In re A.C. CA4/2

CourtListener 10308474Calctapp7 janv. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 1/7/25 In re A.C. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re A.C., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,
E083380
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super.Ct.Nos. DLRI2300202 &
v. J299397)

A.C., OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Mark E. Petersen, Judge.

Affirmed.

Richard Jay Moller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

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Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Kristen

Ramirez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

In January 2024, the juvenile court found true allegations that A.C. violated the

law by having a loaded firearm in a car. A.C. appeals, alleging there was insufficient

evidence he constructively possessed the firearm. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In December 2023, a police officer made a traffic stop. The car had seven people

inside—five in the back, including A.C., and two in the front. After the officer turned on

his lights and initiated the stop, the car took several seconds and about a fifth of a mile to

come to a stop. The officer later testified that in his experience cars “slow roll” after an

officer initiates a stop to allow someone to conceal contraband. A.C. was the rightmost

rear passenger, and the passenger to his immediate left had a seven- or eight-year-old

child sitting on their lap. During this time the officer saw A.C. moving a lot and ducking

down multiple times. A.C. was the only passenger the officer saw move like that.

After all the occupants of the vehicle exited, the officer searched the car from front

to back. He found a loaded gun under the front passenger seat, closer to the rear of the

car, in front of where A.C. was seated. Reaching from the front, the officer had to stick

his arm up to his elbow under the seat to reach the gun. The gun was also covered with

trash such that he could not see it from the rear without moving the trash. According to

the officer, where he found the gun “the rear passenger could just reach down and pretty

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much have access to it, whereas the front passenger would have to put his entire arm

down the seat in order to access the firearm.” The officer arrested A.C., and later

testified he did so “solely based on the movements that he made in the vehicle.”

The San Bernardino County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition

against A.C. alleging he was a minor in possession of a concealable firearm (Pen. Code,1

§ 29610) and was carrying a loaded handgun in a vehicle (§ 25850, subd. (a)). The court

held a jurisdictional hearing on the petition in January 2024. It heard testimony from the

arresting officer and later reviewed the officer’s body camera footage before ultimately

finding true both allegations. The case was transferred to Riverside County Superior

Court later that month, which held the dispositional hearing in February 2024. The court

declared A.C. a ward of the court, imposed probation with credit for time served, and

placed him in the custody of his parents.

ANALYSIS

A.C. argues there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that he

possessed the firearm. We disagree and affirm.2

“[O]n this appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a juvenile

court judgment sustaining the criminal allegations of a petition made under the provisions

1 Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Penal Code.

2 A.C. also argues the probation report stated the wrong maximum term of
confinement. However, the court released A.C. into his parents’ custody and did not set a
maximum term of confinement. We therefore agree with the People that any error in the
probation report on this issue is irrelevant. (See In re Ali A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 569,
571 [“When a juvenile ward is allowed to remain in his parents’ custody, there is no
physical confinement and therefore no need to set a maximum term of confinement.”].)

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of section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, we must apply the same standard of

review applicable to any claim by a criminal defendant challenging the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a judgment of conviction on appeal.” (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92

Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371.) Under this standard of review we “ ‘must review the whole

record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses

substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid

value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.’ ” (Ibid.) “Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears

‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the

true finding].’ ” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331, quoting People v. Redmond

(1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.) “We resolve all evidentiary conflicts . . . ‘in favor of the

verdict, drawing every reasonable inference the [trier of fact] could draw from the

evidence.’ ” (People v. Brady (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1008, 1014, quoting People v.

Cardenas (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 220, 226-227.) “The trial court, not the reviewing

court, ‘is vested with the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any

conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences . . . .’ ”

(People v. Duncan (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1018, quoting People v. Woods (1999)

21 Cal.4th 668, 673.)

Violations of sections 29610 and 25850, subdivision (a), both require proof that

the accused individual possessed a firearm. (See In re Charles G. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th

945, 951 (Charles G.); People v. Taylor (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 432, 436.) “To ‘possess’

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a firearm means ‘having “ ‘ “actual control, care and management of” ’ ” ’ the firearm.

[Citations.] Possession may be actual or constructive.” (Charles G., at p. 951.) “ ‘To

establish constructive possession, the prosecution must prove a defendant knowingly

exercised a right to control the prohibited item, either directly or through another

person.’ ” (People v. Bay (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 126, 132.) “A defendant does not avoid

conviction if his right to exercise dominion and control over the place where the

contraband was located is shared with others.” (People v. Rushing (1989) 209

Cal.App.3d 618, 622.) However, under such circumstances “ ‘ “[d]ominion and

control . . . cannot be inferred from mere presence or access.” ’ ” (In re Anthony J.

(2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 718, 728.) Instead “ ‘ “[s]omething more must be shown to

support inferring of these elements,” ’ ” though “ ‘ “the necessary additional

circumstances may, in some fact contexts, be rather slight.” ’ ” (Ibid.)

The evidence of constructive possession in this case was slight, but it was

nevertheless sufficient to conclude A.C. possessed the firearm. The arresting officer

testified he saw A.C. ducking down and making other gestures while he was pulling the

car over. Nobody else in the car made similar movements. The car also took longer than

necessary to stop, traveling a fifth of a mile before doing so, and the officer testified that

in his experience cars tend to do that when someone is attempting to conceal contraband.

When it finally did stop, the officer found it difficult to access the handgun from the front

of the car, and he testified that a rear passenger would have much easier access to it than

the front passenger. The gun was also covered in trash such that it was hard to see from

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the rear, arguably suggesting someone in the back seat had attempted to conceal it from

view. Finally, the passenger to A.C.’s immediate left had a child on their lap, possibly

obstructing their access to the area beneath the front passenger seat. Viewing this

evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, the trial court could have concluded

A.C. placed the gun under the seat and attempted to conceal it under trash. These actions

would demonstrate dominion and control over, not mere access to, the weapon. Thus,

given the deferential standard of review, there was sufficient evidence that A.C.

constructively possessed the gun.

In support of a different conclusion, A.C. argues that furtive movements are not

sufficient to justify a search of a person, and therefore cannot sustain the court’s finding

that he violated the law. In particular, A.C. points out that the arresting officer said he

arrested A.C. “solely based on the movements that he made in the vehicle,” which A.C.

treats as an admission that this was the only evidence supporting the trial court’s finding

he violated the law. But as discussed above, that is not the case. That the officer’s arrest

decision focused on A.C.’s furtive movements does not mean that was the only evidence

of constructive possession offered at the jurisdictional hearing. The People also offered

evidence that the gun was not easily accessible from the front seat, and that the gun had

been concealed. The first of these facts makes it unlikely that the front passenger and

driver possessed the gun during the stop, and the location of the weapon suggests that the

possessor was a passenger in the right rear of the car—where A.C. was seated. In

addition, the person to A.C.’s immediate left had a child on their lap, which would have

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made reaching the firearm, let alone concealing it, difficult. A.C. thus had the most

access of any person in the car. When combined with A.C.’s movements, this evidence

adequately supports the conclusion A.C. possessed the gun. Thus, while his movements

alone may not have justified the trial court’s finding, the totality of the evidence does.

Accordingly, we conclude there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find

A.C. constructively possessed the firearm in question and therefore violated

sections 29610 and 25850, subdivision (a).

DISPOSITION

We affirm.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL
J.

We concur:

McKINSTER
Acting P. J.

CODRINGTON
J.

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