CourtListener 10305036•People v. Madden CA2/2
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Filed 12/27/24 P. v. Madden CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B330735
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. TA156451)
v.
JONATHAN MADDEN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Allen Joseph Webster, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
William G. Holzer, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Nima Razfar, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
******
Defendant and appellant Jonathan Madden (defendant)
appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict finding him
guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm under Penal Code
section 29800, subdivision (a)(1).1 Defendant contends there is
insufficient evidence to support the conviction because he did not
constructively possess the firearm. We conclude substantial
evidence supports the conviction and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The rifle found in the garage
While investigating a fatal shooting at a Taco Bell in
January 2022, the police obtained security footage showing the
suspect’s vehicle license plate number. The police investigated
the license plate number and located the vehicle at 97th Street
and McKinley Avenue. Two days later, the police found defendant
washing the vehicle in front of a house with another man. Police
also saw defendant enter and exit the residence. After washing
the vehicle, defendant drove off but the other man remained in
front of the house. The police followed defendant, initiated a
traffic stop, detained him, and recovered defendant’s set of keys
and cellphone. The cellphone was registered under defendant’s
name and at the address of the house where defendant had been
observed. The vehicle was registered not to defendant but to
Caruso Motors.
The police searched the residence using one of defendant’s
keys to open the front door. In a bedroom, mail from the
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) and debit cards with
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2
defendant’s identifying information were found. The bedroom
also contained several pieces of ammunition, loaded magazines,
and a shotgun. In the garage, the police located a rifle near the
washing machine and dryer. Cartridges for the rifle were
recovered on the side of the house.
The parties stipulated defendant had a prior felony
conviction.
The charges and the jury trial
Defendant was charged with murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count
1) and attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; counts 2 and 3),
plus the allegations he was armed with a semiautomatic
handgun in the commission and attempted commission of the
offenses (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). Defendant was also charged with
unlawful possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count
4) and unlawful possession of firearms (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1);
counts 5-7). It was further alleged defendant sustained two prior
serious or violent felony convictions, which qualified as strikes
(§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)).
In May 2023, defendant was acquitted of counts 1, 2, 3, and
7, along with the lesser included offenses. Defendant was found
guilty of the charges in counts 4 through 6. At sentencing
defendant admitted the convictions for the prior strike
allegations and aggravating factors. Defendant was sentenced as
a second-strike offender and received an eight-year, eight-month
sentence, which included the upper term of three years on count
4, doubled to six years for the prior strike, plus 16-month terms
on counts 5 and 6 each (one-third the midterm of eight months,
doubled to 16 months).
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Defendant timely appealed his conviction in count 6
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence that he had possession
of the rifle.
DISCUSSION
I. Substantial evidence supports defendant’s
conviction
A. Standard of review
“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we determine ‘“whether from the evidence, including
all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, there is any
substantial evidence of the existence of each element of the
offense charged.”’” (People v. Misa (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 837,
842 (Misa).) “Under such standard, we review the facts adduced
at trial in the light most favorable to the judgment, drawing all
inferences in support of the judgment to determine whether there
is substantial direct or circumstantial evidence the defendant
committed the charged crime.” (Ibid.) “The test is not whether
the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether
substantial evidence, of credible and solid value, supports the
jury’s conclusions.” (Ibid.)
“‘We neither reweigh the evidence nor reevaluate the
credibility of witnesses.’” (In re Charles G. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th
945, 957.) “We resolve all conflicts in favor of the judgment and
indulge all reasonable inferences from the evidence in support of
the judgment.” (People v. Villalobos (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 310,
321.) “Unless it is clearly shown that ‘on no hypothesis whatever
is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the verdict,’ the
conviction will not be reversed.” (Misa, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at
p. 842.) “‘[R]eversal of the judgment is not warranted simply
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because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled
with a contrary finding.’” (In re Charles G., supra, at p. 957.)
B. It is reasonable to infer defendant had
constructive possession of the rifle
Defendant contends there is no substantial evidence
supporting his conviction for unlawfully possessing the rifle
charged in count 6 because he did not constructively possess the
firearm. He argues there is no evidence he had dominion and
control over the rifle as his fingerprints were not found on the
weapon, he was not seen in the garage near the rifle, and no
evidence showed he controlled the entire premises. We disagree.
“Subdivision (a)(1) of section 29800 provides, insofar as
relevant here, ‘Any person who has been convicted of a felony
under the laws of . . . the State of California . . . , and who owns,
purchases, receives, or has in possession or under custody or
control any firearm is guilty of a felony.’ This offense has three
elements: (1) the defendant possessed a firearm, (2) the
defendant knew that he possessed the firearm, and (3) the
defendant had previously been convicted of a felony.” (People v.
Clark (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 939, 958.)
“‘A defendant possesses a weapon when it is under his
dominion and control. [Citation.] A defendant has actual
possession when the weapon is in his immediate possession or
control. He has constructive possession when the weapon, while
not in his actual possession, is nonetheless under his dominion
and control, either directly or through others.’” (People v. Blakely
(2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1052 (Blakely).) “To establish
constructive possession, the prosecution must prove a defendant
knowingly exercised a right to control the prohibited item, either
directly or through another person.” (People v. Sifuentes (2011)
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195 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1417 (Sifuentes), disapproved of on other
grounds by People v. Farwell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 295, 304, fn. 6.)
“Possession may be shared with others.” (Sifuentes, at p. 1417.)
“Possession of a weapon may be proven circumstantially,
and possession for even a limited time and purpose may be
sufficient.” (In re Daniel G. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 824, 831.)
“‘Implicitly, the crime is committed the instant the felon in any
way has a firearm within his control.’” (Blakely, supra, 225
Cal.App.4th at p. 1052.) “‘The inference of dominion and control
is easily made when the contraband is discovered in a place over
which the defendant has general dominion and control: his
residence [citation], his automobile [citation], or his personal
effects [citation].’” (People v. Busch (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 150,
162 (Busch).)
Here the evidence shows defendant had constructive
possession of the rifle as he maintained his residence at the
house where the rifle was found. Defendant’s cellphone was
registered at the address of the house and the keys recovered
from defendant provided access to the entire house. Inside one
bedroom, mail from the DMV and debit cards with defendant’s
name and the house’s mailing address were found. Because these
personal items linked defendant to the property, it can
reasonably be inferred defendant maintained residence there.
Accordingly, it can reasonably be inferred from the evidence of
his residency that he exercised general dominion and control over
items inside the property. (See Busch, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at
p. 162.)
Though the rifle was not found in defendant’s bedroom, and
it is likely another person resided at the house, the weapon was
found in a common area, the garage. One can reasonably infer
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defendant had dominion and control over this openly accessible
area of the house. No evidence suggests defendant had restricted
access and control over the common areas of the house. Although
someone else possibly resided at the property,2 possession may be
shared with others. (See Sifuentes, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1417.) There is no evidence another resident of the house had
exclusive use of the garage. Also, the rifle was far from hidden—
it was in plain view, placed next to the washing machine and
dryer inside the garage, supplying no evidence someone else at
the house exercised exclusive dominion and control over the rifle.
Hence, it can reasonably be inferred defendant maintained
dominion and control over the rifle inside the garage.
Further, the fact that defendant’s fingerprints were not on
the rifle does not preclude him from maintaining possession. One
need only to knowingly maintain the right to control the firearm,
directly or through another person. (Sifuentes, supra, 195
Cal.App.4th at p. 1417.) “A firearm can be under a person’s
dominion and control without it being available for use.” (Blakely,
supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1052.) “[A] convicted felon may be
found to be a felon in possession of a firearm if he or she
knowingly kept a firearm in a locked offsite storage unit even
though he or she had no ready access to the firearm and, thus,
was not armed with it.” (People v. White (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th
512, 524.) “‘[T]he crime is committed the instant the felon in any
2 No evidence was presented that another person resided at
the property, only that one other person was seen helping
defendant wash his car there, and who remained at the residence
when defendant later drove away. There is no evidence the other
person resided at or had any dominion and control as to the
property.
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way has a firearm within his control.’” (Blakely, supra, at
p. 1052.)
As discussed above, one can reasonably infer defendant had
possession of the rifle because it was found in a common area at
his residence, over which he had dominion and control. The rifle
was in plain sight, not hidden, and could be readily accessed by
defendant. There is no evidence defendant was excluded from the
garage or was restricted from accessing the house’s common
areas. Nothing shows defendant ever relinquished his right to
control the rifle or sought to disassociate himself from it. Thus, it
can reasonably be inferred defendant knowingly maintained
control over the rifle in the garage despite not physically placing
the firearm there himself. Defendant’s argument at best shows
only the facts could be reconciled with contrary findings, which is
insufficient to sustain his burden on appeal. (See In re
Charles G., supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 957.)
C. Defendant’s reliance on Sifuentes and In re I.A.
is misplaced
Defendant asserts the decisions in Sifuentes, supra, 195
Cal.App.4th 1410 and In re I.A. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 767
demonstrate the doctrine of constructive possession is not
applicable here. We find both cases to be distinguishable here.
1. Sifuentes
In Sifuentes, police investigated a motel where they learned
the defendant, a convicted felon, had rented a room. (Sifuentes,
supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1413.) When the police entered the
room, the defendant laid on top of the bed nearest to the door. (Id.
at pp. 1413–1414.) A fellow gang member of the defendant, who
was also a convicted felon, near the second bed in the room. (Id.
at p. 1414.) Two women were also in the room. (Ibid.) The police
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found a loaded .40-caliber semiautomatic handgun under the
mattress of the second bed. (Ibid.)
The gang expert testified how weapons, particularly guns,
played a prominent role in gang subculture. (Sifuentes, supra,
195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1415.) According to the expert, a “gang
gun” is a gun shared freely among gang members in criminal
activities. (Ibid.) However, the expert admitted he had no
information whether the defendant’s colleague kept a gun for his
gang. (Id. at p. 1416.) The expert conceded no direct evidence tied
the gun in question to other gang members or showed the gang
had even used it. (Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal concluded there was no substantial
evidence showing the defendant had the right to control the
firearm. (Sifuentes, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1417.) The
Sifuentes court observed the gang expert did not testify any gun
possessed by a gang member automatically constituted a gang
gun to be shared with all other members. (Ibid.) Moreover, the
court indicated the expert did not testify all gang members had
the right to control communal gang guns. (Id. at p. 1419.) The
expert also had not linked the defendant to the particular firearm
found near his associate. (Ibid.)
Unlike Sifuentes, here there is no evidence another resident
in the house was in possession of the rifle. Rather, the rifle was
kept in a common area openly accessible to anyone who resided
at the property. There is no evidence defendant was excluded
from or had no general right to access the garage. Unlike in
Sifuentes, where the evidence showed another person kept
exclusive possession of the firearm by hiding it under his
mattress, the rifle here was not hidden (see Sifuentes, supra, 195
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1414, 1418–1419), and there is no evidence
9
another person had exclusive possession of the rifle in the garage,
which was within defendant’s dominion and control.
Further, the defendant in Sifuentes was lodging in a motel
room with other people, one of whom occupied the room’s second
bed where he kept his gun. (Sifuentes, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1413–1414.) Hence, it could not be inferred that defendant
had general access to the motel room, let alone the firearm his
associate kept hidden under his mattress. This contrasts with the
circumstances here where one can reasonably infer defendant
had general dominion and control over the common areas of the
house and no evidence another resident had exclusive access to
the garage where the rifle was located. Accordingly, Sifuentes is
inapposite to the analysis of possession in this case.
2. In re I.A.
In In re I.A., the defendant and five of his friends were
driving through rival gang territory (In re I.A., supra, 48
Cal.App.5th at p. 771), defendant and two others in one car, while
the other three were in another car directly ahead of them. (Ibid.)
When the front car stopped, one of the friends got out and shot
and killed a man who was crossing. (Ibid.) The evidence tying the
defendant to the firearm was he once touched it, he was in the
car following the car the shooter was in, and he knew the shooter
had the gun when it was used. (Id. at pp. 778–779.) The
defendant’s Facebook account showed he desired to purchase a
gun and had a profile picture of him holding an assault rifle. (Id.
at p. 779.) But there was no evidence the gun acquired was the
one used in the shooting. (Ibid.)
The juvenile court nevertheless found the defendant
constructively possessed the firearm used in the incident. (In re
I.A., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 773–774.) The Court of Appeal
10
reversed, finding the prosecutors failed to show the defendant
exercised dominion and control over the gun. (Id. at p. 779.) The
In re I.A. court noted the mere opportunity to access a gun and
knowledge of a gun’s presence, standing alone, are insufficient
evidence of possession. (Ibid.)
In re I.A. is not dispositive here because there was no
evidence in that case that the defendant ever had control or a
right to control the specific gun used in the shooting. Instead he
was in an entirely separate car from the shooter who had actual
possession of the firearm throughout the incident. (In re I.A.,
supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 771–772.) Even though that
defendant touched the gun once, there was no evidence that
firearm was ever within the defendant’s dominion and control.
(Id. at pp. 778–779.)
The circumstances in In re I.A. directly contrast with those
here. Unlike in In re I.A., where the defendant only once touched
the firearm, here defendant maintained residence at the location
where the rifle was openly stored and had unrestricted access to
it through his possession of the house keys. There is also no
evidence anyone else here had exclusive control or the right to
control the rifle in the garage. In In re I.A., however, no evidence
showed that defendant had any dominion and control over the
front car or the items inside it. (In re I.A., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 778–779.)
Defendant focuses on the fact there were no fingerprints or
DNA evidence showing he had ever touched the rifle. However,
this factor alone is not determinative. Indeed, the In re I.A. court
did not conclude a lack of fingerprints or DNA evidence disproves
possession. Instead, the court indicated the defendant once
touched the gun used in the shooting, but there was no evidence
11
he had dominion and control over it. (In re I.A., supra, 48
Cal.App.5th at pp. 778–779.) As discussed above, one need only to
knowingly maintain the right to control the firearm that can be
exercised through another person or shared with others.
(Sifuentes, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1417.)
In short, substantial evidence shows defendant had
constructive possession of the rifle located in plain sight in the
garage, an area within defendant’s dominion and control. Thus,
substantial evidence supports defendant’s conviction of unlawful
possession of the rifle charged in count 6 under section 29800,
subdivision (a)(1).
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
________________________
CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:
________________________
LUI, P. J.
________________________
RICHARDSON, J.
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