People v. Johnson CA1/3

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Filed 12/30/24 P. v. Johnson CA1/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A168691
v.
ELLIS EDWARD JOHNSON, (San Mateo County
Super. Ct. No. SC016867A)
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Ellis Johnson filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to
Penal Code section 1172.6.1 The trial court denied his petition at the prima
facie stage. Defendant contends this was error because the court relied on
the preliminary hearing transcript to make a factual determination that he
was the actual killer and so ineligible for relief. He further contends the
charging document and his admission to a knife use allegation did not

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Defendant filed this petition pursuant to section 1170.95, but
section 1170.95 has been renumbered to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 10; see People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708, fn. 2.) As such, we will
refer to section 1172.6, but also refer to section 1170.95 as necessary to
conform to the record.

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establish his ineligibility. Even assuming the trial court could consider the
preliminary hearing evidence, we conclude the record of conviction does not
conclusively establish defendant’s ineligibility for relief. Accordingly, we
reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1986, the People charged defendant by information with “willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and with malice aforethought” murdering Lulu
Walker. The People further alleged defendant personally used a knife during
the commission of the offense (§ 12022, subd. (b)), and also alleged a robbery-
murder special circumstance (former § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i)). Additionally,
the People charged defendant with a single count of robbery (§ 211). No
codefendants were charged.
The evidence at defendant’s preliminary hearing included the
following. On the evening of May 8, 1986, defendant went to the victim’s
home several times over the course of a few hours to borrow money to buy
drugs. A female housemate of defendant drove him to the victim’s home at
around 4:30 or 5:00 p.m., then took him “around the corner” to buy drugs, and
then drove him back home. She did this for him again at about 6:30 or 7:00
p.m. Defendant’s male housemate later took him to the victim’s home and to
buy drugs five more times that night. The victim’s son was at the house
when defendant came over at around 7:45 p.m., and he saw defendant leave
after hearing him ask the victim to borrow $25. The victim’s son left his
mother’s house at around 8:45 p.m.
Defendant’s male housemate testified that during one of the five trips
to the victim’s house, defendant brought two suits to leave with the victim to
“pawn” for money. After the last trip at around midnight, defendant exited
the victim’s home and asked his male housemate to turn off his vehicle

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headlights and to take a different route than the one taken previously. As
they drove away, defendant wiped his hand on a “little” piece of paper and
threw the paper out of the window. When defendant later asked his male
housemate to take him back to the victim’s house at around 1:30 or 2:00 a.m.,
the housemate refused and did not see defendant again until the next day.
The victim’s body was discovered the next day at around 3:30 p.m. A
purse and money that she kept in a cigarette case on her nightstand were
missing. Also the next day, the female housemate who had driven defendant
to the victim’s home saw defendant and “a couple of other guys” associated
with a blue car bring three suits back home. Eventually, an investigating
officer noticed defendant had red stains, which turned out to be blood, on his
shoes. The blood type on the shoes matched the victim’s blood type, and not
defendant’s. An autopsy established the victim died from exsanguination due
to multiple stab wounds to her face, trunk, and arm.
Defendant ultimately pled no contest to first degree murder and
admitted the knife use enhancement. Defendant’s plea form reflects his
attorney and the district attorney stipulated to a factual basis for the plea,
but does not specify any particular document as providing that factual basis.
In accord with the plea agreement, the trial court dismissed the special
circumstance and the robbery count, fixed the degree of murder at first
degree, and sentenced defendant to 26 years to life in prison with the
possibility of parole.
In March 2023, defendant filed a form petition for resentencing
pursuant to former section 1170.95. His petition checked boxes indicating
that: (1) a charging document was filed against him allowing the prosecution
to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine; (2) he was convicted of murder following his

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plea; and (3) he could not now be convicted of murder because of changes
made to sections 188 and 189 effective January 1, 2019.
The court appointed counsel for defendant, and the parties filed briefs
addressing whether defendant made a prima facie showing of entitlement to
relief. Relying on a copy of the preliminary hearing transcript, the
information, the abstract of judgment, and the change of plea form, the
People contended the record of conviction conclusively established that
defendant was the actual killer. Defendant, however, argued the People
could not rely on the preliminary hearing transcript at the prima facie stage,
and claimed that, in any event, the transcript did not establish his
ineligibility for relief as a matter of law.
In August 2023, the trial court denied the petition without issuing an
order to show cause, finding defendant failed to state a prima facie case for
relief. Specifically, the court found defendant was the actual killer based on
his plea to first degree murder, his admission to the personal knife use
enhancement, and the preliminary hearing evidence, which contained no
indication that any accomplices were involved or that anyone else was the
actual killer. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
The issue on appeal is whether the resentencing court erred in denying
the section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage. We review de novo
whether a petition is properly denied at the prima facie stage. (People v.
William (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251.)
A. General Principles
In 2018, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 (Senate Bill 1437)
“ ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability

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is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the
intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).)
Senate Bill 1437 amended the law of felony murder by amending
section 189. At all relevant times in this case, section 189 has provided that
a murder committed in the actual or attempted perpetration of robbery is
murder of the first degree. (§ 189, subd. (a); see Stats. 1982, ch. 949, § 1,
ch. 950, § 1.) Senate Bill 1437 added subdivision (e) to section 189, which
provides: “A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a
felony listed in subdivision (a) in which a death occurs is liable for murder
only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer.
[¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided,
abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the
actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The
person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of
Section 190.2.”
Senate Bill 1437 also amended the natural and probable consequences
doctrine by adding section 188, subdivision (a)(3): “ ‘Except [for felony-
murder liability] as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be
convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice
aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or
her participation in a crime.’ ” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–
843.)
Senate Bill 1437 additionally added section 1170.95, later renumbered
section 1172.6, providing a procedure “for convicted murderers who could not

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be convicted under the law as amended to retroactively seek relief.” (Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959.) Presently, the statute provides: “A person
convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime . . . may file a
petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s
murder . . . conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts
when all of the following conditions apply: [¶] (1) A complaint, information,
or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to
proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime
. . . . [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of murder . . . following a trial or
accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could have been
convicted of murder . . . . [¶] (3) The petitioner could not presently be
convicted of murder . . . because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)–(3).)
Under section 1172.6, the parties shall be given “an opportunity to
submit briefings,” and the court shall thereafter “hold a hearing to determine
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).) The California Supreme Court has provided the following
guidance for the conduct of such hearings. “The record of conviction will
necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6],
allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those
that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) That said,
“[w]hile the trial court may look at the record of conviction . . . to determine
whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for section [1172.6] relief,

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the prima facie inquiry under subdivision (c) is limited. Like the analogous
prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings, ‘ “the court takes
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her
factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show
cause.” ’ [Citations.] ‘[A] court should not reject the petitioner’s factual
allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary
hearing.’ [Citations.] ‘However, if the record, including the court’s own
documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,”
then “the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to
the petitioner.” ’ ” (Lewis, at p. 971.) Importantly, a petition may be denied
at the prima facie stage only “ ‘[i]f the petition and record in the case
establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief.’ ” (People v.
Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 460 (Curiel), italics added.)
B. Analysis
Mindful of the Supreme Court’s guidance, we assess whether the record
of conviction conclusively establishes defendant’s ineligibility for resentencing
under section 1172.6.
Defendant does not appear to dispute that a preliminary hearing
transcript is a part of the “record of conviction,” but instead contends the
resentencing court engaged in improper factfinding based on the preliminary
hearing transcript to find he was the actual killer. He also contends the
circumstances of his being the only person charged in the information and his
admission to the section 12022, subdivision (b), knife use enhancement do not
establish that he was the actual killer and that no one else was involved.
Insisting to the contrary, the People contend the following portions of
the record of conviction, considered collectively, establish that defendant was

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the actual killer: (1) the change of plea form reflects defendant pleaded no
contest to first degree murder and admitted a knife use enhancement; (2) the
information demonstrates the prosecution “did not proceed on a theory of
imputed malice or felony murder involving multiple participants”; and
(3) uncontroverted evidence from the preliminary hearing shows defendant
“acted alone in killing the victim.”
After due consideration of the record of conviction, we cannot agree the
record of conviction conclusively establishes defendant’s ineligibility for
resentencing.
First, the information charged defendant with committing murder
“wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with malice aforethought,” but that
allegation “is a generic charge permitting the prosecution to proceed on any
theory of murder.” (People v. Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217, 234 (Rivera).)
Indeed, “a charging decision does not establish any facts as a matter of law.”
(People v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328, 339.) Moreover, the fact that
the information charged only defendant and named no co-defendants is of no
moment. Here, the People point to no authority indicating that separate
charging documents cannot be filed against co-defendants, and as one court
recently observed, there appears “no authority requiring prosecutors to try all
codefendants together.” (Ibid.) Consequently, the charging document does
not foreclose the possibility that a co-defendant might be charged or at least
involved.
Second, the change of plea form also falls short of establishing
defendant’s ineligibility for relief. In particular, the form fails to substantiate
the People’s representation that defendant pled no contest to first degree
“premeditated” murder. True, the change of plea form shows defendant pled
no contest to first degree murder, but critically, it does not indicate he

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stipulated to any of the criteria that would presently render him ineligible.
(§ 189, subd. (e)(1)–(3); cf. Rivera, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 234–235.)
And though defendant admitted the allegation that he personally used a
knife during the murder (§ 12022, subd. (b)), the term “use” in this context
can refer simply to displaying the weapon in a menacing manner. (People v.
Wims (1995) 10 Cal.4th 293, 302.) As such, the admitted knife use
enhancement does not conclusively establish that defendant was the actual
killer or that he satisfied other criteria rendering him ineligible for
resentencing. (§ 189, subd. (e)(2)–(3).)
Finally, the California Supreme Court is currently considering a split
among the Courts of Appeal as to whether a court engages in impermissible
fact finding by relying on a preliminary hearing transcript to deny a
section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage.
The People rely on a line of cases—including People v. Patton (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 649 (Patton), review granted June 28, 2023, S279670; People v.
Pickett (2023) 93 Cal.App5th 982 (Pickett), review granted Oct. 11 2023,
S281643; and People v. Mares (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1158 (Mares), review
granted May 1, 2024, S284232—which have upheld denials at the prima facie
stage where the evidence at the preliminary hearing was uncontroverted and
the respective defendants offered no factual or legal basis to support their
petitions.
Not surprisingly, defendant relies on other cases—exemplified by
People v. Williams (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 375, review granted Sept. 11,
2024, S286314—which reject the Patton line of authorities and would support
a reversal in this case. In Williams, the Court of Appeal reasoned that
“absent a factual finding or admission regarding the manner in which the
offense was committed, even compelling, uncontroverted, and uncontradicted

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testimony is not conclusive of a petitioner’s guilt under a specific theory.”
(Williams, at p. 403; see also People v. Alazar (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1100,
1109–1110; People v. Davenport (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 476, 481 [trial court
erroneously relied on a preliminary hearing transcript to make the prima
facie determination where the defendant “did not stipulate to the transcript
as a factual basis for his plea”].)
We need not weigh in on this split because, as explained below, the
People’s authorities are sufficiently distinguishable and do not call for
affirmance of the court’s ruling here.
In Patton, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th 649, a defendant pled no contest to
attempted murder and admitted an allegation that he personally used and
discharged a firearm in the course of that crime (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)).
(Patton, at p. 653.) The trial court denied his section 1172.6 petition at the
prima facie stage based on evidence presented at the preliminary hearing.
(Id. at pp. 654–655.) Specifically, law enforcement officers had identified the
defendant as the shooter in a surveillance video of the crime based on:
(1) clothing the shooter wore, which was similar to clothing the defendant
wore in a Facebook photo; and (2) the shooter’s gait. (Id. at pp. 652–653 &
fn. 2.) In affirming the denial of the petition, the Court of Appeal emphasized
that the defendant never offered any theory to support his implicit contention
that he was an accomplice and not the shooter. (Id. at p. 657.) Thus, because
“[t]he sworn testimony of police officers, based on surveillance video of the
crime, that [the defendant] committed the shooting was and is
uncontroverted,” the court concluded no factfinding or weighing was
necessary to deny relief at the prima facie stage. (Id. at p. 658.)
In Pickett, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th 982, the defendant pled guilty to
second degree murder and admitted a section 12022.5 firearm use allegation.

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(Pickett, at p. 986.) The trial court denied his section 1172.6 petition at the
prima facie stage based on the preliminary hearing transcript, which
included testimony from witnesses who saw the defendant confront the
victim, draw a gun, and fire a shot into the air. As the witnesses fled, they
heard more shots, and one witness looked back and saw the victim on the
ground with a gunshot wound. (Id. at pp. 985–986.) In upholding the denial,
the Court of Appeal explained its reasoning as follows. The “inference that
[the defendant] acted alone and was the actual killer is uncontradicted and
compelling. [¶] . . . [¶] Under these circumstances, where the defendant
alleges no facts concerning the murder to which he pleaded guilty, the People
introduce without objection uncontroverted evidence from the preliminary
hearing transcript showing that the defendant acted alone in killing the
victim, and the defendant does not put forth, by way of briefing or oral
argument, any factual or legal theory in support of his petition, the defendant
has failed to make a prima facie showing.” (Id. at p. 990, italics added.)
Finally, in Mares, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th 1158, the defendant pled
guilty to voluntary manslaughter with a knife use enhancement, and eight
counts of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. (Mares, at
pp. 1162–1163.) The trial court denied his section 1172.6 petition at the
prima facie stage based on evidence presented at the preliminary hearing,
which included statements by the defendant and his girlfriend that the
defendant stabbed the victim. (Mares, at pp. 1162–1164.) The Court of
Appeal upheld the denial because the uncontradicted facts in the record of
conviction, including the preliminary hearing transcript, made it “impossible”
to find that the defendant was not the actual killer. (Id. at p. 1167.) The
court explained it “need not credit the truth of any fact in the preliminary

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hearing transcript. What matters is that the record supports no theory other
than those where [the defendant] was the actual killer.” (Ibid.)
In sum, Patton, Pickett, and Mares each upheld a trial court’s denial of
a section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage where uncontroverted
evidence at the preliminary hearing established that the defendant was the
sole and direct perpetrator of the relevant offense. (Patton, supra, 89
Cal.App.5th at pp. 652–653, 658; Pickett, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 989–
990; Mares, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1161–1162.)
In contrast, the evidence at defendant’s preliminary hearing was
circumstantial and inconclusive. Unlike the situations in Patton, Pickett, and
Mares, the preliminary hearing evidence did not clearly establish the time
the victim was attacked or place defendant alone in the victim’s house at the
time of the attack. In this regard, we observe the People’s record citations
fail to support their factual assertion that defendant “was the only individual
inside of [the victim’s] home at the time of the murder.” There was no
surveillance video of the murder or events leading up the murder, and while
some of the evidence certainly pointed to defendant as the killer, the
transcript did not conclusively demonstrate that defendant acted by himself
at the time of the murder. Rather, as recounted above, during the midnight
trip to the victim’s home, defendant had asked his male housemate to turn off
his vehicle headlights and to leave by a route different from those taken on
previous occasions. Defendant thereafter asked the male housemate to take
him back to the victim’s house at around 1:30 or 2:00 a.m., suggesting the
victim might not have been dead after defendant’s last visit at midnight.
Indeed, the pathologist estimated the time of death could have occurred
“several hours” after midnight. The transcript also included the testimony of
defendant’s male housemate that defendant took suits to the victim’s home

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during one of his visits, as well as the testimony of his female housemate that
the day after she took him to the victim’s home, she saw defendant with “a
couple of other guys” associated with a blue car bringing the suits back home
from the victim’s house. Ultimately, the preliminary hearing evidence was
susceptible of differing inferences and was not comparable to uncontroverted
evidence of sole and direct perpetrator liability that conclusively established
the defendants’ ineligibility for relief found in Patton, Pickett, and Mares.
(See Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying the section 1172.6 petition is reversed. The matter
is remanded to the superior court with directions to issue an order to show
cause and to thereafter proceed as required by section 1172.6, subdivision (d).

_________________________
Fujisaki, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Tucher, P.J.

_________________________
Rodríguez, J.

People v. Johnson (A168691)

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