People v. Diaz CA2/3

CourtListener 10306330Calctapp31 déc. 2024

Texte intégral

Filed 12/31/24 P. v. Diaz CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B329239

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA475327)
v.

LUIS EDEN DIAZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Henry J. Hall, Judge. Affirmed.
Benjamin Owens, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Luis Eden Diaz appeals from the judgment imposed after
this court remanded the matter for resentencing. (People v. Diaz
(Sept. 27, 2022, B314923) [nonpub. opn.].) Diaz’s counsel has
asked us to conduct an independent review of the record under
People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We affirm.
The underlying charges were based on allegations that
Diaz sexually abused four of his wife’s granddaughters between
2002 and 2018. In 2021, a jury found Diaz guilty of sexual
intercourse or sodomy with a child under the age of 10 (Pen.
Code, § 288.7, subd. (a); count 2);1 oral copulation or sexual
penetration with a child under the age of 10 against M.Y.
(§ 288.7, subd. (b); count 3); lewd act upon a child against M.Y.
(§ 288, subd. (a); counts 4, 5); lewd act upon a child under the age
of 14 against M.R. (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 6, 7, 8, 9); lewd act
upon a child against B.Y. (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 10, 11); and
continuous sexual abuse of a child against K.H. (§ 288.5,
subd. (a); count 12).
On counts 4 through 12, the jury also found true the
allegation that Diaz committed a violation of section 288,
subdivision (a) against more than one victim, within the meaning
of the One Strike law, section 667.61, subdivisions (b) and (e).
The trial court sentenced Diaz to an aggregate state prison term
of 175 years to life, consisting of the following consecutive terms:
25 years to life on count 2 (§ 288.7, subd. (a)); 15 years to life on
count 3 (§ 288.7, subd. (b)); 15 years to life on counts 4 to 11,
pursuant to the One Strike law (§§ 288, subd. (a), 667.61,
subds. (b), (c)(8), (e)(4)); and 15 years to life on count 12, pursuant
to the One Strike law (§§ 288.5, subd. (a), 667.61, subds. (c)(9),

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

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(e)(4)). The trial court awarded Diaz 1,062 days of presentence
credits, consisting of 924 days of actual credit and 138 days of
conduct credit.
In the prior appeal, Diaz contended the application of the
One Strike law to the conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a
child (count 12) violated the federal and California constitutional
prohibitions against ex post facto laws. This court held that
because of the ex post facto prohibition, it was necessary for the
jury to find at least one act supporting the conviction occurred
after a specific date. The jury was not asked to make such
findings, and we concluded we could not determine the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore vacated the
sentence as to count 12 and remanded for resentencing. We
directed the trial court to resentence Diaz on count 12 without
application of the One Strike law. We also struck 138 days of
conduct credit Diaz had received, concluding he was ineligible for
such credits since he was sentenced under the One Strike law.
In March 2023, the trial court conducted a resentencing
hearing pursuant to this court’s remand. Diaz was present. The
court again elected to impose consecutive sentences, explaining
numerous factors that contributed to the egregiousness of Diaz’s
conduct, including his relationship with the victims, the victims’
vulnerability that exceeded the vulnerability inherent in the
crimes, and Diaz’s lack of remorse and the high degree of
callousness he demonstrated, making him a significant threat to
the community. The court reinstated the previously imposed
sentences as to counts 2 through 11.
As to count 12, the court acknowledged the jury did not
make findings related to the count that would support the
imposition of the upper term, nor did Diaz have a criminal

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history that would enable the court to impose the upper term,
pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (b)(2). The court imposed
the middle term of 12 years, running consecutively. The court
again explained that the victims were extremely vulnerable,
Diaz’s behavior was extremely callous, and Diaz poses a “very
real danger to the community as established by his lack of
remorse and apparent belief that his predatory actions were
natural and justified.”
The court thus imposed an aggregate sentence of 160 years
to life, plus 12 years. Diaz timely appealed.
Court-appointed appellate counsel filed an opening brief
that raised no issues and asked this court to independently
review the record pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436. We
directed appellant’s counsel to send Diaz the record and a copy of
the opening brief, and we advised that within 30 days of the date
of the notice, Diaz could submit a supplemental brief or letter
stating any grounds for an appeal, contentions, or arguments he
wished this court to consider. Appellate counsel also submitted a
declaration stating that he had informed Diaz of his right to file a
supplemental brief and had sent the appellate record to a person
Diaz had previously designated. Diaz did not submit a
supplemental brief.
We have independently examined the record submitted on
appeal and are satisfied no arguable issues exist and Diaz’s
attorney has complied with the responsibilities of counsel.
(People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 125–126; Wende, supra, 25
Cal.3d at pp. 441–442.)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

HANASONO, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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