People v. Duncan CA2/1

CourtListener 10305620Calctapp30 déc. 2024

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Filed 12/30/24 P. v. Duncan CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B335421

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. GA026890)
v.

CHESTER ALAN DUNCAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Terry Smerling, Judge. Dismissed.
Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Melanie Dorian, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
On July 2, 1997, a jury convicted appellant Chester Alan
Duncan of arson (Pen. Code,2 § 451, subd. (b)). The trial court
thereafter found true special allegations that Duncan had
suffered two prior serious felony convictions. On July 30, 1997,
the trial court sentenced Duncan to 25 years to life pursuant to
the Three Strikes law on the arson conviction, plus 10 years (five
years each) for the two prior serious felony enhancements
pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1). The court struck
enhancement allegations pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision
(b) (section 667.5(b)) based on Duncan having previously served
two prior prison terms, finding that it was in the interest of
justice to do so.
More than two decades after Duncan’s sentencing, Senate
Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) amended section 667.5(b) to
limit one-year prison prior enhancements to prison terms served
for convictions of sexually violent offenses as defined in Welfare
and Institutions Code section 6600, subdivision (b). (Stats. 2019,
ch. 590, § 1.) In 2021, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 483
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) to apply Senate Bill No. 136 retroactively.
(Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1.) To achieve this goal, the Legislature
enacted section 1172.75 (formerly § 1171.1). (Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 12; Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3.)
Section 1172.75, subdivision (a) declares any sentence
enhancement “imposed prior to January 1, 2020” pursuant to
section 667.5(b), except for sexually violent offenses, to be “legally

1 See California Standards of Judicial Administration
section 8.1(1).
2 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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invalid.” Subdivision (b) of section 1172.75 directs that the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) “shall
identify those persons in their custody currently serving a term
for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in
subdivision (a) and shall provide the name of each person, along
with [other information] to the sentencing court that imposed the
enhancement.” (Ibid.) After such notification, “the court shall
review the judgment and verify that the current judgment
includes a sentencing enhancement described in subdivision (a).
If the court determines that the current judgment includes an
enhancement described in subdivision (a), the court shall recall
the sentence and resentence the defendant.” (Id., subd. (c).)
The record does not show CDCR identified Duncan as
currently serving an imprisonment term that included a section
667.5(b) enhancement. Duncan instead independently filed a
petition for recall and resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75.
The trial court denied the petition, finding Duncan did not fall
within section 1172.75 because he was not currently serving a
prison term that included a section 667.5(b) enhancement as the
court had stricken that enhancement when sentencing Duncan.
Duncan now appeals.
Given section 1172.75’s express requirement that CDCR
initiate the contemplated recall and resentencing process set
forth by the statute (id., subd. (b)), “section 1172.75 simply does
not contemplate resentencing relief initiated by any individual
defendant’s petition or motion.” (People v. Burgess (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 375, 384; see also People v. Newell (2023) 93
Cal.App.5th 265, 268.) We accordingly lack jurisdiction to
address Duncan’s appeal from a petition he filed without

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involvement by CDCR. (People v. Newell, at p. 266; People v.
Burgess, at p. 382.)
We note, as the Newell court did before dismissing the
defendant’s appeal in that case, that Duncan “has not shown that
[CDCR] did not comply with its statutory duty.” (People v.
Newell, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 268.) Former section 1170.1,
subdivision (d) provided at the time of Duncan’s sentencing that
“[w]hen the court imposes a prison sentence for a felony . . . the
court shall also impose the additional terms provided in . . .
[s]ection[] . . . 667.5, . . . unless the additional punishment
therefor is stricken pursuant to subdivision (h).” Former
subdivision (h) provided that “[n]otwithstanding any other law,
the court may strike the additional punishment for the
enhancements provided in . . . [s]ection[] . . . 667.5 . . . if it
determines that there are circumstances in mitigation of the
additional punishment and states on the record its reasons for
striking the additional punishment.”3
The reporter’s transcript from Duncan’s sentencing hearing
shows that the court decided to “strike the one year prior” alleged
under section 667.5(b) when sentencing him and sufficiently
stated its reasons for doing so under then-section 1170.1,
subdivision (h). (E.g., People v. Martin (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th
656, 669, disapproved on another ground in People v. Deloza
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 600, fn. 10.) The abstract of judgment lists
the section 667.5(b) enhancement with an “S” next to it. The
abstract of judgment form required the court to “[l]ist all
enhancements based on . . . prior prison terms charged and found

3 Former section 1170.1, subdivision (h) was repealed
effective January 1, 1998, after Duncan was sentenced. (See
People v. Bradley (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 386, 390-391.)

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true,” and if the enhancement was stayed or stricken to identify
that with an “S.” However, the court is not to list enhancements
“stricken under [section] 1385.” Although the court’s order was
silent regarding the statutory basis for striking the section
667.5(b) enhancement, we presume it did so pursuant to then-
section 1170.1, subdivision (h)’s specific grant of discretion to
strike section 667.5(b) enhancements. Thus, the abstract of
judgment listing the section 667.5(b) enhancement with an “S”
correctly reflects the sentence as orally imposed because the court
struck the section 667.5(b) enhancement pursuant to a statute
other than section 1385.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

BENDIX, Acting P. J. KLATCHKO, J.*

* Judge of the Riverside County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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