal.App.4th 1308, 1316-1317.)
Nor does either child have “substantial, positive, emotional attachment” to either
parent. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) Neither R.K. nor N.K. showed any signs
of attachment to the parents during the visits or any signs of distress at the conclusion of

13
a visit. Father testified that R.K. “went mute” when he initially left his parents’ care but
began talking again after Father repeatedly assured him that he would bring R.K. home,
but then simultaneously conceded that R.K.’s speech therapy over the course of the
dependency played a role in helping him talk more. Father also believed that the children
were distressed when separating from him because N.K., who was a “daddy’s girl,” did
not want to sit on his lap anymore. He then conceded that N.K. would “just kind of go
and do her own thing with the letters and stuff on the board,” indicative of normal growth
in a toddler. Father was also sure the resource parents could attest the children acted out
when they did not see their parents. The record does not support this. Both children
actively sought out their resource parent at the end of their visits. R.K.’s medical
evaluation prior to the six-month review settlement conference indicated that he was
distressed when his resource mother was not in front of him during visits with his
biological parents and that he experienced confusion between his resource parents and
biological parent during visits. The evidence of the children’s reactions to their parents
does not support a conclusion that there was a substantial emotional attachment between
them.
Father argues that the juvenile court’s analysis of this factor was cursory and
improperly focused on the children’s relationship with the caregivers instead of the
children’s interactions with Father. In In re M.V. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1155, the
juvenile court acknowledged that the child wanted to remain in contact with her parents
and live with both her parents and her caretakers, and that she would be sad if she could
not see her parents again. (Id. at p. 1184.) The court also stated that there was clearly a
bond with the child and parents. (Id. at pp. 1184-1185.) This was all it said about the
benefit to the child of continuing the parental relationship before moving on to the
detriment analysis. (Id. at p. 1185.) The court of appeal reversed, finding this analysis to
be “cursory.” (Id. at p. 1184.) The court observed that the beneficial relationship
element is not, “Is there a bond?” (Id. at p. 1185.) The court concluded that the trial

14
court had failed to sufficiently evaluate “the quality of the parent-child relationships or to
have considered factors such as M.V.’s age, how much of her life she spent in her
parents’ custody, the positive or negative effects of interaction with the parents, and
M.V.’s particular needs. [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 1184-1185.)
Here, the court’s review was not cursory. It reviewed the children’s attachment to
the parents and found no substantial benefit. It considered the children’s ages, their
positive interactions with their parents, and their needs for permanency and stability. The
court was not required to “recite specific findings relative to its conclusions regarding
any or all of the three elements of the exception” when finding the parental-benefit
exception inapplicable. (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156.) Substantial
evidence indicates that there was no beneficial relationship. (See Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) The children did not live with their parents for most of their
lives, and their visits never progressed past supervised visitation. They did not show any
signs of attachment to the parents during the visits or any signs of distress at the
conclusion of a visit. Instead, both children actively sought out their resource parent at
the end of their visits. Even if the juvenile court also considered the relationship with the
resource parents in its evaluation of this factor, substantial evidence supports its
conclusion that neither parent demonstrated a substantial benefit from continuing their
relationship.
B. Terminating the Parental Relationship Would Not Be Detrimental to the
Children
Both parents also failed to show that severing the parental relationship would be
detrimental the children. In evaluating whether termination would be detrimental to the
child, a court must decide whether the harm from severing the parental relationship
outweighs the benefit to the child of placement in a new adoptive home. (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The trial court must determine whether terminating parental
rights “serves the child’s best interests” by evaluating “what life would be like for the

15
child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.” (Id. at pp. 631-633.)
The juvenile court may consider emotional instability and preoccupation with the parent
leading to acting out, difficulties in school, insomnia, anxiety, or depression. (Id. at
p. 633.) The court may also assess whether “a new, stable home may alleviate the
emotional instability and preoccupation leading to such problems, providing a new source
of stability that could make the loss of a parent not, at least on balance, detrimental.”
(Ibid.) “ ‘If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a
substantial, positive emotional attachment such that,’ even considering the benefits of a
new adoptive home, termination would ‘harm[ ]’ the child, the court should not terminate
parental rights. . . . When the relationship with a parent is so important to the child that
the security and stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh its loss, termination would be
‘detrimental to the child due to’ the child’s beneficial relationship with a parent.
[Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 633-634.) The overall inquiry thus is a “subtle enterprise.” (Id. at
p. 634.)
The juvenile court here considered the children’s lives without their relationship
with both parents. It determined that both young children had securely bonded and
attached to their resource family, and the resource family had created a child and parental
relationship with the children in their home. The court concluded that severing their
relationship with their parents would not outweigh the benefit and security the children
obtain from their resource family, and severing their relationship with their resource
parents would be more detrimental to them.
Thus here, the court properly considered the strength of the children’s bonds with
the parents in the context of whether each child would “be harmed, on balance, by losing
it.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 638.) As discussed above, Father’s testimony that
the children had trouble separating from the parents during visits was not supported by
the record. Both parents presented little to no evidence that either child had such an
“intense” bond with their respective parents that severing the relationship would lead to

16
trauma such as emotional instability, acting out, difficulties in school, insomnia, anxiety,
or depression. (Id. at p. 628 [relying on expert testimony].) There is no evidence that the
children suffered during the parents’ absence, that the children missed either parent or
had difficulties during the time that the children were not with either parent, or that either
child relied on either parent for their emotional wellbeing and security. Instead, the
record is clear that the children experienced distress and confusion by continuing to visit
their parents and sought out their resource parent for comfort at the conclusion of visits.
N.K. could only be comforted by her resource mother when crying during the visits. The
Department also presented evidence that the children, who have special needs, readily
bonded with their resource parents, displayed affection towards them, and relied on them
for their daily and special needs. The evidence demonstrates that R.K. and N.K. were
calm and happy children who were thriving in their homes with their resource family.
Based on this evidence, the court correctly determined the parents failed to show that the
harm from losing the parental relationship would outweigh the benefit the children
obtained from their resource family.
Father contends that because the court failed to properly focus its attention on the
children’s relationship with him rather than their relationship with their caretakers when
evaluating whether the children would benefit from continuing a relationship with him, it
could not accurately weigh the benefits of preserving the parent-child relationship against
the benefits of adoption. We disagree with Father’s framing of the analytic framework.
Caden C. requires that the juvenile court weigh the harm from severing the parental
relationship against the benefit of placement in a new adoptive home. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) It does not require weighing the benefit of preserving the
relationship against the benefit of the adoptive home as Father suggests. The court
properly concluded at step two that the children did not obtain a substantial positive
benefit from their relationship with their parents. Then at step three, the court properly

17
weighed the harm of severing the parent-child relationship against the benefits of
adoption.
Because substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s factual findings, the
court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the benefits of adoption by the
children’s resource family of 18 months outweighed any detriment from the loss of the
parental relationship. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.)
As both parents failed to establish the beneficial relationship exception, the court
did not err in terminating parental rights for both parents.
III. DISPOSITION
The April 22, 2024, orders terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights are
affirmed.

18
_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

________________________________
Grover, J.

________________________________
Danner, J.

H052053 - In re R.K. et al.; Santa Cruz County HSD v. D.L. et al.

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