CourtListener 10306381•People v. Gonzalez CA2/5
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Filed 12/31/24 P. v. Gonzalez CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B328911
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. KA117722)
RAYMOND GONZALEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Juan C. Dominguez, Judge. Affirmed.
Mark Yanis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury found defendant Raymond Gonzalez (defendant)
guilty of carjacking and the premeditated murders of Robert
Ryan, Jr. (Ryan) and Jacob Dominguez (Dominguez). We are
asked to decide many issues: whether the trial court had
jurisdiction to reconsider an order dismissing special
circumstance allegations, whether the court should have
dismissed or inquired further of jurors who were potentially
aware of plea negotiations, whether the court erred in admitting
a recording of a witness interview that included investigators’
statements regarding defendant’s culpability, whether the court
should have instructed the jury to view accomplice testimony
with caution, whether the prosecution’s reference to defendant as
a “monster” violated the Racial Justice Act, and whether the
prosecution improperly vouched for the credibility of a witness
during closing argument.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Offense Conduct, as Established by the Evidence
at Trial
Ryan left home on December 11, 2017, with an insurance
check for over $4,000. Ryan’s father, Robert Ryan, Sr., was “very
concerned” that his son had the check because Ryan struggled
with substance abuse.
Ryan arrived at a check cashing business in Covina shortly
after 4:00 p.m. and left with $4,132 in cash. He was accompanied
by his friend, Dominguez. Later that afternoon, the two men
took an Uber from Covina to El Monte. Their driver, Jose Murillo
(Murillo), testified he took them to their destination—a shopping
center—and agreed to wait while Ryan stepped out of the car for
2
a few minutes. Ryan and Dominguez then offered Murillo cash to
drive them to a second destination in Baldwin Park.
Surveillance video from a neighboring residence captured
Murillo’s white Toyota Yaris arriving at a house on Cosbey Street
in Baldwin Park around 5:25 p.m. Murillo testified Ryan
searched his pockets for a $20 bill to pay for the ride by first
removing a “wad” of cash from one pocket and then pulling
“another wad of money” out of a different pocket because the first
group of bills “was all hundreds.”
The house on Cosbey Street was owned by relatives of
Eduardo Rodriguez (Rodriguez). He sold drugs out of the house
and allowed various friends to live with him on a temporary
basis. Rodriguez believed the home could be described as a “trap
house,” meaning “[a] place [where] people get high and sell drugs
and . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [h]ang out.”
As of December 2017, the other residents of the Cosbey
house included Rodriguez’s significant other, Selena Garcia
(Garcia), a 17-year-old named Jasmin Torres (Torres), and
defendant, who was known by the moniker “Danger.” Also
present on the day Ryan and Dominguez arrived at the Cosbey
house were Adrian Mora (Mora) and Sabino Delgado (Delgado).1
Delgado worked as an auto mechanic. A mutual friend
called “Pest” recommended Delgado to Rodriguez, and Rodriguez
hired him to come to the Cosbey residence to work on his car.
Delgado saw “an older white man and . . . a younger Hispanic
man” (descriptions matching Ryan and Dominguez) enter the
garage where he was working, talk with Rodriguez, and go inside
the house. Delgado later saw Rodriguez leave with others in a
1
Mora died in 2018.
3
truck. Sometime after that, Delgado asked a person resembling
defendant for a key to a gate so he could retrieve a tool from his
car parked outside.
Delgado was still working in the garage when he heard
several gunshots in rapid succession from inside the house. He
grabbed his tools, climbed over a fence, went to his car, and drove
away. Surveillance video from the neighbor’s house showed
Delgado leaving around 6:32 p.m. Other, unidentified individuals
can also be seen in the garage and on the driveway. As he drove
away, Delgado called Pest and told him about the shooting.
Rodriguez was at a friend’s house when Pest called to tell
him “something bad” had happened at the Cosbey house. As we
shall discuss in more detail, the trial court during defendant’s
later criminal trial allowed the prosecution to play a recording of
a February 2018 interview of Rodriguez that investigators
conducted while he was in custody on an unrelated matter.
Among other things, Rodriguez stated during the interview that,
after he spoke with Pest, his father dropped him off at a house in
Azusa, defendant then called Rodriguez and said he needed help,
Rodriguez said he would not help but had a friend drive him back
to the Cosbey house, Rodriguez saw a foot extending from
beneath a curtain when he arrived and asked defendant, “What
the fuck?,” and defendant replied, “I did it, my boy.” Rodriguez
was angry and shoved defendant because Ryan had been his
“best friend.”
Around midnight that same night, Maria Juarez (Juarez)
went outside her home one block away from the Cosbey residence
to check that her van was locked. Defendant approached, pointed
a silver handgun at her, and demanded the keys to the van.
Juarez testified she knew defendant, who was an acquaintance of
4
her son, and initially refused to hand over the keys. She
relented, however, because defendant had the gun pointed at her
face and he seemed “serious.”
Juarez did not report the theft of her van to police because
she believed defendant would hurt her or her family if she did not
keep quiet. Instead, Juarez told Rodriguez she needed her van
back. Rodriguez gave Juarez defendant’s phone number, and she
called him. Defendant returned the van several days later in a
dirty and damaged condition, with a bad odor and blood stains
inside. Stephanie Sandoval (Sandoval), a criminalist employed
by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, found Ryan was
a major contributor of DNA to several blood stains found inside
the van and Dominguez was a possible minor contributor to one.
Surveillance video from Rodriguez’s neighbor on Cosbey
Street showed Juarez’s van backing into Rodriguez’s garage
shortly before 1:00 a.m. Around 8:40 a.m., the garage door
opened and the van drove away.
Michael Easter (Easter), a special agent with the FBI’s
cellular analysis survey team, performed a historical cell site
analysis for the phone number Juarez called to speak with
defendant. Easter testified the phone was near the Cosbey
residence and Juarez’s house on the evening of December 11,
2017, and moved east along Interstate 10 toward Redlands
beginning around 9:00 a.m. the next morning. The phone was in
Victorville around noon.
Ryan and Dominguez’s bodies were discovered in a field
near a hospital in Victorville on December 17, 2017. Defendant
was a major contributor of DNA recovered from the inside of a
glove found among debris scattered near the bodies. Ryan and
Dominguez were wearing the same clothes seen in surveillance
5
video from the check cashing business. Ryan no longer had any
cash in his pockets. Curtains found near the bodies matched the
pattern of curtains seen in a video of a December 15, 2017, search
of the Cosbey residence unrelated to this case. When
investigators searched the house again in February 2018, tiles
had been removed and the floor painted in the room where
Rodgriguez told investigators defendant slept.
Ryan died of multiple gunshot wounds, including to his
head, chest, back, and arm. Dominguez died of a single gunshot
to his head. An autopsy revealed both men consumed various
drugs shortly before they were killed.
B. Verdict and Sentencing
Defendant was charged with two counts of murder (counts
one and two) and one count of carjacking (count three). In
connection with the murder counts, the information alleged
firearm enhancements (Pen. Code,2 § 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)) and
two special circumstances: commission of multiple murders
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and commission of murder during a robbery
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)).3 As we shall discuss in more detail, the
trial court initially dismissed the special circumstance allegations
but subsequently reconsidered and vacated that ruling before
trial.
2
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.
3
A personal use of a firearm enhancement was also alleged
in connection with the carjacking charge. Trial of additional
alleged gang enhancements was bifurcated, and those
enhancements were ultimately dismissed.
6
A jury convicted defendant on all three charged crimes and
found all associated special circumstances and firearm
enhancements true. The trial court sentenced defendant to two
consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole on the
murder counts, plus a consecutive term of 50 years to life for the
associated section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancements. As to
the carjacking count, the trial court sentenced defendant to the
mid-term of five years plus a consecutive term of 10 years for the
section 12022.53, subdivision (b) enhancement.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant’s various assignments of error do not warrant
reversal. We first summarize why and then explain in greater
detail.
Before trial, the prosecution moved to dismiss the special
circumstance allegations it had earlier alleged. The trial court
first granted that motion, believing it was obligated to do so by
“the notion of separation of powers.” The court later reconsidered
that ruling on its own motion, however, reasoning it had not
applied the correct legal standard. The court accordingly vacated
its earlier dismissal order, which reinstated the special
circumstance allegations for trial. Defendant contends this was
error because the trial court had no jurisdiction to reconsider its
initial ruling and its reinstatement of the special circumstance
allegations violated separation of powers principles. We hold to
the contrary. The trial court was entitled to reconsider its pre-
trial dismissal order and it did not usurp the prosecution’s role in
doing so.
Defendant also challenges the trial court’s handling of
jurors’ exposure to information regarding plea negotiations. One
7
juror disclosed to the trial court that he overheard someone
outside the courtroom say defendant had not accepted a plea deal
and, separately, a judicial officer told all prospective jurors prior
to voir dire that the matter was delayed because “‘[w]e’re trying
to see if we can avoid a trial.’” We conclude the trial court
adequately investigated whether the juror making these
disclosures could be impartial, correctly determined he could be,
and acted within its discretion in declining to question other
jurors.
Defendant forfeited his challenge to the trial court’s
admission of portions of Rodriguez’s recorded interview in which
investigators asserted they knew defendant was the killer
because no contemporaneous objection was made. There is no
basis in the appellate record to say the absence of an objection
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel because defendant’s
attorney may have decided to refrain from objecting because the
manner in which the investigators questioned Rodriguez during
the interview undermined the reliability of his statements.
Assuming the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury
that it should consider whether Rodriguez was an accomplice
and, if so, that it should view his testimony and statements
implicating defendant with caution, the error was still harmless.
The jury received other instructions highlighting relevant
considerations in assessing Rodriguez’s credibility, especially
concerning defendant’s statements to Rodriguez.
Defendant further contends the prosecution’s
characterization of him as a “monster” during closing argument
violated the Racial Justice Act. The issue is forfeited, but the
argument lacks merit in any case because the word “monster,”
8
without more, does not constitute “racially discriminatory
language” under section 745, subdivision (h)(4).
Defendant also forfeited his argument that the prosecution
engaged in misconduct during closing argument by suggesting
“truth” and “justice” demanded the prosecution call Rodriguez to
testify as a witness even though that may put Rodriguez in
danger. Defendant’s attorney was not ineffective in failing to
object because he may have determined Rodriguez appeared
genuinely fearful and it was best not to draw further attention to
the point.
A. The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction to Reconsider Its
Order Dismissing the Special Circumstance
Allegations and Did Not Violate Separation of Powers
Principles
1. Additional background
Before trial, the prosecution moved to dismiss all
enhancements and the special circumstance allegations pursuant
to section 1385. The motion, based on special directives issued by
the then newly-elected Los Angeles County District Attorney, did
not make a case-specific argument for why dismissal was in
furtherance of justice.4
4
The deputy district attorney who filed the motion stated at
the hearing on the motion that, “based on [his] education, [his]
law training, and experience as a district attorney, . . . there was
more than sufficient evidence to prove . . . defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt and for a jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the special circumstances, the gun
enhancements, and the gang enhancements” were true.
9
At a January 2021 hearing, the trial court granted the
motion as to the special circumstance allegations but deferred
making a final ruling on the firearm enhancements until
sentencing. The trial court remarked on the record that “the
motion [could not] be possibly supported by the law or the
evidence in this case” and observed the prosecution was “not
asking the court to dismiss based on the law, the facts, the
evidence in this case, or the pain and suffering of the victims’
families. [¶] Instead[,] it wishe[d] the court to dismiss based
upon the notion of separation of powers and the discretion of the
District Attorney to choose which charges and allegations it
wishe[d] to proceed on in the case.” The court stated it was
granting the motion “[f]or that reason alone.” The court
explained that “while [it] [did] not personally agree with the
special directives that apply in this case, [its] personal view [was]
not relevant, and [it] must honor the separation of powers and
the absolute discretion of the [District Attorney] or the [District
Attorney’s] office in making this motion.”
Ryan and Dominguez’s families filed a motion for
reconsideration of the trial court’s ruling. On its own motion, the
trial court asked the parties to be prepared at a future hearing to
discuss “whether or not the victims’ families ha[d] standing to
ask the court for reconsideration of its dismissal order” and
“whether or not the court ha[d] the authority on its own motion to
reconsider its dismissal order.” Further, assuming the trial court
had authority to reconsider the order, the trial court asked the
parties to address whether the motion to dismiss should be
granted in furtherance of justice.
At a hearing in May 2021, defendant argued that although
the trial court has broad jurisdiction to reconsider interim orders,
10
it lacked jurisdiction to reconsider what the defense believed was
a final order dismissing the enhancements. Defendant further
argued that reinstating the special circumstance allegations
would violate separation of powers principles because “the court
would be acting as a prosecutor in determining which special
circumstance should be added back on.” The prosecution confined
itself to “simply stat[ing] what [it] believe[d] the law to be”
because “the court . . . asked for the People’s input . . . .” The
prosecution opined the trial court retained jurisdiction to correct
a legal error—e.g., failing to consider the interest of justice in
granting the motion to dismiss.
After hearing from counsel, the trial court issued an order
vacating its prior dismissal order, which reinstated the special
circumstance allegations. Relying on determinations that it
“erroneously applied the separation of powers doctrine when it
should have determined whether dismissal was ‘in furtherance of
justice,’” that the case “remain[ed] in pre-trial status with no trial
date scheduled,” and that reinstating the special circumstance
allegations would “place[ ] the parties in the same position they
were in before the January . . . hearing,” the court found it could
“reconsider whether the policy considerations set forth in the
Special Directives provide a legal basis for the court to conclude
that dismissal of the special circumstance and sentence
enhancement allegations is in furtherance of justice . . . .” The
trial court concluded dismissal would not be in furtherance of
justice based on the offense conduct and the lack of “mitigating
facts or personal circumstances of the defendant to support the
dismissal motion.”5
5
Defendant challenged this order in a petition for writ of
mandate, and the District Attorney filed a letter in support of the
11
2. Jurisdiction
“Generally speaking, courts may correct judicial error in
the making of interim orders or in limine rulings until
pronouncement or entry of a judgment. [Citations.] On the other
hand, judicial error in the making of a final order or judgment
‘may not be corrected except pursuant to statutory procedures’ or
on the limited grounds available for a collateral attack.
[Citations.]”6 (People v. Delouize (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1223, 1231, fn.
omitted.)
In DeLouize, our Supreme Court considered whether a trial
court may reconsider an order granting a criminal defendant a
petition. This court denied the petition, reasoning defendant had
an adequate remedy by way of appeal after judgment. On
petition for review, our Supreme Court transferred the matter to
this court with directions to vacate the order denying mandate
and to issue an order to show cause why relief should not be
granted. The District Attorney again filed a letter in support of
the petition. This court again denied the petition, explaining,
“[W]e remain of the view that there exists an adequate remedy by
way of appeal after any adverse final judgment such that
extraordinary writ relief should be denied.” (Gonzalez v. Superior
Court (Apr. 7, 2022, B313730) [nonpub. opn.].) Another petition
for review of that opinion was filed in our Supreme Court and
that review petition was denied.
6
Because there is no dispute that the trial court sought to
correct a judicial error, the issue here is whether the trial court’s
January 2021 order was an interim order or a final order.
Defendant’s discussion of Smith v. Superior Court (1981) 115
Cal.App.3d 285, which held that an order’s impact on a criminal
defendant’s substantial rights bears on the distinction between
judicial error and clerical error, is not relevant to our analysis.
12
new trial after the time for the prosecution to appeal the order
has expired. (DeLouize, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 1226.) Eschewing
“appealability as a test for distinguishing final orders from
interim orders,” the Court held the issue should be analyzed “in
terms of the policies underlying the general concept of finality.
Orders and judgments are deemed final in the superior court, and
not subject to reconsideration by that court, to preserve
confidence in the integrity of judicial procedures and to avoid the
delays and inefficiencies associated with repeated examination
and relitigation of the same facts and issues. [Citation.] The
concept of finality ‘rests upon the sound policy of limiting
litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair adversary
hearing on an issue from again drawing it into controversy and
subjecting the other party to further expense in its
reexamination.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at 1232.) The Supreme Court
held an order granting a new trial is an interim order subject to
reconsideration because, among other things, “[t]he time required
to reconsider an order granting a new trial is brief in relation to
the duration of a new criminal trial.” (Ibid.) The trial court’s
reconsideration of an erroneously granted new trial motion
“promotes confidence in the judicial system, conserves judicial
resources, and spares the parties from the inconvenience and
expense of a second trial.” (Ibid.)
Here, the trial court’s sua sponte reconsideration of its own
pre-trial ruling, with no need for further fact development, does
not offend “‘the sound policy of limiting litigation by preventing a
party who has had one fair adversary hearing on an issue’” from
raising it again. (DeLouize, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 1232; People v.
Nesbitt (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 227, 243 [holding that the trial
court did not err in reconsidering a prior order where doing so
13
“did not involve the delay or inefficiencies associated with
repeated examination and relitigation of the same facts and
issues”].) Moreover, the trial court’s correction of an undisputed
error—defendant does not dispute the trial court applied the
wrong legal standard in its January 2021 ruling—promotes
confidence in the judicial system.
Citing DeLouize, however, defendant contends the
prosecution’s failure to timely appeal the January 2021 order
weighs in favor of its finality. DeLouize explained that “[a]
party’s failure to file a timely appeal from an appealable order
generally shows acquiescence in the ruling” and “may bar a later
motion in the trial court seeking reconsideration of the ruling.”
(DeLouize, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 1232-1233.) Here, the
prosecution’s “acquiescence” in a ruling granting its motion is
both unremarkable and immaterial because it was not the
prosecution that sought reconsideration.
Defendant’s further contention that the January 2021 order
must be deemed final because it preserved “judicial and public
resources” by “narrowing or eliminating major issues” also lacks
merit. As pertinent to this appeal, all the same evidence
(commission of multiple murders and commission of murder
while engaged in robbery) would have been presented at trial
regardless of whether the special circumstances were dismissed
or reinstated.
The trial court’s January 2021 dismissal order is therefore
properly considered an interim order based on the policy factors
identified in DeLouize and the trial court accordingly had
jurisdiction to reconsider its ruling.
14
3. Separation of powers
“The California Constitution (art. III, § 3) provides that
‘[t]he powers of state government are legislative, executive, and
judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not
exercise either of the others except as permitted by this
Constitution.’ [¶] It is well settled that the prosecuting
authorities, exercising executive functions, ordinarily have the
sole discretion to determine whom to charge with public offenses
and what charges to bring. [Citations.] This prosecutorial
discretion to choose, for each particular case, the actual charges
from among those potentially available arises from ‘“the complex
considerations necessary for the effective and efficient
administration of law enforcement.”’ [Citation.] The
prosecution’s authority in this regard is founded, among other
things, on the principle of separation of powers, and generally is
not subject to supervision by the judicial branch. [Citations.]”
(People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 134.)
Defendant contends the trial court’s May 2021 order
vacating its earlier ruling was tantamount to “unilaterally adding
special circumstances to the information” in violation of the
California Constitution. His argument depends, however, on a
premise we have already rejected: that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to reconsider its January 2021 order of dismissal.
Because the trial court had jurisdiction to reconsider that order,
its May 2021 order simply restored the District Attorney’s
original charging document.7 Defendant’s suggestion that there
7
Although this is reason alone to reject defendant’s
argument, we also find it significant that the Legislature has,
through section 1385, expressly given the court a role in
determining whether enhancements or allegations (among other
15
was nothing to restore because a dismissal order is “effective for
all purposes when so entered” conflates disparate issues.
Defendant relies on In re Anthony H. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 159,
which considered whether a dismissal order was entered and
effective because dismissal under the particular statute at issue
would “have the same effect as an acquittal for the purpose of
double jeopardy analysis. [Citations.]” (Id. at 164.)
Reconsideration in that context raises issues not applicable here.8
B. The Trial Court Adequately Investigated Potential
Juror Misconduct and Did Not Err in Declining to
Dismiss Juror No. 6
1. Additional background
After jury selection, but before trial began, Juror No. 6
alerted the trial court to a conversation he overheard in the
courthouse hallway. Outside the presence of the other jurors, the
trial court said to Juror No. 6, “I was told that[ ] when you were
out there waiting in the hallway, someone approached you that
wasn’t one of your fellow jurors.” Juror No. 6 responded, “They
things) should be tried notwithstanding a prosecutor’s charging
decisions.
8
Because we conclude the trial court had jurisdiction to
reconsider its January 2021 dismissal order and its May 2021
order did not “add” special circumstances to the information, we
do not consider the Attorney General’s argument that the
separation of powers doctrine is not implicated here “[b]ecause
the [deputy district attorney] supported the reinstatement of the
special circumstance allegations . . . .”
16
didn’t approach me. They sat to my left. I was already sitting
there. I was the only one sitting there and they sat to my left.”
The trial court inquired, “Okay. Did they engage you in
conversation?” Juror No. 6 responded, “Not with me. They
engaged with each other.” The trial court explained, “Okay. It
just so happens I think one or both of the people that sat next to
you are going to be witnesses in this case. You did nothing wrong
here. . . . And they did nothing wrong either because they don’t
know what they are supposed to do or not supposed to do.”9
The trial court next asked Juror No. 6 whether he
overheard the others’ conversation. He heard “[a] couple things.
And then they were starting to talk about other things, and [he]
turned to them and [he] said, ‘To let you know, I’m a juror
member so you probably shouldn’t be talking.’” The trial court
asked Juror No. 6 to specify what he heard them talking about.
Juror No. 6 “heard them say that they tried—the lady said to the
guy, ‘He didn’t accept a plea deal?’ And the guy said, ‘No, he
didn’t accept a plea deal.’ And then they whispered something,
but [Juror No. 6] didn’t hear that.” After discussing their drives
to the courthouse, the people seated next to Juror No. 6 then
“started to talk again. And [Juror No. 6] leaned over to them
and . . . said, ‘I’m a jury member.’ . . . And they stopped. And
then [Juror No. 6] said . . . ‘I’m just going to go sit over here,’ and
[he] moved.”
9
The appellate record does not reveal the identities of the
people who sat next to Juror No. 6, why the trial court believed
they were potential witnesses, or whether they ultimately
testified at trial.
17
The trial court inquired of Juror No. 6, “That portion that
you heard, that he didn’t take a plea deal, does that affect your
ability to be fair and impartial?” Juror No. 6 responded, “No,
because we kind of knew that last week, when we were—the very
first day, sitting upstairs, when that other judge was talking to
us and he says we’re being delayed right now because they’re
trying to see if we can avoid court. So, in other words, [Juror No.
6] took that as they’re trying to see if there’s a plea deal. [¶] . . .
[¶] And he told that to all 75 of us or however many were sitting
in there.” The trial court clarified, “Trying to see if we can avoid
a trial.” Juror No. 6 agreed, “That’s what he said, ‘We’re trying to
see if we can avoid a trial.’” The trial court asked, “So, in your
mind, they were trying to work it out somehow?” Juror No. 6
answered yes. The trial court continued, “And[ ] when you were
sent down here, obviously it didn’t work out.” Juror No. 6 again
answered in the affirmative.10
10
As we shall discuss, the actual record concerning plea
negotiations is immaterial to our analysis of the impact (if any) of
these statements on the jury. It is not clear, however, that plea
negotiations caused any delay. On Monday, November 7, 2022,
the trial court held a hearing at which it stated its
“understanding . . . that there’s going to be a plea; that the
defendant will plead to counts [one] and [two]. It will be, as to
count [one], life plus 25; count [two], life plus 25 consec[utive].
[¶] . . . [¶] For a total of life with a minimum parole eligibility
date of 50 years.” Defendant had signed a plea form, but he
decided at the hearing to proceed to trial. The prosecution
withdrew the offer, and the trial court indicated it would “order
82 [jurors], then, for Wednesday[, November 9, 2022].” The trial
court heard motions in limine on the morning of Wednesday,
November 9, 2022, but the reporter’s transcript does not reflect
18
Neither defense counsel nor the prosecution asked to pose
any questions to Juror No. 6 beyond the court’s inquiry. Outside
the presence of all the jurors, the trial court asked the attorneys
to address Juror No. 6’s statements. Defense counsel stated,
“Yeah. I’m—I don’t have an opinion one way or the other. I
mean, I think—I prefer having jurors with zero contact with
witnesses in an ideal world. I know it happens sometimes. This
is a little bit more than riding in an elevator. So it could
prejudice [defendant] with insider information.” The prosecution
said, “You know, it sounds like the juror doesn’t have any feelings
one way or another with that information, that there was a
possible plea deal that . . . defendant didn’t accept. [¶] I don’t
know if that raises [sic] to the level of prejudice so I’ll defer to the
court and counsel, whatever the court wants to do.”
The trial court allowed Juror No. 6 to remain on the jury,
explaining, “Well, we heard him. It was extremely brief. I mean,
it wasn’t any—it wasn’t an opportunity to become even remotely
chummy, chummy to the extent that there would be any
sympathy or bias in favor of the individual who sat next to him.
And they were aware that they were on a holding pattern
because—that the matter was trying to be resolved so it’s not—as
he indicated, it wasn’t a surprise to him. It’s not something that
he was not—already had figured out, in the sense that—and I
think everyone, as a general proposition, understands that most
cases are settled out of court, as a layperson can assess, even
though it’s settled in court. But what they mean is—when they
say that, it means that it settled without a trial. So I think, . . .
any further plea negotiations before prospective jurors arrived in
the courtroom that afternoon.
19
based on the fact that it wasn’t earth-shattering news by any
stretch of the imagination and the juror had the presence of mind
to break it off right away, I’m going to allow him to remain.”
2. Legal framework
“Each criminal defendant is entitled to an impartial jury.
[Citations.] That entitlement imposes upon each juror a duty to
maintain impartiality throughout the trial. [Citation.] The loss
of impartiality requires dismissal of the juror. [Citation.] Loss of
impartiality may result from a juror’s receipt of information
about the case that was not part of the evidence received at trial.
[Citation.] A jury must be ‘capable and willing to decide the case
solely on the evidence before it,’ lest a due process violation occur.
[Citation.]” (People v. Mora & Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 482-
483.)
“‘The law is clear . . . that the court must investigate
reports of juror misconduct to determine whether cause exists to
replace an offending juror with a substitute.’ [Citation.] If a
juror’s ability to perform his or her duty is called into question, a
court is expected to hold a hearing; failure to conduct a sufficient
hearing constitutes an abuse of discretion. [Citation.] Following
a hearing, the trial court may discharge a juror if it finds that the
juror is unable to perform his or her duty. (§ 1089.)” (Mora,
supra, 5 Cal.5th at 483.)
“Receipt of extraneous information is not ‘“misconduct” in
the pejorative sense,’ but it ‘may require similar examination for
probable prejudice.’ [Citation.] If a sitting juror communicates
with a nonjuror, there arises ‘a rebuttable “presumption” of
prejudice.’ [Citation.] The presumption can be rebutted by
demonstrating there is ‘no substantial likelihood that one or more
20
jurors were actually biased against the defendant.’ [Citation.] A
substantial likelihood of bias may be found where the material
was not inherently prejudicial but the totality of the
circumstances suggest actual bias arose. [Citation.]” (Mora,
supra, 5 Cal.5th at 484-485.)
3. Juror No. 6
Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to
dismiss Juror No. 6 or, in the alternative, by failing to adequately
inquire into whether Juror No. 6 could be fair and impartial. We
assume for the sake of argument that these issues are preserved
for appeal notwithstanding the lack of any request that the trial
court inquire as to the potential impact of the judicial officer’s
statement and, as to remarks Juror No. 6 overheard in the
hallway, defense counsel’s statement that he had no “opinion one
way or the other.”11
Defendant’s contention that the trial court “did not get a
direct answer from Juror No. 6 whether he could be fair and
11
As a general matter, challenges to the trial court’s decision
not to dismiss a juror are subject to forfeiture, but challenges to
the trial court’s failure to inquire into potential misconduct where
the trial court possesses information that might constitute good
cause to remove a juror are not. (People v. Cowan (2010) 50
Cal.4th 401, 506 [holding that the duty to inquire in such
circumstances “rests with the trial court whether or not the
defense requests an inquiry”]; People v. Johnsen (2021) 10
Cal.5th 1116, 1169-1170 [holding that a defendant forfeits a
challenge to the trial court’s failure to dismiss a juror “when
defense counsel does not ‘propose additional questions [be asked
of jurors], object to any juror’s continued service, or request a
mistrial on the ground of juror misconduct’”].)
21
impartial” is not accurate. In defendant’s view, Juror No. 6 only
answered the trial court’s question as to whether the statements
he overheard in the hallway “affect[ed] [his] ability to be fair and
impartial” and defendant believes this does not rule out the
possibility that Juror No. 6 was already unable to be fair and
impartial in light of the other judicial officer’s statement that
they were trying to see if they could avoid a trial. The most
natural reading of the trial court’s question, however, is that both
the court and Juror No. 6 took his pre-contact impartiality to be
presumed. He was, after all, subject to voir dire and swore an
oath to render a “true verdict . . . according only to the evidence
presented . . . and to the instructions of the court” after the other
judicial officer addressed him and the other prospective jurors.12
In this context, Juror No. 6’s assurance that he could be fair and
impartial was not ambiguous.
Defendant further contends Juror No. 6’s “one-word
response to the court’s . . . question was not remotely sufficient”
to ensure his ability to be fair and impartial. Again, defendant
ignores important context. Juror No. 6 proactively raised the
issue of remarks overheard in the hallway. (Mora, supra, 5
Cal.5th at 484 [holding that the trial court’s inquiry into a juror’s
impartiality was adequate because, among other things, the juror
herself “prompt[ly] . . . communicate[d] the potential issue to the
court”].) Indeed, prior to this, immediately after taking the oath,
Juror No. 6 had demonstrated his conscientiousness by asking,
12
In voir dire, Juror No. 6 affirmed that various
experiences—ranging from relationships with lawyers and law
enforcement personnel to his having been a victim of armed
robbery—did not affect his ability to be fair and impartial.
22
“hypothetically,” what he should do if someone he knew entered
the courtroom.13 In short, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that this juror would offer a considered
and sincere assessment of his impartiality.
Apart from challenging the adequacy of the trial court’s
inquiry, defendant also believes Juror No. 6’s knowledge that
defendant did not accept a plea deal necessarily influenced his
assessment of the case. In so arguing, defendant relies on a
nonbinding federal case, United States v. Galindo (9th Cir. 1990)
913 F.2d 777, and a plurality opinion from another nonbinding
out-of-state court, Blue v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) 41 S.W.3d
129.14 As we shall explain, however, these cases are not
persuasive because they involved disclosures to jurors suggesting
the defendants were actively involved in plea negotiations.
Defendant’s suggestion that Juror No. 6 “found out that [he] had
considered pleading guilty” or “seriously considered entering into
a plea agreement” does not accurately reflect what Juror No. 6
said he heard.
In Galindo, the defendants and the prosecution “engaged in
plea negotiations” during a recess in the trial “and arrived at a
proposed disposition of the case.” (Galindo, supra, 913 F.2d at
778.) The trial court rejected the proposed agreement and,
13
Later, during trial, Juror No. 6 notified the trial court that
he overheard another hallway conversation to the effect that a
juror had been excused because she knew a family member of one
of the victims.
14
Texas courts have emphasized “the Blue decision has no
precedential value” even in that jurisdiction. (Unkart v. State
(Tex. Crim. App. 2013) 400 S.W.3d 94, 101.)
23
“[s]hortly thereafter, . . . explained to the jury the reason for the
delay: ‘We had this delay. There was a big long argument as to
whether or not there could be a plea bargain worked out where
there would be a plea recommended sentencing but I couldn’t get
together.’” (Ibid.) On appeal, the defendants argued that “at
least some of the jurors must have assumed that only guilty
defendants engage in plea discussions” and the Ninth Circuit
“agree[d] that the jury should not be exposed to this kind of
information in a criminal case.” (Id. at 779.) The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the judgment, however, because there was no
reasonable possibility that the statement contributed to the jury’s
verdict. (Id. at 779-780.)
Here, neither statement reported by Juror No. 6 suggested
“a big long argument as to whether or not there could be a plea
bargain worked out” as in Galindo. Indeed, unlike in Galindo,
there was no indication to any juror that defendant was
participating in negotiations as opposed to merely rejecting offers
by the prosecution. (Mora, supra, 5 Cal.5th at 484 [“The refusal
of a guilty plea, of course, is not necessarily indicative of
culpability and may instead be consistent with a defendant’s
belief in his innocence or reduced culpability”].) Moreover,
although the court’s remark in Galindo that “I couldn’t get
together” is not altogether clear, it is likely the jurors interpreted
it to mean that the defendant had actually entered into a plea
agreement that the court rejected. There was no such implication
in the statements that Juror No. 6 reported.
In Blue, a judicial officer “apologized to a group of
prospective jurors for their long wait.” (Blue, supra, 41 S.W.3d at
130.) He went on to explain, among other things, that “the
[defense] attorney has been speaking to his client about what
24
does he want to do. And when you are on the button like these
cases, it’s a question. Frankly, an offer has been made by the
State or do I go to trial. And he has been back and forth so I
finally told him I had enough of that, we are going to trial. You
have been sitting out here and this is holding up my docket and I
can’t get anything done until we know if we are going to trial or
not. [¶] Frankly, obviously, I prefer the defendant to plead
because it gives us more time to get things done and I'm sure not
going to come out here and sit. Sorry, the case went away and we
were all trying to work toward that and save you time and cost of
time, which you have been sitting here and I apologize about
that. I told the defendant that. Like I said, I have enough of this
and going to trial.” (Ibid.) The plurality opinion of Texas’s high
court for criminal appeals held that “the judge’s comments
imparted information to the venire that tainted the presumption
of innocence. A juror who knows at the outset that the defendant
seriously considered entering into a plea agreement no longer
begins with a presumption that the defendant is innocent. A
juror who hears the judge say that he would have preferred that
the defendant plead guilty might assume that the judge knows
something about the guilt of the defendant that the juror does
not.” (Id. at 132.)
Here, again, there was no indication to Juror No. 6 that
defendant was “seriously considering” pleading guilty. Although,
as it happens, defendant was considering accepting a plea deal,
the statements overheard by Juror No. 6 did not convey that.
Also unlike in Blue, the judicial officer who addressed the
prospective jurors in this case did not express a preference that
defendant should plead guilty.
25
In sum, even if we assume the statements reported by
Juror No. 6 together give rise to a rebuttable presumption of
prejudice, the trial court conducted an appropriate inquiry and
correctly determined his conscientiousness in reporting the issue
and his assurance that he could be fair and impartial
demonstrate there is no substantial likelihood that he was
actually biased against defendant. (Mora, supra, 5 Cal.5th at
485.)
4. Other members of the jury
Defendant contends that even if the trial court adequately
investigated Juror No. 6’s potential bias and properly concluded
his dismissal was not necessary, it erred in failing to investigate
whether other members of the jury could be fair and impartial in
light of the judicial officer’s statement that they were trying to
see if they could avoid a trial.
“Not every incident [of potential juror misconduct]
warrants investigation,” and “[t]he decision whether, and to what
extent, investigation into possible juror bias is required ‘“rests
within the sound discretion of the trial court.”’ [Citations.]”
(People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 120; accord Cowan, supra, 50
Cal.4th at 506.) Here, the judicial officer’s statement was
ambiguous and the jurors were subsequently subject to voir dire.
Although they were not specifically questioned regarding the
judicial officer’s statement, all indicated they could be fair and
impartial and swore an oath to render a verdict based on the
evidence and the trial court’s instructions. Under these
circumstances, the trial court reasonably concluded there were no
grounds for believing good cause might exist to excuse any of the
jurors and no inquiry was necessary. (Cowan, supra, at 508.)
26
Defendant contends the trial court must inquire of jurors
“even when the possibility of bias [is] essentially speculative.”
Defendant relies on People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, in
which the defendant argued jurors may have read news reports
in which the prosecution allegedly discussed the trial. (Id. at
252.) Although there was no evidence that any of the jurors
actually read the articles in question—and our Supreme Court
ultimately concluded the record was insufficient to evaluate a
claim of juror misconduct—“the better and proper course of
action . . . would have been for the [trial] court ‘to make whatever
inquiry [was] reasonably necessary’ to determine if there was in
fact any misconduct . . . .” (Id. at 253-254.) In contrast to Adcox,
where there were unresolved factual issues concerning what the
articles reported and whether any jurors read them, here there is
no existing dispute as to what the judicial officer said to the
prospective jurors, and what was said was quite oblique—there
are many ways a trial can be avoided without an admission of
guilt by a defendant (e.g., a court’s dismissal of charges for
insufficient evidence). The trial court was within its discretion in
deciding not to raise the judicial officer’s comment with all the
jurors (at least some, and maybe many, of whom likely paid no
attention to it).
C. Defendant Forfeited His Challenge to the Trial
Court’s Admission of the Unredacted Recording of
Rodriguez’s Interview
1. Additional background
At the outset of Rodriguez’s trial testimony, the jury
learned he was serving a state prison sentence for a 2020
kidnapping conviction. After testifying that he lived on Cosbey
27
Street in December 2017 and the home was fairly characterized
as a trap house, Rodriguez claimed he was unable to recall
circumstances surrounding Ryan and Dominguez’s deaths. He
testified his memory was “very clouded” because he was “always
heavily intoxicated” around that time. He further indicated he
wanted “no part” in the trial because “[e]verybody loses in this
scenario, and [he] just want[ed] to move forward with [his] life.”
After Rodriguez acknowledged speaking with detectives in
January and February 2018 and having his memory refreshed on
certain issues after reviewing the transcripts, he testified that
reviewing the transcripts would not refresh his recollection as to
other issues. At sidebar, the prosecution requested permission to
play the February 2018 interview in its entirety. Among other
things, as we have already mentioned, Rodriguez told
investigators that defendant confessed to having killed Ryan and
Dominguez.
Defense counsel “object[ed] and submit[ed]” without further
argument, and the trial court ruled the prosecution would be
allowed to play the recording. Following a recess, and before the
recording was played for the jury, defendant’s attorney
“flesh[ed] . . . out” his objection. He explained, “It appears to be
the full . . . interview. In the interview, Mr. Rodriguez asserts he
knows who the murderer is, who committed it, even though he
has no personal knowledge of it. There is a discussion of gangs.
There is discussion of the gun. And I think it’s not appropriate
for the jury to hear Mr. Rodriguez telling [investigators] his
knowledge of the murder when he was not present.” The trial
court again overruled the objection, explaining that Rodriguez’s
statements concerning the killer’s identity were based on
28
defendant’s confession to him and that it planned to give a
limiting instruction regarding gang evidence.
The recording of the February 2018 interview is over an
hour long, and the transcript runs 108 pages. It was played for
the jury in its entirety.
Defendant’s assignment of error does not challenge the
substance of Rodriguez’s statements to investigators but rather
the investigators’ statements to Rodriguez. Throughout the
interview, Rodriguez expressed fear of retaliation should he
cooperate in the investigation. The investigators assured him he
would be protected and repeatedly asserted they already knew
defendant was responsible for the killings.15 They made
comments suggesting they had evidence of defendant’s guilt they
were not disclosing to Rodriguez. In one exchange, for instance, a
detective told Rodriguez they “wouldn’t be here unless [they had]
done [their] homework” and explained that, “A lot of times when
[they] sit down with somebody, it’s because [they] wanna see
what [that person] ha[s] to say after [the investigators] already
know something.” The detective emphasized “right now is the
time to ‘come to Jesus moment’ and just tell what really
happened” because, although the investigators could not “put
15
Among other things, defendant cites instances in which the
investigators mentioned “the gun . . . [defendant] killed these two
guys with,” referred to defendant as a “[f]uck[i]n idiot [who] killed
your friends” and a “fucker [who] killed, basically, a best friend,”
suggested that defendant’s killing Ryan and Dominguez in the
Cosbey residence “disrespected [Rodriguez’s] dad,” stated that
defendant was “the one that killed these guys,” and urged
Rodriguez to help make sure “this fucker never sees the light of
day again.”
29
words in [Rodriguez’s] mouth,” they were asking “some pretty
simple questions [they] already ha[d] answers to.” The other
investigator emphasized “[e]verybody in the neighborhood kn[ew]
[defendant] did this.”
2. Analysis
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in
permitting the prosecution to play the recording of Rodriguez’s
February 2018 interrogation because the investigators’
statements asserting defendant was the killer and hinting at
undisclosed evidence of his guilt violated his constitutional rights
to confrontation and a fair trial.
Although plaintiff raised other objections to the recording,
he forfeited the argument he makes now focused on the
investigators’ statements by failing to object on that ground in
the trial court. (People v. Nadey (2024) 16 Cal.5th 102, 150
[“Failure to object on the specific ground later
asserted . . . forfeits that ground on appeal”]; People v. Robinson
(2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1345, 1356 [“An evidentiary objection
made on one ground in a trial court does not preserve a challenge
based upon a different ground in an appellate court”]; Evid. Code,
§ 353.) Defendant argues, however, that his attorney’s prefatory
remark in his “flesh[ed] . . . out” objection that “[i]t appears to be
the full . . . interview” was “sufficient to fairly apprise the court
that the transcript should be properly redacted . . . .” But
defendant’s attorney elaborated by identifying the other material
from the full interview that he believed should be redacted, and
he expressed no concern about the investigators’ statements.
30
There was accordingly no proper objection on that ground.16
(Robinson, supra, at 1357 [emphasizing that an objection must
inform the trial court and opposing party “of the specific reason
or reasons the objecting party believes the evidence should be
excluded, so the party offering the evidence can respond
appropriately and the court can make a fully informed ruling”].)
Citing In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, defendant
asks us to exercise our inherent discretion to review “a forfeited
claim involv[ing] an important issue of constitutional law or a
substantial right.” (Id. at 887, fn. 7.) Our Supreme Court
emphasized, however, that its holding in Sheena K. was “in
accord with [a] limited exception—for constitutional claims
initially raised on appeal when closely related to claims raised at
trial regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence—to the
established rule that a forfeited claim of trial court error in
admitting or excluding evidence is not subject to discretionary
appellate review.” (Id. at 887, fn. 7.) Because that “limited
16
Defendant also contends his failure to object to the
investigators’ statements is excused because objection would have
been futile. Although defendant does not challenge the trial
court’s ruling on his hearsay objection to Rodriguez’s statements,
he assumes the objection was meritorious and suggests the trial
court’s ruling demonstrates any other objection to the recording
would have been futile. Even if defendant were correct that the
trial court abused its discretion in admitting portions of the
recording in which Rodriguez identified defendant as the killer,
this would not establish the futility of an objection to the
investigators’ statements. (People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39
Cal.4th 1, 31, fn. 8 [ruling on earlier objections did not
demonstrate futility of objecting “on different, if somewhat
related, points”].)
31
exception” to forfeited claims of evidentiary error does not apply
here, we decline to undertake a discretionary review.
Defendant’s alternative contention that his attorney’s
failure to object to the investigators’ statements amounted to
ineffective assistance of counsel also lacks merit. “‘In assessing
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we consider
whether counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and
whether the defendant suffered prejudice to a reasonable
probability, that is, a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466
U.S. 668, 694[ ]; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 217 [
].)’” (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1189.) “‘If the
record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to
act in the manner challenged, an appellate claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel must be rejected unless counsel was asked
for an explanation and failed to provide one, or there simply could
be no satisfactory explanation.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.; accord People
v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198 [“[A] reviewing court will
reverse a conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel on
direct appeal only if there is affirmative evidence that counsel
had ‘no rational tactical purpose’ for an action or omission”].)
We cannot say on the record we have that there was no
rational tactical purpose for trial counsel’s failure to object to the
investigator statements challenged only now. Contrary to
defendant’s argument, the fact that his attorney objected to some
portions of the interview does not demonstrate that he would
have benefited by excluding any portion of the interview.
Defendant’s attorney might well have reasoned that, having
failed to exclude Rodriguez’s statements concerning defendant’s
32
confession, the challenged statements by the investigators were
unlikely to carry significant weight with the jury and could help
to demonstrate Rodriguez was unreliable. It appeared, for
instance, that the investigators were bluffing as to some of the
evidence against defendant, including when they told Rodriguez
they had the murder weapon.17 The investigators’ leading
questions also supported the theme in defendant’s closing
argument: that Rodriguez’s substance abuse impacted his
memory. Additionally, the investigators’ suggestion that
Rodriguez might face charges in this case—they reminded him
the killings happened at his home and stressed he did not
“wanna take the fall for this bullshit”—supplied a potential
motive for Rodriguez to tell them what they wanted to hear.
D. Any Error in Failing to Instruct the Jury on
Accomplice Testimony Was Harmless
“When a jury receives substantial evidence that a witness
who has implicated the defendant was an accomplice, a trial
court on its own motion must instruct it on the principles
regarding accomplice testimony. [Citation.] This includes
instructing the jury that an accomplice’s testimony implicating
the defendant must be viewed with caution and corroborated by
other evidence. [Citation.]” (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th
17
No firearm was presented at trial. After one of the
investigators asked Rodriguez where the murder weapon was,
the other cut off Rodriguez’s answer to say, “We have it,” at
which point the investigators asked Rodriguez which of his
“homeboys” had been “busted for a strap recently,” emphasizing
they “already kn[e]w” and just “want[ed] [Rodriguez] to tell
[them].”
33
1186, 1223.) This rule applies to both accomplice testimony and
out-of-court statements “‘“‘made under suspect circumstances,’”’”
including, “‘“most obvious[ly],”’” statements made “‘“when the
accomplice has been arrested or is questioned by the police.”
[Citation.]’” (People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 946.) “The
reason most often cited in support of these instructions is that an
accomplice is inherently untrustworthy because he or she ‘usually
testif[ies] in the hope of favor or the expectation of immunity.’
[Citation.] In addition, an accomplice may try to shift blame to
the defendant in an effort to minimize his or her own culpability.
[Citation.]” (People v. Tobias (2001) 25 Cal.4th 327, 331.)
Here, defendant does not argue reversal is required based
on the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that accomplice
testimony must be corroborated. His sole contention is that the
jury should have been instructed to view Rodriguez’s testimony
and statements to investigators with caution. The relevant
portion of CALCRIM No. 334 instructs that “[a]ny (statement/
[or] testimony) of an accomplice that tends to incriminate the
defendant should be viewed with caution. You may not, however,
arbitrarily disregard it. You should give that (statement/ [or]
testimony) the weight you think it deserves after examining it
with care and caution and in the light of all the other evidence.”
We assume for the sake of argument that a jury could find
Rodriguez was an accomplice to the charged murders and the
trial court should have instructed the jury to view his testimony
and statements implicating defendant with caution. Any error,
however, was harmless.
Defendant contends reversal is required unless the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, but this standard does
not apply because the duty to instruct on accomplice liability is
34
rooted in state statutory and common law. (Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [discussing harmlessness
standard applicable to “federal constitutional error”].) Instead,
we consider whether it is reasonably probable the result at
defendant’s trial would have been different had the jury been
instructed to view Rodriguez’s statements and testimony with
caution. (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 456 [applying
the standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818
and concluding “it [was] not reasonably probable the result at
[the] defendant’s trial would have been different” but for the
omission of an accomplice instruction because “[t]he jury would
have been inclined to view [the alleged accomplice’s] testimony
with caution even in the absence of an instruction that it do so”].)
As we have already discussed, although Rodriguez was not
arrested in connection with this case, investigators emphasized
his potential exposure in statements including, “It’s your house.
[¶] . . . [¶] [and] [l]ike you said, you don’t wanna take the fall for
this bullshit.” The jury was therefore keenly aware of the
pressures that counsel caution in evaluating accomplice
testimony. (Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at 456.)
Other instructions also made the jury aware of
considerations the omitted instruction is intended to highlight.
An instruction based on CALCRIM No. 226 listed factors that
may be considered in assessing witness credibility, including
whether the witness was “influenced by . . . a personal interest in
how the case is decided[.]” (People v. Gonzalez & Soliz (2011) 52
Cal.4th 254, 304 [holding that the failure to give an accomplice
instruction was harmless where, among other things, “[t]he
jury . . . would have used the witness credibility instructions it
was given in evaluating the truth of [the accomplice’s]
35
testimony”]; People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 371 [“To the
extent [the] defendant argues the jury should have been
instructed to view [an accomplice’s] testimony with distrust
[citation], we find the other instructions given . . . were sufficient
to inform the jury to view [this] testimony with care and
caution”].) More significantly, the probative value of Rodriguez’s
statements and testimony resided chiefly in his disclosure of
statements made by defendant, and the jury was instructed that
it must view these with caution regardless of who testified to
them. Specifically, the trial court gave an instruction based on
CALCRIM No. 358 directing the jury, in part, to “[c]onsider with
caution any statement made by a defendant tending to show . . .
guilt unless the statement was written or otherwise recorded.”18
In light of the jury’s knowledge of the context in which
Rodriguez made statements incriminating defendant and other
instructions explaining that the jury should view these with
caution, it is not reasonably probable that defendant would have
obtained a more favorable outcome if an accomplice instruction
had been given.
18
Defendant’s attorney emphasized this instruction in his
closing argument, reminding the jury that “in the jury
instructions it tells you if you get a statement from Raymond
Gonzalez that’s not recorded or not written, you should take that
with caution. Caution. Caution.” Counsel then tied this
instruction to Rodriguez’s credibility, arguing, “[Rodriguez] is a
drug abuser, he has felony convictions, and what he’s trying to
pin on [defendant] wasn’t even recorded and you want to pin your
entire case on that? That’s not enough. Not for two murders.”
36
E. The Prosecution’s Reference to Defendant as a
“Monster” Did Not Violate the Racial Justice Act
1. Additional background
Near the end of its closing argument, the prosecution
remarked that “[Ryan] and [Dominguez] were innocent victims in
this case. They did not live an exemplary life. They had
substance abuse problems. They did not associate with people
who had their best interest at heart, but they absolutely did not
deserve to be executed in a trap house in Baldwin Park weeks
before Christmas in 2017. [¶] They had loved ones. They had
family. They had entire lives ahead of them. They had goals.
They had dreams and aspirations, but what they didn’t have was
control over their desire for substance abuse, for heroin, for
Xanax, for methamphetamines. [¶] And what those substance
abuse problems caused was them to go into places that they
normally probably would never go before, into a monster’s den
and pass out at the feet of a monster. [¶] [Defendant] is
responsible for their murders.”
2. The Racial Justice Act
The Legislature enacted the Racial Justice Act (RJA) “to
eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system”
and “to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or
obtaining convictions or in sentencing.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, §
2(i).) Among other things, the Legislature sought to eliminate
“the use of racially incendiary or racially coded language, images,
and racial stereotypes in criminal trials.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, §
2(e).) The Legislature found that such “racially incendiary or
racially coded language” was “tolerate[d]” in “[e]xisting
precedent,” with courts upholding “convictions in cases where
37
prosecutors have compared defendants who are people of color to
Bengal tigers and other animals, even while acknowledging that
such statements are ‘highly offensive and inappropriate’
[citation].” (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 2(e).) The Legislature
concluded that “[b]ecause use of animal imagery is historically
associated with racism, use of animal imagery in reference to a
defendant is racially discriminatory and should not be permitted
in our court system [citations].” (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 2(e).)
Section 745, subdivision (a)(1) prohibits attorneys and
others from “exhibit[ing] bias or animus towards the defendant
because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin.”
Subject to exceptions not relevant here, section 745, subdivision
(a)(2) prohibits attorneys and others from “us[ing] racially
discriminatory language [at trial] about the defendant’s race,
ethnicity, or national origin, or otherwise exhibit[ing] bias or
animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race,
ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful.” The
statute defines “racially discriminatory language” to include
“language that, to an objective observer, explicitly or implicitly
appeals to racial bias, including, but not limited to, racially
charged or racially coded language, language that compares the
defendant to an animal, or language that references the
defendant’s physical appearance, culture, ethnicity, or national
origin. Evidence that particular words or images are used
exclusively or disproportionately in cases where the defendant is
of a specific race, ethnicity, or national origin is relevant to
determining whether language is discriminatory.” (§ 745, subd.
(h)(4).)
38
3. Analysis
Defendant forfeited his RJA claim by failing to object to the
prosecution’s characterization of him as a “monster” in the trial
court. (People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804, 810-815.)
Even if the issue were preserved for appeal, however, defendant’s
position lacks merit.19
Defendant contends the prosecution’s characterization of
him—“a Hispanic man”—as a monster was “dehumanizing and
racially charged.” He relies on several non-California cases in
which courts have criticized arguments characterizing criminal
defendants as “monsters” as improper appeals to juries’ passions
and prejudices, but in which the defendants’ race did not
expressly factor into the courts’ reasoning. (See, e.g., Lawson v.
State (Md. Ct. App. 2005) 886 A.2d 876, 891-893; Malicoat v.
State (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 2000) 992 P.2d 383, 401; Malicoat v.
Mullin (10th Cir. 2005) 426 F.3d 1241, 1256.) The RJA only
applies to racial animus and racially discriminatory language—
not inflammatory language generally—and our Supreme Court
has held, as a general matter, that describing a defendant as
“monstrous” is not necessarily improper. (People v. Farnam
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 168.)
Defendant also cites two non-California cases in which
courts construed the term “monster” as perpetuating racist
stereotypes against Black defendants. In Bennett v. Stirling (4th
Cir. 2016) 842 F.3d 319, the prosecution described the defendant
as a “‘huge, giant man, six-six, six-seven, brutal monster size,’”
19
Because we address defendant’s RJA claim on the merits,
we need not discuss whether the failure to object amounted to
ineffective assistance of counsel.
39
and went on to refer to him as “King Kong,” “a ‘caveman,’ a
‘mountain man,’ a ‘monster,’ a ‘big old tiger,’ and ‘[t]he beast of
burden.’” (Id. at 321, 326.) In Belton v. State (Md. Sup. Ct. 2023)
295 A.3d 612, an intermediate appellate court likened the
defendant “to Grendel, the mythical monster in the Old English
epic, Beowulf,” and, among other things, contrasted his co-
defendant mother with “more elderly White mothers and
grandmothers depicted by Whistler, Rockwell, and Currier &
Ives” and drew “a racialized contrast between the African
American neighborhood where the events of this case took place
and the mostly White settings traditionally depicted in Hallmark
Hall of Fame programs.” (Id. at 615, 629.)
In both Bennett and Belton, the surrounding context gave
the term “monster” an unmistakable racial and animalistic
character. In this case, however, “an objective observer” would
not read the isolated use of the word “monster” to appeal to racial
biases or to compare defendant to an animal. (§ 745, subd.
(h)(4).) Defendant’s suggestion that use of the word “monster”
necessarily violates the RJA because Merriam-Webster defines
the term to include “an animal of strange or terrifying shape” is
undermined by the same dictionary’s definition of the term to
refer to “one who deviates from normal or acceptable behavior or
character.” (Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2024)
<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/monster> [as of
Aug. 20, 2024].) Under established law, we infer the
prosecution’s closing argument employed the latter sense of the
word. (People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1129 [“‘we “do
not lightly infer” that the jury drew the most damaging rather
than the least damaging meaning from the prosecutor’s
statements’”].)
40
F. Defendant Forfeited His Claim of Prosecutorial
Misconduct
1. Additional background
In its rebuttal argument, the prosecution said, “yes,
Eduardo Rodriguez is a very powerful witness in this case and
he’s a very powerful witness in this prosecution and I take no
pleasure in dragging a man out of state prison and putting him in
the public forum of a murder trial to testify and to go on the
record knowing very well that in his heart he knows exactly the
dangers that come along with that. But it is so vital to this case.
It is so vital to seek justice and to seek the truth and to really get
out before the jury what happened that it is a necessity that I,
the prosecutor, take responsibility myself and myself alone to put
a man like Eduardo Rodriguez in danger so you, ladies and
gentlemen, who have the job of deciding the truth in this case can
evaluate as best you can what the truth is.”
2. Analysis
Defendant contends the prosecution improperly “invoked
the prestige of [its] office to vouch for Rodriguez, appealed to the
sympathies and prejudices of the jury, and suggested [it] had
evidence not before the jury” in this portion of its rebuttal.
Because defendant did not object in the trial court, however, the
issue is forfeited.
“It is well settled that making a timely and specific
objection at trial, and requesting the jury be admonished (if jury
is not waived), is a necessary prerequisite to preserve a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct for appeal. [Citations.] ‘The primary
purpose of the requirement that a defendant object at trial to
41
argument constituting prosecutorial misconduct is to give the
trial court an opportunity, through admonition of the jury, to
correct any error and mitigate any prejudice.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1328.) Defendant
contends this case falls within an exception to the forfeiture rule
because an admonition would not have cured the harm caused by
the prosecution’s remarks.20 (Ibid.) He does not explain,
however, why an admonition that there was no evidence
Rodriguez’s testimony exposed him to danger would not have
been sufficient to cure any misconduct.21
Defendant alternatively contends his trial attorney was
ineffective for not objecting to the challenged statements.22 The
20
Defendant takes inconsistent positions on this point in his
opening brief on appeal. In the portion of the brief discussing the
need for an accomplice instruction, defendant contends “the
prosecutor improperly invoked the prestige of his office to vouch
for Rodriguez’s otherwise abysmal credibility [citation], and [an
accomplice] instruction likely would have negated that.”
21
Defendant cites United States v. Weatherspoon (2005) 410
F.3d 1142 to establish that no admonition may overcome
misconduct “affect[ing] the jury’s ability to consider the totality of
the evidence fairly,” but the Ninth Circuit in fact held that the
curative instructions given in that case “did not deliver the
required strong cautionary message,” failed to “‘mention the
specific statements of the prosecutor[,] and were not given
immediately after the damage was done[.]’ [Citation.]” (Id. at
1151-1152.) Nothing in Weatherspoon implies that a different
admonition would not have been sufficient.
22
We decline defendant’s request that we exercise our
discretion to review this forfeited claim for the same reasons we
conclude defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object.
42
record sheds no light on why defendant’s attorney failed to object,
and defendant suggests “‘there simply could be no satisfactory
explanation.’ [Citation.]” (Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th at 1189.)
Defendant’s attorney might well have believed, however, that
Rodriguez seemed genuinely fearful both at trial and in speaking
with investigators. Because that fear arguably bolstered
Rodriguez’s credibility regardless of whether it was well founded
and regardless of the prosecution’s personal view of its
significance, it would have been reasonable to conclude that an
objection would draw further attention to the issue. (People v.
Milner (1988) 45 Cal.3d 227, 245 [“Defense counsel would . . .
have been well within the bounds of reasonable competence had
he chosen to ignore [the prosecution’s] statements rather than
draw attention to them with an objection”], disapproved on
another ground in People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 686,
fn. 13.)
G. Cumulative Error
Defendant argues that even if none of the purported errors
we have discussed individually requires reversal, they
cumulatively prejudiced his right to a fair trial and compel
reversal. The contention is meritless. (People v. Edwards (2013)
57 Cal.4th 658, 767; People v. Woods (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 461,
489.)
43
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, Acting P. J.
We concur:
MOOR, J.
KIM (D.), J.
44
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