Mensinger v. Meadows CA1/1

CourtListener 10307814Calctapp6 janv. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 1/6/24 Mensinger v. Meadows CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

LESTER MICHAEL MENSINGER
et al.,
Cross-complainants and A169289
Respondents,
v. (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. 22CV020813)
CHARLES VERNON MEADOWS et
al.,
Cross-defendants and
Appellants.

Charles Vernon Meadows and Shuyi Liu appeal from the trial court’s
order denying their special motion to strike cross-claims by Lester Michael
Mensinger and Michelle N. Biche under Code of Civil Procedure
section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP1 law). Appellants failed to meet their initial
burden to show respondents’ claims fall within the statute by identifying the
“acts each challenged claim rests on” and showing “how those acts are
protected under” one of four “statutorily defined categor[ies] of protected

1 “ ‘SLAPP’ is an acronym for ‘strategic lawsuit against public

participation.’ ” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 381, fn. 1 (Baral).)
activity.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009
(Bonni).) We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Parties’ Dispute
Appellants and respondents are neighbors on a private cul-de-sac. For
several years, they have been embroiled in a dispute over what appellants
claim is unpermitted and illegal construction by respondents, and what
respondents claim is trespassing and harassment by appellants.2
According to appellants, respondents engaged in large-scale dumping
and grading to build an unpermitted recreational vehicle pad on their
property, which caused a hillside slope to fail. Then, they dumped fill and
debris on and trespassed on appellants’ property and easement in an
apparent effort to retain the failing hillside. These activities damaged and
impeded appellants’ access to their property. Appellants lodged a complaint,
which was investigated by the Code Enforcement Division of the Alameda
County Community Development Agency and the Alameda County Public
Works Agency. They then complained to several more local government
agencies about respondents’ activities. Appellants took photographs of
respondents and their property to support their complaints.
Meanwhile, Mensinger filed separate requests for civil harassment
restraining orders against appellants, claiming they drove recklessly, “use[d]
[a] vehicle as a weapon,” and filmed and photographed respondents and their
family members and guests. Appellants took photographs to support their
defense.

2 The parties have exchanged many more accusations of harassment

and other improper conduct than we will repeat here. Our goal is only to put
the allegations giving rise to appellants’ special motion to strike in context.

2
Ultimately, appellants filed this lawsuit, seeking damages resulting
from respondents’ construction-related activities and from their alleged
harassment of appellants in retaliation for their complaints.
B. Respondents’ Cross-complaint
Respondents filed a cross-complaint for wrongful use of administrative
proceedings, defamation, and intentional trespass. Appellants demurred to
all three cross-claims and moved to strike the first two under the anti-SLAPP
law. The trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend as to the
first cross-claim and denied the motion to strike without prejudice.
Respondents filed an amended cross-complaint, asserting claims for
nuisance and trespass. They alleged that appellants came onto their
property many times, sometimes with their unleashed dogs, despite requests
that they stop. Appellants repeatedly threw vegetation and other debris onto
respondents’ property. Meadows would back his vehicle onto their property
to turn it around, and when respondents positioned a metal trough to prevent
this, Meadows repeatedly slammed his vehicle into it.
Respondents further alleged that appellants filmed and photographed
them and their family “for no legitimate purpose,” including with security
cameras pointed towards their property. Meadows made “false complaints
with public agencies,” among them the Alameda County Public Works
Agency.
Respondents obtained temporary restraining orders against appellants
and reported their misconduct to law enforcement, but appellants’
trespassing and harassment continued. Meadows placed three cameras on
15-foot poles pointed towards respondents’ backyard. He aimed a spotlight
directly into their bedroom and installed cameras on his second-story deck
that pointed at respondents’ bedroom window. As grading and other work

3
proceeded on respondents’ property, appellants harassed workers and Liu
sprayed one with a hose. Meadows was arrested for “harassing” respondents’
son. He again trespassed on their property, argued with their contractors,
and refused to move his vehicle so an accessory dwelling unit could be legally
delivered in accordance with permits.
C. Appellants’ Special Motion to Strike
Appellants filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the first and second
cross-claims and unspecified “portions” of the amended cross-complaint
“including, but not limited to facts alleged that are common to all causes of
action.” As grounds for their motion, they claimed their “activit[ies]
underlying the allegations” in the amended cross-complaint “were in
furtherance of their petitions for redress or free speech” and the photographs
they took were “available . . . during public hearings regarding [respondents’]
unpermitted construction and illegal dumping, which is a matter of public
concern.”
In their moving papers, appellants declared that their “us[e] [of]
photographs to document violations” by respondents was “the focus of the
cause of action for nuisance and trespass,” citing “[b]y way of example” the
allegations about Meadows’s complaints to public agencies at paragraph 10 of
the amended cross-complaint. Appellants dismissed the many remaining
allegations in the cross-complaint as “vague, unsupported by admissible
evidence and false,” referring to a lengthy “Statement of Evidence” rather
than addressing the remaining allegations directly in their memorandum of
points and authorities. Appellants did not specify which of the four statutory
categories of protected activity they claimed respondents’ allegations
implicated, citing to three of the categories without explanation in their
notice of motion and never addressing them in their supporting

4
memorandum. Nor did appellants discuss the elements of respondents’
claims for nuisance and trespass or explain how paragraph 10 or any other
portion of the amended cross-complaint related to those elements.3
D. The Trial Court Holds Hearings and Denies Appellants’ Motion
The trial court issued a tentative ruling denying appellants’ motion on
the ground that they failed to meet their burden under Bonni to identify the
acts alleged in the cross-complaint they claimed were protected. Appellants
contested the tentative ruling and the court held a hearing at which
Meadows testified concerning his complaints to public agencies and his use of
photographs to support them. The court then issued an amended tentative
ruling stating that it would continue the matter to “allow both sides to
augment the record, including allowing Mr. Meadows opportunity to complete
his oral testimony.” The court held a further hearing at which counsel
presented oral argument in response to the tentative ruling and Meadows
provided additional testimony.
After this hearing, the trial court issued an order denying appellants’
motion. The court ruled that appellants failed to identify the acts alleged in

3 The statement of evidence (an amended version of which was also

filed) is over 80 pages long and addresses nearly every allegation in the
amended cross-complaint in a two-column format. The first column mixes
together allegations that appellants contend are false with allegations they
apparently claim concern protected activity. The second column similarly
mixes together argument about the merits of the allegations identified in the
first column with argument that some of the alleged conduct furthered
complaints to public agencies and litigation. Despite its length, the
statement of evidence does not set forth reasoned argument connecting the
elements of respondents’ cross-claims to protected activity, or (aside from two
bare references addressed to paragraph 10) identify which statutory
categories of protected activity appellants maintain the cross-claims arise
from and explain how.

5
the cross-complaint they claimed were protected, other than the allegations of
false complaints to public agencies in paragraph 10. The court determined
that paragraph 10 did not concern protected activity because “there is no
constitutional right to make false reports to government agencies.”
Otherwise, the court explained, appellants’ argument that the amended
cross-complaint was “based on [their] petitioning activity” was “predicated
upon . . . [Meadows’s] oral testimony” and did not address the allegations of
the cross-complaint, improperly “bypassing the first step of identifying
allegations of protected conduct.” Since appellants failed to meet their initial
burden, the court concluded it did not need to address the merits of
respondents’ allegations in the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.
II. DISCUSSION
Appellants now claim their acts underlying the amended cross-
complaint were (1) protected statements or writings before an official
proceeding (Code Civ. Proc.,4 § 425.16, subd. (e)(1)) or connected with an issue
in such a proceeding (id., subd. (e)(2)), and (2) evidence gathering “ ‘in
furtherance of’ ” their petitioning activities. They urge the trial court erred
by failing to strike paragraph 10 of the amended cross-complaint when they
contested that their complaints to public agencies were false, and also by
failing to consider evidence that their photography was integral to their
petitioning activity and to strike various photography-related allegations
discussed in their statement of evidence. Appellants also maintain
respondents failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of their
claims—including several that appellants do not claim are based on protected
activity.

4 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

6
We find the allegations in paragraph 10 are merely incidental to
respondents’ cross-claims, and the trial court correctly determined that
appellants did not meet their initial burden to show the cross-claims arise
from protected activity. We therefore affirm, without the need to address
most of appellants’ arguments.
A. Relevant Legal Principles
1. The Anti-SLAPP Statute and Our Standard of Review
The anti-SLAPP law helps “combat lawsuits designed to chill the
exercise of free speech and petition rights.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of
California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1060 (Park v. Board of
Trustees).) It provides that claims arising from an act “in furtherance of [a]
person’s right of petition or free speech . . . in connection with a public issue
shall be subject to a special motion to strike,” unless the plaintiff or cross-
complainant establishes “a probability [of] prevail[ing] on the claim.”
(§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
There are two steps to an anti-SLAPP motion. First, the moving party
“must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by”
the statute. (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384.) Only “[i]f the defendant
makes the required showing” does “the burden shift[] to the plaintiff to
demonstrate the merit of the claim” in a “ ‘summary-judgment-like
procedure.’ ” (Ibid.) Stated differently, “[o]nly a cause of action that satisfies
both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises from protected
speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit—is a SLAPP, subject to
being stricken under the statute.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82,
89.)
We review de novo the trial court’s ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion.
(Park v. Board of Trustees, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1067.) “ ‘If the trial court’s

7
decision is correct on any theory applicable to the case, we affirm the order
regardless of the correctness of the grounds on which the lower court reached
its conclusion.’ ” (Young v. Midland Funding LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 63,
80.)
2. The First Step of the Analysis
Here we are concerned with the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.
To meet its burden in this step, the moving party must “identify what acts
each challenged claim rests on” and “show how those acts are protected under
a statutorily defined category of protected activity”—of which there are four
(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1)–(4)). (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009.) This
involves “two related showings.” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019)
7 Cal.5th 871, 887 (Wilson).) The moving party “must demonstrate activity
qualifying for protection” by “[c]omparing its statements and conduct against
the statute.” (Ibid. [citing § 425.16, subd. (e)].) Then, “comparing that
protected activity against the complaint,” the moving party “must also
demonstrate that the activity supplies one or more elements of a plaintiff’s
claims.” (Ibid.)
Critically, “a claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning
activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability or
a step leading to some different act for which liability is asserted.” (Park v.
Board of Trustees, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060.) We therefore examine the
elements of the relevant claims and distinguish between protected conduct
that forms the basis for liability and protected conduct that merely provides
evidentiary support or context for the claim. (Id. at pp. 1062–1065; Baral,
supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 394.) The plaintiff’s “subjective intent . . . is not
relevant.” (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78.) “[T]he mere
fact an action was filed after protected activity took place,” even if it

8
“arguably may have been triggered by protected activity,” does not mean it
arises from that activity for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. (City of
Cotati, at pp. 76, 78.)
3. Moving Party’s Burden as to Mixed Causes of Action
When addressing a “ ‘ “mixed cause of action” ’—that is, [one] that rests
on allegations of multiple acts, some of which constitute protected activity
and some of which do not”—courts analyze each “set of acts supplying a basis
for relief” in order to determine whether they “are protected and, if so,
whether the claim they give rise to has [enough] merit to survive the motion.”
(Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1010.)
The moving party can directly “attack parts of a count as pleaded” by
using an anti-SLAPP motion “like a conventional motion to strike.” (Baral,
supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 393.) Otherwise, when moving to strike an entire cause
of action, the moving party bears the burden to show “that each allegation
supporting [the] claim of recovery is one that rests on protected activity.”
(Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1012.) “If a cause of action contains multiple
claims and a moving party fails to identify how the speech or conduct
underlying some of those claims is protected activity, it will not carry its first-
step burden as to those claims.” (Id. at p. 1011.)
“Our Supreme Court’s guidance from Baral to Bonni explains that
while courts may strike less than the entirety of a complaint or pleaded cause
of action, the trial court is not required to take on the burden of identifying
the allegations susceptible to a special motion to strike.” (Park v. Nazari
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1109.) The moving party must identify, “in the
initial motion,” the portion of the pleading “that comprises a challenged claim
and explain[] ‘the claim’s elements, the actions alleged to establish those

9
elements, and wh[y] those actions are protected.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Bonni,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1015.)
B. Appellants Failed to Meet Their Initial Burden
As they did in the trial court, appellants give short shrift to the first
step of the anti-SLAPP analysis in their appellate briefing. Again, that step
requires the moving party not only to “demonstrate activity qualifying for
protection” under one of the four categories described in section 425.16,
subdivision (e), but then to “compar[e] that protected activity against the
complaint” to show it “supplies one or more elements of a plaintiff’s claims.”
(Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 887, italics added.) Appellants only briefly
address the first aspect of their burden and do not even attempt to meet the
second.
Appellants raise two types of activity they claim are protected under
the anti-SLAPP statute. The first is Meadows’s lodging of complaints with
public agencies as alleged at paragraph 10 of the cross-complaint. Such
complaints are statements or writings before an official proceeding (§ 425.16,
subd. (e)(1)) or in connection with an issue under consideration in such a
proceeding (id., subd. (e)(2)). But they do not supply an element of
respondents’ claims for nuisance or trespass. Such claims arise from,
respectively, the defendant’s interference with the plaintiff’s use and
enjoyment of their property or the defendant’s entry onto the plaintiff’s
property.5 The lodging of complaints is neither. Rather, the allegations at

5 A claim for private nuisance arises from (1) interference with the

plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of their property that is (2) substantial and
(3) unreasonable. (Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC (2016)
3 Cal.App.5th 248, 262–263.) The elements of a claim for trespass are (1) the
plaintiff’s ownership or control of property that the defendant
(2) intentionally, recklessly, or negligently enters, (3) without permission,

10
paragraph 10 “merely provide context, without supporting a claim for
recovery,” and thus “cannot be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.”
(Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 394.)
The second type of activity appellants raise is “taking evidentiary
photos in support of their petitioning activities.” Even assuming, as
appellants contend, that these photographs are writings in an official
proceeding because they were later used in a proceeding, appellants fail to
explain how respondents’ cross-claims arise from the photographs. “[A] claim
may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong
complained of.” (Park v. Board of Trustees, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060.)
Here, it is appellants’ alleged trespassing on respondents’ property and
harassment of respondents and others on the property that constitute the
acts for which liability is asserted—including many acts that have nothing to
do with photography, like “shin[ing] a flashlight into [respondents’] bedroom
in the evening hours,” damaging respondents’ personal property, “yelling at
[respondents’] contractors almost daily,” and spraying a delivery driver with
a hose. Respondents’ cross-claims do not arise from appellants’ use of
photographs in complaints to public agencies or in litigation.
Golden Gate Land Holdings illustrates the point. In that case, the
operator of a horse racing track sued an animal rights organization whose
affiliated individual defendants climbed over a fence surrounding the track
and remained there for several hours, preventing scheduled races from
taking place. (Golden Gate Land Holdings, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 87.)

where (4) the plaintiff suffers harm and (5) the defendant’s conduct was a
substantial factor in causing the harm. (Golden Gate Land Holdings LLC v.
Direct Action Everywhere (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 82, 90–91 (Golden Gate Land
Holdings).)

11
The animal rights organization filed an anti-SLAPP motion, maintaining it
had been sued for opposing the operator’s horse-racing business, gathering
signatures on a petition to close it, and organizing protests against the horse
track. (Id. at p. 88.) But as we explained, these protected activities were not
the basis for the operator’s claims for trespass and intentional interference
with prospective economic advantage. (Id. at p. 91.) “The cause of action for
trespass was necessarily based on the individual defendants’ trespass” by
entering the operator’s property, and the claim for intentional interference
was premised on the allegation that this caused the operator economic harm.
(Ibid.) While the complaint alleged that the animal rights organization
maintained an online petition to shut the operator down and “streamed live
video footage of the trespass,” the operator’s “claims did not seek recourse
from [the organization] for these activities.” (Id. at pp. 91–92.) Like the
allegation about Meadows’s complaints here, those allegations were
“extraneous to the claims” and merely provided context. (Id. at p. 92.)
To the extent that some portion of respondents’ claims arises from
appellants’ photography as opposed to their photographs, it was appellants’
burden to explain how this was protected activity by “[c]omparing” their
“conduct against the statute”—and then to show this activity supplied one or
more elements of a cross-claim by referring to specific allegations in the
cross-complaint. (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 887.) This they failed to do.
Their anti-SLAPP motion did not identify which of the four “statutorily
defined categor[ies] of protected activity” encompassed their photography and
explain “how those acts are protected” under that category. (Bonni, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 1009.) Their motion “did not identify any ‘particular
allegations’ of protected activity that they contended should be stricken,”
Littlefield v. Littlefield (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 815, 826, nor show how those

12
allegations supplied an element of one or more cross-claims. While
appellants mentioned allegations now directly targeted by their appellate
briefing in their prolix statement of evidence, neither respondents nor the
trial court were required to weed through and read into that document to
“make [appellants’] case for [them].” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1011; see
also Young v. Midland Funding LLC, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 99–100.)
In their appellate briefing, appellants rely entirely on the statutory
categories addressing statements or writings before an official proceeding or
connected with an issue in such a proceeding (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1) & (2)).
(See Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106,
1114–1115 [claims arising from communications in furtherance of official
proceedings were subject to anti-SLAPP statute].) But their acts of
photographing respondents and their property are not statements or
writings. Appellants expressly disclaim any reliance on the one statutory
category addressing more general “conduct in furtherance of the exercise of
the constitutional right of petition”—presumably because the statute requires
such conduct be connected “with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”
(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4); see Briggs, at p. 1117.) Appellants have forfeited any
argument that this category applies. (See Vitug v. Alameda Point Storage,
Inc. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 407, 412.) And to the extent they claim—
contrary to statements by our Supreme Court (see, e.g., Bonni, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 1009)—that the anti-SLAPP statute protects a broader range
of conduct than described by the four statutory categories, they fail to provide
any relevant legal authority or reasoned argument to support this position.
Any such argument is also forfeited.
Finally, since appellants did not even attempt to show the entire cross-
complaint or any cross-claim “was based solely on protected activity, they did

13
not show that the court could properly strike the [cross-complaint] or all of its
causes of action.” (Littlefield v. Littlefield, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 826.)
Their arguments that admittedly nonprotected aspects of the cross-claims
lack merit have no bearing on their initial burden to show the claims arise
from protected activity.
Appellants failed to meet their initial burden to show any portion of
respondents’ cross-complaint arises from activity protected under the anti-
SLAPP law.
III. DISPOSITION
The order denying the special motion to strike is affirmed.
Respondents are entitled to their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.278(a)(2).)

HILL, J.*

WE CONCUR:

HUMES, P. J.

LANGHORNE WILSON, J.

* Judge of the San Mateo County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

14

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.